in the Matter of the Guardianship of Edwin Wooley, an Alleged Incapacitated Person ( 2016 )


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  •                            COURT OF APPEALS
    SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    FORT WORTH
    NO. 02-14-00315-CV
    IN THE MATTER OF THE
    GUARDIANSHIP OF EDWIN
    WOOLEY, AN ALLEGED
    INCAPACITATED PERSON
    ----------
    FROM PROBATE COURT NO. 2 OF TARRANT COUNTY
    TRIAL COURT NO. 2014-GD00251-2
    ----------
    DISSENTING MEMORANDUM OPINION1
    ----------
    Absent waiver or consent to suit, DADS, a state entity, is entitled to
    sovereign immunity from suit. See Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 
    133 S.W.3d 217
    , 224 (Tex. 2004).          While not styled as such, the application for
    appointment of DADS as the permanent guardian for Wooley is tantamount to a
    lawsuit being brought against DADS. See Tex. Est. Code Ann. § 1051.103(a)(5)
    1
    See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
    (West 2014) (providing that “the person named in the application to be appointed
    guardian” is entitled to service of citation “to appear and answer” the application).
    While the goal of promoting and protecting the well-being of an incapacitated
    person is laudable, this action seeks to accomplish its goal in an impermissible
    manner by controlling the action of a state agency, namely, compelling DADS to
    serve as a permanent guardian when it has not consented to do so.
    DADS properly filed a plea to the jurisdiction, contesting the trial court’s
    authority to consider the matter before it—the application for appointment of
    DADS as a permanent guardian.               See 
    Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 225
    –26
    (“Sovereign immunity from suit defeats a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction
    and thus is properly asserted in a plea to the jurisdiction.”). Properly granted, the
    trial court would have dismissed the permanent guardianship application pending
    against DADS but would have retained its authority with regard to DADS’s
    continuing service as temporary guardian. In other words, DADS would not be
    entitled to be dismissed from the proceeding altogether, but it would be relieved
    of the burden of defending an action seeking to compel it to serve as a
    permanent guardian.
    Because I would hold that the trial court erred by denying DADS’s plea to
    the jurisdiction, I respectfully dissent.
    /s/ Bonnie Sudderth
    BONNIE SUDDERTH
    JUSTICE
    DELIVERED: June 2, 2016
    2
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 02-14-00315-CV

Filed Date: 6/2/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 6/4/2016