Michelle McManus v. Sheila Richey, Individually, as Next Friend of T.R., a Minor, and as Independent of the Estate of George Richey ( 2016 )


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  •                                  IN THE
    TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
    No. 10-16-00061-CV
    MICHELLE MCMANUS,
    Appellant
    v.
    SHEILA RICHEY, INDIVIDUALLY, AS NEXT
    FRIEND OF T.R., A MINOR, AND AS
    INDEPENDENT EXECUTRIX OF THE
    ESTATE OF GEORGE RICHEY,
    Appellee
    From the 12th District Court
    Madison County, Texas
    Trial Court No. 15-14136-012-02
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    In two issues, appellant, Michelle McManus, challenges the trial court’s denial of
    her motion to dismiss brought under Chapter 27 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies
    Code—the Texas Citizens Participation Act (“TCPA”). See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
    ANN. § 27.001-.011 (West 2015). Specifically, McManus contends that the claims brought
    by appellee, Sheila Richey, individually, and as next friend of T.R., a minor, and as
    independent executrix of the estate of George Richey, were based on her exercise of the
    rights of free speech and association and, thus, were subject to dismissal under Section
    27.003 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See 
    id. § 27.003.
    Additionally,
    McManus alleges that Sheila’s claims should have been dismissed with an award of fees,
    costs, and sanctions because Sheila purportedly did not establish by clear and specific
    evidence a prima-facie case for each essential element of her claims. Because we conclude
    that Sheila is a limited-purpose public figure and, thus, Chapter 27 applies, and because
    appellate courts are limited to reviewing the findings of the trial court, we reverse and
    remand.
    I.      BACKGROUND
    Here, Sheila sued numerous people, including McManus, over allegedly libelous
    comments made on the internet that were critical of Sheila.1              Sheila asserted that
    McManus made numerous defamatory comments on numerous websites, including
    Facebook, on a GoFundMe account, and the webpage for the Madisonville Meteor. Many
    of McManus’s comments referenced the loss of Tammy Wynette memorabilia after a fire
    at Sheila’s house. Among McManus’s many comments was the following:
    What a horrible shame to have lost so many irreplaceable items belonging
    to Tammy Wynette and George Jones. Of course if Sheila Richey had
    possessed even an ounce of compassion. She would have returned all of
    these items to Tammy’s daughters a long time ago. How a person can stoop
    so low as to manipulate and steal the daughter’s inheritance is beyond
    1 The record reflects that Sheila is the widow of George Richey. George was the widower of
    Virginia Wynette Pugh, better known as country music legend Tammy Wynette.
    McManus v. Richey                                                                         Page 2
    comprehension. What drives someone to have a lack of empathy and
    conscience? Could it have been greed? Surely Karma is calling! What a
    blessing that Sheila’s daughter was spending the night at a friends house,
    the dog was at the Groomer and the Rolls Royce was at a Garage being
    worked on. “Bless her heart,” she only had the time to throw on Tammy’s
    fur and jewelry before escaping . . . .
    If you want to be benevolent why not give to a truly needy, deserving cause!
    This Woman has millions stashed away that she unjustly took from
    Tammy’s kids and Grandkids.
    McManus also posted a photograph of the ruins of Sheila’s home on Facebook with an
    image of Tammy Wynette superimposed over it and with the caption, “Karma’s a Bitch!”
    Sheila also alleged that, in addition to numerous defamatory statements made on
    the internet, McManus also sent her a letter dated March 5, 2015, which mirrors many of
    the statements made on various websites.2 According to Sheila, in the letter, McManus
    accused Sheila of stealing Tammy Wynette’s possessions and burning down her own
    home. The letter further stated that Sheila is a “compassionless slut”; that “we have
    people in this ugly town who hate you as much as we do”; and that it was the writer’s
    and others’ intent to “make [Sheila’s] life hell.” The letter concluded with a warning that
    Tammy’s daughters “are coming after you” and that “[w]e are right behind them.”
    Upon discovering McManus’s comments, Sheila sent a letter on May 22, 2015,
    requesting that McManus clarify, correct, or retract her statements on the internet.
    McManus purportedly posted a clarification and apology on two different Facebook
    2   McManus claims that she has no recollection of writing the letter.
    McManus v. Richey                                                                    Page 3
    pages, acknowledging that the matters referenced in her postings were not within her
    personal knowledge, but rather based on information received from others. McManus
    also notified members on a Facebook page dedicated to Tammy Wynette and George
    Jones, for which she was an administrator, that postings critical of Sheila would be
    deleted and posters would be blocked. McManus then sent notice to Sheila’s counsel
    confirming that she had complied with the request made on May 22, 2015.
    Thereafter, on September 4, 2015, Sheila filed suit against McManus and numerous
    others, asserting claims for libel, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
    conspiracy. McManus filed an answer, generally denying the allegations contained in
    Sheila’s original petition. McManus also made numerous assertions herself, including
    the following: (1) Sheila’s claims are not defamatory as a matter of law; (2) the publication
    complained of is privileged; (3) the complained-of publication is true or substantially
    true; (4) the publication contains some evaluative opinion and/or rhetorical hyperbole
    that does not state or imply verifiable fact and, thus, is not actionable; (5) Sheila is a public
    figure; (6) McManus’s comments were not made with actual malice; (7) Sheila is barred
    from recovery by the doctrine of no incremental harm; and (8) Sheila cannot recover
    exemplary damages under section 73.059 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.
    See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 73.059 (West Supp. 2015).                  Additionally,
    McManus pleaded for the mitigation of damages under section 73.003 of the Texas Civil
    Practice and Remedies Code. See 
    id. § 73.003
    (West 2011).
    McManus v. Richey                                                                         Page 4
    Subsequently, McManus filed a motion to dismiss Sheila’s claims against her
    under section 27.003 of the TCPA. See 
    id. § 27.003.
    Specifically, McManus alleged that
    Sheila’s suit infringes on McManus’s exercise of her rights of free speech and association
    and that Sheila cannot produce clear and specific evidence on each essential element of
    her claims; thus, the claims should be dismissed under section 27.003. See 
    id. The trial
    court ultimately concluded that Sheila is not a public figure and that the
    TCPA does not apply to the claims asserted against McManus. Accordingly, the trial
    court denied McManus’s motion to dismiss. This accelerated, interlocutory appeal
    followed. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(12) (West Supp. 2015); see
    also TEX. R. APP. P. 28.1(a).
    II.   MCMANUS’S MOTION TO DISMISS
    A.     Standard of Review
    We review de novo a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to
    Chapter 27 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See Better Bus. Bureau of Metro.
    Hous., Inc. v. John Moore Servs., Inc., 
    441 S.W.3d 345
    , 353 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
    2013, pet. denied); see also Serafine v. Blunt, 
    466 S.W.3d 352
    , 357 (Tex. App.—Austin 2015,
    no pet.).
    B.     Whether the Claims Fall Under Chapter 27
    McManus v. Richey                                                                    Page 5
    Chapter 27 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code allows parties to seek
    dismissal of certain types of claims filed against them unless the opposing party presents
    prima-facie evidence of each element of those claims. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
    ANN. § 27.003(a), 27.005(b)-(c). This involves a two-step process. See, e.g., Fawcett v.
    Rogers, No. 01-15-00121-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 3175, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
    Dist.] Mar. 29, 2016, no pet.) (op. on reh’g) (citing Prather & Bland, Bullies Beware:
    Safeguarding Constitutional Rights Through Anti-SLAPP in Texas, 47 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 725,
    750-53 (2015)). Initially, as it applies in this case, the moving party must show “that the
    legal action is based on, relates to, or is in response to the party’s exercise of . . . the right
    of free speech . . . or the right of association.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §
    27.005(b)(1), (3).
    If the movant establishes that the claims against her fall within the scope of
    Chapter 27, the burden shifts to the non-movant to “establish[] by clear and specific
    evidence a prima facie case for each essential element of the claim in question.” 
    Id. § 27.005(c).
    In reviewing the evidence, the trial court “shall consider the pleadings and
    supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts on which the liability or defense is
    based.” 
    Id. § 27.006(a).
    While the requirement that prima-facie proof be established by
    clear and specific evidence “demands more information about the underlying claim, the
    Act does not impose an elevated evidentiary standard or categorically reject
    circumstantial evidence.” In re Lipsky, 
    460 S.W.3d 579
    , 591 (Tex. 2015). For a defamation
    McManus v. Richey                                                                          Page 6
    claim, “pleadings and evidence that establish the facts of when, where, and what was
    said, the defamatory nature of the statements, and how they damaged the plaintiff should
    be sufficient to resist a TCPA motion to dismiss.” 
    Id. Sheila brought
    defamation claims against McManus.                The elements for a
    defamation claim are “(1) the publication of a . . . statement of fact to a third party, (2)
    that was defamatory concerning the plaintiff, (3) with the requisite degree of fault, and
    (4) damages, in some cases.” 
    Id. at 593
    (citing 
    McLemore, 978 S.W.2d at 571
    ). In any event,
    McManus argues that the defamation claims relate to her exercise of the right of free
    speech and association. As noted earlier, a legal action that “is based on, relates to, or is
    in response to a party’s exercise of . . . the right of free speech . . . or the right of
    association” falls within the protections of Chapter 27. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
    ANN. § 27.003(a); accord 
    id. § 27.005(b)(1),
    (3). “‘Exercise of the right of association’ means
    a communication between individuals who join together to collectively express, promote,
    pursue, or defend common interests.” 
    Id. § 27.001(2).
    Moreover, “‘[e]xercise of the right
    of free speech’ means a communication made in connection with a matter of public
    concern.” 
    Id. § 27.001(3).
    Matters of public concern include issues related to health or
    safety; environmental, economic, or community well-being; the government; a public
    official or public figure; or a good, product, or service in the marketplace. 
    Id. § 27.001(7).
    Here, the parties disagree about whether Sheila is a public figure.
    McManus v. Richey                                                                        Page 7
    Chapter 27 does not define a public figure; however, the Texas Supreme Court has
    categorized public figures as being either (1) all-purpose, or general-purpose, public
    figures, or (2) limited-purpose public figures. WFAA-TV, Inc. v. McLemore, 
    978 S.W.2d 568
    , 571 (Tex. 1998). General-purpose public figures are those individuals who have
    achieved such pervasive fame and notoriety that they become public figures for all
    purposes and in all contexts. 
    Id. (citing Gertz
    v. Robert Welch, Inc., 
    418 U.S. 323
    , 351, 94 S.
    Ct. 2997, 
    41 L. Ed. 2d 789
    (1974)). Limited-purpose public figures are only public figures
    for a limited range of issues surrounding a public controversy. 
    Id. McManus contends
    that Sheila is a limited-purpose public figure.
    To be a limited-purpose public figure, the record must show: (1) there is a public
    issue “both in the sense that people are discussing it and people other than the immediate
    participants in the controversy are likely to feel the impact of its resolution”; (2) the
    plaintiff has more than a trivial or tangential role in the issue; and (3) the alleged
    defamation is germane to the plaintiff’s participation in this issue. Neely v. Wilson, 
    418 S.W.3d 52
    , 70 (Tex. 2013). It is “exceedingly rare” for an individual to become a public
    figure involuntarily. 
    Id. at 71
    (citing 
    Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345
    , 94 S. Ct. at 3009). Rather,
    limited-purpose public figures are those that “have thrust themselves to the forefront of
    particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved.”
    
    Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345
    , 94 S. Ct. at 2009.
    McManus v. Richey                                                                        Page 8
    In an affidavit attached to her motion to dismiss, McManus asserts that this
    dispute centers on the will of Tammy Wynette and the “lack of inheritance received by
    her daughters.”3 With respect to Sheila’s status as a public figure, McManus notes the
    following:
    In following matters related to Tammy Wynette over many years, I have
    become familiar with Plaintiff Sheila Slaughter Richey’s public profile.
    Until fairly recently, Ms. Richey kept a very prominent public profile and
    was frequently involved in matters concerning Ms. Wynette, including
    publicity surrounding the ongoing controversy over Ms. Wynette’s will.
    For example, in the ID [Investigation Discovery] television network
    program discussed above, Ms. Richey is prominently featured and makes
    many statements regarding her conduct, and that of George Richey, in
    connection with the controversy. In that program, Ms. Richey is shown
    making the following statements, among others, which I have confirmed by
    re-watching the program on YouTube:
    [George] Richey later told me that they [Ms. Wynette’s daughters]
    had been told that they were going to get, you know, a life insurance
    policy. But I know from my own experience, I mean, I’ve changed
    my own personal life insurance many times. So, Tammy probably
    decided to change it. [At approximately 20:25-20:45 in the YouTube
    link given above]
    They weren’t just Tammy Wynette’s riches. They were
    George Richey and Tammy Wynette’s riches. They built it together.
    George Richey was a wildly successful music executive, he was
    president of Capitol Records. I mean, you just couldn’t get or find a
    better producer or writer, piano player. He was as equal to her. So
    to say George Richey wanted Tammy’s riches is a total insult, and
    you can see that’s not the way it really was. [At approximately 21:23-
    21:58]
    3  One of Tammy Wynette’s greatest hits was “Stand By Your Man,” see Billboard.com, Tammy
    Wynette: Chart History, http://www.billboard.com/artist/281500/tammy-wynette/chart (last visited June
    3, 2016); however, McManus notes that Tammy’s daughters have asserted in various books and in the
    media that George and Sheila have not stood by them.
    McManus v. Richey                                                                             Page 9
    I know that there’s been a lot of question of where was this
    list of things that Tammy wanted to give out. And he told me that
    she wrote them out, not daily, but constantly. She’d get mad at this
    kid and it would—you know, they would be scratched off. You get
    mad at this kid. I mean, she was constantly revising it. [At
    approximately 22:38-23:00]
    [On her donating some of Tammy Wynette’s items to the
    Country Music Hall of Fame:] Those items were not Tammy’s girls’
    items. They were George Richey’s. And he did not want them to
    end up on E-Bay. She was a member of the Country Music Hall of
    Fame, the highest honor that any artist could have. So why not have
    her things in an elegant, beautiful, honorable situation that where
    she could be safe? [At approximately 38:41-39:11]
    Her will was carried out to the letter how she would have
    wanted it after what her children did to her after she died. I’m a very
    compassionate person. They’ve never reached out to me in kind. If
    they had, they would have gotten a very different response. [At
    approximately 41:58-42:18][4]
    In response to McManus’s motion to dismiss, Sheila executed her own affidavit,
    wherein she averred:
    8. In 2012, a producer for the IDTV show “The Will—Family Secrets
    Revealed” contacted me because they planned on an episode featuring
    Tammy Wynette’s death and the aftermath involving the distribution of her
    estate. The producer wanted my participation. I did not want to participate
    in this program in any manner whatsoever and initially refused. However,
    it was represented to me that the show would be produced and would air
    with or without my input. In light of the prior hurtful accusations made
    against my deceased husband, I participated in the filming of the “The
    Will—Family Secrets Revealed” episode simply to answer questions. After
    filming my interview, I did not participate in any of the promotion of the
    4 The ID television network series described in McManus’s affidavit is called “The Will: Family
    Secrets Revealed.”
    McManus v. Richey                                                                             Page 10
    episode, including the Dr. Drew program cited in Defendant McManus’s
    motion.
    9. Prior to the Dr. Drew program, I was contacted by staff at the Dr.
    Drew show who requested my participation. I refused to participate
    beyond giving a very brief comment. I refused to appear on the show and
    also declined appearances on other television programs.
    The above-mentioned evidence shows that Tammy’s will and the disinheriting of
    Tammy’s children is a public issue “both in the sense that people are discussing it and
    people other than the immediate participants in the controversy are likely to feel the
    impact of its resolution." See 
    Neely, 418 S.W.3d at 70
    . Indeed, the purported defamatory
    comments made by McManus and others, as well as the numerous television shows and
    internet websites dedicated to this issue, illustrate that this issue has been highly
    publicized. Moreover, Sheila admitted to participating in the Investigation Discovery
    network show, entitled “The Will—Family Secrets Revealed,” and the Dr. Drew show to
    discuss Tammy’s will and the complaints made by Tammy’s children. See 
    McLemore, 978 S.W.2d at 573
    (“‘By publishing your views you invite public criticism and rebuttal; you
    enter voluntarily into one of the submarkets of ideas and opinions and consent therefore
    to the rough competition in the marketplace.’” (quoting Dilworth v. Dudley, 
    75 F.3d 307
    ,
    309 (7th Cir. 1996))); see also 
    Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345
    , 351; Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v. Deaner, 
    623 F.2d 264
    , 273 (3d Cir. 1980) (noting that public figures have “assumed the risk of
    potentially unfair criticism by entering into the public arena and engaging the public’s
    attention”). Furthermore, the alleged defamatory comments made by McManus and
    McManus v. Richey                                                                         Page 11
    others directly relate to Sheila’s involvement in the distribution and possession of the
    assets of the Tammy Wynette estate.
    We conclude that the evidence demonstrates that Sheila is a limited-purpose
    public figure with regard to the issue at hand. See 
    Neely, 418 S.W.3d at 70
    ; see also Einhorn
    v. LaChance, 
    823 S.W.2d 405
    , 413 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ dism’d w.o.j.)
    (holding that pilots who flew for a hospital’s air ambulance system and who had made
    statements to the press regarding a controversy over unionization were limited-purpose
    public figures).    Moreover, we further conclude that the complained-of statements
    involved in this case pertain to matters of public concern that touch on the exercise of
    McManus’s right of free speech and that McManus carried her burden of establishing
    that Chapter 27 applies. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 27.001(3), (7), 27.003(a),
    27.005(b)(1).
    Nevertheless, the record reflects that the trial court denied McManus’s motion to
    dismiss, specifically noting that “Plaintiff Sheila Richey is not a public figure and that
    Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 27 does not apply to the claims asserted
    by Plaintiffs against Defendant Michelle Reiber Wood McManus.”               Based on the
    foregoing, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying McManus’s motion to dismiss
    on the grounds that Sheila is not a public figure and that Chapter 27 does not apply. See
    
    Serafine, 466 S.W.3d at 357
    ; John Moore Servs., 
    Inc., 441 S.W.3d at 353
    ; see also TEX. CIV.
    PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 27.001(3), (7), 27.003(a), 27.005(b)(1). On the contrary, we
    McManus v. Richey                                                                     Page 12
    believe that Sheila is a limited-purpose public figure and that Chapter 27 does apply. We
    therefore sustain McManus’s first issue on appeal.
    C.     Prima-Facie Elements of the Defamation Claims
    Ordinarily, as the second step in the analysis outlined in Chapter 27, we must
    analyze whether Sheila established by clear and specific evidence a prima-facie case for
    each essential element of the claim in question. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §
    27.005(c); see also In re 
    Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 587
    . However, McManus admits, and the
    record reveals, that the trial court never reached the second step of the analysis because
    of the conclusions that Sheila is not a public figure and that Chapter 27 does not apply.
    Regardless, McManus urges us to make an independent determination that Sheila did
    not establish by clear and specific evidence the essential elements of her defamation
    claims.
    It is well-established that courts of appeals are limited to reviewing findings made
    by trial courts and may not make affirmative findings. See Tex. Nat’l Bank v. Karnes, 
    717 S.W.2d 901
    , 903 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam); City of Beaumont v. Graham, 
    441 S.W.2d 829
    , 832-
    33 (Tex. 1969); Duff v. Spearman, 
    322 S.W.3d 869
    , 887 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2010, pet.
    denied); AMX Enters., L.L.P. v. Master Realty Corp., 
    283 S.W.3d 506
    , 519 (Tex. App.—Fort
    Worth 2009, no pet.).       We therefore decline McManus’s invitation to make a
    determination as to whether Sheila established by clear and specific evidence the essential
    elements of her defamation claims. That determination should be made by the fact finder
    McManus v. Richey                                                                   Page 13
    in the trial court. See 
    Karnes, 717 S.W.2d at 903
    ; 
    Graham, 441 S.W.2d at 832-33
    ; 
    Duff, 322 S.W.3d at 887
    ; AMX Enters., 
    L.L.P., 283 S.W.3d at 519
    .         Accordingly, we overrule
    McManus’s second issue.
    III.   CONCLUSION
    Because we have concluded that Sheila is a limited-purpose public figure and that
    Chapter 27 applies in this case, we reverse the trial court’s denial of McManus’s motion
    to dismiss and remand to the trial court to consider the second step in the Chapter 27
    analysis—whether Sheila established by clear and specific evidence the essential
    elements of her claims against McManus.
    AL SCOGGINS
    Justice
    Before Chief Justice Gray,
    Justice Davis, and
    Justice Scoggins
    (Chief Justice Gray dissenting with a note)*
    Reversed and remanded
    Opinion delivered and filed July 27, 2016
    [CV06]
    *(Chief Justice Gray dissents. A separate opinion will not issue. He notes, however, that
    even if Sheila Richey meets some of the elements to be a limited-purpose public figure,
    of which he has grave doubts under first amendment jurisprudence, he finds no support
    for the proposition that the matter at issue is of public concern. Further, he cautions the
    parties on remand that Sheila Richey is present in this suit in three capacities and each
    must be addressed in any efforts to summarily and finally dispose of this proceeding.)
    McManus v. Richey                                                                   Page 14
    McManus v. Richey   Page 15