Lori Stephenson v. Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services ( 2003 )

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-02-00776-CV
Lori Stephenson, Appellant
v.
Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services, Appellee
FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 201ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
NO. FM104466, HONORABLE F. SCOTT MCCOWN, JUDGE PRESIDING
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Lori Stephenson appeals two district-court orders; one order terminated her
parental rights to three of her children and another order appointed appellee Texas Department of
Protective and Regulatory Services (the Department) sole managing conservator of her fourth child. The
Department moved to dismiss the appeal contending that, because Stephenson failed to properly perfect her
appeal, this Court lacks jurisdiction over her appeal. We will dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
The district court signed both the order terminating Stephenson=s parental rights and the
order appointing the Department sole managing conservator of one of Stephenson=s children on September
19, 2002. Stephenson filed a motion for new trial on September 24, 2002, and a notice of appeal on
December 18, 2002.
An appeal from an order terminating the parent-child relationship and an appeal from an
order appointing the Department managing conservator of a child without terminating parental rights are
accelerated and governed by the rules for accelerated appeals in civil cases. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. ''
109.002(a), 263.405(a) (West 2002); Tex. R. App. P. 26.1(b). In an accelerated appeal, the appellant
must file a notice of appeal within twenty days after the trial-court order is signed. See Tex. R. App. P.
26.1(b). Moreover, neither a motion for new trial, a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law, nor
any other posttrial motion will extend the deadline for filing a notice of appeal. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann.
'263.405(c).
The supreme court directs courts of appeals to liberally construe the rules of appellate
procedure in order that the right to appeal is not lost by imposing requirements not absolutely necessary to
effect the purpose of a rule. See Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615, 616-17 (Tex. 1997). Regarding
jurisdiction, however, courts of appeals are expressly prohibited from enlarging the time for perfecting
appeals in civil cases. Tex. R. App. P. 2; see also In re T.W., 89 S.W.3d 641, 642 (Tex. App.CAmarillo
2002, no pet. h.); Denton County v. Huther, 43 S.W.3d 665, 666 (Tex. App.CFort Worth 2001, no
pet.) (dismissing accelerated appeals for lack of jurisdiction because notices of appeal not filed within
twenty days after district court=s orders were signed).
To timely perfect her accelerated appeal, Stephenson was required to file her notice of
appeal within twenty days of the district court=s September 19 orders as required by rule of appellate
procedure 26.1(b). Because Stephenson failed to file her notice of appeal within twenty days of September
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19 in accordance with such rule, we grant the Department=s motion to dismiss the appeal. The appeal is
dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Lee Yeakel, Justice
Before Justices Kidd, Yeakel and Patterson
Dismissed for Want of Jurisdiction
Filed: March 20, 2003
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