in Re Tamsin Jacky and Kevin Squyres , 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 8565 ( 2016 )

Opinion issued August 9, 2016
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-16-00236-CV
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IN RE TAMSIN JACKY AND KEVIN SQUYRES, Relators
Original Proceeding on Petition for Writ of Mandamus
OPINION
In this probate dispute, relators, Tamsin Jacky and Kevin Squyres
(collectively, “Jacky”), filed a motion seeking to set aside the probate court’s order
issuing letters testamentary and appointing real party in interest, Deirdre Squyres
Baker (“Baker”), the independent executor of the estate of the parties’ deceased
father, Coy Herman Squyres (“Squyres”).1 In one issue, Jacky contends that the
probate court abused its discretion in appointing Baker independent executor
because the probate court had signed a final judgment admitting Squyres’ will to
probate as a muniment of title three-and-a-half years earlier and, thus, the probate
court lacked plenary power to reopen the estate and appoint Baker as independent
executor.
We conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus.
Background
In October 2006, Squyres executed a self-proving will that divided his estate
among his five children: Alexander Squyres, relator Kevin Squyres, real party in
interest Deirdre Baker, Moira Young, and relator Tamsin Jacky.2 In his will, Squyres
named Baker as independent executor, and he named Young, Jacky, and Kevin
Squyres as contingent independent executors.
Squyres died in January 2012. On March 29, 2012, Baker filed with the
probate court an application to probate Squyres’ will as a muniment of title. The
application included the following statement: “Applicant has investigated the affairs
1
The Honorable Rory R. Olsen, Judge of the Probate Court Number Three of Harris
County, Texas, Respondent. The underlying lawsuit is In re Estate of Coy H.
Squyres, aka Coy Herman Squyres, Deceased, No. 412110 (Prob. Ct. No. 3, Harris
County, Tex.).
2
Alexander Squyres died in 2009 and predeceased his father. Moira Young is not a
party to this mandamus proceeding.
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of the Decedent and finds that to the best of Applicant’s knowledge and belief, there
are no unpaid debts owing by the Estate of the Decedent, exclusive of any debt
secured by liens on real estate, and there is no necessity for administration [of] such
Estate.”
On April 26, 2012, the probate court signed an order admitting Squyres’ will
to probate as a muniment of title. The probate court specifically found that “there
are no unpaid debts owing by this Estate, exclusive of any debt secured by liens on
real estate” and that “there is no necessity for administration of this Estate.” The
order stated:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND DECREED by the Court that
the Will of COY HERMAN SQUYRES is hereby proved and
established and admitted to probate as a Muniment of Title only, and
that the Clerk of this Court record said Will, together with the
Application of DEIRDRE SQUYRES BAKER in the judge’s probate
docket; and, that this Order shall constitute sufficient legal authority to
all persons owing money to Decedent, having custody of any property,
or acting as registrar or transfer agent of any evidence of interest,
indebtedness, property, or right belonging to the Estate of COY
HERMAN SQUYRES, Deceased, and to persons purchasing from or
otherwise dealing with [the] Estate of COY HERMAN SQUYRES,
Deceased, for payment or transfer without liability, to the persons
described in said Will to receive the particular asset without
administration; and further, that the person or persons entitled to
property under provisions of said Will shall be entitled to deal with and
treat the properties to which they are so entitled in the same manner as
if the record title thereof were vested in their names.
The order included a handwritten notation that “the 180 day affidavit shall be filed.”
3
On May 21, 2012, the probate court signed a “Drop Order,” which stated: “It
appearing that no further court action is necessary in this case, it is ORDERED that
the clerk drop this cause from the Court’s docket.” On October 2, 2012, within 180
days of the probate court’s order admitting the will to probate, Baker filed an
affidavit with the probate court stating that “all terms of the Last Will and Testament
of the said COY HERMAN SQUYRES, Deceased, have now been fulfilled.” No
further action occurred in this case for three years.
On November 11, 2015, Baker filed an application for the probate court to
issue letters testamentary and appoint her as independent executor of Squyres’ estate.
In this application, Baker acknowledged that the probate court had already admitted
Squyres’ will to probate as a muniment of title in April 2012. Baker alleged:
Since the will was admitted to probate as a muniment of title by this
Court, Applicant has learned of potential claims due the Estate. There
is a necessity for an administration of the Estate so that such claims may
be further investigated.
Applicant hereby requests the Court Appoint her as Independent
Executor of Decedent’s estate. Applicant is not aware of any
disqualification that would disqualify her from accepting Letters
Testamentary, and is entitled to such Letters.
Applicant requests, as provided in Section 401.001 of the Texas Estates
Code, that no other action be had in this Court in relation to the
settlement of Decedent’s Estate, other than the return of an Inventory,
Appraisement and List of Claims of Decedent’s Estate and that a bond
be waived.
Baker provided no information concerning the potential claims allegedly owing to
the estate, and she did not identify any specific claims owing to the estate.
4
On December 11, 2015, the probate court signed an order appointing Baker
independent executor and issuing letters testamentary. This order included a finding
that “a necessity exists for the administration of Decedent’s estate.” The probate
court ordered the filing of an inventory and list of claims.
Jacky received notice of the probate court’s order appointing Baker as
independent executor in January 2016. She moved the probate court to vacate this
order, arguing that the probate court lost jurisdiction over this case after it admitted
Squyres’ will to probate as a muniment of title in April 2012. Jacky argued that this
order was a final judgment and that Baker could not, over three years later, reopen
the estate and apply for appointment as independent executor.
In response, Baker argued that jurisdiction of a probate court attaches when
an application to probate a will is filed and continues until the estate is closed, which,
in the case of an estate in which the will is admitted to probate as a muniment of
title, is when the estate’s property is distributed, the debts are paid, and there is no
need for further administration. Baker argued that, because she believed that there
are potential claims owing to Squyres’ estate and, thus, that potential assets remain
in the estate, there is still a necessity for administration, and the probate court did
not lose jurisdiction upon signing the order admitting the will to probate as a
muniment of title. Baker thus argued that the probate court had jurisdiction to enter
an order appointing her as independent executor.
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The record does not include a ruling on Jacky’s motion to set aside. In this
mandamus proceeding, Jacky requests that we vacate the probate court’s order
issuing letters testamentary and appointing Baker as independent executor.
Mandamus Standard of Review
Generally, to be entitled to mandamus relief, the relator must demonstrate that
the trial court abused its discretion and that it has no adequate remedy by appeal.
See In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex. 2004) (orig.
proceeding); Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839–40 (Tex. 1992) (orig.
proceeding). A trial court clearly abuses its discretion if it reaches a decision so
arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a clear prejudicial error of law. Walker,
827 S.W.2d at 839. A trial court has no discretion in determining what the law is or
in applying the law to the facts. Id. at 840. Thus, a clear failure by the trial court to
analyze or apply the law correctly will constitute an abuse of discretion. In re
Allstate Cty. Mut. Ins. Co., 85 S.W.3d 193, 195 (Tex. 2002) (orig. proceeding).
Mandamus relief is proper when the trial court issues a void order, and the relator
need not demonstrate that she lacks an adequate remedy by appeal. See In re Sw.
Bell Tel. Co., 35 S.W.3d 602, 605 (Tex. 2000) (orig. proceeding); In re Flores, 111
S.W.3d 817, 818 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, orig. proceeding) (per
curiam).
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Probate Jurisdiction
In a county in which there is a statutory probate court, such as Harris County,
the statutory probate court has “original jurisdiction of probate proceedings.” TEX.
EST. CODE ANN. § 32.002(c) (West 2014); see also id. § 31.001 (West 2014)
(defining “probate proceeding” to include, among other things, “the probate of a
will, with or without administration of the estate,” “the issuance of letters
testamentary and of administration,” and “an application, petition, motion, or action
regarding the probate of a will or an estate administration”). Estates Code section
32.001(d) provides that “[t]he administration of the estate of a decedent, from the
filing of the application for probate and administration, or for administration, until
the decree of final distribution and the discharge of the last personal representative,
shall be considered as one proceeding for purposes of jurisdiction.” Id. § 32.001(d)
(West 2014).
Estates Code Chapter 257 governs the probate of a will as a muniment of title.
Section 257.001 provides:
A court may admit a will to probate as a muniment of title if the court
is satisfied that the will should be admitted to probate and the court:
(1) is satisfied that the testator’s estate does not owe an
unpaid debt, other than any debt secured by a lien
on real estate; or
(2) finds for another reason that there is no necessity for
administration of the estate.
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Id. § 257.001 (West 2014). A trial court order admitting a will to probate as a
muniment of title “constitutes sufficient legal authority for each person who owes
money to the testator’s estate . . . to pay or transfer without administration the
applicable asset without liability to a person described in the will as entitled to
receive the asset.” Id. § 257.102(a) (West 2014). “A person who is entitled to
property under the provisions of a will admitted to probate as a muniment of title is
entitled to deal with and treat the property in the same manner as if the record of title
to the property was vested in the person’s name.” Id. § 257.102(b). Within 180 days
after the trial court signs an order admitting a will to probate as a muniment of title,
“the applicant for the probate of the will shall file with the court clerk a sworn
affidavit stating specifically the terms of the will that have been fulfilled and the
terms that have not been fulfilled.” Id. § 257.103(a) (West 2014).
“Probating a will as a muniment of title provides a means to probate a will
quickly and cost-efficiently when there is no need for administration of the estate.”
In re Estate of Kurtz, 54 S.W.3d 353, 355 (Tex. App.—Waco 2001, no pet.). When
a court admits a will to probate as a muniment of title, the court does not issue letters
testamentary to an executor, nor does it appoint an administrator. Id. One of the
purposes of this “limited form of probate” is to “provide continuity in the chain of
title to estate properties by placing the will on the public record.” Id.; In re Estate
of Hodges, 725 S.W.2d 265, 271 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.)
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(“Admitting the will [to probate] for such limited purposes vests the named executor
with neither duty nor authority.”). “[T]he final distribution of an estate’s assets after
all debts and claims against the estate are paid results in the closing of the estate.”
In re John G. Kenedy Mem’l Found., 159 S.W.3d 133, 144 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi 2004, orig. proceeding) (quoting Interfirst Bank-Houston, N.A. v. Quintana
Petroleum Corp., 699 S.W.2d 864, 874 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, writ
ref’d n.r.e.)).
A probate order is the “functional equivalent” of a final judgment when it
finally disposes of a particular issue between parties. Ajudani v. Walker, 232 S.W.3d
219, 223 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.). “Thus, the probate court’s
plenary power to vacate, modify, correct, or reform a final order expires 30 days
after it is signed.” Id. (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(d)). A probate court retains
jurisdiction over the administration of an estate until that estate is disposed of, but
“that continuing jurisdiction does not alter the court’s plenary power over final
judgments.” Smalley v. Smalley, 436 S.W.3d 801, 806 n.9 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.).
The Estates Code allows for correction of orders rendered in a probate
proceeding, but it contains strict time limits concerning when interested parties may
seek to set aside such orders. See Valdez v. Hollenbeck, 465 S.W.3d 217, 227–28
(Tex. 2015) (“The Legislature has rarely prescribed express limitations periods for
9
bills of review but did so several times in the Probate Code and carried those
limitations forward when the Probate Code was recently recodified as the Texas
Estates Code.”). For example, section 55.251(a) provides that “[a]n interested
person may, by a bill of review filed in the court in which the probate proceedings
were held, have an order or judgment rendered by the court revised and corrected on
a showing of error in the order or judgment, as applicable.” TEX. EST. CODE ANN.
§ 55.251(a) (West 2014). Section 55.251(b), however, provides that such a bill of
review “may not be filed more than two years after the date of the order or judgment,
as applicable.” Id. § 55.251(b); cf. id. § 256.204 (West 2014) (limiting action to
contest validity of will admitted to probate to two years after date will was admitted
to probate, although if forgery or other fraud is alleged, two-year time period runs
from date forgery or fraud was discovered).
“These express references to statutes of limitations for bills of review reflect
legislative concern for the orderly administration of estates and finality of judgments
and are consistent with the ‘strong public interest in according finality to probate
proceedings,’ which has been afforded great weight in our precedent.” Valdez, 465
S.W.3d at 228 (quoting Little v. Smith, 943 S.W.2d 414, 421 (Tex. 1997)). “‘[A]fter
an estate has been finally distributed, the interest in finality may provide an
additional, valid justification for barring the belated assertion of claims,’ even if the
claims have merit and ‘even though mistakes of law or fact may have occurred
10
during the probate process.’” Id. at 230 (quoting Reed v. Campbell, 476 U.S. 852,
855–56, 106 S. Ct. 2234, 2237 (1986)).
Here, it is undisputed that Squyres died in January 2012 and that Baker applied
to have his will probated as a muniment of title in March 2012. In this application,
Baker alleged, “Applicant has investigated the affairs of the Decedent and finds that
to the best of Applicant’s knowledge and belief, there are no unpaid debts owing by
the Estate of the Decedent, exclusive of any debt secured by liens on real estate, and
there is no necessity for administration on such Estate.” The probate court entered
an order admitting the will to probate as a muniment of title on April 26, 2012,
specifically finding that “there are no unpaid debts owing by this Estate, exclusive
of any debt secured by liens on real estate” and that “there is no necessity for
administration of this Estate.” Within 180 days of the date of this order, Baker filed
an affidavit with the probate court “indicating that all terms of the Last Will and
Testament of the said COY HERMAN SQUYRES, Deceased, have now been
fulfilled.”
The April 26, 2012 order admitting Squyres’ will to probate as a muniment of
title finally disposed of all issues in the proceeding and was a final and appealable
judgment. See De Ayala v. Mackie, 193 S.W.3d 575, 578 (Tex. 2006); In re Estate
of Perez, 324 S.W.3d 257, 259–60 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2010, no pet.) (considering
merits of appeal from probate court’s order admitting will to probate as muniment
11
of title). Thus, the probate court retained plenary power to vacate, modify, correct,
or reform this order for thirty days. Ajudani, 232 S.W.3d at 223; see also Smalley,
436 S.W.3d at 806 n.9 (stating that probate court’s jurisdiction continues until estate
is disposed of, but continuing jurisdiction does not alter plenary power over final
judgments).
Baker, however, filed an application for issuance of letters testamentary and
appointment of an independent executor for Squyres’ estate on November 11, 2015,
more than three years after the probate court admitted the will to probate as a
muniment of title and after Baker averred that the terms of the will had been fulfilled.
This was more than three years after the probate court’s plenary power expired and
the estate closed and more than a year after the deadline for filing a bill of review to
correct any error in the probate court’s final order. See TEX. EST. CODE ANN.
§ 55.251(a), (b); In re John G. Kenedy Mem’l Found., 159 S.W.3d at 144; Interfirst
Bank-Houston, N.A., 699 S.W.2d at 874. Baker alleged, “Since the will was
admitted to probate as a muniment of title by this Court, Applicant has learned of
potential claims due the Estate. There is a necessity for an administration of the
Estate so that such claims may be further investigated.”3 The probate court found
3
We note that Baker has not, at any point in this proceeding, identified a specific
claim still owing to the estate.
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“[t]hat a necessity exists for the administration of Decedent’s estate,” issued letters
testamentary, and appointed Baker as independent executor on December 11, 2015.
In contending that the probate court retained jurisdiction to enter the
December 11, 2015 order, Baker argues that the probate court’s jurisdiction
continues until the estate is closed, which, in the case of a will admitted to probate
as a muniment of title, occurs “when all of the estate’s property is distributed, the
estate’s debts are paid, and there is no need for further administration.” Baker argues
that Squyres’ estate did not close after the probate court admitted the will to probate
because she discovered, after the court entered the order admitting the will to probate
as a muniment of title, potential claims owing to the estate which would require an
administration of the estate to resolve. This is incorrect.
When the probate court signed the order admitting the will to probate as a
muniment of title, the court specifically found that “there is no necessity for
administration of this Estate.” After the probate court entered this order, it retained
plenary power to vacate, modify, correct, or reform the order for thirty days. See
Ajudani, 232 S.W.3d at 223. Baker later filed the statutorily-required affidavit, in
which she averred that all of the terms of Squyres’ will had been fulfilled. By this
point, no known claims owing to the estate existed, no further actions needed to be
taken with regard to the estate, and Squyres’ estate had closed. See In re John G.
Kenedy Mem’l Found., 159 S.W.3d at 144 (“[T]he final distribution of an estate’s
13
assets after all debts and claims against the estate are paid results in the closing of
the estate.”). Holding, as Baker contends, that Squyres’ estate did not close because
unknown and unidentified claims owing to the estate potentially existed would mean
that no estate in which a will is admitted to probate as a muniment of title could ever
close because there always exists the possibility that an unknown claim needing
administration might remain and might not come to light until later.
The Estates Code provides a mechanism for correcting errors in orders
rendered in a probate proceeding: an interested party may file a bill of review seeking
revision or correction of the order upon a showing of an error in the order. See TEX.
EST. CODE ANN. § 55.251(a). This section, however, requires that such a bill of
review be filed within two years after the date of the challenged order. Id.
§ 55.251(b); Valdez, 465 S.W.3d at 227 (noting two-year statute of limitations period
for bills of review). Baker did not file a bill of review seeking to set aside or correct
the order admitting the will to probate as a muniment of title within two years of the
date the probate court signed the order. See Power v. Chapman, 994 S.W.2d 331,
334 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, no pet.) (holding that party seeking to set aside
order admitting will to probate as muniment of title could not obtain relief under
predecessor to Estates Code section 55.251 because party filed petition to set aside
order “well outside the two-year limitations period” provided in statute).
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The Texas Supreme Court has afforded “great weight” to the “strong public
interest in according finality to probate proceedings.” Valdez, 465 S.W.3d at 228
(quoting Little, 943 S.W.2d at 421). Here, the probate court’s April 26, 2012 order
admitting Squyres’ will to probate as a muniment of title became a final judgment,
and the probate court lost plenary power thirty days later. See Ajudani, 232 S.W.3d
at 223; In re Estate of Kurtz, 54 S.W.3d at 356 (“When the order admitting the will
to probate as a muniment of title became final, the County Court’s jurisdiction
terminated.”). The existence of unspecified potential claims owing to the estate—
potential claims raised for the first time more than three years after the probate
court’s order admitting the will to probate as a muniment of title—did not prevent
the order from becoming final and did not prevent the estate from closing.
We conclude that the probate court erred in issuing letters testamentary and
appointing Baker independent executor of Squyres’ estate more than three years
after the court admitted the will to probate as a muniment of title. Because the
probate court entered this order after its plenary power had expired, this order is
void. See State ex rel. Latty v. Owens, 907 S.W.2d 484, 486 (Tex. 1995) (“Judicial
action taken after the court’s jurisdiction over a cause has expired is a nullity.”); In
re T.G., 68 S.W.3d 171, 177 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. denied)
(“Judicial action taken after the trial court’s plenary power has expired is void.”).
Mandamus relief is proper when the trial court enters a void order, and Jacky need
15
not demonstrate the lack of an adequate remedy by appeal. See In re Sw. Bell Tel.
Co., 35 S.W.3d at 605; In re Flores, 111 S.W.3d at 818.
We sustain Jacky’s sole issue.
Conclusion
We conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus and order the
probate court to vacate its order issuing letters testamentary and appointing Baker
independent executor of Squyres’ estate. The writ will only issue if the probate court
fails to comply.
Evelyn V. Keyes
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Brown, and Huddle.
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