Michael Joe Sorrell and Sorrell Family Ltd Partners v. Estate of Benjamin Hardy Carlton, III, by and Through Its Independent Administratrix Darlene Barton ( 2016 )


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  • Affirmed and Majority and Dissenting Opinions filed August 11, 2016.
    In The
    Fourteenth Court of Appeals
    NO. 14-15-00361-CV
    MICHAEL JOE SORRELL AND SORRELL FAMILY LTD. PARTNERS,
    Appellants
    V.
    ESTATE OF BENJAMIN HARDY CARLTON, III, BY AND THROUGH
    ITS INDEPENDENT ADMINISTRATRIX DARLENE BARTON, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 239th District Court
    Brazoria County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. 70579
    DISSENTING OPINION
    In this appeal from a bench trial, our chief task is to apply the plain words of
    a real-property redemption statute — Tax Code section 34.21 — to determine if the
    former property owner satisfied the requirements to redeem the property after a tax
    sale. The trial court found that the former owner successfully redeemed. But, the
    trial evidence conclusively proves that the former owner did not unconditionally
    tender the full redemption amount by the redemption deadline and that the former
    owner did not substantially comply with section 34.21. For these reasons, this court
    should reverse and render judgment that the former owner take nothing. Because
    the court instead affirms, I respectfully dissent.
    Redemption Under Tax Code Section 34.21
    Appellants/defendants Michael Joe Sorrell and Sorrell Family, Ltd. Partners
    (hereinafter the “Sorrell Parties”) appeal the trial court’s judgment in favor of
    appellee/plaintiff the Estate of Benjamin Hardy Carlton, III, by and through its
    Independent Administratrix Darlene Barton (the “Estate”) in the Estate’s suit
    seeking a declaratory judgment that the Estate redeemed the approximately three-
    acre tract of land in question (the “Property”) that the Sorrell Parties purchased at a
    tax sale. After a bench trial, the trial court determined that the Estate had redeemed
    the Property under Tax Code section 34.21 based on the court’s conclusions that the
    Estate tendered full compensation during the redemption period and that the Estate
    substantially complied with the statute.
    Tax Code section 34.21, entitled “Right of Redemption,” provides in pertinent
    part:
    (a) The owner of real property sold at a tax sale to a purchaser other
    than a taxing unit that was used as the residence homestead of the owner
    or that was land designated for agricultural use when the suit or the
    application for the warrant was filed, or the owner of a mineral interest
    sold at a tax sale to a purchaser other than a taxing unit, may redeem
    the property on or before the second anniversary of the date on which
    the purchaser’s deed is filed for record by paying the purchaser the
    amount the purchaser bid for the property, the amount of the deed
    recording fee, and the amount paid by the purchaser as taxes, penalties,
    interest, and costs on the property, plus a redemption premium of 25
    percent of the aggregate total if the property is redeemed during the first
    year of the redemption period or 50 percent of the aggregate total if the
    property is redeemed during the second year of the redemption period.
    2
    ...
    (e) The owner of real property sold at a tax sale other than property that
    was used as the residence homestead of the owner or that was land
    designated for agricultural use when the suit or the application for the
    warrant was filed, or that is a mineral interest, may redeem the property
    in the same manner and by paying the same amounts as prescribed by
    Subsection (a), (b), (c), or (d), as applicable, except that:
    (1) the owner’s right of redemption may be exercised not later than the
    180th day following the date on which the purchaser’s or taxing unit’s
    deed is filed for record; and
    (2) the redemption premium payable by the owner to a purchaser other
    than a taxing unit may not exceed 25 percent.
    (f) The owner of real property sold at a tax sale may redeem the real
    property by paying the required amount as prescribed by this section to
    the assessor-collector for the county in which the property was sold, if
    the owner of the real property makes an affidavit stating:
    (1) that the period in which the owner’s right of redemption must be
    exercised has not expired; and
    (2) that the owner has made diligent search in the county in which the
    property is located for the purchaser at the tax sale or for the purchaser
    at resale, and has failed to find the purchaser, that the purchaser is not
    a resident of the county in which the property is located, that the owner
    and the purchaser cannot agree on the amount of redemption money
    due, or that the purchaser refuses to give the owner a quitclaim deed to
    the property.
    (f-1) An assessor-collector who receives an affidavit and payment
    under Subsection (f) shall accept that the assertions set out in the
    affidavit are true and correct. The assessor-collector receiving the
    payment shall give the owner a signed receipt witnessed by two
    persons. The receipt, when recorded, is notice to all persons that the
    property described has been redeemed. The assessor-collector shall on
    demand pay the money received by the assessor-collector to the
    purchaser. An assessor-collector is not liable to any person for
    performing the assessor-collector’s duties under this subsection in
    reliance on the assertions contained in an affidavit.
    ...
    (i) The owner of property who is entitled to redeem the property under
    this section may request that the purchaser of the property, or the taxing
    3
    unit to which the property was bid off, provide that owner a written
    itemization of all amounts spent by the purchaser or taxing unit in costs
    on the property. The owner must make the request in writing and send
    the request to the purchaser at the address shown for the purchaser in
    the purchaser’s deed for the property, or to the business address of the
    collector for the taxing unit, as applicable. The purchaser or the
    collector shall itemize all amounts spent on the property in costs and
    deliver the itemization in writing to the owner not later than the 10th
    day after the date the written request is received. Delivery of the
    itemization to the owner may be made by depositing the document in
    the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the owner at the
    address provided in the owner’s written request. Only those amounts
    included in the itemization provided to the owner may be allowed as
    costs for purposes of redemption.1
    In crafting this statute, the Legislature set specific deadlines, provided a formula for
    determining the redemption amount, and identified the responsibilities of the parties
    in the redemption process. The statutory regime bespeaks the Legislature’s
    consideration of the needs and interests of the taxing entity, the tax-sale purchaser,
    and the former property owner. Likewise, the statute’s precision and detail reflects
    clear legislative intent that to get the benefit of statutory redemption, the former
    property owner must follow the rules. It is the Legislature’s prerogative to make the
    rules. It is the court’s obligation to evaluate the record evidence to determine if the
    former property owner followed those rules.
    When reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, this court is to consider
    the evidence in the light most favorable to the challenged finding and indulge every
    reasonable inference that would support it.2 We are to credit favorable evidence if a
    reasonable factfinder could and disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable
    factfinder could not.3 We must determine whether the evidence at trial would enable
    1
    Tax Code Ann. § 34.21 (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.).
    2
    City of Keller v. Wilson, 
    168 S.W.3d 802
    , 823 (Tex. 2005).
    3
    See 
    id. at 827.
    4
    reasonable and fair-minded people to find the facts at issue. See 
    id. The factfinder
    is the only judge of witness credibility and the weight to give to testimony. 4 Because
    findings of fact in a bench trial have the same force and dignity as a jury verdict, we
    are to review them for legal sufficiency of the evidence under the same standards we
    apply in reviewing a jury’s findings.5 We are to review the trial court’s conclusions
    of law de novo.6
    The Trial Court’s Conclusion that the Estate Tendered the Full Redemption
    Amount During the Statutory Time Period
    To redeem the Property, the Estate was required to “pay” the Sorrell Parties a
    statutory redemption amount not later than the 180th day following the date on
    which the Sorrell Parties’ deed was filed for record.7 The applicable statutory
    redemption amount was “the amount the [Sorrell Parties] bid for the property, the
    amount of the deed recording fee, and the amount paid by the [Sorrell Parties] as
    taxes, penalties, interest, and costs on the property, plus a redemption premium of
    25 percent of the aggregate total.”8 Based on the undisputed evidence and the trial
    court’s findings, the redemption amount was $96,755.61 (“Redemption Amount”)
    and the deadline for the Estate to pay this amount to the Sorrell Parties was August
    27, 2012 (“Redemption Deadline”).9 Though section 34.21 requires that the
    redeeming party “pay” the redemption amount, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals and
    other courts have held that the payment requirement may be satisfied if the
    4
    See 
    id. at 819.
    5
    Anderson v. City of Seven Points, 
    806 S.W.2d 791
    , 794 (Tex. 1991).
    6
    Johnston v. McKinney, 
    9 S.W.3d 271
    , 277 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied).
    7
    See Tax Code Ann. § 34.21 (a),(e).
    8
    Tax Code Ann. § 34.21 (a),(e).
    9
    See 
    id. The majority
    agrees that this sum is the Redemption Amount and that this date is the
    Redemption Deadline. See ante at 6.
    5
    redeeming party timely tenders funds to the purchaser in the full redemption amount
    without any conditions on the purchaser’s right to possess the funds.10 This court
    has noted that, though redemption statutes should be construed liberally in favor of
    redemption, courts cannot use the doctrine of liberal construction as a license to
    contradict the plain meaning of section 34.21, which requires full payment of the
    required redemption amount during the statutory redemption period.11 In Bluntson,
    this court held that, as a matter of law, no redemption occurred under section 34.21
    because the party attempting redemption did not timely tender funds to the purchaser
    in the redemption amount of $19,081.73 without any conditions on the purchaser’s
    right to possess the funds.12 The Bluntson court concluded there was no redemption
    as a matter of law even though, during the redemption period, the party attempting
    redemption made an unconditional tender of $17,687.98 (93% of the required
    amount) and a conditional tender of the remainder of the redemption amount.13
    In today’s case, the trial court concluded that the Estate tendered the full
    Redemption Amount to the Sorrell Parties before the Redemption Deadline based
    on the Estate’s August 21, 2012 letter to the Sorrell Parties. In this letter, the Estate
    enclosed a proposed redemption deed and checks payable to the Sorrell Parties in
    the amounts of $85,000 (125% of the amount the Sorrell Parties paid for the
    Property) and $28 (the deed recording fee). The Estate instructed the Sorrell Parties
    that the checks and deed were delivered to them in trust and that they should not
    negotiate the checks until after the Sorrell Parties executed the deed and sent the
    10
    Bluntson v. Wuensche Servs., Inc., 
    374 S.W.3d 503
    , 507–08 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
    2012, no pet.).
    See 
    id. at 509;
    Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Stockdick Land Co., 
    367 S.W.3d 308
    , 315 (Tex.
    11
    App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. denied).
    12
    
    Bluntson, 374 S.W.3d at 505
    –08.
    13
    
    Id. 6 deed
    back to the Estate. The Estate’s counsel stated: “If there are any more claimed
    expenses, please notify me immediately and such funds will be paid, upon review.”
    Presuming for the sake of argument that the Estate unconditionally tendered $85,028
    to the Sorrell Parties,14 under the letter’s unambiguous text, the Estate did not
    unconditionally tender an amount greater than $85,028.15
    To tender payment, the Estate had to relinquish possession of the amount of
    money in question for a sufficient time and under such circumstances as to enable
    the Sorrell Parties, without any special effort on their part, to acquire possession of
    the money.16 The Estate said it would pay in the future any additional expenses that
    the Sorrell Parties brought to the Estate’s attention “upon review.” Neither in this
    statement nor in any other part of the letter did the Estate relinquish possession of
    any money to cover these expenses. As a matter of law, the Estate did not tender an
    amount greater than $85,028 because it did not relinquish possession of an amount
    greater than this sum by the Redemption Deadline.17 In addition, the use of the term
    “upon review” reflects that the Estate would pay these amounts only if, after review
    of the expense(s) in question, the Estate concluded that the expense(s) were part of
    the Redemption Amount.              Therefore, any promise by the Estate to pay these
    expenses in the future was conditional and thus insufficient to effect a redemption.18
    Even presuming that during the redemption period the Estate tendered
    $85,028 (88% of the Redemption Amount) to the Sorrell Parties without any
    14
    The trial court found that the Estate tendered $85,028 to the Sorrell Parties in the August 21,
    2012 letter. In its fact findings, the trial court did not find that the Estate tendered a higher amount
    during the redemption period.
    15
    See 
    Bluntson, 374 S.W.3d at 507
    –08.
    16
    
    Id. at 507.
    17
    See 
    id. 18 See
    id.
    7
    conditions 
    on their right to possess the funds, the trial evidence conclusively proves
    that the Estate did not unconditionally tender the full Redemption Amount by the
    Redemption Deadline. The Bluntson precedent mandates that this court reverse the
    trial court’s judgment and render judgment that the Estate take nothing.19
    The Trial Court’s Conclusion that the Estate Substantially Complied with
    Tax Code Section 34.21
    In Tax Code section 34.21, the Legislature did not address whether substantial
    compliance with the statute would be enough to effect a redemption. To date, neither
    the Supreme Court of Texas nor this court has addressed whether a former property
    owner’s substantial compliance with section 34.21 is sufficient to effect a
    redemption. Although the majority holds that substantial compliance is enough, this
    holding is unnecessary for two reasons. First, as discussed above, as a matter of law
    the Estate did not effect a redemption under the Bluntson precedent. And, second,
    as a matter of law the trial evidence shows that the Estate did not substantially
    comply with section 34.21.
    The undisputed trial evidence shows:
     On February 7, 2012, the Sorrell Parties bought the Property at a tax sale for
    the purchase price of $68,000.
     After buying the Property and before any attempt to redeem the Property, the
    Sorrell Parties paid $8,694.49 in property taxes on the Property and $682 for
    insurance on the Property.
     The deed conveying the Property to the Sorrell Parties was filed for record on
    February 29, 2012, and a deed recording fee of $28 was paid.
     The first action taken by the executrix of the Estate in an attempt to redeem
    the Property was taken on July 31, 2012, the 153rd day following the date on
    which the deed to the Sorrell Parties was filed for record.
    19
    See 
    id. 8 
    On July 31, 2012, the Estate’s lawyer sent a letter to the Sorrell Parties
    notifying them that the Estate “will be redeeming” the Property and indicating
    that the deadline for this redemption was the 180th day after February 29,
    2012. The Estate’s lawyer stated that, as required by law, the Estate would in
    the future be tendering to the Sorrell Parties the amount they paid for the
    Property plus 25%. The Estate’s lawyer stated that he would be sending the
    funds in the future; he did not request a written itemization of the amounts the
    Sorrell Parties had expended in costs on the Property.
     The Estate took no further action to redeem the Property until August 21,
    2012, the 174th day following the date on which the deed to the Sorrell Parties
    was filed for record.
     On August 21, 2012, the Estate’s lawyer sent a second letter to the Sorrell
    Parties enclosing a proposed redemption deed and checks payable to the
    Sorrell Parties in the amounts of $85,000 (125% of the amount the Sorrell
    Parties paid for the Property) and $28 (the deed recording fee).
     The Estate instructed the Sorrell Parties that the checks and deed were
    delivered to them in trust and that they should not negotiate the checks until
    after the Sorrell Parties had executed and sent the deed to the Estate.
     The Estate stated that, as required by law, the Estate was tendering the amount
    the Sorrell Parties paid for the Property plus an additional 25% and the deed
    recording fee. The Estate stated, “If there are any more claimed expenses,
    please notify me immediately and such funds will be paid, upon review.”
     The Estate did not state unequivocally that the expenses would be paid. Nor
    did the Estate request a written itemization of the amounts the Sorrell Parties
    spent on the Property.
     The Sorrell Parties retained a lawyer, who sent a letter on August 31, 2012,
    ten days after the Estate’s second letter and the 184th day following the date
    on which the deed to the Sorrell Parties was filed for record.
     The Sorrell Parties returned the two checks to the Estate, stating that the
    amount tendered in the attempted redemption was insufficient. The Sorrell
    Parties notified the Estate that the Sorrell Parties had paid $8,694.49 in taxes
    on the Property and $682 for insurance.
    The Legislature laid out the redemption procedure plainly. Under the
    unambiguous language of the statute, to calculate the redemption amount, the former
    owner needs to know the amount, if any, paid by the purchaser as taxes, penalties,
    9
    interest, and costs on the property.20 These amounts often are known only to the
    purchaser. If the purchaser fails to disclose these amounts to the former owner
    voluntarily, the former owner has recourse to subsection (i) of section 34.21.21
    Under this provision, the former owner may send the purchaser a written request that
    the purchaser provide the former owner a written itemization of all amounts spent
    by the purchaser in costs on the property.22 The purchaser must deliver a written
    itemization of these amounts to the former owner not later than the tenth day after
    receiving the written request.23 If the purchaser provides a written itemization, then
    the itemization allows the former owner to calculate and pay or tender payment of
    the redemption amount.24 If the purchaser does not timely respond with a written
    itemization, the former owner need not include in the calculation of the redemption
    amount any taxes, penalties, interest, or costs on the property.25
    The Estate first took action on July 31, 2012, 153 days into the redemption
    period. If the Estate had made a written request in its July 31, 2012 letter for a
    written itemization of all amounts spent by the purchasers in costs on the property,
    the written itemization would have been due on August 11, 2012 (ten days after
    receipt on August 1, 2012), allowing the Estate sufficient time to tender
    unconditionally the Redemption Amount by the Redemption Deadline. In the July
    31, 2012 letter, the Estate did not request a written itemization or anything else from
    the Sorrell Parties. Instead, the Estate incorrectly stated that it only needed to tender
    20
    Tax Code Ann. § 34.21 (a),(e).
    21
    
    Id. § 34.21(i).
    22
    
    Id. 23 Id.
    24
    
    Id. 25 Id.
    10
    125% of the amount paid for the Property.
    Six days before the Redemption Deadline, the Estate sent a second letter.
    Even presuming the Estate unconditionally tendered $85,028 to the Sorrell Parties
    in that letter, the sum did not include any amount for taxes, penalties, interest, or
    costs on the property. The record contains no evidence that in the 173 days of the
    redemption period before the Estate sent this letter that the Estate did anything to
    determine the Redemption Amount. There is not an iota of evidence that the Estate
    either formally asked for a written itemization or that the Estate informally inquired
    as to the amount of the costs. Even in this second letter, there is no request for a
    written itemization of all amounts spent by the purchasers in costs on the Property.26
    Though the Estate did not request a written itemization, the Estate did ask the Sorrell
    Parties to immediately “notify” the Estate “[i]f there are any more claimed
    expenses.”27 Even if the Estate had made a request for written itemization in the
    August 21, 2012 letter, the Sorrell Parties would not have been required to provide
    the itemization until ten days later, after the Redemption Deadline.28 Indeed,
    apparently treating the August 21, 2012 letter as a request for a written itemization
    out of excess of caution, the Sorrell Parties itemized these costs in a letter written to
    the Estate ten days later.
    The trial evidence conclusively proves that the Estate did not substantially
    comply with section 34.21, and therefore, this court should reverse and render a take-
    26
    See Tax Code Ann. § 34.21(i).
    27
    The majority concludes that this request for notification of any claimed expenses was a written
    request for a written itemization of all amounts spent by the purchasers in costs on the Property.
    See ante at 8. But, a request for notification if there are any claimed expenses is not a request for
    a writing, nor is it a request for an itemization. Notification of the existence of any claimed
    expenses can be made through oral communication and need not include any itemization of the
    expenses.
    28
    See 
    id. 11 nothing
    judgment without addressing whether substantial compliance applies to this
    statute.29
    Today, the majority embraces the analysis of the Tenth Court of Appeals in
    Jensen v. Covington,30 a case in which, unlike today’s case, the former owner made
    a written request under subsection (i) of section 34.21 for a written itemization of all
    amounts spent by the purchaser in costs on the property.31 The Jensen court
    concluded that the former owner tendered the full redemption amount within the
    redemption period and substantially complied with section 34.21, even though the
    former owner (1) first took action at 3:00 p.m. on the day of the redemption deadline;
    (2) did not know the amounts spent by the purchaser in costs on the property; (3)
    waited until the redemption deadline to make a written request under subsection (i)
    of section 34.21 for a written itemization; and (4) relied on the purchaser calculating
    the full redemption amount, confirming to the former owner’s satisfaction the
    amounts of costs spent on the property, executing a quitclaim, and obtaining a check
    drawn on the former owner’s escrow account sometime between 3:00 p.m. and
    midnight on the redemption deadline after first receiving notice at 3:00 p.m. that
    day.32
    The facts of Jensen differ from the facts before us today.33 As the dissenting
    justice in Jensen pointed out, the Jensen court failed to apply the unambiguous
    language of subsection (i) of section 34.21, which gives the purchaser ten days to
    29
    See Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust 
    Co., 367 S.W.3d at 314
    –15; Burd v. Armistead, 
    982 S.W.2d 31
    ,
    35 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied).
    30
    See 
    234 S.W.3d 198
    , 203 (Tex. App.—Waco 2007, pet. denied).
    31
    See 
    id. at 201.
    32
    See 
    id. at 201–02.
    33
    See 
    id. 12 respond
    to a request for a written itemization.34 The Jensen court held that the
    purchaser “violated his statutory duty to provide [the former owner] with the
    itemization]” by not providing the itemization on the day it was requested, rather
    than within the ten-day period allowed under the plain language of the statute.35 The
    Jensen court appeared to base this holding on a liberal construction of the statute in
    favor of redemption.36 Though the Tenth Court of Appeals apparently allows this
    liberal construction to be used to undercut the unambiguous text of section 34.21,
    the Fourteenth Court of Appeals has eschewed that approach.37 Under this court’s
    precedent, a liberal construction in favor of redemption cannot be used as a license
    to contradict the plain meaning of section 34.21.38
    In addition, the Jensen court found that a redemption had been effected on the
    redemption deadline, even though the former owner did not unconditionally tender
    the full redemption amount during the redemption period; instead, the former owner
    invited the purchaser to stop by the former owner’s lawyer’s office on the deadline
    date to confirm to the lawyer the amount of costs spent on the property.39 The would-
    be redeeming party conditioned the last-minute alleged tender on the purchaser’s
    confirmation of the amount of costs spent on the property to the satisfaction of the
    former owner’s lawyer.40 Thus, this part of Jensen conflicts with Bluntson’s holding
    that the former owner must make a timely tender of funds to the purchaser in the full
    redemption amount without any conditions on the purchaser’s right to possess the
    34
    See 
    id. at 205,
    n.3; 
    id. at 208
    (Gray, C.J., dissenting).
    35
    See Tax Code Ann. § 34.21(i); Jensen, 
    234 S.W.3d 201
    –202, 205 & n.3.
    36
    
    Jensen, 234 S.W.3d at 205
    , n.3.
    37
    See 
    Bluntson, 374 S.W.3d at 509
    ; Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust 
    Co., 367 S.W.3d at 315
    .
    38
    See 
    Bluntson, 374 S.W.3d at 509
    ; Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust 
    Co., 367 S.W.3d at 315
    .
    39
    
    Jensen, 234 S.W.3d at 201
    .
    40
    See 
    id. 13 funds.41
    Jensen is not on point. And, Jensen clashes with this court’s binding
    precedent.42 This court should not follow Jensen.
    Conclusion
    The trial evidence conclusively proves that the Estate did not unconditionally
    tender the full Redemption Amount by the Redemption Deadline. Even presuming
    that the substantial-compliance doctrine applies, the trial evidence conclusively
    proves that the Estate did not substantially comply with Tax Code section 34.21. For
    these reasons, this court should reverse and render judgment that the Estate take
    nothing.
    /s/    Kem Thompson Frost
    Chief Justice
    Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Boyce and Wise. (Boyce, J.,
    majority).
    41
    
    Bluntson, 374 S.W.3d at 507
    –08.
    42
    See 
    id. at 507–09;
    Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust 
    Co., 367 S.W.3d at 315
    .
    14