Nydia De La Garza v. the Home Care Team Inc., and Maria Patricia Solis ( 2016 )


Menu:
  •                            NUMBER 13-15-00571-CV
    COURT OF APPEALS
    THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
    NYDIA DE LA GARZA,                                                       Appellant,
    v.
    THE HOME CARE TEAM INC., AND
    MARIA PATRICIA SOLIS,                                                    Appellees.
    On appeal from the 357th District Court
    of Cameron County, Texas.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Garza and Longoria
    Memorandum Opinion by Justice Garza
    This is an appeal challenging the trial court’s ruling under the expert report
    requirement of the Texas Medical Liability Act (“TMLA”). See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
    CODE ANN. § 74.351(a) (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.). By a single issue, appellant
    Nydia De La Garza contends the trial court erred in dismissing her suit with prejudice
    against appellee Maria Patricia Solis because of appellant’s failure to timely serve Solis
    with an expert report as required by section 74.351(a). Because we hold that appellant
    had no duty to produce an expert report to Solis, we reverse the trial court’s order
    dismissing appellant’s claims against Solis and remand for further proceedings.
    I. BACKGROUND1
    Appellant alleges that she was hired by The Home Care Team, Inc. (“THCT”) as a
    home health care services provider. On November 10, 2013, appellant sustained injuries
    while providing home health care services at the Brownsville, Texas home of Joaquina
    Garcia and Luciano Palafox. Garcia and Palafox were renting the home, which was
    owned by Solis. Appellant was allegedly injured while walking up and down an outside
    ramp to deposit trash in a trash container. Appellant alleged claims of negligence and
    gross negligence against Solis for various omissions, including failure to inspect the
    condition of the premises, failure to make the premises reasonably safe, and failure to
    install handrails or other safety devices.2
    II. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW
    A trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss a health care liability claim is reviewed
    for a clear abuse of discretion. Marino v. Wilkins, 
    393 S.W.3d 318
    , 325 (Tex. App.—
    Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. denied) (citations omitted). A trial court abuses its discretion
    1 Solis has not filed a brief to assist us in our disposition of this appeal. The background facts are
    taken from appellant’s brief, her live petition, Solis’s motion to dismiss, appellant’s response to the motion
    to dismiss, and the trial court’s order of dismissal.
    2 We view appellant’s claims as alleging a premises-liability cause of action against Solis. See
    Del Lago Partners, Inc. v. Smith, 
    307 S.W.3d 762
    , 767 (Tex. 2010) (“[G]enerally, a property owner owes
    invitees a duty to use ordinary care to reduce or eliminate an unreasonable risk of harm created by a
    premises condition about which the property owner knew or should have known.”).
    2
    if it acts in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner without reference to any guiding rules or
    principles. 
    Id. Under the
    TMLA, a “health care liability claim” (“HCLC”) is defined, in pertinent
    part, as “a cause of action against a health care provider or physician . . . .” See TEX. CIV.
    PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.001(a)(13) (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.). Under the
    expert report requirement of section 74.351(a), a claimant is required to serve each
    defendant physician or other health care provider with an expert report within 120 days
    after each defendant’s original answer is filed.               See 
    id. § 74.351(a);3
    Samlowski v.
    Wooten, 
    332 S.W.3d 404
    , 411 (Tex. 2011). A “physician” is defined as: (A) an individual
    licensed to practice medicine in this state; (B) a professional association organized under
    the Texas Professional Association Act (Article 1528f, Vernon's Texas Civil Statutes) by
    an individual physician or group of physicians; (C) a partnership or limited liability
    partnership formed by a group of physicians; (D) a nonprofit health corporation certified
    under Section 162.001, Occupations Code; or (E) a company formed by a group of
    physicians under the Texas Limited Liability Company Act (Article 1528n, Vernon's Texas
    Civil Statutes). See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.001(a)(23) (West, Westlaw
    through 2015 R.S.). A “health care provider” means any person, partnership, professional
    association, corporation, facility, or institution duly licensed, certified, registered, or
    chartered by the State of Texas to provide health care, including: (i) a registered nurse;
    3   Section 74.351(a) provides, in relevant part:
    In a health care liability claim, a claimant shall, not later than the 120th day after the date
    each defendant's original answer is filed, serve on that party or the party's attorney one or
    more expert reports, with a curriculum vitae of each expert listed in the report for each
    physician or health care provider against whom a liability claim is asserted.
    TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351(a) (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.) (emphasis added).
    3
    (ii) a dentist; (iii) a podiatrist; (iv) a pharmacist; (v) a chiropractor; (vi) an optometrist; (vii)
    a health care institution; or (viii) a health care collaborative certified under Chapter 848,
    Insurance Code.       The term includes:       (i) an officer, director, shareholder, member,
    partner, manager, owner, or affiliate of a health care provider or physician; and (ii) an
    employee, independent contractor, or agent of a health care provider or physician acting
    in the course and scope of the employment or contractual relationship.                   See 
    id. § 74.001(a)(12)
    (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.)
    III. DISCUSSION
    In her motion to dismiss, Solis argued that she was entitled to dismissal of
    appellant’s suit against her because appellant failed to provide her with an expert report
    as required by section 74.351(a). See 
    id. §74.351(a). Citing
    Ross v. St. Luke’s Episcopal
    Hospital, Solis argued that, at the time appellant was injured, she was “providing health
    care,” and therefore, appellant’s claim is a “health care liability claim.” 
    462 S.W.3d 496
    ,
    505 (Tex. 2015) (listing factors to determine if a claim is an HCLC, including “[a]t the time
    of the injury[,] was the claimant providing or assisting in providing health care”). We
    conclude that Solis’s reliance on Ross is misplaced.
    In her response to the motion to dismiss and on appeal, appellant argued that
    because Solis is neither a “physician” nor a “health care provider” as defined by section
    74.001, her claims against Solis are not HCLCs. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
    § 74.001(a)(12), (23).
    Following a hearing on November 12, 2015, the trial court found that, because
    appellant was “providing health care” at the time she was injured, her claim is a HCLC.
    See 
    Ross, 462 S.W.3d at 505
    . The trial court further found that appellant is a home health
    4
    care service provider. Finally, the trial court found that appellant failed to serve Solis with
    an expert report as required by section 74.351(a), and granted Solis’s motion to dismiss.
    We disagree. Regardless of whether appellant was “providing health care” when
    she was injured, her claim against Solis cannot be a HCLC because Solis is neither a
    physician nor a health care provider. See 
    id. § 74.001(a)(13).
    As noted, appellant’s
    petition alleges negligence and gross negligence claims against Solis for alleged
    premises defects. There is no allegation that Solis is a “health care provider or physician,”
    see id.; therefore, appellant’s claim against Solis is not a HCLC, and she was not required
    to serve Solis with an expert report pursuant to section 74.351(a). See 
    id. § 74.351(a).
    We sustain appellant’s sole issue.
    IV. CONCLUSION
    We reverse the trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings consistent
    with this opinion.
    DORI CONTRERAS GARZA
    Justice
    Delivered and filed the
    1st day of September, 2016.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 13-15-00571-CV

Filed Date: 9/1/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/5/2016