Elizabeth A. Lousteau and Brett Clanton v. Jaime L. Noriega and Sonia A. Noriega ( 2016 )

Opinion issued August 30, 2016
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-15-00254-CV
———————————
ELIZABETH A. LOUSTEAU AND BRETT CLANTON, Appellants
V.
JAIME L. NORIEGA AND SONIA A. NORIEGA, Appellees
On Appeal from the 151st District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2013-35448-B
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellants, Elizabeth A. Lousteau and Brett Clanton, challenge the trial
court’s judgment, entered after a jury trial, in favor of appellees, Jaime L. Noriega
and Sonia A. Noriega (“the Noriegas”), in the Noriegas’ declaratory-judgment
action against Lousteau and Clanton.1 In seven issues, Lousteau and Clanton
contend that the trial court erred in submitting a question to the jury on an
immaterial fact; disregarding the jury’s finding on a material fact; concluding that
their affirmative defense was not tried by consent; not issuing a final judgment;
awarding damages; and severing the case.
We reverse and remand.
Background
In their “First Amended Petition for Bill of Review, Application for
Injunctive Relief, and Suit for Declaratory Relief,”2 the Noriegas asserted that
Lousteau and Clanton had sued them for trespass and nuisance, alleging that water
runoff from a structure on the Noriegas’ property (the “Goldenrod property”) had
caused flooding that damaged Lousteau and Clanton’s adjacent property. 3 After
the trial court signed a default judgment in their favor, Lousteau and Clanton
obtained a writ of execution on the Goldenrod property, and they purchased it at a
1
See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 37.001–.011 (Vernon 2015).
2
Jaime L. Noriega and Sonia A. Noriega v. Elizabeth A. Lousteau and Brett
Clanton, No 2014-14152 (151st Dist. Ct., Harris Cty., Tex.). “A bill of review is
an independent action to set aside a judgment that is no longer appealable or
subject to challenge by a motion for new trial.” Wembley Inv. Co. v. Herrera, 11
S.W.3d 924, 926–27 (Tex. 1999); see also Urso v. Lyon Fin. Servs., Inc., 93
S.W.3d 276, 280 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (“A bill of
review is a new suit filed in same court [that] render[ed] the original judgment.”).
3
Elizabeth A. Lousteau and Brett Clanton v. Jaime L. Noriega and Sonia A.
Noriega, No. 2013-35448 (151st Dist. Ct., Harris Cty., Tex.).
2
constable’s sale on March 4, 2014. In their petition for bill of review, the Noriegas
argued that they were entitled to have the default judgment and the
“sheriff’s/constable’s sale and deed set aside” because they were not served with
Lousteau and Clanton’s lawsuit. They asserted that they did not become aware of
the lawsuit until their tenant at the Goldenrod property “told them that Lousteau
had come over and stated that she [had] bought the property” and directed the
tenant to leave. The Noriegas also sought a declaration that the Goldenrod
property is their homestead and “thus exempt from seizure and execution.” And
they requested a temporary injunction to enjoin Lousteau and Clanton from
accessing or taking any action regarding the Goldenrod property; disturbing the
Noriegas’ tenant or taking any rents; encumbering or transferring the property; or
filing their constable’s deed in the real property records. In their supplemental
petition, the Noriegas brought a wrongful-execution claim against Lousteau and
Clanton, seeking damages for lost rental income accruing since April 2014 and
“the costs to repair physical changes [that Lousteau and Clanton] ha[d] made to the
[p]roperty during their possession of it via the constable’s deed.”
In their third amended answer, Lousteau and Clanton generally denied the
Noriegas’ allegations and abandoned their previous counterclaim and affirmative
defenses. Subsequently, however, Lousteau and Clanton filed a written
3
“Stipulation” that the Noriegas had “not [been] served with process” in the
underlying suit for trespass and nuisance.
On November 4, 2014, the Noriegas, “[b]ased on” Lousteau and Clanton’s
stipulation, filed a “Pre-Trial Motion to set Aside Default Judgment, Execution and
Constable’s Deed,” in which they re-urged their petition for bill of review. They
asserted that the trial court “should set aside” the default judgment and “should
likewise and necessarily set aside and void the writ of execution issued thereon and
the purported Constable’s Deed issued pursuant to the writ of execution on the
default judgment.”
On November 7, 2014, the trial court signed an order4 setting aside its
default judgment, as follows:
On this day, the Court considered the [Noriegas’] Pre-Trial
Motion to set Aside Default Judgment, Execution and Constable’s
Deed. . . . Having considered the motion, the response, if any,
admissions of the parties, arguments of counsel, and the applicable
law, the Court is of the opinion that [the] motion is well taken and
should be and is hereby GRANTED.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Final Order on
Motion[] for Default Judgment . . . [is] hereby set aside, and [is]
VOID AB INITIO.
4
Documents relevant to the trial court proceedings underlying this appeal are
included in the clerk’s record filed in this Court’s Cause No. 01-15-00341-CV,
Elizabeth A. Loustea and Brett Clanton v. Jaime L. Noriega and Sonia A. Noriega.
We may take judicial notice of our own records involving the same parties and
subject matter. See Douglas v. Am. Title Co., 196 S.W.3d 876, 877 n.1 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.).
4
Later the same day, the parties tried to a jury the Noriegas’ declaratory
action. The parties argued to the jury5 that the “sole” issue for it to “decide and
confirm” was whether the Goldenrod property was the Noriegas’ homestead. And
the trial court instructed the jury to answer the following questions:
Question No. 1
Do you find that the real property and improvements commonly
known as [the Goldenrod property] was the homestead of [the
Noriegas] when they purchased the property in December 1994?
....
Answer: Yes
Question No. 2
Do you find that the real property and improvements commonly
known as [the Goldenrod property] was the homestead of [the
Noriegas] on March 4, 2014?
....
Answer: No
Subsequently, on December 22, 2014, the trial court signed an “Interlocutory
Judgment,” noting that trial was had to a jury on “the limited issue of whether the
[Goldenrod property] was [the Noriegas’] homestead.” The trial court concluded
5
In her opening statement to the jury, counsel for the Noriegas noted, “[T]he only
issue we’re bringing to you today is to decide and confirm that the 314 Goldenrod
property is the Noriegas’ homestead. You’re only going to hear my case.” In her
opening statement to the jury, counsel for Lousteau and Clanton noted, “The sole
issue for you to decide today is whether or not 314 Goldenrod was declared as the
[Noriegas’] homestead on March 4th, 2014.” And in closing, counsel for
Lousteau and Clanton emphasized, “So you are here to determine whether the
Noriegas . . . showed you [by] a preponderance of the evidence that this property
was not just their home, but was their homestead in December of 1994.
And . . . whether it was their homestead on March 4th of 2014.”
5
that the jury’s answer to the first question was “material and dispositive” and its
answer to the second question was “immaterial” and “disregarded.” The trial court
noted that it had, by its November 7, 2014 order, already “set aside the underlying
default judgment,” “as well as released the bonds and other monies in the registry
of the Court to [the Noriegas].” However, “[t]o the extent that is not clear in the
November 7, 2014 Order, the same is hereby” ordered. And the trial court set
aside the constable’s deed as “void ab initio,” restoring “[a]ll property rights” in
the Goldenrod property to the Noriegas and ordering that Lousteau and Clanton
turn over possession of the property to the Noriegas.
On February 13, 2015, the trial court signed an order6 consolidating, under
cause number 2013-35448, Lousteau and Clanton’s trespass and nuisance suit
(cause number 2013-35448) and the Noriegas’ bill of review, declaratory-judgment
action on the homestead issue, and wrongful-execution claim for damages (cause
number 2014-14152). In its order, the trial court explained:
After completion of a limited jury trial on [the Noriegas’]
declaratory judgment cause of action regarding whether [the
Goldenrod property] was [the Noriegas’] homestead at times material
to the suit, the Court entered an Interlocutory Judgment on December
22, 2014. The Interlocutory Judgment generally held, among other
things, that [the Goldenrod property] was and is [the Noriegas’]
homestead and that, for the reason stated therein, they were entitled
to the return of the home (rather than having to sue for its fair market
value) under the authority of Salomon v. Lesay, 369 S.W.3d 540,
554–57 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.). Further,
6
See supra note 5.
6
because [Lousteau and Clanton] conceded the bill of review issues
immediately before trial, the Court set aside the underlying default
judgment in cause number 2013-35548.
The issues which remain to be tried—and which were
dependent on the outcome of the bill of review and declaratory
judgment causes of action—include (subject to amendment): (1) any
liability and damage claim by [the Noriegas] for wrongful execution;
(2) any third party claims . . . ; [and] (3) [Lousteau and Clanton’s]
claims [for trespass and nuisance] in the underlying lawsuit . . . . It is
the Court’s desire to try all of these matters together.
The trial court, also on February 13, 2015, then signed an “Order of
Severance,” stating as follows:
The Court hereby sua sponte severs its December 22, 2014
Interlocutory Judgment regarding [the Noriegas’] Bill of Review and
Declaratory Judgment causes of action against [Lousteau and Clanton]
from the remainder of this consolidated case.
It is therefore ORDERED that [the Noriegas’] causes of action
for Bill of Review and Declaratory Judgment, as adjudicated in the
Court’s December 22, 2014 Interlocutory Judgment . . . are hereby
severed from this consolidated case into a new cause [Cause No.
2013-35448-B].
....
It is further ORDERED that the entry of this Order shall
immediately make the Court’s December 22, 2014 Interlocutory
Judgment . . . into a final and appealable Judgment, disposing of all
claims and all parties in that newly severed cause, 2013-35448-B.
On March 11, 2015, the trial court vacated its February 13, 2015 “Order of
Severance” “only insofar as it severed the Bill of Review cause of action.” The
trial court explained:
The Court’s February 13, 2015 Order is hereby UNCHANGED as to
the declaratory judgment cause of action that was tried in 2014-14152
7
and then consolidated into 2013-35448. The Court’s judgment on that
cause of action remains final and appealable from within 2013-35448-
B.
To be clear, by vacating the February 13, 2015 Order in part, it is the
Court’s intent and Order that the Bill of Review cause of action is
now consolidated back into the 2013-35448 main case where it will sit
until it is made part of a final judgment in that case on the remaining
issues therein, or until further order of this Court.
(Emphasis added.)
Lousteau and Clanton then filed notices of appeal in trial court cause
numbers 2013-35448 and 2013-35448-B, challenging the trial court’s December
22, 2014 interlocutory judgment; February 13, 2015 consolidation and severance
orders; and March 11, 2015 order. We dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction
in trial court cause number 2013-35448. Lousteau v. Noriega, No. 01-15-00341-
CV, 2015 WL 6081385, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 13, 2015, no
pet.) (mem. op.). The instant appeal is from trial court cause number 2013-35448-
B, which contains only the Noriegas’ declaratory-judgment action on the
homestead issue.
Severance
In their fifth issue, Lousteau and Clanton argue that the trial court erred in
“not issuing a final judgment” on the Noriegas’ claims because “the wrongful
execution claim was on the live pleadings at the time of trial”; “the record
shows . . . no orders severing/bifurcating it before trial commenced”; and the
8
“record is clear” that the Noriegas “waived” their wrongful-execution claim “by
failing to pursue it at trial.” In their seventh issue, Lousteau and Clanton argue that
the trial court erred in “severing the wrongful execution claim”7 because it did so
“after” the “case” “ha[d] gone to a jury.” They assert that the trial court’s
“severance should be disregarded by this Court and a final judgment that provides
a ruling that the wrongful execution was waived in the jury trial should be
rendered.”
A trial court has broad discretion to order separate trials on certain issues or
claims. See Patterson v. Brewer Leasing, Inc., 490 S.W.3d 205, 222 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.); Barnes v. Deadrick, 464 S.W.3d 48, 58–59
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.). A trial court, “in furtherance of
convenience or to avoid prejudice[,] may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-
claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of any separate issue or of any number
of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party claims, or issues.” TEX. R. CIV.
P. 174(b). A separate trial “leaves the lawsuit intact but enables the court to hear
and determine one or more issues without trying all controverted issues at the same
hearing.” Hall v. City of Austin, 450 S.W.2d 836, 838 (Tex. 1970). “The order
7
As discussed above, the trial court, in its “Order of Severance,” severed the
Noriegas’ “causes of action for Bill of Review and Declaratory Judgment, as
adjudicated in the Court’s December 22, 2014 Interlocutory Judgment.” And it
subsequently vacated its severance of the bill-of-review action, leaving only the
declaratory action in the severed cause. The Noriegas’ wrongful-execution claim,
which was not “adjudicated,” was not severed.
9
entered at the conclusion of a separate trial is often interlocutory, because no final
and appealable judgment can properly be rendered until all of the controlling issues
have been tried and decided.” Id.; see Christopher Columbus St. Mkt. LLC v.
Zoning Bd. of Adjustments of City of Galveston, 302 S.W.3d 408, 414 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.).
Here, as discussed above, the record shows that the trial court and the parties
proceeded to a jury trial on the limited issue of determining the Noriegas’
declaratory-judgment action on their homestead claim. See Tarrant Reg’l Water
Dist. v. Gragg, 151 S.W.3d 546, 556 (Tex. 2004) (trial court authorized to order
separate trial on any issue in interest of convenience or to avoid prejudice);
Christopher Columbus St. Mkt. LLC, 302 S.W.3d at 413 (“It is clear that the parties
and the district court agreed to proceed with the [plaintiffs’] claims under a
bifurcated structure with separate proceedings . . . .”); see also Barnes, 464 S.W.3d
at 59 (“treat[ing] the procedure utilized” by trial court “as a separate trial”). To the
extent they complain that the trial court erred in conducting a separate trial on the
Noriegas’ homestead claim, Lousteau and Clanton do not direct us to any point in
the record in which they objected, before or during trial, and thus such complaint is
waived. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a) (preservation of complaint for appellate
review requires timely request, objection, or motion with sufficient specificity to
apprise trial court of complaint); Christopher Columbus St. Mkt. LLC, 302 S.W.3d
10
at 413 (complaint that trial court conducted separate trial of discrete issue waived
by failure to object).
After trial of the homestead claim, the trial court signed an “Interlocutory
Judgment.” See Hall, 450 S.W.2d at 838 (“The order entered at the conclusion of a
separate trial is often interlocutory, because no final and appealable judgment can
properly be rendered until all of the controlling issues have been tried and
decided.”). Because all the controlling issues in the case, i.e., the wrongful-
execution claim for damages, had not been tried and decided, the trial court did not
err in not issuing a final judgment in the case. See id.
Subsequently, however, the trial court signed an order purporting to sever
the Noriegas’ homestead claim “to make it final and appealable.” Lousteau and
Clanton assert that the trial court erred in severing the case “after” it “ha[d] gone to
a jury.”
Generally, a trial court has broad discretion in the severance of cases, and its
decision will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Guar. Fed. Sav. Bank
v. Horseshoe Operating Co., 793 S.W.2d 652, 658 (Tex. 1990); In re Henry, 388
S.W.3d 719, 726 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, orig. proceeding). The
“controlling reasons for a severance are to do justice, avoid prejudice, and further
convenience.” Guar. Fed. Sav. Bank, 793 S.W.2d at 658. A trial court properly
exercises its discretion in severing claims if (1) the controversy involves more than
11
one cause of action; (2) the severed claim is one that could be asserted
independently in a separate lawsuit; and (3) the severed claim is not so interwoven
with the remaining action that they involve the same facts and issues. In re Henry,
388 S.W.3d at 726. “Severance of a single cause of action into two parts is never
proper and should not be granted for the purpose of enabling the litigants to obtain
an early appellate ruling on the trial court’s determination of one phase of the
case.” Pierce v. Reynolds, 329 S.W.2d 76, 78, 79 n.1 (Tex. 1959). When a trial
court severs a lawsuit, two or more independent suits result, and each leads to its
own final, appealable judgment. In re Henry, 388 S.W.3d at 725.
A trial court is authorized to sever claims on its own motion, so long as the
severance is proper under the rules of civil procedure. Aviation Composite Techs.,
Inc. v. CLB Corp., 131 S.W.3d 181, 187 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.)
(citing Rice v. Travelers Exp. Co., 407 S.W.2d 534, 536 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston
1966, no writ)). Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 41 provides:
Misjoinder of parties is not ground for dismissal of an action. Parties
may be dropped or added, or suits filed separately may be
consolidated, or actions which have been improperly joined may be
severed and each ground of recovery improperly joined may be
docketed as a separate suit between the same parties, by order of the
court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of
the action, before the time of submission to the jury or to the court if
trial is without a jury, on such terms as are just. Any claim against a
party may be severed and proceeded with separately.
TEX. R. CIV. P. 41.
12
“A literal interpretation of [r]ule 41 implies that only complaints about
improper joinder must be made prior to the time of submission to the jury.” Arlitt
v. Weston, No. 04-98-00035-CV, 1999 WL 1097101, at *4 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio Dec. 1, 1999, pet. denied) (not designated for publication). And,
“[o]therwise, the general rule that [a]ny claim against a party may be severed and
proceeded with separately applies, and the motion may be made at any time.” Id.
(internal quotations omitted). However, the Texas Supreme Court has interpreted
rule 41 to mean that “all ‘[p]arties and actions may be severed at any stage of the
action, before the time of submission to the jury.’” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting
State Dep’t of Highways and Pub. Trans. v. Cotner, 845 S.W.2d 818, 819 (Tex.
1993)); see TEX. R. CIV. P. 41. Thus, rule 41 does not “permit a trial court to sever
a case after it has been submitted to the trier of fact.” Cotner, 845 S.W.2d at 819
(emphasis added). A trial court abuses its discretion in ordering a severance after a
jury verdict, “regardless of the [three]-pronged test [for] severability.” Arlitt, 1999
WL 1097101, at *4.
Here, the trial court erred in severing the case after the Noriegas’ declaratory
action on the homestead claim was tried to the jury. See id. This Court has held
that a post-submission severance constitutes trial court error and does not deprive
an appellate court of jurisdiction to consider the appeal. City of Houston v. Am.
Res., Inc., No. 01-99-01377-CV, 2002 WL 31941517, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston
13
[1st Dist.] Dec. 27, 2002, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (“A trial court’s
action that is contrary to a procedural rule does not divest a court of appeals of
jurisdiction, but may be corrected through the ordinary appellate process or other
direct proceedings.”); see also Pierce, 329 S.W.2d at 78 (“No matter how
erroneous its conclusion and action may have been, it was within the judicial
power of the court to determine that the cause was severable and to sever the same
accordingly.”); Bird v. Lubricants, USA, LP, No. 2-06-061-CV, 2007 WL
2460352, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 31, 2007, pet. denied) (mem. op.)
(denying motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction based on improper severance);
Nicor Expl. Co. v. Fla. Gas Transmission Co., 911 S.W.2d 479, 482–83 (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi 1995, writ denied) (declining to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction notwithstanding improper severance); Rutherford v. Whataburger, Inc.,
601 S.W.2d 441, 443 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (judgment in
severed portion of case final for purposes of appellate jurisdiction regardless
whether severance proper).
In City of Houston, the city argued that the trial court’s severance entered
after the case had been submitted to a jury was “void,” and its “final” judgment
was interlocutory and unappealable. 2002 WL 31941517, at *1. We held that
“[o]nly a trial court judgment rendered without ‘jurisdictional power’ is void.” Id.
(quoting Mapco, Inc. v. Forrest, 795 S.W.2d 700, 702 (Tex. 1990)). We explained
14
that “[a] trial court’s action that is contrary to a procedural rule does not divest a
court of appeals of jurisdiction.”8 Id. Rather, “an erroneous order of severance
may be set aside on appeal.” Id. And “a judgment that possesses all the attributes
of finality cannot be regarded as interlocutory merely because the trial court may
have erred in ordering a severance.” Id.
Here, the trial court fully adjudicated the Noriegas’ declaratory action.
However, it issued its severance order in contravention of a procedural rule. See
id.; see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 41. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred in
severing the case.
We overrule Lousteau and Clanton’s fifth issue and sustain their seventh
issue.
Having concluded that the trial court erred in entering its severance order,
we further conclude that the underlying judgment is interlocutory and, thus, we
8
Courts have held that “[t]here is a distinction between those severances that are
facially invalid and those that are merely improper.” Nicor Expl. Co. v. Fl. Gas
Transmission Co., 911 S.W.2d 479, 483 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1995, writ
denied); see also A-Affordable Ins. Agency, Inc. v. AEA Ins. Agency Inc., No. 14-
09-00879-CV, 2010 WL 2103967, at *1–2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May
27, 2010, no writ) (mem. op.) (dismissing appeal of severance order where trial
court “severed a definition, not a judgment” and did not “dispose of any claims,
causes of action, or parties, and [did] not deny or grant any relief”); Forlano v.
Joyner, 906 S.W.2d 118, 120 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ)
(attempted severance of transfer order invalid and not appealable); H.E. Butt
Grocery Co. v. Currier, 885 S.W.2d 175, 177 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1994,
no writ) (attempted severance of preliminary discovery order invalid and not
appealable).
15
lack jurisdiction to reach Lousteau and Clanton’s first, second, third, and fourth
issues, in which they argue, in regard to the Noriegas’ homestead issue, that the
trial court erred in submitting question one to the jury because “it was not
supported by the pleadings and, thus, was not a controlling question”; disregarding
the jury’s negative finding in answer to question two because the jury’s finding
was “material” and the trial court had “no authority to substitute its finding for that
of a jury”; and concluding that their abandonment defense was not tried by
consent. See In re Hoover, Bax & Slovacek, L.L.P., 6 S.W.3d 646, 649 (Tex.
App.—El Paso 1999, orig. proceeding) (concluding “no jurisdiction to address the
remaining points of error since the discovery order would become interlocutory
upon rejoining the original suit”); Tilger v. Samson Homes, Inc., No. 14-97-0361-
CV, 1999 WL 160995, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 25, 1999, pet.
denied) (not designated for publication) (“Having determined severance in the
court below was improper, we do not reach the remaining issues.”); Nicor Expl.
Co., 911 S.W.2d at 483 (declining to reach remaining issues after determining that
severance was improper); see also In re B.T.G., No. 05-13-00305-CV, 2016 WL
1367073, at *4 (Tex. App. Apr.—Dallas Apr. 6, 2016, no pet.) (“Because the
severance was improper, we conclude the divorce decree is interlocutory and
issues other than the severance are not properly before us.”).
16
Further, we do not reach Lousteau and Clanton’s sixth issue, in which they
argue that the trial court erred in “awarding damages” to the Noriegas because “the
jury verdict did not award damages.” They assert that the “damages awarded
(setting aside the sale, handing over the deed, foregoing rental payments on the
property) were all sought by [the Noriegas] in relation to the bill of review action
or the wrongful writ of execution, both of which were not a part of the trial in this
case.” Because, as Lousteau and Clanton note, the trial court set aside the writ of
execution and the constable’s sale and deed “in relation to the bill-of-review
action,” which, as discussed above, remains in the main suit (trial court cause
number 2013-35448), such actions are not before us in this appeal. See Lousteau,
2015 WL 6081385, at *2–3.
17
Conclusion
We reverse the trial court’s severance order and remand the case to the trial
court for further proceedings.9 We dismiss all pending motions as moot.
Terry Jennings
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Massengale, and Huddle.
9
See Owens v. Owens, 228 S.W.3d 721, 727 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2006, pet. dism’d) (reversing trial court’s severance order and remanding for
further proceedings); Nicor Expl. Co., 911 S.W.2d at 483; see also TEX. R. APP. P.
43.2.
18