Richard Charles Owings, Jr. v. State ( 2016 )


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  • Opinion issued August 30, 2016
    In The
    Court of Appeals
    For The
    First District of Texas
    ————————————
    NO. 01-15-00132-CR
    ———————————
    RICHARD CHARLES OWINGS, JR., Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 262nd District Court
    Harris County, Texas
    Trial Court Case No. 1454997
    OPINION
    A jury convicted appellant, Richard Charles Owings, Jr., of the first-degree
    felony offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child and assessed his punishment
    at thirty years’ confinement.1 In two issues, appellant contends that the trial court
    erred by (1) allowing the State to cross-examine him about the underlying facts of
    his prior conviction for aggravated robbery, and (2) denying his request that the
    court order the State to elect which of the instances of sexual assault presented
    during the trial testimony it would rely upon for a conviction.
    We reverse and remand.
    Background
    Appellant was previously married to F.M., the grandmother of the
    complainant, K.M., who was born in 2003 and was eleven years old at the time of
    trial. Appellant and K.M. are not biologically related. K.M. and her mother,
    M.M., occasionally lived with F.M. and appellant, and they all lived together in
    late 2009 and early 2010. Because appellant was unemployed during this period of
    time and both F.M. and M.M. worked, K.M. spent a lot of time after school in the
    care of appellant or K.M.’s uncle, who was in high school. K.M. had a “close”
    relationship with appellant.
    F.M. testified that she felt suspicious of appellant’s interactions with K.M.
    Occasionally, appellant and K.M. would be alone in appellant and F.M.’s bedroom
    with the door locked, and, when questioned about this, appellant would respond
    that he and K.M. wanted to spend time together without other family members
    1
    See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.021(a)(1)(B)(iii), 22.021(a)(2)(B) (Vernon Supp.
    2015).
    2
    being involved.    F.M. noticed that this happened most often when she and
    appellant hosted family dinners on Sundays. On one occasion, when appellant
    unlocked and opened the door, F.M. noticed K.M. standing in the doorway to the
    bathroom pulling up her pants, and appellant explained that she had just used the
    bathroom. F.M. testified that the incident seemed “[a] little weird” to her and that,
    although K.M. appeared physically fine, she was acting “like maybe she had done
    something she shouldn’t have.” F.M. did not suspect sexual abuse at that point in
    time.
    M.M. and K.M. moved out of F.M. and appellant’s house in early 2010, but
    K.M. still frequently spent time with F.M. and appellant, including Sunday family
    dinners and holidays. On Thanksgiving day, 2010, F.M. called everyone to the
    table, but appellant and K.M. did not show up. When F.M. went to the bedroom
    she shared with appellant, the door was locked, and she told appellant and K.M.
    that it was time to eat. K.M. sat next to F.M. at the table and refused to eat, saying
    that she was not hungry. When F.M. asked her what was wrong, K.M. “looked
    terrified” and “like she was saying help me.”         At this point, F.M. became
    suspicious that something improper had occurred between appellant and K.M., and
    she asked K.M. about a week later if appellant had ever touched her
    inappropriately.   K.M. denied that anything improper had occurred.              F.M.
    3
    “periodically” asked K.M. about whether appellant had done anything
    inappropriate to her, and K.M. always denied it.
    In February 2011, F.M. filed for divorce from appellant. Two years later, in
    January 2013, K.M. was spending the night at F.M.’s house, and F.M. asked her if
    she ever missed appellant. K.M. started crying, and when F.M. asked if there was
    anything that K.M. wanted to tell her, K.M. disclosed that appellant had sexually
    abused her. F.M. then told M.M. about this conversation, and they called the
    sheriff’s department.
    The indictment in this case alleged that, on or about January 1, 2010,
    appellant “did then and there unlawfully, intentionally and knowingly cause the
    sexual organ of [K.M.], a person younger than fourteen years of age and not the
    spouse of [appellant], to contact the sexual organ of [appellant].”2
    K.M. testified that when she was about five years old and F.M. and M.M.
    were both at work, appellant took her into his bedroom, took off her clothes and his
    clothes, and laid her down on the bed. Although she started crying and told
    2
    The State charged appellant with the offense of aggravated sexual assault of a
    child. The State did not charge appellant with the offense of continuous sexual
    abuse of a young child. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02(b) (Vernon Supp.
    2015). Section 21.02(b) provides that a person commits an offense if, during a
    time period that is thirty days or more in duration, the person commits two or more
    acts of sexual abuse, regardless of whether the acts are committed against one or
    more victims, and at the time of the commission of each of the acts of sexual
    abuse, the actor is seventeen years old or older, and the victim is a child younger
    than fourteen years old. 
    Id. 4 appellant
    to stop, appellant climbed on top of her and vaginally penetrated her.
    Appellant showed her a knife that he carried around with him all the time, “put it to
    [her],” and told her that if she told anyone about what had happened, he would hurt
    her, someone else, or one of her pets. K.M. also testified concerning a separate
    incident that occurred in appellant’s bedroom in which, in addition to vaginally
    penetrating her, he made her perform oral sex on him. On another occasion, K.M.
    was watching a movie in her uncle’s bedroom in appellant and F.M.’s house when
    appellant came into the room, engaged in vaginal intercourse with K.M. and made
    her perform oral sex on him.
    K.M. further testified to a fourth incident that occurred after appellant and
    F.M. had separated in early 2011. Appellant picked her up from where she was
    living with M.M. to take her to an arcade. On the way there, appellant stopped by
    his father’s house, where he was living at the time, took her to his bedroom, and
    forced her to engage in both oral and vaginal intercourse. Appellant then took
    K.M. home and told her to tell M.M. that they had visited the arcade. K.M. did not
    see appellant again after this incident. K.M. did not state specific dates for when
    these actions allegedly occurred.
    Lisa Holcomb, a forensic interviewer with the Children’s Assessment
    Center, and Sarah Valdes, a nurse practitioner with the U.T. Child Abuse Center,
    conducted K.M.’s forensic interview in February 2013 and her physical and genital
    5
    examination in June 2013, respectively. K.M. disclosed to both Holcomb and
    Valdes that she had been sexually abused, and she was “very detailed” regarding
    what had happened.       K.M. disclosed that appellant would take her into his
    bedroom and threaten her with a knife and that his “private area” would touch her
    “private area.” K.M. told Holcomb that the abuse happened “a lot” when she was
    four through eight years old. K.M. specifically described to Holcomb an incident
    that occurred in her uncle’s bedroom in appellant and F.M.’s house in which
    appellant forced K.M., who was five or six years old at the time, to perform oral
    sex on him. K.M. also specifically told Holcomb about an incident that occurred at
    appellant’s father’s house.
    Upon appellant’s request, the trial court verbally instructed the jury pursuant
    to Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.37 that
    [E]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts committed by the
    Defendant against the child who is the victim of the alleged offense in
    this indictment shall be admitted for its bearing on relevant matters
    including the state of mind of the Defendant and the child and the
    previous and subsequent relationship between the Defendant and the
    child.
    The trial court further instructed the jury that it could not consider this evidence for
    any other purpose. The trial court included a substantially similar instruction in the
    charge.
    After the State rested, defense counsel argued that there had been evidence
    of “multiple offenses” and multiple dates for the instances of different acts of
    6
    sexual assault, and he requested that the trial court order the State “to elect which
    one of the multiple occasions it’s going to rely on.” The trial court stated:
    And just so that I’m clear, I have a copy of the indictment in front of
    me, which we all, obviously, had an opportunity to review it. There is
    one allegation alleged in the indictment. There is one date that is
    alleged in the indictment. So, the State is relying on the elements, I
    would imagine—well, they are required by law to rely on what they
    have pled, which is one act on or about a certain date. There aren’t
    multiple paragraphs in this indictment alleging different acts on
    different dates.
    Now, I do intend to give the jury a limiting instruction, and I gave a
    limiting instruction already, but I’ll give it to the jury, obviously, in
    the Court’s Charge regarding other acts between—alleged acts
    between the Defendant and the complaining witness. And I’ll limit
    the jury’s consideration.
    The trial court did not require the State to elect which instance of sexual assault it
    would rely upon for a conviction.
    Appellant testified on his own behalf. On direct-examination, appellant
    acknowledged that he had a prior conviction for aggravated robbery in 1986 and a
    prior conviction for felony driving while intoxicated in 2012. Appellant testified
    that he had had a close relationship with K.M., but he denied ever sexually abusing
    her or behaving in an inappropriate way with her. He suggested that F.M. had
    encouraged K.M. to make the abuse allegations against him and that K.M. was
    possibly motivated by “positive attention” from F.M. and M.M.
    On cross-examination, the State questioned appellant about his prior
    aggravated robbery conviction over the objection of the defense. Specifically, the
    7
    State asked appellant, “Fair to say then that you have threatened people with
    weapons before to get what you want?” Appellant acknowledged that he exhibited
    a gun during the aggravated robbery offense.
    The jury charge stated, “The defendant, Richard Charles Owings, Jr., stands
    charged by indictment with the offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child,
    alleged to have been committed on or about the 1st day of January, 2010, in Harris
    County, Texas.” The charge also included an instruction informing the jury that
    “the State is not bound by the specific date which the offense, if any, is alleged in
    the indictment to have been committed, but that a conviction may be had upon
    proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense, if any, was committed at any
    time within the period of limitations.”      The instruction stated, “There is no
    limitation period applicable to the offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child.”
    The charge included a general instruction that, to convict, the jury had to
    unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant committed the offense
    of aggravated sexual assault of a child. The charge did not include a specific
    instruction that, to convict, the jury had to unanimously agree that appellant
    committed a particular act of sexual assault. Appellant did not object to this
    omission.
    The jury found appellant guilty of aggravated sexual assault of a child and
    assessed his punishment at thirty years’ confinement. This appeal followed.
    8
    Failure to Elect Particular Act of Sexual Assault Relied Upon for Conviction
    In his second issue, appellant contends that the trial court erroneously
    refused to require the State to elect which of the specific instances of sexual assault
    of K.M. presented in the trial testimony it would rely upon as the primary act for a
    conviction. The State replies that appellant failed to preserve this complaint for
    appellate review.
    A.    Governing Law
    1. Election of Act Relied Upon for Conviction
    “The general rule is that where one act of intercourse is alleged in the
    indictment and more than one act of intercourse is shown by the evidence in a
    sexual assault trial, the State must elect the act upon which it would rely for
    conviction.”3 O’Neal v. State, 
    746 S.W.2d 769
    , 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988); see
    Phillips v. State, 
    193 S.W.3d 904
    , 910 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (reaffirming
    O’Neal). Once the State rests its case in chief, upon a timely request by the
    defendant, the trial court must order the State to make its election. 
    O’Neal, 746 S.W.2d at 772
    ; see 
    Phillips, 193 S.W.3d at 909
    (“In reexamining O’Neal, we find
    no reason to deviate from our holding that a trial court errs by failing to have the
    State elect at the close of its evidence when properly requested by the defense.”).
    3
    An exception to this general rule exists “where several acts of intercourse were
    committed by one continuous act of force and threats, and are part of the same
    criminal transaction.” O’Neal v. State, 
    746 S.W.2d 769
    , 771 (Tex. Crim. App.
    1988). The State does not contend that this exception applies in this case.
    9
    The Court of Criminal Appeals reasoned that in a “single count, multiple
    transaction case[],” in which the indictment charges a single offense but the
    evidence “reveal[s] numerous repetitions of sexual acts over a considerable period
    of time,” the State must elect which “transaction,” or act of intercourse, it will rely
    upon to prove the single offense alleged in the indictment because otherwise, “a
    defendant might find himself without notice as to which of a multitude of acts he
    might be called upon to defend.” 
    O’Neal, 746 S.W.2d at 772
    .
    In Phillips, the Court of Criminal Appeals stated:
    In short, requiring the State to elect at the close of its evidence forces
    it to formally differentiate the specific evidence upon which it will
    rely as proof of the charged offense from evidence of other offenses or
    misconduct it offers only in an evidentiary capacity. This allows the
    trial judge to distinguish the evidence which the State is relying on to
    prove the particular act charged in the indictment from the evidence
    that the State has introduced for other relevant purposes. Thus, the
    trial court can instruct the jury on the proper use and weight to accord
    each type of evidence. Moreover, the election requirement protects
    fundamental rights such as notice and [jury] unanimity, insuring both
    that the defendant is aware of precisely which act he must defend
    himself against, and that the jurors know precisely which act they
    must all agree he is guilty of in order to convict 
    him. 193 S.W.3d at 910
    (emphasis in original); Phillips v. State, 
    130 S.W.3d 343
    , 349
    (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004) (noting that one reason for election
    requirement is to minimize risk that jury chooses to convict defendant “not because
    one or more crimes were proved beyond a reasonable doubt, but because all of
    10
    them together convinced the jury the defendant was guilty”), aff’d, 
    193 S.W.3d 904
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
    The Court of Criminal Appeals in Phillips also addressed whether other
    procedural actions taken during trial could render the election requirement
    unnecessary. 
    See 193 S.W.3d at 911
    –12. The court held that Code of Criminal
    Procedure article 38.37, which permits the admission of evidence of “other crimes,
    wrongs, or acts committed by the defendant against the child who is the victim of
    the alleged offense [of sexual misconduct],” does not “restrict a defendant’s right
    to have the State elect the incident for which it will seek a conviction by forcing
    the defendant to request a limiting instruction when the evidence is admitted.” 
    Id. at 911;
    see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.37, § 1(b) (Vernon Supp. 2015)
    (permitting admission of extraneous acts between defendant and child “for its
    bearing on relevant matters, including . . . the state of mind of the defendant and
    the child; and . . . the previous and subsequent relationship between the defendant
    and the child”). Similarly, “[a] jury charge alone . . . does not afford the defendant
    with the requisite notice that is provided by a valid and timely election by the
    State” because the charge is not given until the end of trial and would not require
    the State to make its election at a time “when the defense needs to know the
    evidence it must refute in order to challenge the specific act in the indictment.”
    
    Phillips, 193 S.W.3d at 912
    .
    11
    When the trial court requires the State to make an election, a defendant is
    also entitled to an instruction in the jury charge informing the jury to consider only
    the elected act in deciding guilt and limiting the consideration of the unelected acts
    to the purposes for which they were admitted, such as for consideration under
    article 38.37. See Rivera v. State, 
    233 S.W.3d 403
    , 406 (Tex. App.—Waco 2007,
    pet. ref’d).   “While each of the incidents presented [to the jury during trial
    testimony] may constitute the commission of a sexual abuse offense, the jury must
    agree on one distinct incident in order to render a unanimous verdict.” 
    Phillips, 193 S.W.3d at 913
    . The jury’s consideration of multiple instances of sexual abuse
    without the State’s election of one instance on which to rely for a conviction
    “jeopardizes the defendant’s right to a unanimous jury verdict as guaranteed by the
    Texas Constitution, even though the extraneous incidents may be admissible for
    other purposes under Article 38.37 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.” 
    Id. The trial
    court’s failure to require the State to elect the specific act on which
    it intends to rely for a conviction upon a timely request by the defendant
    constitutes constitutional error. 
    Id. at 914.
    In such cases, we must reverse a
    judgment of conviction unless we determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the
    error did not contribute to the conviction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(a); 
    Phillips, 193 S.W.3d at 914
    . In determining whether the trial court’s failure to require the
    12
    State to elect harmed the defendant, we consider the four purposes behind the
    election rule:
    (1) to protect the accused from the introduction of extraneous
    offenses;
    (2) to minimize the risk that the jury might choose to convict, not
    because one or more crimes were proven beyond a reasonable
    doubt, but because all of them together convinced the jury the
    defendant was guilty;
    (3) to ensure unanimous verdicts, that is, all of the jurors agreeing that
    one specific incident, which constituted the offense charged in the
    indictment, occurred; and
    (4) to give the defendant notice of the particular offense the State
    intends to rely upon for prosecution and afford the defendant an
    opportunity to defend.
    Dixon v. State, 
    201 S.W.3d 731
    , 733, 734 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). “If the State
    fails to elect, but the evidence presented clearly indicates which specific incident
    the State is relying on, the error is not harmful.” 
    Phillips, 130 S.W.3d at 352
    . If,
    however, multiple instances are described in detail and it is unclear which act the
    State would rely upon for conviction, then courts cannot say beyond a reasonable
    doubt that the error in failing to require an election did not contribute to the
    conviction. 
    Id. at 353–54.
    2. Preservation of Error
    On appeal, the State contends that appellant failed to preserve for appellate
    review his complaint that the trial court failed to require the State to elect the
    alleged act upon which it relied for conviction. It argues that although appellant
    13
    timely requested that the State elect which alleged act it would be relying upon, the
    record does not demonstrate that the trial court made an adverse ruling on the
    request.
    To preserve error for appellate review, the complaining party must make a
    timely request, objection, or motion and must obtain a ruling by the trial court. See
    TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); Mendez v. State, 
    138 S.W.3d 334
    , 341 (Tex. Crim. App.
    2004). The complaining party must receive an adverse ruling from the trial court,
    and that ruling must be conclusive, “that is, it must be clear from the record the
    trial judge in fact overruled the defendant’s objection or otherwise error is
    waived.” Ramirez v. State, 
    815 S.W.2d 636
    , 643 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). An
    implied ruling by the trial court may be sufficient to preserve error “when the
    objection was brought to the trial court’s attention and the trial court’s subsequent
    action clearly addressed the complaint.” See State v. Kelley, 
    20 S.W.3d 147
    , 153
    n.3 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000, no pet.); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(2)(A)
    (providing that to preserve error, record must show that trial court “ruled on the
    request, objection, or motion, either expressly or implicitly”); Gutierrez v. State, 
    36 S.W.3d 509
    , 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (holding that court of appeals erred in
    determining that appellant failed to preserve complaint concerning motion to
    suppress when appellate court failed to consider whether trial court impliedly ruled
    on motion).
    14
    B.     Application of the Law to the Facts of the Case
    Here, after the State rested, defense counsel had the following exchange with
    the trial court:
    [Defense counsel]:       We have a Motion for Directed Verdict and
    a Motion for an election by the State at this
    point as to which one of the alleged dates or
    times that they will be relying on.
    The Court:               Well, they have alleged on or about January
    1st of 2010 in their indictment.
    [Defense counsel]:       We have had multiple offenses given to us
    in testimony, and we have multiple dates for
    occasions for them, and we believe that
    under Milby v. State, the State having rested,
    we have the right to ask the State to elect
    which one of the multiple occasions it’s
    going to rely on.
    The Court:               And just so I’m clear, I have a copy of the
    indictment in front of me, which we all,
    obviously, had an opportunity to review it.
    There is one allegation alleged in the
    indictment. There is one date that is alleged
    in the indictment. So, the State is relying on
    the elements, I would imagine—well, they
    are required by law to rely on what they
    have pled, which is one act on or about a
    certain date.        There aren’t multiple
    paragraphs in this indictment alleging
    different acts on different dates.
    Now, I do intend to give the jury a limiting
    instruction, and I gave a limiting instruction
    already, but I’ll give it to the jury,
    obviously, in the Court’s Charge regarding
    other acts between—alleged acts between
    15
    the Defendant and the complaining witness.
    And I’ll limit the jury’s consideration.
    The charge given by the trial court reiterated the language from the
    indictment concerning the date of the alleged offense as January 1, 2010, but the
    charge also included an instruction that “the State is not bound by the specific date
    which the offense, if any, is alleged in the indictment to have been committed, but
    that a conviction may be had upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the
    offense, if any, was committed at any time within the period of limitations.”4 The
    instruction then informed the jury that “[t]here is no limitation period applicable to
    the offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child.” See Farr v. State, 
    140 S.W.3d 895
    , 899–900 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004) (“[F]or the purposes of
    determining appellant’s guilt or innocence of the indicted offenses, the jury
    charges did not limit the jury’s consideration to appellant’s conduct on any specific
    date.”), aff’d sub nom. Phillips, 
    193 S.W.3d 904
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). The
    4
    The State need not allege a specific date in the indictment. Sledge v. State, 
    953 S.W.2d 253
    , 255 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). “It is well settled that the ‘on or about’
    language of an indictment allows the State to prove a date other than the one
    alleged in the indictment as long as the date is anterior to the presentment of the
    indictment and within the statutory limitation period.” 
    Id. at 256;
    Thomas v. State,
    
    753 S.W.2d 688
    , 693 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (“Where an indictment alleges that
    some relevant event transpired ‘on or about’ a particular date, the accused is put
    on notice to prepare for proof that the event happened at any time within the
    statutory period of limitations.”); see also Yzaguirre v. State, 
    957 S.W.2d 38
    , 39
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (“In the absence of evidence that the offense occurred on
    April 23, 1995, [the specific date alleged in the indictment,] the State was entitled
    to rely upon an instance of prior conduct occurring during the preceding year that
    otherwise met the description of the offense in the indictment.”).
    16
    charge did not include a specific instruction that the jury had to unanimously agree
    that appellant committed a particular act of sexual assault.
    1. Preservation of Error
    Here, appellant properly requested at the close of the State’s evidence that
    the State be required to elect the primary act relied upon for conviction. See
    
    Phillips, 193 S.W.3d at 910
    . When appellant requested that the State make its
    election, the trial court responded that the indictment alleged January 1, 2010, as
    the date that appellant allegedly assaulted K.M. and that the State is “required by
    law to rely on what they have pled, which is one act on or about a certain date.”
    The trial court then stated that it intended to give a limiting instruction in the
    charge concerning other alleged acts between appellant and K.M. Although the
    trial court did not expressly deny or overrule appellant’s request that the State be
    required to make its election, the trial court’s subsequent statements reflected that
    it did not believe that the State needed to make an election because the indictment
    alleged one act on a specific date. The court then stated that it would give an
    article 38.37 limiting instruction, but it did not require the State to make an
    election.
    We hold that, in view of these statements and actions, the trial court
    overruled appellant’s request that the State be required to make an election.
    Appellant, therefore, properly preserved his complaint for appellate review. See
    17
    TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(2)(A) (noting that trial court’s ruling may be made “either
    expressly or implicitly”); 
    Kelley, 20 S.W.3d at 153
    n.3 (stating that implied ruling
    may preserve error “when the objection was brought to the trial court’s attention
    and the trial court’s subsequent action clearly addressed the complaint”); see also
    Rey v. State, 
    897 S.W.2d 333
    , 336 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (“While we require that
    a defendant’s objections be specific enough to effectively communicate his
    complaint to the court, we are less stringent in our requirements of the trial court’s
    ruling on an objection. A court’s ruling on a complaint or objection can be
    impliedly rather than expressly made.”).
    We turn, therefore, to whether the trial court erred in failing to require the
    State to elect the primary act relied upon for conviction.
    2. Trial Court’s Failure to Require Election
    Here, the indictment against appellant alleged:
    The duly organized Grand Jury of Harris County, Texas, presents in
    the District Court of Harris County, Texas, that in Harris County,
    Texas, Richard Charles Owings, Jr., hereafter styled the Defendant,
    heretofore on or about January 1, 2010, did then and there
    unlawfully, intentionally and knowingly cause the sexual organ of
    [K.M.], a person younger than fourteen years of age and not the
    spouse of the Defendant, to contact the sexual organ of the Defendant.
    At trial, Holcomb testified that in her forensic interview, K.M. told her that the
    abuse happened “a lot” when she was between four and eight years old. K.M.
    testified to four separate, specific instances in which appellant’s sexual organ
    18
    contacted her sexual organ: two different occasions that occurred in F.M. and
    appellant’s bedroom (one of which was accompanied by appellant forcing K.M. to
    also perform oral sex on him), one occasion that occurred in her uncle’s bedroom,
    and one occasion that occurred at appellant’s father’s house.         K.M. provided
    detailed testimony regarding each of these instances, such as where the acts took
    place and what appellant made her do. K.M. did not give specific dates for when
    any of these instances occurred, although she testified that the first specific
    instance occurred when she was “[a]bout five years old,” or in 2008 or 2009, and
    that the incident at appellant’s father’s house occurred after appellant and F.M. had
    separated in 2011. K.M. did not testify that any particular instance occurred on or
    around January 1, 2010, the particular date alleged in the indictment, and no other
    witness testified to any offense against K.M. occurring on that date. The State
    referred to each of the four specific instances testified to by K.M. during closing
    argument.
    This is a case in which the indictment alleged one act of intercourse and the
    testimony at trial demonstrated that more than one act of intercourse occurred.
    Thus, upon appellant’s timely request, the State was required to elect the act of
    intercourse upon which it would rely for a conviction. See 
    Phillips, 193 S.W.3d at 912
    (“[O]nce the State rests its case in chief, on the timely request of a defendant
    the trial court must order the State to make its election . . . .”); O’Neal, 
    746 S.W.2d 19
    at 772 (“[O]nce the State rests its case in chief, in the face of a timely request by
    the defendant, the trial court must order the State to make its election. Failure to
    do so constitutes error.”) (emphasis in original). The admission of evidence of
    other acts committed by appellant against K.M. did not restrict appellant’s right to
    require the State to elect the incident for which it was seeking conviction. See
    
    Phillips, 193 S.W.3d at 911
    . Moreover, the jury charge did not serve “as a de facto
    election” because it was given too late in the trial to afford appellant the requisite
    notice to marshal his evidence to challenge the specific act relied upon by the
    State. See 
    id. at 912.
    We hold that the trial court erred by failing to require the State to make its
    election. We therefore turn to whether this error harmed appellant. See 
    Dixon, 201 S.W.3d at 734
    ; 
    Phillips, 130 S.W.3d at 349
    .
    3. Harm Analysis for Failure to Require State to Make Election
    Versus Harm Analysis for Failure to Inform Jury of Its Duty
    When Election Is Made
    In Phillips, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that “the failure to require
    the State to elect upon timely request results in constitutional 
    error.” 193 S.W.3d at 914
    . In reviewing complaints about the court’s failure to require an election, an
    appellate court is “required to reverse the convictions unless it [finds] beyond a
    reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the conviction or had but slight
    effect.” 
    Id. (citing TEX.
    R. APP. P. 44.2(a)). In answering this question in the
    20
    specific failure-to-elect context, courts must consider the four purposes underlying
    the election requirement, as articulated in Phillips. See 
    id. at 910
    (setting out
    purposes), 913–14 (conducting harm analysis); see also 
    Dixon, 201 S.W.3d at 734
    –
    36 (analyzing failure to elect under constitutional harm standard set out in
    Phillips).
    A related issue that arises in this context occurs when the trial court properly
    requires the State to make an election, but then fails to inform the jury in the jury
    charge of that election and of the jury’s corresponding duty to consider only the
    elected act in deciding guilt and to convict only if all jurors agree unanimously,
    beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed the elected act. In other
    words, the trial court errs when it requires an election but fails to inform the jury of
    the consequences of that election. This issue is related to, but distinct from, the
    trial court’s failure to require an election at all. See Reza v. State, 
    339 S.W.3d 706
    ,
    713 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, pet. ref’d) (“Both Phillips and Dixon address
    harm when the State fails to elect upon request; they do not deal with a harm
    analysis when the State makes an election, yet the trial court fails to include in its
    jury charge an instruction regarding the State’s election.”); Isenhower v. State, 
    261 S.W.3d 168
    , 175 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (rejecting
    constitutional harm analysis from Dixon and Phillips as “inapposite” when State
    21
    made election but error complained of was court’s failure to include instruction on
    this election in jury charge).
    In a case in which the trial court requires the State to make an election but
    fails to inform the jury of the election in the charge, courts conduct a harm analysis
    under the usual standard of harm for jury charge errors. They consider whether the
    error amounts to “some harm” or “egregious harm” depending on whether the
    defendant objected to the charge error at trial, and they consider the four Phillips
    purposes within this framework. See 
    Reza, 339 S.W.3d at 714
    –15 (“Because Reza
    did not object to the trial court’s failure to include in the jury charge an instruction
    regarding the State’s election, we must decide whether the error was so egregious
    and created such harm that Reza was deprived of a fair and impartial trial—in
    short, that ‘egregious harm’ has occurred.”); 
    Isenhower, 261 S.W.3d at 175
    (“Because we have found that the trial court erred by failing to include a more
    specific instruction in the charge limiting the jury’s consideration to the [elected]
    first act of intercourse between A.B. and appellant, in light of appellant’s failure to
    object to this charge error, we review it for egregious harm.”); but see Duffey v.
    State, 
    326 S.W.3d 627
    , 631 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.) (holding, in case in
    which State made election but trial court did not specifically instruct jury on
    election in charge, that Phillips constitutional harm standard is appropriate, instead
    of usual charge error harm standard, because court’s “failure to instruct the jury
    22
    concerning the State’s election placed Duffey in the same position as if no election
    had been made,” i.e., in position in which he could not know whether jury verdict
    was unanimous as to any specific act).
    Here, however, as in Phillips, the trial court did not require the State to elect,
    upon appellant’s timely request, which particular instance of sexual assault it
    would rely upon for conviction. As we have held, this was error. See 
    Phillips, 193 S.W.3d at 914
    . As a result of this error, the trial court also did not include in the
    charge an instruction concerning which act the State had elected to rely upon and
    informing the jury that, to convict, it had to unanimously find beyond a reasonable
    doubt that appellant committed that particular elected act. Although appellant did
    not object to the omission of such an instruction in the charge, in this case, the
    erroneous charge derives from the trial court’s earlier error in failing to require the
    State to make an election at all. It is that first error that appellant complains about
    on appeal.
    Because this is a case in which the trial court wholly failed to require an
    election, as opposed to a case in which the court required the State to elect but then
    erroneously failed to include a corresponding instruction in the charge, we analyze
    harm using the constitutional harm standard set out in Phillips and Dixon. See
    
    Dixon, 201 S.W.3d at 734
    ; 
    Phillips, 193 S.W.3d at 914
    ; cf. 
    Reza, 339 S.W.3d at 713
    (distinguishing Phillips and Dixon and using usual harm analysis for charge
    23
    error when trial court required election but failed to instruct jury in charge);
    
    Isenhower, 261 S.W.3d at 175
    (holding same).          We, therefore, must consider
    whether, without the election, the four purposes of requiring the election were
    nevertheless met.
    4. Application of Constitutional Harm Analysis for Failure to
    Require Election
    a.     Admission of extraneous offense evidence to show
    relationship between defendant and child victim
    With regard to the first purpose of the election requirement, which we
    consider in a harm analysis pursuant to Phillips and Dixon, appellant “was not
    entitled to be protected from the admission of evidence of extraneous sexual
    offenses committed by him against the child.” See 
    Dixon, 201 S.W.3d at 734
    .
    Article 38.37 “permits the admission of evidence of these offenses to show the
    previous and subsequent relationship between appellant and the child victim.” See
    
    id. (citing TEX.
    CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.37, § 1(1), 2(2)). Here, the trial
    court gave the jury an oral article 38.37 instruction, and the court included a
    substantially similar instruction in the charge.
    Thus, this purpose of the election requirement was satisfied.
    b.     Risk of jury’s finding defendant guilty of offense not
    proved beyond a reasonable doubt
    The second purpose in requiring the State to elect the act of sexual assault on
    which it relies is to allow the courts to determine whether a risk exists that the jury
    24
    found appellant guilty of an offense that was not proved to its satisfaction beyond a
    reasonable doubt. See 
    id. at 735.
    Here, as in Dixon, the “‘multiple offenses’ were
    all recounted by the same source—the child,” and this case does not involve
    “evidence of different activities from different sources that a jury might perceive to
    ‘add up’ to the defendant being guilty even though no individual offense was
    proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” 
    Id. Dixon, however,
    involved a situation in
    which the child complainant “did not testify about a number of varied incidents
    with differing details that might have incrementally added to the idea that the
    defendant must have done something to provoke the plethora of stories about his
    activities”; rather, the child “articulated one sequence of events and merely
    answered that this sequence happened one hundred times, with all but one of those
    instances occurring at night.” Id.; Hulsey v. State, 
    211 S.W.3d 853
    , 856 (Tex.
    App.—Waco 2006, no pet.) (finding no harm in failing to require State to elect
    when child complainant “did not testify to specific instances of sexual assaults or
    indecency by contact” but instead testified that conduct occurred “every morning
    that [the defendant] could when [the complainant’s] mother was at work” and that
    conduct occurred “so many times that [the complainant could not] remember how
    many”).
    In this case, in contrast, K.M. testified concerning four different instances of
    sexual assault: the first occasion, which occurred in F.M. and appellant’s bedroom;
    25
    the second occasion, which occurred in the same location but that also involved
    appellant forcing K.M. to perform oral sex on him; the third occasion, which
    occurred in K.M.’s uncle’s bedroom while she was watching a movie; and the
    fourth occasion, which occurred after F.M. and appellant divorced and occurred at
    appellant’s father’s house after appellant picked K.M. up from her mother’s house,
    ostensibly to take her to an arcade.      All four instances involved the charged
    conduct of appellant’s sexual organ contacting K.M.’s sexual organ, and the last
    three instances also involved appellant forcing K.M. to perform oral sex on him.
    Thus, the purpose of requiring an election to minimize the risk that the jury
    convicted appellant not because the State proved one or more instances beyond a
    reasonable doubt but because all of the instances together convinced the jury of
    appellant’s guilt was not satisfied.
    c.     Assurance of unanimous verdict
    The third purpose behind the election rule is to ensure a unanimous verdict.
    In this respect, this case is factually analogous to Phillips, in which the Fourteenth
    Court of Appeals held that, as to two counts of aggravated sexual assault alleged
    against the defendant, the trial court’s failure to require an election by the State
    constituted harmful error. 
    See 130 S.W.3d at 353
    –54. Phillips involved three
    counts of aggravated sexual assault alleged against the defendant—one count of
    oral penetration of the complainant’s sexual organ, one count of digital penetration
    26
    of the complainant’s sexual organ, and one count of penetrating the complainant’s
    mouth with the defendant’s sexual organ. See 
    id. For the
    first two counts, the
    complainant presented detailed testimony concerning “more than a few offenses,”
    including “clear testimony” of “two specific occurrences of both digital and oral
    penetration.” 
    Id. at 353.
    The Fourteenth Court noted that “both offenses were
    described in detail more than once” and yet “it was completely unclear to the jury
    which act the State would rely upon for conviction.” 
    Id. Thus, the
    court held that
    the failure to require the State to elect constituted harmful error. 
    Id. at 354.
    For the third count alleged against the defendant, in contrast, the
    complainant “testified in detail about only [one] occurrence, but also testified
    generally that the activity continued at least intermittently from the summer of
    2000 until the spring of 2001.” 
    Id. The Phillips
    court held that, unlike the error in
    the other two counts, “error in failing to require the State to elect is harmless when
    there is detailed testimony as to one occurrence and general, very vague and
    unspecific testimony as to other occurrences,” as there was in the third count in
    that case. 
    Id. at 355.
    With respect to that count, the court reasoned, “Because the
    State focused its attention on one particular occurrence, it would have been clear to
    both appellant and the jury that the State was relying on that occurrence to
    convict.” 
    Id. 27 This
    is not a case comparable to the third count at issue in Phillips, in which
    there was detailed testimony as to one occurrence of the charged offense and
    “general, very vague and unspecific testimony” as to other occurrences. See 
    id. at 355.
    Nor is it a case comparable to Dixon, in which the complainant testified to a
    general sequence of events that occurred on repeated occasions. 
    See 201 S.W.3d at 735
    (holding that there was “no risk that the present case led to a non-unanimous
    verdict” because “[t]he only distinguishing detail among the one hundred offenses
    [to which the child complainant testified was] that one occurred during the day,
    while all the others happened at night”); see also 
    Reza, 339 S.W.3d at 716
    (holding
    that trial court’s error in failing to include instruction in jury charge as to State’s
    election did not cause egregious harm in part because “[t]his is not a case in which
    the complainant described multiple specific incidents such that some jurors could
    have relied on one specific incident and other jurors could have relied on another
    specific incident”); 
    Duffey, 326 S.W.3d at 633
    –34 (finding no harm in failing to
    instruct jury concerning State’s election when complainant testified to one specific
    instance of vaginal penetration but testimony concerning other instances “was both
    brief and general in nature”); 
    Hulsey, 211 S.W.3d at 856
    (finding no harm in
    failing to require election by State “[f]or the same reasons articulated in Dixon”).
    Rather, in this case, K.M. provided detailed testimony concerning four
    specific, separate instances in which appellant’s sexual organ contacted her sexual
    28
    organ. As with the first and second counts in Phillips, “clear testimony exist[ed]”
    for more than one specific occurrence of contact between appellant’s sexual organ
    and K.M.’s sexual organ, “along with further testimony—often vague on the date,
    much less vague on describing the acts—that they often occurred.” See 
    Phillips, 130 S.W.3d at 353
    ; see also 
    Farr, 140 S.W.3d at 900
    (finding failure to require
    State’s election harmful when complainant presented “[s]pecific details of at least
    four instances of oral sex in the family’s Houston apartment”). We conclude that,
    as with the first and second counts in Phillips, the sexual assault offense alleged in
    the indictment was “described in detail more than once; yet, it was completely
    unclear to the jury which act the State would rely upon for conviction.” See
    
    Phillips, 130 S.W.3d at 353
    .
    Furthermore, although the jury charge contained a general instruction that
    the jury had to unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant
    committed the offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child, this is not sufficient
    to ensure, in a case in which the complainant testified to multiple detailed instances
    of conduct fitting the allegations in the indictment, that the jury unanimously
    agreed that appellant had committed the same particular offense. See Ngo v. State,
    
    175 S.W.3d 738
    , 745 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“Unanimity in this context means
    that each and every juror agrees that the defendant committed the same, single,
    specific criminal act.”); see also Arrington v. State, 
    451 S.W.3d 834
    , 841 (Tex.
    29
    Crim. App. 2015) (“[R]egardless of the number of times the generic [unanimity]
    requirement was mentioned, the entire instructions failed to apprise the jurors that
    they had to be unanimous on which incident of conduct they believed constituted
    each count in the indictment.”). A general or “boilerplate” unanimity instruction
    can lead jurors to believe “that they [have] to be unanimous about the offense in
    general, not a particular incident comprising the offense.” See Cosio v. State, 
    353 S.W.3d 766
    , 773 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Demps v. State, 
    278 S.W.3d 62
    , 68 (Tex.
    App.—Amarillo 2009, pet. ref’d) (“Although the jury charge did contain an
    instruction requiring a unanimous verdict, it did not contain any additional
    instructions requiring unanimity as to one distinct offense. Conceivably then, the
    jury could have believed that their verdict of guilty or not guilty need only be
    unanimous on the general offense of sexual assault.”).
    Here, the jury charge contained a general unanimity instruction, but it did
    not contain an instruction specifically informing the jury that it had to agree
    unanimously that appellant committed a particular act of sexual assault against
    K.M. The purpose of assuring a unanimous verdict was not satisfied.
    The dissent argues that there is not a unanimity concern in this case because
    “the trial court clarified to [appellant’s] counsel that the State pursued a conviction
    based on the single act as alleged in the indictment, and that the court planned to
    charge the jury as to that incident.” Slip Op. at 4. The trial court charged the jury,
    30
    in accordance with the indictment, that if it unanimously found beyond a
    reasonable doubt that “on or about the 1st day of January, 2010” appellant sexually
    assaulted K.M., it was to find appellant guilty of aggravated sexual assault of a
    child. However, the charge also included an instruction informing the jury that
    “the State is not bound by the specific date which the offense, if any, is alleged in
    the indictment to have been committed, but that a conviction may be had upon
    proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense, if any, was committed at any
    time within the period of limitations.”
    Here, K.M. testified to four distinct instances of sexual assault, but she did
    not provide any dates for when these acts occurred, nor did she provide any
    indication of when in the year these acts occurred. Thus, there is no testimony that
    any of these four instances of sexual assault occurred on or around January 1,
    2010, the date charged in the indictment and specified in the jury charge.
    Furthermore, the charge specifically informed the jury that the State was not bound
    by the particular date alleged in the indictment.        Considering the evidence
    presented in this case, the instructions given to the jury in this charge did not
    ensure that the jury unanimously agreed beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant
    committed a particular act of sexual assault against K.M.
    31
    d.       Notice of the offense
    Finally, the fourth purpose of the election requirement is to give the
    defendant notice of the particular offense the State intends to rely upon to convict
    and to afford the defendant an opportunity to defend. Regarding this element, this
    case is also like the first and second counts in Phillips.        In Phillips, it was
    “completely unclear” which of the two different specifically detailed occurrences
    of sexual assault the State intended to rely upon. 
    See 130 S.W.3d at 353
    . By
    contrast, the Court of Criminal Appeals in Dixon “reject[ed] the notion that [the
    defendant] was deprived of adequate notice” focusing on the fact that “the only
    distinction made between the incidents is that one occurred during the day,” and
    “[w]ithout more, a variance in the time of day is not a basis for claiming lack of
    
    notice.” 201 S.W.3d at 736
    . The court then stated, “Further, there is no real doubt
    regarding which option the State would pick if forced to choose whether the
    offense relied upon was committed during the day or at night: it would pick the
    night, a characteristic shared by ninety-nine percent of the offenses about which
    the victim testified.” 
    Id. This case—like
    Phillips but unlike Dixon—is not a case in which the child
    complainant testified to a course of events that occurred the same way each time
    with little variation. Instead, K.M. testified to four distinct incidents that occurred
    at different times, different locations, and involved different sexual acts.        In
    32
    presenting its case, the State did not dwell on one instance significantly longer than
    the others. In the absence of an election, it was unclear from the testimony which
    incident the State would rely upon for a conviction. See 
    id. Appellant, therefore,
    did not have adequate notice of the particular offense upon which the State
    intended to rely.
    e.    Conclusion regarding harmful error
    Because of the State’s failure to elect which act it was relying upon for a
    conviction, the jury could have convicted appellant on any or all of the four
    instances of sexual assault as to which evidence was presented, with some of the
    jurors relying on one specific instance of sexual assault and other jurors relying on
    different instances of sexual assault, thus violating the jury unanimity requirement.
    See 
    Phillips, 130 S.W.3d at 354
    . Moreover, by failing to require the State to make
    an election, appellant did not have adequate notice of which act the State would
    rely upon in time to present his defense. We therefore cannot say beyond a
    reasonable doubt that the trial court’s error in failing to require the State to make
    its election did not contribute to appellant’s conviction. See id.; TEX. R. APP. P.
    44.2(a). We hold that the trial court committed harmful constitutional error in
    failing to require the State to make an election of the incident upon which it relied
    for conviction.
    33
    We sustain appellant’s second issue.5
    Conclusion
    We reverse the judgment and remand the case to the trial court for a new
    trial.
    Evelyn V. Keyes
    Justice
    Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Keyes, and Bland.
    Justice Bland, dissenting.
    Publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
    5
    Because we sustain appellant’s second issue and remand the case for a new trial,
    we do not address appellant’s first issue concerning whether the trial court erred
    by allowing the State to question him about the underlying details of his prior
    conviction for aggravated robbery.
    34