Patrick O'Connor & Associates, LP v. Chester R. Hall ( 2016 )

Opinion issued August 23, 2016
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-15-00661-CV
———————————
PATRICK O’CONNOR & ASSOCIATES, L.P., Appellant
V.
CHESTER R. HALL, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 4
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 1036533
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Patrick O’Connor & Associates, L.P. appeals a default summary judgment on
a bill of review in favor of Chester R. Hall. On appeal, O’Connor contends that the
trial court erred in granting summary judgment because a fact issue exists as to
whether a typographical error on the citation in the underlying suit establishes
improper service. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Patrick O’Connor & Associates, L.P., provides commercial property tax
reduction advocacy services. Between 2007 and 2010, O’Connor billed Chester R.
Hall for its services. In December 2010, O’Connor sued Hall in justice court,
requesting $549.04 in unpaid fees, $52.42 in unpaid interest, and $1,500.00 in
attorney’s fees. Hall was served with a citation that named “Patrick OConnor
Associates” as the Plaintiff, instead of “Patrick O’Connor & Associates, L.P.”
In June 2012, the justice court entered a default judgment against Hall. The
court awarded O’Connor $549.04 in fees, $104.37 in interest, $750.00 in attorney’s
fees, and $109.00 for cost of court and service of process fees. In February 2013,
Hall filed a bill of review in the justice court. The court denied Hall’s bill of review.
Hall appealed that decision to the county court at law.
On appeal to the county court, Hall argued that the default judgment entered
against him was the result of fraud because he had never hired O’Connor to provide
him any services. Second, he argued that O’Connor was prohibited from filing a
lawsuit against him because an agreed permanent injunction between O’Connor and
the State of Texas prohibited him from “initiating debt collection efforts of any
kind . . . including lawsuits” after November 1, 2010. Finally, Hall filed a
2
supplemental petition arguing that he was entitled to a bill of review as a matter of
law because he was not properly served in the underlying suit.
Hall moved for summary judgment on his bill of review. O’Connor filed an
untimely response the day before the hearing, arguing that the typographical error in
his citation in the justice court in the first suit did not constitute defective service.
The trial court granted summary judgment to Hall.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
When a trial court grants summary judgment on a bill of review, we apply the
regular standard of review. See Boaz v. Boaz, 221 S.W.3d 126, 130–31 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.); Brown v. Vann, No. 05-06-01424-CV, 2008 WL
484125, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 25, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.). We review a
summary judgment de novo. Boerjan v. Rodriguez, 436 S.W.3d 307, 310 (Tex.
2014). To prevail, the movant has the burden of proving that there is no genuine
issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. TEX. R.
CIV. P. 166a(c). When deciding whether a disputed, material fact issue precludes
summary judgment, we take as true evidence favorable to the non-movant, and we
indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in its favor. See Boerjan,
536 S.W.3d at 311–12 (quoting Timpte Indus., Inc. v. Gish, 286 S.W.3d 306, 310
(Tex. 2009)).
3
II. Applicable Law
A bill of review is an equitable proceeding brought to set aside an earlier final
judgment. Caldwell v. Barnes, 154 S.W.3d 93, 96 (Tex. 2004) (citing Baker v.
Goldsmith, 582 S.W.2d 404, 406 (Tex. 1979)). A bill-of-review plaintiff must plead
and prove (1) a meritorious defense to the underlying cause of action; (2) that fraud,
accident, or wrongful act of the opposing party, or an official mistake, prevented the
presentation of this defense, and (3) this error was unmixed with any fault or
negligence on the plaintiff’s part. Baker, 582 S.W.2d at 406–07. In cases in which
a bill of review plaintiff establishes a lack of proper service, constitutional due
process eliminates the need to show the first two elements. Caldwell, 154 S.W.3d
at 96. A bill-of-review plaintiff alleging defective service must still show that the
defective judgment resulted from conduct that was “unmixed with any fault or
negligence of his own.” Id. at 97.
A default judgment is void unless the record shows strict compliance with the
rules governing issuance, service, and return of citation. Primate Constr., Inc. v.
Silver, 884 S.W.2d 151, 152 (Tex. 1994). There are no presumptions in favor of
valid issuance, service, or return of citation. Id. “[F]ailure to affirmatively show
strict compliance with the Rules of Civil Procedure renders the attempted service of
process invalid and of no effect.” Uvalde Country Club v. Martin Linen Supply Co.,
690 S.W.2d 884, 886 (Tex. 1985).
4
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 99 provides that a citation shall “show the
names of the parties . . .” TEX. R. CIV. P. 99(b)(7). An incorrect name of a party to
the suit demonstrates that a citation is not in strict compliance. Martin Linen Supply,
690 S.W.2d at 885 (holding that citation was invalid because it named “Henry
Bunting,” and not Henry Bunting Jr., as defendant); Medeles v. Nunez, 923 S.W.2d
659 (Tex. App.––Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, writ denied) (holding that citation was
invalid because it named “Felix Numez,” not Felix Nunez, as plaintiff and “Maria
Mendeles,” not Maria Medeles, as defendant), overruled on other grounds by Barker
CATV Constr. v. Ampro, Inc., 989 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
1999, no pet.).
On the other hand, if the name’s misspelling is consistent in both the court
documents and the citation, then the incorrectly spelled name is not fatal to a citation,
provided that the correct parties are so evident from the pleadings and process that
the defendant could not have been misled. Orange Grove Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rivera,
679 S.W.2d 482, 483 (Tex. 1984); see Enserch Corp. v. Parker, 794 S.W.2d 2, 4–5
(Tex. 1990); Hayley v. Young, 541 S.W.2d 217, 219 (Tex. Civ. App.––Houston [1st
Dist.] 1976, no writ); Huynh v. Vo, 2003 WL 1848607, at *2 (Tex. App. ––Houston
[1st Dist.] Apr. 10, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op.). Texas courts thus distinguish between
cases of misidentification, as in Medeles and Uvalde, and misnomer, as in Enserch,
Hayley, and Huynh.
5
III. Analysis
In this case, Hall attached the original petition and citation in the justice court
as summary judgment evidence, together with the justice court’s notice of trial
setting that did not list him as being notified of the trial date. The court documents
name the plaintiff as “Patrick O’Connor & Associates, LP.” The citation that lead
to the default judgment, however, names the plaintiff as “Patrick OConnor
Associates.” Although the variance is minor, the citation removes the limited
partnership identifier and requires the conclusion that the citation misidentifies the
limited partnership entity that is the named plaintiff, rendering the citation invalid as
a matter of law. See Medeles, 923 S.W.2d at 662–63 (explaining that “strict
compliance” required under rules of civil procedure governing service of citation
means literal compliance; holding that citation with small spelling variances from
pleadings rendered citation void and service ineffective). The citation failed to
identify “Patrick O’Connor & Associates, L.P.,” signifying that the named plaintiff
was a limited partnership, as required by Rule 99.
Because the variance in the named plaintiff renders the citation void as a
matter of law, we need not reach the question of whether Hall could not identify
O’Connor based on the citation. See Amato v. Hernandez, 981 S.W.2d 947, 950
(Tex. App.––Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied) (citing Wilson v. Dunn, 800
S.W.2d 833, 836 (Tex. 1990)). In the no-answer default judgment context, it is
6
sufficient that the citation was not issued as required by Rule 99. Wilson, 800
S.W.2d at 836. Hall adduced evidence that he was not otherwise notified of the trial
setting.
O’Connor’s response was not timely filed; thus, the trial court did not
consider it in granting summary judgment. On appeal, O’Connor contends that the
typographical errors should not dictate the conclusion that service was invalid, an
argument that we have rejected. He does not challenge Hall’s argument that he has
otherwise met the requirements for obtaining a bill of review. Because we have
rejected O’Connor’s argument as to the validity of the citation, the trial court did not
err in granting a bill of review to Hall.
CONCLUSION
We hold that the error in the citation rendered O’Connor’s service on Hall
fatally defective in the context of a no-answer default judgment because it failed to
identify the limited partnership entity that was the named plaintiff. The other
elements for establishing a bill of review went unchallenged in the trial court.
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment on Hall’s bill
of review. We therefore affirm.
Jane Bland
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Bland, Brown, and Lloyd.
7