Sunny Letot v. United Services Automobile Association ( 2016 )

AFFIRM in Part, REVERSE in Part, and REMAND; Opinion Filed August 17, 2016.
Court of Appeals
S In The
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-14-01394-CV
SUNNY LETOT, Appellant
V.
UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION, Appellee
On Appeal from the 192nd Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 13-00156-E
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Lang, Brown, and Richter 1
Opinion by Justice Brown
Appellant Sunny Letot appeals a summary judgment granted in favor of appellee United
Services Automobile Association (USAA). In two issues, Letot generally asserts the trial court
erred in granting summary judgment because (1) USAA failed to establish that it properly
reported her vehicle as salvage to the Texas Department of Transportation, and (2) USAA
otherwise failed to show it was entitled to summary judgment on her individual claims. For the
following reasons, we reverse the trial court’s summary judgment on Letot’s claims under the
Texas Insurance Code, conversion, and tortious interference with existing contractual relations
and remand those claims to the trial court for further proceedings. We affirm the trial court’s
1
The Hon. Martin Richter, Justice, Court of Appeals, Fifth District of Texas at Dallas, Retired, sitting by assignment.
summary judgment that Letot take-nothing on her claims for tortious interference with
prospective contractual relations, slander of title and injurious falsehood.
Background
On January 2, 2009, Letot was involved in a motor vehicle accident with USAA’s
insured, Evan Crosby. At the time of the collision, Letot was driving a vintage 1983 Mercedes
she had recently restored.
Almost immediately after the collision, Letot contacted USAA seeking to recover her
property damages. On January 15, after investigating her claim, USAA informed Letot that it
had deemed her vehicle a “total loss” and offered to pay her $2,494.02, which it asserted was the
actual cash value of her vehicle. On January 20, Letot rejected USAA’s valuation and its offer.
Nevertheless, the next day, on January 21, USAA mailed Letot an uncertified check for
$2,494.02 and, the day after that, USAA submitted an “Owner Retained Report” (“Report”) to
the Texas Department of Transportation (“TxDoT”) pursuant to provisions of the Texas
Certificate of Title Act (“the Act”). 2 In the Report, USAA represented to TxDoT that it had paid
a claim on a salvage motor vehicle, that Letot retained that vehicle, and therefore the motor
vehicle records should be marked to prevent further transfer of title until Letot obtained a salvage
title.
Letot subsequently received USAA’s check. On January 30, now through counsel, Letot
returned the check. That same day, TxDoT sent Letot a letter to inform her that USAA had filed
the Report and, as a result, her registration was no longer valid, she was not permitted to operate
the vehicle, and she could not transfer it until she obtained a salvage title.
2
USAA asserts USAA CIC, a wholly owned subsidiary of USAA, actually insured Crosby. Letot refers to both USAA and USAA CIC as
USAA. However, in a footnote, she states it was USAA that actually filed the Report. The parties otherwise treat the entities the same for
purposes of this appeal. We refer to both USAA and USAA CIC as USAA.
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After receiving the letter and discussing her options with her mechanic, Letot disposed of
the vehicle as scrap to avoid incurring further storage fees. Then, almost two years after it filed
the Report, USAA filed a “correction” with TxDoT, representing it had filed the Report in error
and that the damages to Letot’s vehicle were insufficient to classify it as a salvage motor vehicle.
Letot sued USAA asserting claims for (1) violations of the Insurance Code and the
Deceptive Trade Practices Act, (2) conversion, (3) tortious interference with existing and
prospective contractual relations, (4) slander of title, and (5) injurious falsehood. USAA moved
for summary judgment asserting both traditional and no-evidence grounds. First, USAA
asserted it was entitled to summary judgment on all of Letot’s claims because it properly filed
the Report in accordance with the provisions of the Act. USAA also moved for summary
judgment on each of Letot’s individual claims. Following a hearing, the trial court granted
USAA’s motion, without stating its reasons, and rendered judgment that Letot take nothing.
This appeal followed.
Summary Judgment
1. Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment
A traditional motion for summary judgment must state “the specific grounds therefor.”
TEX.R. CIV. P. 166a(c); see also Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Lenk, 361 S.W.3d 602, 609 (Tex.
2012) (“[C]ourt cannot grant summary judgment on grounds that were not presented.”);
McConnell v. Southside Indep. Sch. Dist., 858 S.W.2d 337, 339 (Tex.1993) (motion must
expressly present grounds for summary judgment). “Grounds” refers to the reasons entitling the
movant to summary judgment. McConnell, 858 S.W.2d at 339 n. 2. The motion must provide the
nonmovant with adequate information to oppose the motion and to define the issues for the
purpose of summary judgment. See Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Alvarez, 576 S.W.2d 771, 772
(Tex. 1978).
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To be entitled to traditional summary judgment, a defendant must conclusively negate at
least one essential element of each of the plaintiff’s causes of action or conclusively establish
each element of an affirmative defense. Am. Tobacco Co., Inc. v. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d 420, 425
(Tex. 1997). Evidence is conclusive only if reasonable people could not differ in their
conclusions. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 816 (Tex. 2005). Summary judgment is
also proper if the material facts are not in dispute and the sole question is whether those facts
entitle the movant to summary judgment. City of Dallas v. Cornerstone Bank, N.A., 879 S.W.2d
264, 269 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994, no writ).
2. No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment
In a no-evidence motion for summary judgment, the moving party must assert that
no evidence exists as to one or more of the essential elements of the nonmovant’s claim on
which the nonmovant would have the burden of proof. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i). A no-
evidence motion for summary judgment must challenge specifically identified elements of a
cause of action or defense on which the non-movant bears the burden of proof at trial. See id.;
Timpte Indus., Inc. v. Gish, 286 S.W.3d 306, 310 (Tex. 2009).
Simply stating in the body of a motion the nonmovant cannot show or produce
evidence, without clearly stating the movant seeks summary judgment on a particular element of
a specific cause of action on no-evidence grounds, is insufficient provide notice that the motion
is seeking a no-evidence summary judgment. See Methodist Hosps. of Dallas v. Mid–Century
Ins. Co. of Tex., 195 S.W.3d 844, 846 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet. hist.). If a motion fails
to provide adequate notice the movant was seeking a no-evidence motion for summary judgment,
we will presume the movant sought a traditional summary judgment. AIG Life Ins. Co. v.
Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 200 S.W.3d 280, 284 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. denied)
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When we review a no-evidence summary-judgment motion, we ask whether the
nonmovant produced more than a scintilla of probative evidence to raise a fact issue on the
challenged elements. Killingsworth v. Housing Auth. of City of Dallas, 447 S.W.3d 480, 486
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, pet. denied). More than a scintilla of evidence exists if the evidence
rises to a level that would enable reasonable and fair-minded jurors to differ in their conclusions.
Hamilton v. Wilson, 249 S.W.3d 425, 426 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam).
Owner Retained Report
The first issue we must decide is whether USAA showed, as a matter of law, it properly
submitted the Report to TxDoT. Our resolution of this issue turns on our construction of former
section 501.093(a) of the Act. At the time it filed the Report, section 501.093(a) provided: “if an
insurance company pays a claim on a nonrepairable motor vehicle or salvage motor vehicle and
the insurance company does not acquire ownership of the motor vehicle, the insurance company
shall submit to [TxDoT] . . . a report stating that the insurance company: (1) has paid a claim on
the motor vehicle; and (2) has not acquired ownership of the motor vehicle. See Act of June 2,
2003, 78th Leg., ch. 1325, § 17.02, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 4979, 4983 (current version at TEX.
TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 501.0002 (West 2012). When an insurance company submits such a
report the owner of the motor vehicle “may not operate or permit operation of the motor vehicle
on a public highway or transfer ownership of the motor vehicle by sale or otherwise unless the
department has issued a salvage vehicle title or a nonrepairable vehicle title for the motor vehicle
. . . .” Id. A “salvage motor vehicle” is a vehicle that has suffered damages to the extent “the
cost of repairs . . . exceeds the actual cash value of the motor vehicle immediately before the
damage.” TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 501.091 (West 2013).
Initially we note that it is undisputed that Letot made a claim for property damages to her
vehicle. It is also undisputed that USAA offered to pay her what it had determined represented
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the fair market value of her vehicle, but Letot rejected both that offer and the check that
followed. Finally, it is undisputed USAA actually paid nothing to Letot for her claim.
USAA nevertheless asserts it paid a claim on Letot’s vehicle because, it argues, a tender
of an uncertified check constitutes “payment of a claim,” regardless of whether the payee
accepted the payment, either before or after it was tendered. To support its contention, USAA
relies heavily on its assumption that the purpose of the Act is to protect the public from unsafe
vehicles. 3 From that, USAA views the payment requirement as a procedural issue to be
determined entirely from the perspective of the insurance company. More specifically, it asserts
the term “pay” refers to “process of bestowing funds.”
In interpreting a statute, we begin with the statute’s plain language. Greater Houston
P’ship v. Paxton, 468 S.W.3d 51, 59 (Tex. 2015). The term “pay” has been defined as “to
discharge an obligation,” “to discharge an indebtedness for: SETTLE,” “to make an agreed . . .
transfer of money.” See Webster’s Third International Dictionary 519 (1981). USAA profers
only one definition that defines the term “pay” entirely from the perspective of the payor.
Specifically, pay has been defined as “to give, offer, or make freely or fitting.” Webster’s Ninth
New Collegiate Dictionary, 9th ed. p. 864 (1988). However, the notation that follows that
definition explains it is referencing the meaning of the term in the context of to “pay attention.”
See id. So, we disagree with USAA that the term “pay” refers only to the payor’s conduct
without reference to any underlying agreement with the payee.
We likewise reject USAA’s assertion that the legal meaning of the term “pay” means
“tender” and, that as a consequence, its tender of an uncertified check to Letot constituted
3
The Act itself states its purpose is to lessen and prevent theft of motor vehicles and the sale of encumbered motor vehicles without
disclosing prior liens. TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 501.003 (West 2012); see also Martinez v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 04-11-00306-CV, 2012
WL 3711347, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 29, 2012, pet. denied) (purpose of Act not to ensure vehicles in a safe condition, but to notify
downstream purchasers about vehicle’s prior damage.). We also note that whether a vehicle qualifies as salvage is a mathematical equation that
does not incorporate any safety considerations. Indeed, it is as much, if not more, dependent on the starting value of the vehicle as on the cost of
the repairs needed.
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payment of a claim. 4 A tender is an offer of funds. See Black’s Law Dictionary 1315 (5th ed.
1983) (tender is an offer or proffer of money); Bucuum v. Great Am. Ins. Co. of N.Y., 370
S.W.2d 863, 866 (Tex. 1963) (“A tender is an unconditional offer by a debtor to pay another, in
current coin of the realm, a sum not less in amount that that due on a specified debt or
obligation.”). It is not a payment of funds. 5 Moreover, tender of an uncertified check is a
conditional offer. See Probus Props. v. Kirby, 200 S.W.3d 258, 262–63 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2006, pet. denied). For an uncertified check to constitute a “payment,” the check must be both
accepted and then honored. Tex. Mut. Life Ins. Ass’n v. Tolbert, 136 S.W.2d 584, 589 (Tex.
1940). We conclude that “pay” does not have the same meaning as “tender of payment.” We
further conclude that if the Legislature intended to require an insurer to submit a Report on a
tender of payment alone, it surely would have said so.
Here, USAA showed only that it mailed an uncertified check in an effort to pay Letot a
portion of her claimed damages. It is undisputed that Letot did not accept either the amount of
payment or the manner in which USAA tendered it. Further, because she returned the check,
USAA did not actually transfer any funds to Letot. We conclude USAA did not conclusively
establish it paid a claim on Letot’s vehicle.
As noted, USAA also moved for summary judgment on each of Letot’s individual causes
of actions. USAA’s expressed grounds for summary judgment were largely based on, or at least
intertwined with, its interpretation of the statutory language. We will address Letot’s remaining
4
According to Letot, sections 2.511 and 3.310 of the Business and Commerce Code support her payment argument. Under section 3.310
“unless otherwise agreed . . . if a note or uncertified check is taken for an obligation, the obligation is suspended to the same extent the obligation
would be discharged if an amount of money equal to the amount of the instrument were taken.” TEX. BUS. COM. CODE ANN. § 3.310 (West
2002). We cannot agree that section lends any support to its contention. Rule 3.03 only applies if a party takes a check as payment, it does not
force a party to accept a check as payment. Under section 2.511, a tender of payment for goods is sufficient “when made by any means and
manner currency in the ordinary course of business unless seller demands payment in legal tender . . . .” TEX. BUS. COM. CODE ANN. § 2.511
(West 2009) Section 2.511 is inapplicable for the simple reason that it applies only to transactions involving the sale of goods. Id. at § 2.102.
Moreover Section 2.511 determines when a buyer’s payment constitutes a tender as a condition to the seller’s duty to tender and complete
delivery of goods. Id. It does not reference “payment.”
5
In Republic Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Mex-Tex, Inc., 150 S.W.3d 423 (2004), the Texas Supreme Court concluded that the mailing of a
check constitutes a tender of payment, and if unconditional, is sufficient to preclude a claimant from claiming penalties for failure to make a
prompt payment. Contrary to USAA’s suggestion, the Supreme Court did not conclude mailing a check constitutes a payment. See id.
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challenges to the extent USAA’s motion asserted independent grounds supporting summary
judgment.
Deceptive Insurance Practices
Letot asserted USAA violated provisions of 17.46(b) of the Deceptive Trade
Practices Act (“DTPA”) by falsely representing to TxDoT that it had paid a claim on a salvage
motor vehicle. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b) (West 2011). Letot asserted her claims
both directly under the DTPA and through section 541.051 of the Insurance Code. See TEX. INS.
CODE ANN. § 541.151 (West 2009). USAA filed a motion for summary judgment on these
claims asserting Letot lacked standing to sue under either the DTPA or the Insurance Code.
First, USAA asserted Letot lacked standing to sue directly under the DTPA because she was not
a consumer. In a separate ground, USAA asserted that Letot lacked standing under the Insurance
Code because her claims arose out of USAA’s actions in handling her claim as a third party
claimant of insurance benefits. On appeal, Letot only challenges the trial court’s summary
judgment with respect to her standing under section 541.051 the Insurance Code.
Under Section 541.051, “a person” may bring a claim for damages for violations of
section 17.46(b) the DTPA. Id. Thus, the Insurance Code, unlike the DTPA, does not require a
plaintiff to be a consumer to bring an action, even if her claims are based on violations of the
DTPA. Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Casteel, 22 S.W.3d 378, 384 (2000). The plaintiff may,
nevertheless, be required to prove consumer status if the DTPA violation asserted itself requires
consumer status. Id.
In its motion for summary judgment USAA asserted Letot lacked standing to assert
claims under the Insurance Code because her claims arose out of its actions in settling her claim
against Crosby, its insured. USAA relied on Allstate Ins. v. Watson, 866 S.W.2d 145, 149 (Tex.
1994). In Watson, the plaintiff sued Allstate asserting claims for unfair settlement practices and
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specifically complained Allstate had failed to promptly settle her third-party claim against its
insured. The supreme court acknowledged the Insurance Code (then former article 21.21)
granted broad standing to “any person” to sue for unfair practices in the business of insurance.
The supreme court nevertheless concluded the plaintiff in that case lacked standing. Id. The
supreme court’s analysis turned on whether the plaintiff had a substantive claim under the
Insurance Code. It concluded she did not because her claims were based on violations of duties
Allstate did not owe her, but owed its insured. See id. at 145. The supreme court refused to
recognize a third-party cause of action because it would compromise the insurer’s duties to its
insured. Id. at 150.
The Supreme Court has since declined to extend Watson beyond its rationale. See
Rocor Intern, Inc. v. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, P.A., 77 S.W.3d 253, 258 (Tex. 2002);
Casteel, 22 S.W.3d at 384. Specifically, the Supreme Court has consistently recognized the
Insurance Code provides broad standing to any person who has been damaged by deceptive or
unfair trade practices in the insurance industry. See Casteel, 22 S.W.3d at 384 (grant of broad
standing is consistent with legislature’s express objective to regulate all insurance trade
practices); see also Rocor Intern, 77 S.W.3d at 77.
In its motion for summary judgment, USAA relied entirely on Letot’s status as a
third party claimant to show she lacked standing to assert claims under the Insurance Code. In
other words, USAA did not assert she lacked an underlying claim. Nor did it assert she lacked
standing to sue for the specific DTPA violations she alleged. We conclude Letot’s status as a
third party claimant was only incidental to her claims and therefore, did not defeat her standing.
Specifically, Letot was not claiming USAA owed her any duties or obligations under an
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insurance policy. Nor were Letot’s claims related to any liability Crosby may have had. We
conclude USAA did not conclusively establish that Letot lacked standing to assert her claims. 6
USAA also moved for summary judgment on the merits of Letot’s Insurance Code
claims. As noted, Letot’s claims under the Insurance Code were based on her contention that
USAA violated provisions of the DTPA. On appeal, the parties both identify USAA’s motion
for summary judgment on these claims as generally challenging whether Letot had any evidence
it made a false statement.
According to Letot, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on this
ground because she presented sufficient evidence to show the Report contained false statements.
In its response, USAA relies on essentially the same arguments it made under the first issue;
specifically, it asserts it did pay a claim on a salvage motor vehicle. We have previously
rejected USAA’s contention. Moreover, Letot also presented evidence that, two years after it
filed the Report, USAA submitted a “correction” to TxDoT representing that Letot’s vehicle was
not a salvage vehicle and that the estimated cost to repair the vehicle did not exceed its fair
market value. We conclude the trial court erred in granting USAA’s motion for summary
judgment on this basis.
USAA also moved for summary judgment on Letot’s Insurance Code claims on the
basis that she had no evidence of any damages. Letot presented evidence that, as a result of
USAA’s representation, she was prohibited from operating her vehicle, her registration was
declared invalid, and she was required to obtain a salvage vehicle title. We conclude this
evidence constitutes more than a scintilla of evidence to show she was damaged as a result of
6
On appeal, Letot also asserts the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of USAA on her Insurance Code claims because
she asserted DTPA violations that do not require consumer standing. We have reviewed USAA’s motion for summary judgment and conclude it
did not assert that, and it did not ask the trial court determine whether Letot’s individual claims required consumer status. We conclude that
question is not properly before us at this time.
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USAA’s conduct. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the trial court erred in granting
USAA’s motion for summary judgment on Letot’s claims under the Insurance Code.
Conversion
Letot next asserts the trial court erred in granting USAA’s motion for summary judgment
on her conversion claim. Letot’s conversion claim was based on her complaint that USAA
unlawfully exercised dominion and control over her title and the registration to her vehicle. See
Bures v. First Nat. Bank, Port Lavaca, 806 S.W.2d 935, 938 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1991,
no writ) (a title is property subject to conversion).
To prove a claim for conversion, a plaintiff must establish: (1) it owned or had legal
possession of the property or entitlement to possession; (2) the defendant unlawfully and without
authorization assumed and exercised dominion and control over the property to the exclusion of,
or inconsistent with, the plaintiff's rights; (3) the plaintiff demanded return of the property; and
(4) the defendant refused to return the property. Khorshid, Inc. v. Christian, 257 S.W.3d 748,
75859 (Tex. App.–Dallas 2008, no pet.).
USAA moved for summary judgment on Letot’s conversion claim setting out its grounds
in three paragraphs. In its first paragraph, USAA recited the elements of conversion and
generally asserted there was no evidence supporting any element of Letot’s claim. However, to
support this ground, USAA argued the evidence conclusively established Letot could not prevail
because she remained in exclusive control of her vehicle and USAA never exercised physical
dominion or control over the vehicle
According to Letot, USAA’s first paragraph challenged only whether she could present
evidence that USAA exercised dominion and control over her property, not whether she
demanded, and USAA had refused, to return property. We agree that the grounds raised in that
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paragraph were only sufficient to put Letot on notice to come forward with evidence that it
exercised dominion and control over her property. We conclude she did so.
The summary judgment evidence showed that USAA represented to TxDoT that it had
paid a claim on a salvage vehicle and that Letot had retained the vehicle. As a consequence,
USAA instructed TxDoT to mark the property records to prevent Letot from transferring the
vehicle until she obtained a salvage title. As a direct result, Letot was prohibited from operating
her vehicle, her registration was terminated, and she could not sell the vehicle until she obtained
a salvage title. In addition, Letot’s title records were physically marked as “SURRENDERED.”
According to USAA, Letot’s evidence failed to raise a fact issue to show it exercised
either actual or constructive dominion and control over Letot’s property. Specifically, it asserts
that, regardless of its actions, Letot only had the rights of an owner of a salvage vehicle, and thus
it did not interfere with those rights. However, USAA’s argument is premised on its legal
construction of the Act, not whether Letot presented evidence to support her claims. We
conclude Letot presented more than a scintilla of evidence that USAA exercised dominion and
control over her property by engaging in conduct that directly resulted in her title and registration
being deemed invalid. Cf. Bures, 806 S.W.2d at 938 (bank’s possession and control over title to
trailer effectively precluded plaintiff from using trailer).
USAA also moved for summary judgment on the basis that there was no evidence USAA
intended to assert a right in Letot’s property. However, USAA’s argument was premised on its
contention that USAA had no intent to obtain physical possession of Letot’s property, which was
not disputed. Moreover, the evidence showed USAA intentionally filed the Report, claiming it
had paid a claim on a salvage vehicle, and USAA specifically requested TxDoT to invalidate
Letot’s title. We conclude that evidence raised a fact issue showing USAA intentionally asserted
rights in Letot’s property.
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Finally, USAA moved for summary judgment on the ground that Letot could show no
injury or damages. Again, it is undisputed that, as a direct result of TxDoT’s actions, Letot’s
title and registration were no longer valid. We conclude that evidence was sufficient to raise a
fact issue on damages. Therefore, USAA did not establish it was entitled to summary judgment
on Letot’s conversion claim.
Tortious Interference with Existing Contract
Letot next asserts the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on her tortious
interference with existing contract claim. Letot’s tortious interference claim was based on her
complaint that USAA contacted TxDoT, falsely represented it had paid her claim on a salvage
vehicle and requested TxDoT mark the title records to prevent her from transferring her vehicle.
As an immediate result of USAA’s actions, her registration and title were deemed invalid.
USAA moved for summary judgment on this claim asserting it could not have interfered with
appellant’s existing contract because “there was no existing contract or agreement between Letot
and the state under which Letot was entitled to anything but a ‘salvage motor vehicle.’” 7
Having reviewed USAA’s motion for summary judgment, we agree with Letot that it did not
present a legal basis for summary judgment on this claim. Indeed, it is not entirely clear on what
legal theory USAA was basing its entitlement to summary judgment. In any event, a motion for
summary judgment must meet the plaintiff’s cause of action as pleaded. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. Finlan, 27 S.W.3d 220, 231-32 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000, pet. denied). We conclude USAA’s
motion did not demonstrate Letot could not prevail on this claim.
Tortious Interference with Prospective Contractual Relations
Letot also asserts the trial court erred in granting USAA’s traditional motion for summary
judgment on her tortious interference with prospective contract claim. To prevail on a claim for
7
USAA did not challenge whether a contract existed.
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tortious interference with prospective business relations, the plaintiff must establish that (1) there
was a reasonable probability that the plaintiff would have entered into a business relationship
with a third party; (2) the defendant either acted with a conscious desire to prevent the
relationship from occurring or knew the interference was certain or substantially certain to occur
as a result of the conduct; (3) the defendant’s conduct was independently tortious or unlawful;
(4) the interference proximately caused the plaintiff injury; and (5) the plaintiff suffered actual
damage or loss as a result. Coinmach Corp. v. Aspenwood Apartment Corp., 417 S.W.3d 909,
923 (Tex. 2013).
USAA moved for summary judgment asserting Letot had no evidence USAA committed
any independent tortious conduct, no evidence it interfered with any prospective business
relationships, and no evidence she was injured as a result of any interference. On appeal, Letot
asserts USAA’s filing of the Report was independently tortious. Letot has not, however,
challenged USAA’s other grounds for summary judgment on this claim. Therefore, she has
failed to show the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on this claim. TEX. R. APP. P.
38.1(h); Capital One, N.A. v. Haddock, 394 S.W.3d 605, 612 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, pet.
denied).
Slander of Title/Injurious Falsehood
Letot’s claims for slander of title and injurious falsehood were based on her claim that
USAA made false and disparaging statements about her car. USAA moved for summary
judgment on those claims asserting, among other things, she had no evidence of special damages
and no evidence that she had lost a specific sale. Slander of title is a species of injurious
falsehood arising from a party’s disparaging statements about a person’s title. See Ellis v.
Waldrop, 656 S.W.2d 902, 904-05 (Tex. 1983). To succeed in an action for slander of title, a
party must prove special damages, specifically the loss of a specific sale. Id. On appeal, Letot
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has not challenged USAA’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that she had no
evidence of special damages and no evidence she lost a specific sale. We conclude she has failed
to show summary judgment on this claim was improper.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment in favor of USAA on Letot’s claims under the Insurance Code, for conversion, and for
tortious interference with existing contract and remand those claims to the trial court for further
proceedings. We affirm the trial court’s judgment ordering that Letot take nothing on her claims
for tortious interference with prospective contract and slander of title and injurious falsehood.
/Ada Brown/
ADA BROWN
JUSTICE
141394F.P05
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S
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
SUNNY LETOT, Appellant On Appeal from the 192nd Judicial District
Court, Dallas County, Texas
No. 05-14-01394-CV V. Trial Court Cause No. 13-00156-E.
Opinion delivered by Justice Brown. Justices
UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE Lang and Richter participating.
ASSOCIATION, Appellee
In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part. We REVERSE that portion of the trial court's
judgment that appellant Sunny Letot take nothing on her claims under the Texas Insurance Code,
conversion, and tortious interference with existing contractual relations. In all other respects,
the trial court's judgment is AFFIRMED. We REMAND this cause to the trial court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is ORDERED that appellant SUNNY LETOT recover her costs of this appeal from
appellee UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION.
Judgment entered this 17th day of August, 2016.
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