in Re Mark Thuesen ( 2013 )


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  • Petition for Writ of Mandamus Denied and Memorandum Opinion filed April
    11, 2013.
    In The
    Fourteenth Court of Appeals
    NO. 14-13-00243-CV
    IN RE MARK THUESEN, Relator
    ORIGINAL PROCEEDING
    WRIT OF MANDAMUS
    151st District Court
    Harris County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. 2012-49262
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    On March 26, 2013, relator Mark Thuesen filed a petition for writ of
    mandamus in this court. See Tex. Gov’t Code §22.221; see also Tex. R. App. P.
    52. In the petition, relator asks this court to compel the Honorable Mike Engelhart,
    presiding judge of the 151st District Court of Harris County, to set aside his order
    denying relator’s motion for partial summary judgment and to grant the motion.
    Relator was an owner and resident of a condominium project known as 2520
    Robinhood, and he formerly served as president of the 2520 Robinhood at Kirby
    Condominium Association. The record in this proceeding indicates that relator, the
    condominium association, and its management company have been involved in
    several lawsuits with neighbors and members of the Houston real estate
    community.
    Swamplot Industries, LLC operates a website, Swamplot.com, which reports
    on matters related to Houston real estate. Laurence Albert, and his wife, Beth
    Brinsdon, operate Swamplot, including the website. Swamplot.com posted a
    number of stories related to the 2520 Robinhood lawsuits. In May of 2011, relator
    and the condominium association filed suit against Swamplot.com. based on
    comments posted on the site, but the action was non-suited a few months later. In
    August of 2012, Swamplot Industries, Albert, and Brinsdon, filed the underlying
    suit against relator and others, alleging malicious prosecution, defamation, and
    other related claims.
    On February 11, 2013, relator filed a motion for partial summary judgment
    on five causes of action: (1) trespass to real property; (2) invasion of Privacy by
    intrusion on seclusion; (3) public disclosure of private facts; (4) product
    disparagement; and (5) violations of the Texas Wiretap Act. Relator included his
    own affidavit “unequivocally denying any involvement in these causes of action.”
    The real parties responded, objecting that discovery had not been completed. An
    affidavit from real party Albert was included with the response. On March 6, 2013,
    the trial court denied relator’s motion for partial summary judgment. This
    proceeding followed.
    Relator raises two issues in this proceeding. He asserts that his motion for
    summary judgment was denied in error and that the real party’s affidavit filed in
    response to the summary judgment motion was defective and void.
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    Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that will issue only if (1) the trial
    court clearly abused its discretion and (2) the party requesting mandamus relief has
    no adequate remedy by appeal. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 
    148 S.W.3d 124
    ,
    135–36 (Tex. 2004). We determine the adequacy of an appellate remedy by
    balancing the benefits of mandamus review against its detriments. 
    Id. at 136.
    In
    evaluating benefits and detriments, we consider whether mandamus will preserve
    important substantive and procedural rights from impairment or loss. 
    Id. A trial
    court abuses its discretion if it reaches a decision so arbitrary and
    unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law, or if it clearly
    fails to analyze or apply the law correctly. In re Cerberus Capital Mgmt., L.P., 
    164 S.W.3d 379
    , 382 (Tex. 2005). When reviewing the trial court’s decision for an
    abuse of discretion, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court
    with respect to the resolution of factual issues or matters committed to the trial
    court’s discretion. See Walker v. Packer, 
    827 S.W.2d 833
    , 839-40 (Tex. 1992).
    Mandamus is generally unavailable when a trial court denies summary
    judgment, no matter how meritorious the motion, because “trying a case in which
    summary judgment would have been appropriate does not mean the case will have
    to be tried twice.” In re McAllen Med. Ctr., Inc., 
    275 S.W.3d 458
    , 465–66 (Tex.
    2008) (stating that parties are not “entitled” to summary judgment in the same way
    they are entitled to arbitration). Only the most extraordinary circumstances warrant
    mandamus relief from the erroneous denial of a motion for summary judgment. See
    In re USAA, 
    307 S.W.3d 299
    , 314 (Tex. 2010) (granting relief to enforce
    limitations after relator had already endured trial in incorrect jurisdiction). Relator
    has not presented such extraordinary circumstances.
    Relator argues only that because an interlocutory order denying a motion for
    summary judgment may not be immediately appealed, he lacks an adequate
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    appellate remedy. As the Texas Supreme Court has repeatedly held, the cost or
    delay incident to pursuing an appeal does not make the remedy inadequate. See In
    re Kansas City S. Indus, Inc., 
    139 S.W.3d 669
    , 670 (Tex. 2004).
    Relator has an adequate remedy by appeal after a final judgment is signed in
    the underlying case. Accordingly, we deny his petition for writ of mandamus.
    PER CURIAM
    Panel consists of Chief Justice Hedges and Justices Boyce and Donovan.
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