Harlon Ray Buckner, II v. State ( 2012 )


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  • Abatement Order filed June 21, 2012.
    In The
    Fourteenth Court of Appeals
    NO. 14-11-01008-CR
    NO. 14-11-01010-CR
    HARLON RAY BUCKNER, II, Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 178th District Court
    Harris County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause Nos. 755721 & 755722
    ABATEMENT ORDER
    Appellant Harlon Ray Buckner, II, appeals the trial court’s order denying his
    Motion for DNA testing. He contends that there is no evidence to support the trial
    court’s “conclusion that there is not a reasonable probability that[,] had the results been
    available at the time of trial, [appellant] would not have been convicted.”
    Appellant was indicted for aggravated kidnapping and sexual assault. In 1997, a
    jury found appellant guilty of aggravated kidnapping in cause number 755721 and the
    trial court assessed appellant’s punishment at 20 years’ confinement. A jury also found
    appellant guilty of sexual assault in cause number 755722, and the trial court assessed
    appellant’s punishment at 20 years’ confinement. Appellant appealed his convictions,
    and this court affirmed his convictions in 1999. See Buckner v. State, Nos. 14-97-01399,
    14-97-01400-CR, 
    1999 WL 649098
    (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (not
    designated for publication).
    At some point, appellant filed a motion for post-conviction DNA testing; this
    motion is not contained in the record before us. The record contains a motion filed by the
    State on January 23, 2008, in which the State asked the trial court to make findings
    pursuant to Article 64.03 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure in response to
    appellant’s motion for post-conviction DNA testing. In its January 2008 motion, the
    State stated that the Harris County District Clerk’s Office is in possession of the
    following evidence:
    key map of streets; 911 transcript; video tape; receipt; photos; diagram of
    street; magazine; brown ball cap; and cassette tape. . . . samples from a
    rape kit; box containing boots, socks, a shirt, shorts, and a belt;
    miscellaneous paper; a wooden club; a bag of clothes; a rape kit; blood,
    hair, and saliva from the applicant; pulled hair from the applicant; and hair
    samples from the complainant. . . . microscope slides containing hairs.
    The State filed Proposed Findings and Order pursuant to Texas Code of Criminal
    Procedure Article 64.03, and the trial court adopted and signed the State’s Proposed
    Findings and Order on January 24, 2008.
    In its 2008 order, the trial court directed among other things that: (1) “an
    appropriately qualified professional take a sample of the applicant’s blood and/or saliva;”
    (2) the sample be packaged and transported to the Texas Department of Public Safety
    (DPS) Crime Lab for testing; (3) “a representative of the Harris County District
    Attorney’s Office obtain from the Houston Police Department biological evidence in the
    above styled and numbered causes, specifically the following evidence:” (a) “samples
    from sexual assault,” (b) “small box containing assorted clothing,” (c) “bag of clothes,”
    and (d) “rape kit;” (4) the “Harris County District Attorney’s Office transport such
    evidence” to the DPS Crime Lab for testing and comparison; (5) the DPS Crime Lab
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    “conduct DNA forensic testing comparing the remaining evidence, excluding hair, in the
    primary case with the applicant’s blood and/or saliva sample taken;” and (6) the DPS
    Crime Lab “send a written report of the results of the ordered DNA testing to the Court,”
    the Harris County District Attorney’s office, and to Crespin Michael Linton, who
    presumably was appellant’s appointed counsel.
    On December 19, 2008, the trial court signed the State’s Proposed Findings of
    Fact and Order, stating:
    Having considered the Applicant’s motion requesting DNA testing
    of evidence, having examined the results of DNA testing performed by the
    Texas Department of Public Safety, and having heard the State’s motion for
    finding and order in the above-styled cases, the Court makes the following
    finding of fact:
    FINDING OF FACT
    The Court finds, pursuant to TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
    64.04, that the results of the DNA testing performed in this case pursuant to
    TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.03 are not favorable to the Applicant,
    Harlan Ray Buckner, and that it is not reasonably probable that, had the
    DNA testing results been available before or during the trial of the offense,
    the Applicant, Harlon Ray Buckner, would not have been prosecuted or
    convicted.
    ORDER
    THE CLERK IS ORDERED to send a copy of the State’s Motion
    for Finding Under TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.04 and Order
    Under art. 64.03(e), along with the Court’s finding of fact that the results of
    DNA testing are not favorable to the Applicant, to the Texas Department of
    Public Safety. . . .
    THE CLERK IS FURTHER ORDERED to send a copy of this
    Finding and Order to the Applicant’s counsel: Crespin M. Linton, 440
    Louisiana, Suite 900, Houston, Texas, 77002; and to the State: Inger M.
    Hampton, 1201 Franklin, Suite 600, Houston, Texas
    77002.
    Appellant did not appeal the trial court’s December 19, 2008 order.
    The record shows that the trial court appointed counsel, Tom Martin, to represent
    appellant on November 16, 2009 “for the purpose of post-conviction DNA testing.” The
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    record before the court does not contain a motion for post-conviction DNA testing filed
    by appellant’s appointed counsel or anyone else after November 16, 2009. The record
    does contain the State’s Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order,
    which the State filed on September 27, 2011 in response to a post-conviction DNA
    motion appellant presumably filed sometime in 2009 or thereafter.
    The trial court adopted and signed the State’s Proposed Findings of Fact,
    Conclusions of Law, and Order on September 27, 2011, stating:
    Having reviewed the documents filed in cause numbers 755721 &
    755722; the trial court’s original findings granting DNA testing under
    Chapter 64 dated January 24, 2008; the trial court’s original findings under
    Chapter 64 that the testing results were not favorable to the defendant dated
    December 18, 2008; and the Department of Public Safety’s (DPS)
    laboratory report dated October 20, 2008; the Court adopts its previous
    findings of fact and conclusions of law entered in cause numbers 755721 &
    755722 on December 18, 2008.
    The Court finds, pursuant to TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
    64.04, that the results of the DNA testing performed in this case pursuant to
    TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.03 are not favorable to the defendant,
    Harlon Ray Buckner, and that it is not reasonably probable that, had the
    DNA testing results been available before or during the trial of the offense,
    the defendant, Harlon Ray Buckner, would not have been convicted.
    ORDER
    THE CLERK IS ORDERED [to] send a copy of this Court’s
    findings of fact denying DNA testing in cause numbers 755721 & 755722
    and the instant order to the Defendant’s appointed counsel, Tom Martin,
    1018 Preston, Ste. 500, Houston, 77002, and to the attorney representing
    the State of Texas, Alicia Devoy O’Neill, 1201 Franklin, Suite 600,
    Houston, Texas 77002.
    Appellant now challenges the trial court’s September 27, 2011 order in this appeal.
    Appellant contends on appeal that the “record is insufficient to determine if the
    conclusion of the Trial Court, that the results of previous DNA testing were unfavorable
    to [appellant], was justifiable.” According to appellant, there is “no evidence to support
    this conclusion.” Appellant argues that there is “no indication as to what the test results
    demonstrated. Without any evidence of the results of the alleged DNA testing, this Court
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    has no way to evaluate the findings of the Trial Court below and certainly no basis to
    conduct de novo review.”
    As outlined above, the trial court’s September 27, 2011 order states that, in
    concluding that “the results of the DNA testing performed in this case” are not favorable
    to appellant, the trial court considered “original findings granting DNA testing under
    Chapter 64 dated January 24, 2008; the trial court’s original findings under Chapter 64
    that the testing results were not favorable to the defendant dated December 18, 2008; and
    the Department of Public Safety’s (DPS) laboratory report dated October 20, 2008.” The
    trial court’s September 27, 2011 order does not state that appellant’s motion for post-
    conviction DNA testing was deficient.
    Given the circumstances surrounding this record, the trial court is directed to
    conduct a hearing and make a written determination as to whether (1) a transcribed
    hearing on appellant’s post-conviction DNA motion resulting in the December 19, 2009
    order was held; (2) the DPS laboratory report of October 20, 2008 is in existence; and (3)
    appellant’s latest motion for post-conviction DNA testing is in existence.               A
    supplemental clerk’s record containing those findings shall be filed with the clerk of this
    Court on or before July 30, 2012.          Further, we direct the trial court to have a
    supplemental record filed with the clerk of this Court on or before July 30, 2012
    containing such items as are found to be in existence in the trial court’s written
    determination.
    The appeal is abated, treated as a closed case, and removed from this Court’s
    active docket. The appeal will be reinstated on this Court’s active docket when the trial
    court’s findings and record are filed in this Court. The Court also will consider an
    appropriate motion to reinstate the appeal filed by either party.
    PER CURIAM
    Panel consists of Justices Boyce, Christopher and Jamison.
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Document Info

Docket Number: 14-11-01010-CR

Filed Date: 6/21/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/23/2015