Wilfred Warren Sheppard v. State ( 2019 )

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-19-00180-CR
Wilfred Warren Sheppard, Appellant
v.
The State of Texas, Appellee
FROM THE 27TH DISTRICT COURT OF BELL COUNTY,
NO. 73471, THE HONORABLE JOHN GAUNTT, JUDGE PRESIDING
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Wilfred Warren Sheppard filed a pro se pretrial notice of appeal of the
trial court’s oral order denying his pretrial motion to dismiss.1 We lack jurisdiction over
Sheppard’s appeal for several reasons.
In criminal cases, this Court has jurisdiction to consider appeals from the entry of
an appealable order. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 44.02; see also Tex.
R. App. P. 26.2(a)(1). However, there must be a written, signed order from which to
appeal. See State v. Sanavongxay, 407 S.W.3d 252, 259 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (noting that “our
precedent requires that an order be in writing” when discussing State’s statutory right to appeal
pretrial suppression order); see also State v. Rosenbaum, 818 S.W.2d 398, 401-02 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1991) (holding that for purposes of appeal, trial court “enters” order when judge signs
order). The record before us contains no written, signed order denying Sheppard’s motion to
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The trial court’s docket sheet reflects that a Faretta hearing has been held and that
Sheppard is representing himself at trial.
dismiss; thus, there has been no entry of an appealable order. See, e.g., Dekneef v. State,
No. 03-13-00699-CR, 2013 WL 6801261, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 20, 2013, no pet.)
Even if the trial court had signed an order, we find no authority for Sheppard to
appeal the order. In Texas, appeals in a criminal case are permitted only when they are
specifically authorized by statute. State ex rel. Lykos v. Fine, 330 S.W.3d 904, 915 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2011); see Bayless v. State, 91 S.W.3d 801, 805 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (“[A] defendant’s
right of appeal is a statutorily created right.”). The standard for determining whether an
appellate court has jurisdiction to hear and determine a case “is not whether the appeal
is precluded by law, but whether the appeal is authorized by law.” Blanton
v. State, 369 S.W.3d 894, 902 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (quoting Abbott v. State, 271 S.W.3d 694,
696-97 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)); State ex rel. Lykos, 330 S.W.3d at 915. Thus, a court of
appeals does not have jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders unless that jurisdiction has been
expressly granted by law. Ex parte Apolinar, 820 S.W.2d 792, 794 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Ex
parte Shumake, 953 S.W.2d 842, 844 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, no pet.). No such grant exists
for a defendant’s direct appeal of an interlocutory order denying a pretrial motion to dismiss.
See, e.g., Ex parte Wiley, 949 S.W.2d 3, 4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1996, no writ) (dismissing
appeal because “[t]here is no statute providing for interlocutory appeal of denial of
a motion to dismiss”).
Finally, the trial-court certification in the record reflects that Sheppard has no
right of appeal. We are required to dismiss an appeal “if a certification that shows the defendant
has a right of appeal has not been made part of the record.” See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(d); Dears
v. State, 154 S.W.3d 610, 613 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P.
25.2(a)(2), (d); id. R. 43.2 (f).
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__________________________________________
Jeff Rose, Chief Justice
Before Chief Justice Rose, Justices Kelly and Smith
Dismissed for Want of Jurisdiction
Filed: May 1, 2019
Do Not Publish
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