in the Matter of the Marriage of William Edward Piske, Jr and Jamie Krivan Lange ( 2019 )


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  • Affirmed in Part, Reversed and Remanded in Part, and Majority and
    Concurring Opinions filed May 7, 2019.
    In The
    Fourteenth Court of Appeals
    NO. 14-17-00869-CV
    IN THE MATTER OF THE MARRIAGE OF WILLIAM EDWARD
    PISKE, JR. AND JAMIE KRIVAN LANGE
    On Appeal from the 246th District Court
    Harris County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. 2014-59709
    CONCURRING OPINION
    A neutral arbitrator exhibits evident partiality “if the arbitrator does not
    disclose facts which might, to an objective observer, create a reasonable
    impression of the arbitrator’s partiality.” Tenaska Energy, Inc. v. Ponderosa Pine
    Energy, LLC, 
    437 S.W.3d 518
    , 524 (Tex. 2014); see also Burlington N. R.R. Co. v.
    TUCO Inc., 
    960 S.W.2d 629
    , 630 (Tex. 1997).             When a party’s rights are
    prejudiced by an arbitrator’s evident partiality in failing to disclose such facts, a
    trial court shall vacate the arbitration award.    Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code
    § 171.088(a)(2)(A). Appellant Jamie Lange contends and the majority agrees that
    the arbitrator, Warren Cole, failed to disclose several facts that might, to an
    objective observer, create a reasonable impression of the arbitrator’s partiality.
    The court therefore reverses the trial court’s order denying Lange’s motion to
    vacate the arbitration award, reverses the divorce decree with the exception of the
    part granting the divorce, and remands for further proceedings.
    One undisclosed fact is that the arbitrator and William Piske’s counsel, Joan
    Jenkins, are friends. Jenkins was not involved in the proceedings when the parties
    selected the arbitrator in 2015. But after she appeared as co-counsel for Piske in
    January 2017, the arbitrator did not disclose any relationships with Jenkins. While
    a neutral arbitrator need not disclose trivial connections, the conscientious
    arbitrator “should err in favor of disclosure.”     
    Tenaska, 437 S.W.3d at 524
    .
    Moreover, an arbitrator’s duty to check conflicts and make disclosures exists
    throughout arbitration proceedings. See Alim v. KBR (Kellogg, Brown & Root)-
    Halliburton, 
    331 S.W.3d 178
    , 181-82 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.). This
    matter was tried to the arbitrator in February and March 2017. Lange learned that
    Jenkins and Cole were friends on July 12, 2017, when Jenkins emailed Cole
    requesting a ruling. The arbitrator signed an award on July 15, and issued a
    clarification and additional award on September 20. Lange first raised the issue of
    Cole’s friendship with Jenkins in a motion to vacate the arbitration award filed on
    September 29. Lange asserted that she first learned of the friendship from Jenkins’
    July 12 email and argued that the arbitrator’s failure to disclose the relationship
    constituted evident partiality necessitating the award’s vacatur. In response, Piske
    argued that Lange waived any right to vacate the award based on the arbitrator’s
    alleged evident partiality. The trial court denied Lange’s motion to vacate and
    motion for new trial.
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    I would hold that Lange waived her right to rely on the undisclosed
    friendship between Cole and Jenkins as a basis to vacate the award because, after
    learning of the friendship on July 12, Lange took several material actions
    inconsistent with asserting an objection to the arbitrator’s evident partiality based
    on the friendship. Approximately two weeks after receiving the email, Lange filed
    a 26-page motion requesting the arbitrator to reconsider and clarify several
    material aspects of his July 15 award, including asking the arbitrator to change his
    rulings on the merits. Lange’s motion did not raise any objection to the arbitrator’s
    potential bias. On August 23, Lange filed an additional 11-page supplement to her
    motion for reconsideration and clarification, again requesting substantive relief in
    her favor from the arbitrator and raising no concern about the arbitrator’s potential
    bias.    Cole granted the parties additional time to complete briefing through
    September and so notified the trial court by letter with copies to all counsel. In his
    September 6 letter, Cole requested the trial court to reset the matter for September
    25.     Lange raised no objection to the arbitrator’s consideration of the issues
    outlined in his letter or his communication with the court.            Cole issued a
    clarification and additional award on September 20. Again raising no objection to
    Cole’s potential partiality, one week later Lange filed a request for the arbitrator to
    issue findings of fact and conclusions of law.               Only after requesting
    reconsideration, clarification, and findings on the merits, and after receiving an
    unfavorable result, did Lange file on September 29 a motion to vacate the award
    and a motion for continuance of the trial setting to conduct additional discovery
    into the relationship between Cole and Jenkins, citing the July 12 email.
    A party may waive a challenge to an arbitrator’s evident partiality by
    proceeding to arbitrate despite knowledge of facts giving rise to a partiality
    objection. See 
    Tenaska, 437 S.W.3d at 528
    ; Kendall Builders, Inc. v. Chesson, 149
    
    3 S.W.3d 796
    , 803 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, pet. denied); see also Skidmore
    Energy, Inc. v. Maxus (U.S.) Expl. Co., 
    345 S.W.3d 672
    , 678 (Tex. App.—Dallas
    2011, pet. denied). Waiver is “[the] intentional relinquishment of a known right or
    intentional conduct inconsistent with claiming it.” In re Media Arts Grp., Inc., 
    116 S.W.3d 900
    , 909 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.).            Lange’s
    conduct described above is inconsistent with claiming a right to object to the
    arbitrator’s evident partiality based on a friendship between Cole and Jenkins.
    Lange may not have known the full scope or depth of the friendship in July, but
    she could have objected and sought discovery to explore the issue at that time.
    Instead, she repeatedly requested substantive relief from the arbitrator.       She
    objected to the arbitrator’s partiality based on the friendship and requested
    discovery only after losing. On this record, the trial court’s implied finding that
    Lange waived her right to seek vacatur of the award based on evident partiality due
    to the arbitrator’s friendship with Jenkins is supported, and we should defer to it.
    See Forest Oil Corp. v. El Rucio Land & Cattle Co., 
    518 S.W.3d 422
    , 431 (Tex.
    2017).
    At the hearing on her motion to vacate, however, Lange introduced evidence
    of other undisclosed facts besides the friendship between Cole and Jenkins. Both
    Cole and Jenkins voluntarily gave deposition testimony on October 18, 2017. The
    court admitted excerpts from both depositions into evidence at the hearing. The
    depositions revealed that Cole had served as a mediator in approximately six or
    seven cases in which Jenkins appeared as counsel, and that Cole served as an
    arbitrator on at least one other occasion in which Jenkins was counsel. Jenkins
    also recalled that she once served as an arbitrator in a matter where Cole was
    counsel. These undisputed facts were not disclosed by Cole and no evidence in our
    record shows that Lange learned of them until the depositions. Lange cited these
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    facts during the hearing on her motion to vacate as a basis for finding evident
    partiality.
    The family law arbitration rules applicable here stated that the arbitrator
    would disclose to the parties any circumstance likely to affect impartiality,
    including “any past or present relationship with the parties or their counsel.” That
    an arbitrator has served previously as a mediator or arbitrator for a party or counsel
    is a matter arbitration parties would reasonably want to know when deciding
    whether to agree to a particular arbitrator. A past history serving as a mediator or
    arbitrator for a party or counsel is not trivial in this circumstance. See Builders
    First Source-S. Tex., LP v. Ortiz, 
    515 S.W.3d 451
    , 459 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
    Dist.] 2017, pet. denied). The undisclosed facts regarding Cole’s and Jenkins’s
    mediation and arbitration history formed an independent ground for Lange’s
    motion to vacate based on evident partiality regardless whether Jenkins and Cole
    are friends. Lange could not have waived her evident partiality claim based on
    those facts because she was unaware of them before and during the arbitration
    proceeding.    See 
    Tenaska, 437 S.W.3d at 528
    .           Because the mediation and
    arbitration history between Cole and Jenkins was not disclosed, Lange
    demonstrated evident partiality and we are thus compelled to vacate the award. I
    therefore concur in the judgment.
    /s/       Kevin Jewell
    Justice
    Panel consists of Justices Christopher, Jewell, and Hassan. (Hassan, J., majority).
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