in the Matter of the Expunction of J.L.M. ( 2019 )


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  • Opinion filed May 9, 2019
    In The
    Eleventh Court of Appeals
    __________
    No. 11-17-00334-CV
    __________
    IN THE MATTER OF THE EXPUNCTION OF J.L.M.
    On Appeal from the 142nd District Court
    Midland County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. CV53260
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    J.L.M. appeals the trial court’s denial of his pro se and in forma pauperis
    petition for expunction of records arising out of a dismissed charge against him for
    escape from custody. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.06 (West 2016). Appellant
    contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his petition because
    the State dismissed the indictment for this offense. We affirm.
    Background Facts
    While Appellant was being held in the Midland County Jail for the offense of
    manufacture or delivery of a controlled substance, he allegedly committed the
    offense of escape from custody on July 21, 2016. Appellant was later indicted for
    escape from custody. Pursuant to a subsequent plea agreement, Appellant pleaded
    guilty to the offense of possession of a controlled substance. As a part of the plea
    agreement, the charge for escape from custody was dismissed. The motion to
    dismiss listed the reason for dismissal as: “The defendant was convicted in another
    case.”
    Less than a year later, Appellant filed a pro se petition for expunction of
    records arising out of his indictment and confinement for escape from custody.
    Appellant alleged that he was entitled to an expunction under Chapter 55 of the
    Texas Code of Criminal Procedure because the indictment was dismissed on
    October 14, 2016. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. ch. 55 (West 2018).
    The State filed an answer opposing Appellant’s motion seeking expunction.
    The State asserted that the indictment was dismissed as a result of a plea agreement
    with the State and not because the indictment was based upon “mistake, false
    information, or any other similar reason indicating absence of probable cause” as
    required under the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. The trial court denied
    Appellant’s petition for expunction in a written order without holding a hearing on
    the matter. This pro se appeal followed.
    Analysis
    In a single issue, Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion
    when it denied his petition for expunction. Appellant asserts that he was entitled to
    an expunction based on the dismissal of the indictment for escape from custody.
    Appellant argues that Article 55.01 does not require any particular ground for
    dismissal to satisfy the requirement that the indictment has been dismissed. We
    disagree.
    We review a trial court’s ruling on a petition for expunction under the abuse
    of discretion standard.       State v. T.S.N., 
    547 S.W.3d 617
    , 620 (Tex. 2018);
    Rodriguez v. State, 
    224 S.W.3d 783
    , 784 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2007, no pet.).
    “Under the abuse of discretion standard, appellate courts afford no deference to the
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    trial court’s legal determinations because a court has no discretion in deciding what
    the law is or in applying it to the facts.” 
    T.S.N., 547 S.W.3d at 620
    (citing In re
    Labatt Food Serv., L.P., 
    279 S.W.3d 640
    , 643 (Tex. 2009); Walker v. Packer, 
    827 S.W.2d 833
    , 840 (Tex. 1992)). “Thus, a trial court’s legal conclusions are reviewed
    de novo.” 
    Id. (citing State
    v. Heal, 
    917 S.W.2d 6
    , 9 (Tex. 1996)). As was the case
    in T.S.N., the trial court’s ruling on the expunction request hinged on a question of
    law because it required the interpretation of Article 55.01; therefore, it is subject to
    de novo review. See 
    id. (citing City
    of Rockwall v. Hughes, 
    246 S.W.3d 621
    , 625–
    26 (Tex. 2008)).
    “The purpose of an expunction statute is to permit the expunction of records
    of wrongful arrests.” In Expunction of R.H., 
    510 S.W.3d 143
    , 145 (Tex. App.—El
    Paso 2016, no pet.) (citing Harris Cty. Dist. Attorney’s Office v. J.T.S., 
    807 S.W.2d 572
    , 574 (Tex. 1991); Travis Cty. Dist. Attorney v. M.M., 
    354 S.W.3d 920
    , 926 (Tex.
    App.—Austin 2011, no pet.)).        Article 55.01 of the Texas Code of Criminal
    Procedure contains the requirements for expunction of criminal records. “A person
    is not entitled to expunction until all of the statutory conditions are met.” 
    T.S.N., 547 S.W.3d at 620
    (citing Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. J.H.J., 
    274 S.W.3d 803
    , 806
    (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.)).
    Appellant sought expunction pursuant to subsection (a)(2)(A)(ii) of
    Article 55.01. The version of Article 55.01 in effect both at the time of Appellant’s
    offense and when he filed his application for expunction, provided as follows:
    (a) A person who has been placed under a custodial or
    noncustodial arrest for commission of either a felony or misdemeanor
    is entitled to have all records and files relating to the arrest expunged
    if:
    ....
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    (2) the person has been released and the charge, if any, has not
    resulted in a final conviction and is no longer pending and there was no
    court-ordered community supervision under Article 42.12 for the
    offense, unless the offense is a Class C misdemeanor, provided that:
    (A) regardless of whether any statute of limitations exists for the
    offense and whether any limitations period for the offense has expired,
    an indictment or information charging the person with the commission
    of a misdemeanor offense based on the person’s arrest or charging the
    person with the commission of any felony offense arising out of the
    same transaction for which the person was arrested:
    ....
    (ii) if [an indictment or information is] presented at any time
    following the arrest, was dismissed or quashed, and the court finds that
    the indictment or information was dismissed or quashed because the
    person completed a pretrial intervention program authorized under
    Section 76.011, Government Code, because the presentment had been
    made because of mistake, false information, or other similar reason
    indicating absence of probable cause at the time of the dismissal to
    believe the person committed the offense, or because the indictment or
    information was void.
    Act of May 27, 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., ch. 894, § 1, sec. 55.01, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws
    2275–76. Appellant asserts that the reason why a case is dismissed has no bearing
    on an expunction under Article 55.01. We disagree. By the express terms of the
    statute, the legislature intended to limit expunction after the dismissal of a case to
    only those situations provided in Article 55.01(a)(2). In Expunction of 
    R.H., 510 S.W.3d at 147
    .
    The El Paso Court of Appeals addressed an analogous situation in In
    Expunction of R.H. The applicant in that case had two charges of aggravated assault
    with a deadly weapon dismissed as a part of a plea agreement wherein he pleaded
    guilty to nine counts of criminal mischief. 
    Id. at 144–45.
    El Paso County asserted
    that the applicant was not entitled to expunction because the charges were dismissed
    as a result of a plea bargain with the State and not because the indictment was based
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    upon mistake, false information, or other reason indicating absence of probable
    cause, as required under the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. 
    Id. at 145.
    The El
    Paso Court of Appeals agreed with the County’s contention based upon the express
    terms of Article 55.01(a)(2). 
    Id. at 145–47;
    see Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. J.A.M.,
    No. 01-16-00814-CV, 
    2017 WL 1629444
    , at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
    May 2, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing In Expunction of R.H. with approval); Ex
    parte Lopez, No. 07-03-0413-CV, 
    2004 WL 351135
    , at *1–2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo
    Feb. 25, 2004, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (dealing with an escape charge dismissed as
    a result of a plea agreement on another charge).
    We agree with the reasoning of the El Paso Court of Appeals.
    Article 55.01(a)(2)(A)(ii) sets out the parameters for an expunction when a charge
    has been dismissed after the person has been indicted. As quoted above, the
    applicable version of Article 55.01(a)(2)(A)(ii) required a finding by the trial court:
    [T]hat the indictment or information was dismissed or quashed because
    . . . the presentment had been made because of mistake, false
    information, or other similar reason indicating absence of probable
    cause at the time of the dismissal to believe the person committed the
    offense, or because the indictment or information was void.
    See Act of May 27, 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., ch. 894, § 1, sec. 55.01, 2011 Tex. Gen.
    Laws 2275–76. Because Appellant’s charge for escape from custody was dismissed
    as a result of a plea agreement on another charge, the dismissal was not made
    because of one of the reasons listed in Article 55.01(a)(2)(A)(ii). Simply put, there
    was no evidence indicating that the indictment was dismissed because the indictment
    had been made because of mistake, false information, or other similar reason
    indicating absence of probable cause or that the indictment was void. Accordingly,
    Appellant was not entitled to an expunction under the subsection of Article 55.01
    upon which he relied, and the trial court did not err by denying his petition. We
    overrule Appellant’s sole issue on appeal.
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    This Court’s Ruling
    We affirm the order of the trial court.
    JOHN M. BAILEY
    CHIEF JUSTICE
    May 9, 2019
    Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
    Stretcher, J., and Wright, S.C.J.1
    Willson, J., not participating.
    1
    Jim R. Wright, Senior Chief Justice (Retired), Court of Appeals, 11th District of Texas at Eastland,
    sitting by assignment.
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