David Keith Sauls Jr. v. State ( 2018 )


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  •                         COURT OF APPEALS
    SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    FORT WORTH
    NO. 02-17-00224-CR
    DAVID KEITH SAULS JR.                                              APPELLANT
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS                                                      STATE
    ----------
    FROM THE 78TH DISTRICT COURT OF WICHITA COUNTY
    TRIAL COURT NO. 58,646-B
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    MEMORANDUM OPINION 1
    ----------
    A jury convicted Appellant David Keith Sauls Jr. of evading arrest or
    detention in a vehicle, and upon his plea of true to two enhancement paragraphs,
    the trial court sentenced him to twenty-five years’ confinement. In one point,
    Appellant complains about the State’s closing argument.     Because Appellant
    1
    See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
    forfeited his complaint by not objecting to the argument at trial, we affirm the trial
    court’s judgment.
    I.     BRIEF FACTS
    On the evening of January 14, 2017, Deputy Daniel Jacobson of the
    Wichita County Sheriff’s Office was on patrol when he saw ahead of him a silver
    2012 Nissan Versa with a right brake light out. He caught up with the Nissan
    after it turned left on Old Iowa Park Road, and he activated his patrol car’s
    overhead, flashing lights as he followed the Nissan onto an access road and then
    southbound on the Central Freeway, both of which had improved shoulders. The
    Nissan went past the first available exit, and Deputy Jacobson turned on his
    siren. Without signaling, the Nissan exited to Seymour Highway, moved to the
    far right lane, and turned right at a red light without stopping. The Nissan then
    immediately turned right into an EconoLodge parking lot, made a U-turn, and
    stopped, facing Seymour Highway. The driver, Appellant, got out and began
    running across the highway. He collided with the windshield and passenger-side
    mirror of the patrol car of another deputy arriving to assist Deputy Jacobson,
    landed on the ground, and then tried to run again before the two deputies
    captured and arrested him.
    A grand jury indicted Appellant for evading arrest or detention while using
    a vehicle, and the indictment contained two sentence-enhancement paragraphs
    alleging prior felony convictions of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon
    and injury to a disabled person.
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    During trial, at a hearing outside the jury’s presence, the trial court ruled
    admissible for impeachment purposes at guilt Appellant’s prior offenses including
    a 2005 felony conviction for evading arrest or detention with a vehicle and a
    2008 misdemeanor conviction for evading arrest or detention. The trial court
    confirmed at Appellant’s request that the facts of the convictions would be
    admissible but not the underlying details of the crimes. Appellant then testified
    before the jury, claiming that he did not intend to evade arrest in a motor vehicle
    in the present case.        The prosecutor asked Appellant about the 2005 and
    2008 evading arrest convictions, and he admitted them. He did not request a
    contemporaneous limiting instruction.
    In the State’s closing argument at guilt, the prosecutor stated,
    Also in 2005, [Appellant was] convicted of evading arrest or
    detention using a motor vehicle.
    In 2008, [he was] convicted of evading arrest or detention as a
    misdemeanor offense on foot.
    Ladies and gentlemen, he knows the difference between the
    two of them. He knows what one offense is and what the other
    offense is.
    Appellant did not object.
    II.   DISCUSSION
    In his sole point, Appellant complains that in the portion of the jury
    argument quoted above, the State “improperly argued the jury [should] consider
    [his] prior evading convictions in determining the element of intent. The prior
    convictions had been admitted for impeachment purposes only.”            Appellant
    3
    admits that he did not object to the argument at trial, and, without citing any
    authority for the proposition, argues that “[t]his error is of such a fundamental
    nature that [it] denies [him] due process that this Court cannot ignore.”
    Absent an objection to jury argument at trial, nothing is presented for
    review.   Threadgill v. State, 
    146 S.W.3d 654
    , 667 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004);
    Cockrell v. State, 
    933 S.W.2d 73
    , 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), cert. denied,
    
    520 U.S. 1173
    (1997).      The objection must be timely and specific, and the
    defendant must pursue the objection to an adverse ruling.          Mathis v. State,
    
    67 S.W.3d 918
    , 927 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); 
    Cockrell, 933 S.W.2d at 89
    ; Carter
    v. State, 
    614 S.W.2d 821
    , 823 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981); see also Tex. R. App. P.
    33.1(a)(1). An objection is timely if it is made as soon as the ground of objection
    becomes apparent. Thompson v. State, 
    691 S.W.2d 627
    , 635 (Tex. Crim. App.
    1984), cert. denied, 
    474 U.S. 865
    (1985). Even if an argument is egregious and
    an instruction to disregard would not have cured the harm, the complaint is
    forfeited if the defendant did not object. 
    Mathis, 67 S.W.3d at 926
    –27; see also
    
    Threadgill, 146 S.W.3d at 667
    . Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s point.
    III.   CONCLUSION
    Having overruled Appellant’s single point, we affirm the trial court’s
    judgment.
    4
    /s/ Mark T. Pittman
    MARK T. PITTMAN
    JUSTICE
    PANEL: WALKER, MEIER, and PITTMAN, JJ.
    DO NOT PUBLISH
    Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
    DELIVERED: June 28, 2018
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 02-17-00224-CR

Filed Date: 6/28/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 7/2/2018