Robert Gonzales v. State ( 2015 )


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  •                        COURT OF APPEALS
    SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    FORT WORTH
    NO. 02-15-00032-CR
    ROBERT GONZALES                                                APPELLANT
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS                                                   STATE
    ----------
    FROM THE 396TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
    TRIAL COURT NO. 1351979D
    ----------
    MEMORANDUM OPINION 1
    ----------
    In a single issue, appellant Robert Gonzales appeals his conviction for
    arson and 18-year sentence. Because we conclude Gonzales has defaulted his
    claim that his sentence was cruel and unusual, we affirm the trial court’s
    judgment.
    1
    See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
    Shane Bradshaw and Akita McGowan were asleep in their home on
    December 3, 2013, when McGowan heard something hit the bedroom window,
    heard a sloshing sound, smelled gasoline, heard the click of a lighter, and heard
    a “whoosh.” Bradshaw and McGowan were able to escape before their bedroom
    became engulfed in flames. Gonzales was indicted for arson with the intent to
    damage a habitation with a deadly weapon—a combustible or flammable liquid or
    material. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 28.02(a), (d)(2) (West 2011). Gonzales
    pleaded guilty to the offense without a plea-bargain agreement but did not enter
    a plea to the deadly-weapon notice.         After a punishment hearing and after
    reviewing a presentence-investigation report, the trial court made an affirmative
    deadly-weapon finding and assessed his punishment at 18 years’ confinement.
    On appeal, Gonzales argues that his sentence is cruel and unusual
    because he is young, he accepted responsibility for his crime, and he “is a
    diligent and good worker.” However, Gonzales failed to raise this issue in the
    trial court at the punishment hearing 2 and did not file a motion for new trial.
    Thus, he has procedurally defaulted this claim. See Sample v. State, 405 SW.3d
    295, 303–04 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2013, pet. ref’d). We overrule Gonzales’s
    sole issue and affirm the trial court’s judgment. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(a).
    2
    When the trial court asked if there was “any legal reason why sentence
    should not be pronounced,” Gonzales’s counsel stated that there was not.
    2
    /s/ Lee Gabriel
    LEE GABRIEL
    JUSTICE
    PANEL: DAUPHINOT, WALKER, and GABRIEL, JJ.
    DO NOT PUBLISH
    Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
    DELIVERED: October 1, 2015
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 02-15-00032-CR

Filed Date: 10/1/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/2/2015