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No. 04-99-00439-CR John F. SAUNDERS, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee From the 144th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 98-CR-3107 Honorable Mark Luitjen,(1) Judge Presiding Opinion by: Sarah B. Duncan, Justice
Sitting: Phil Hardberger, Chief Justice
Catherine Stone, Justice
Sarah B. Duncan, Justice
Delivered and Filed: March 8, 2000
AFFIRMED
John F. Saunders appeals the trial court's judgment entered pursuant to his plea of nolo contendere. Saunders argues his plea was involuntary because the State reneged on its end of the plea bargain. We disagree and affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background Saunders, indicted for indecency with a child by contact, reached a plea agreement with the State under which he agreed to plead nolo contendere if the State would recommend punishment of no more than three years in prison and a $1000 fine and would remain silent on Saunders' application for probation. The court held a plea hearing at which it presented Saunders with the requisite admonitions. However, before the court accepted Saunders' plea, it noticed the State had agreed to remain silent on the issue of probation. The court then remarked:
COURT: Isn't this one where he can only be granted deferred [adjudication], as opposed to regular [probation]? It's an indecency with contact.
STATE: That's correct.
COURT: And I thought that the jury has to be the one to grant regular probation on indecency cases now.
STATE: That I believe's correct, Judge.
COURT: Right.
STATE: If the offense is after May 23rd of '97.
COURT: Uh-huh. And this is March of 1998? See, there's two kinds of supervision. There's regular and there's deferred, and the jury is the only one that can grant regular probation on an indecency. And your plea bargain says they are going to be silent on the regular.
STATE: We would be silent on the application for deferred.
COURT: So the only thing you can apply for is deferred. Do you understand that? Maybe you need to talk to him a little bit.
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: Yeah, we can talk about that, Your Honor.
STATE: Thank you, Your Honor.
The court took a recess while Saunders and his attorney apparently discussed the situation. When they returned, the following exchange took place:
COURT: Your plea bargain is for three years, $1,000 fine. The State is silent on your application for deferred. You are not eligible for probation. We took a break so you could talk to your lawyer about this.
SAUNDERS: Yes, ma'am.
COURT: Do you understand how this works?
SAUNDERS: Yes.
The court went on to explain that while the State would remain silent on the issue of deferred adjudication, Saunders was not guaranteed to receive deferred adjudication. The court then asked Saunders whether he wanted it to follow the plea bargain, and Saunders indicated that he did. The trial court accepted Saunders' plea of no contest and ordered a presentence report. At the subsequent sentencing hearing, the trial court denied Saunders' application for deferred adjudication and sentenced Saunders to three years in prison and a $1000 fine.
Discussion Saunders argues his plea was involuntary because the State did not carry out its end of the plea bargain. Specifically, Saunders argues probation was the convincing factor in his pleading nolo contendere to the charge, and he would not have pleaded guilty had he known probation was not available to him. We disagree.
To determine whether a plea of nolo contendere was knowing and voluntary, we look at the totality of the circumstances surrounding the entry of the plea, including the written stipulations and waivers. Gonzales v. State, 963 S.W.2d 844, 846 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1998, no pet.). "When the record reflects that the trial court appropriately admonished the defendant, a prima facie showing that the defendant's guilty plea was knowing and voluntary is established." Rodriguez v. State, 933 S.W.2d 702, 705 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1996, pet. ref'd). "The burden then shifts to the defendant to prove that he did not understand the consequences of his plea." Id. at 706. This burden is particularly heavy when the defendant states he understands the nature of the proceeding and his plea is voluntary. Id.
When a defendant enters a nolo contendere plea pursuant to a plea bargain, the State must fulfill its part of the agreement or the plea is rendered involuntary. DeRusse v. State, 579 S.W.2d 224, 236 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979); Bryant v. State, 974 S.W.2d 395, 398 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1998, pet. ref'd). However, a State may change or withdraw its offer anytime before the defendant enters his plea and the court agrees to be bound by the plea agreement. DeRusse, 579 S.W.2d at 236; Bryant, 974 S.W.2d at 398. Furthermore, a defendant may knowingly and voluntarily enter a plea despite a State's reneging on its promise under a plea bargain if the State reneges before the court accepted the defendant's plea, the court admonishes the defendant of his rights and options in the wake of the State's reneging, and the defendant indicates he understands his rights and options and still pleads nolo contendere. Bryant, 974 S.W.2d at 398.
Here, if the State reneged, it did so before Saunders pleaded and the court accepted the plea agreement. Furthermore, the trial court explained to Saunders that he could not receive normal probation but only deferred adjudication. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, § 3g (Vernon Supp. 1999); Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 21.11(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1999). Saunders was even given time to discuss this issue with his attorney and, upon returning to the hearing, Saunders indicated he understood he was not eligible for probation. Under these circumstances, we hold Saunders' plea of nolo contendere was made knowingly and voluntarily at the time it was entered, Bryant, 974 S.W.2d at 398, and we affirm the trial court's judgment.
Sarah B. Duncan, Justice
Do not publish
1. The Honorable Susan Reed presided over Saunders' plea hearing, while the Honorable Mark Luitjen presided over his sentencing hearing and signed the judgment.
Document Info
Docket Number: 04-99-00439-CR
Filed Date: 3/8/2000
Precedential Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 9/6/2015