Craig Thomas Mellor v. State ( 2000 )

No. 04-99-00004-CR

Craig Thomas MELLOR, Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas, Appellee

From the 290th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 96-CR-4053 Honorable Sharon MacRae, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Phil Hardberger, Chief Justice

Sitting: Phil Hardberger, Chief Justice

Alma L. López, Justice

Paul W. Green, Justice

Delivered and Filed: May 10, 2000

AFFIRMED

Craig Thomas Mellor ("Mellor") appeals his conviction of driving while intoxicated. Mellor presents two points of error, complaining: (1) the evidence is factually insufficient to support his conviction; and (2) section 49.09 of the Texas Penal Code violates both the Texas and United States Constitutions. We overrule each of Mellor's contentions and affirm the trial court's judgment.

Background

Mellor was driving home from a bar at around 2:30 in the morning when he was stopped for running a red light. Officer Ambriz approached Mellor's vehicle on the driver's side, while Officer DeLeon approached along the passenger side of the vehicle. Ambriz testified that Mellor produced his driver's license in response to Ambriz's request; however, Mellor had difficultly locating his proof of insurance. In his frustration, Mellor grabbed the contents of his glove compartment and handed it to Ambriz. Ambriz also observed that Mellor had slurred speech and glassy eyes.

Based on these indicators, Ambriz asked Mellor to exit his car. As Mellor walked to the rear of the car, he was holding onto the car for support. When Mellor reached the rear of the car, he leaned against the trunk until Ambriz requested Mellor to step away from the car. Ambriz smelled a strong odor of intoxicants on Mellor's breath and proceeded to conduct three field sobriety tests. Ambriz testified that Mellor failed two of the tests and refused to perform a third. Mellor was then arrested and transported to the Bexar County Sheriff's Office, where Mellor refused to take a breath test. Because Mellor refused the breath test, Ambriz made a videotape of Mellor. Mellor refused to perform the field sobriety tests on tape.

During cross-examination, Mellor's attorney challenged Ambriz with the inconsistencies between his trial testimony and his prior testimony at an administrative license revocation proceeding. Inconsistencies existed between which test Mellor failed and which test Mellor refused to perform. On re-direct examination, Ambriz testified that his report would contain the most accurate information regarding the events that occurred when Mellor was arrested. The report reflected that Mellor failed the horizontal gaze nystagmus and one leg stand test and refused to perform the walk and turn test. Mellor's attorney also asked Ambriz whether Mellor had mentioned that he suffered from gout. Ambriz did not recall being told of that condition, and testified during re-direct that gout would not cause Mellor's breath to smell of intoxicants. Ambriz further testified that he believed Mellor's speech was still slurred when he was videotaped; however, Ambriz stated that Mellor appeared better in the videotape because it was taken an hour after he was arrested.

The bartender who served Mellor on the night he was arrested testified that Mellor arrived around 9:30 p.m. and left around 2:15 a.m. The bartender stated that he only served Mellor three beers during that time. The bartender described Mellor as a good customer. On cross-examination, the bartender admitted that he could have some liability if he served an intoxicated patron. In addition, the bartender's credibility was challenged by the fact that two bartenders served drinks at the bar although the bartender stated that he kept an accurate count of all drinks served to Mellor.

Mellor testified that he was frustrated when he was pulled over because of the effect that a traffic ticket would have on his insurance. Mellor stated that it was his frustration that caused him difficulty in retrieving his proof of insurance and, ultimately, Officer DeLeon reached in the car to retrieve the insurance card. Mellor testified that he had difficulty with the field sobriety tests because of his weight and because of his gout condition, which made his ankles weak. Mellor stated that he told the officers at the scene of his condition but did not think to restate his condition when he was being videotaped. Mellor's counsel elicited testimony from Officer DeLeon that the validity of the one leg stand and walk and turn tests would be affected if the person being tested was 50 pounds overweight. Mellor testified that he was five feet, seven and one-half inches tall and weighed two hundred and five pounds. Mellor stated that his ideal weight was around 150 pounds.

After hearing this evidence, a jury found Mellor guilty of driving while intoxicated. Mellor timely filed this appeal from the trial court's judgment based on that verdict.

Factual Sufficiency

In his first point of error, Mellor challenges the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's verdict. In our factual sufficiency review, we must consider all of the evidence to determine whether the judgment is "so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust." Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). We must review the jury's weighing of the evidence in a deferential manner to avoid substituting our judgment for that of the jury. See Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Our review of the evidence must not substantially intrude upon the jury's role as the sole judge of the credibility of witness testimony. See Santellan v. State, 939 S.W.2d 155, 164 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The weight to be given contradictory testimonial evidence is within the sole province of the jury, because it turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. See Cain, 958 S.W.2d at 408-09.

Although Mellor's counsel attempted to challenge Ambriz's credibility, it was within the jury's province to believe Ambriz's testimony and to disbelieve Mellor. The jury could have chosen to believe that portion of Ambriz's testimony that was supported by his written report. Furthermore, the jury was in a position to view the videotape and compare Mellor's manner of speech during trial with his manner of speech on the tape. Considering all of the evidence and the jury's ability to evaluate credibility and demeanor, the judgment is not so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Mellor's first point of error is overruled.

Constitutionality of Section 49.09 of the Texas Penal Code

In his second point of error, Mellor challenges the facial constitutionality of section 49.09 of the Texas Penal Code.⁽¹⁾ We summarily reject Mellor's contention based on existing precedent. See Diamond v. State, 530 S.W.2d 586, 587 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) (statutes using prior convictions to create new offense withstand attacks under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution for same reasons such attacks are rejected with respect to enhancement statutes); Barlow v. State, 398 S.W.2d 933, 935 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966) (rejecting due process challenge to state's ability to plead and prove prior conviction in DWI case); see also Tamez v. State, 11 S.W.3d 198 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (discussing balancing of article 36.01(a)(1) and Rule 403 in felony DWI prosecutions); cf. Crocker v. State, 385 S.W.2d 392, 393-94 (Tex. Crim. App. 1964) (reading indictment alleging prior offense does not deny due process of law). Mellor's second point of error is overruled.

Conclusion

The trial court's judgment is affirmed.

PHIL HARDBERGER,

CHIEF JUSTICE

DO NOT PUBLISH

1. Because Mellor challenges the facial validity of the statute, rather than the constitutionality of its application, he was not required to raise his constitutional challenge below in order to preserve error. See Sullivan v. State, 986 S.W.2d 708, 711 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1999, no pet.); Gravis v. State, 982 S.W.2d 933, 938 (Tex. App.--Austin 1998, pet. ref'd).