Chelsea Marie Gilbert v. State ( 2016 )

In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
Nos. 07-16-00158-CR, 07-16-00159-CR
CHELSEA MARIE GILBERT, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the County Criminal Court No. 2
Tarrant County, Texas1
Trial Court Nos. 1405019, 1405032, Honorable Carey Frank Walker, Presiding
November 22, 2016
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before QUINN, C.J., and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ.
After her motions to suppress were denied by the trial court, appellant, Chelsea
Marie Gilbert, entered open pleas of guilty to charges of driving while intoxicated,
possession of marijuana in an amount under two ounces, and criminal mischief. 2 The
trial court entered judgment finding appellant guilty of driving while intoxicated (appellate
cause no. 07-16-00158-CR) and sentencing her to incarceration for 180 days, and a
1
Pursuant to the Texas Supreme Court’s docket equalization efforts, this case was transferred to
this Court from the Second Court of Appeals. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001 (West 2013).
2
Appellant’s appeal does not address the criminal mischief charge.
$500 fine. The sentence of incarceration was suspended and appellant was placed on
community supervision for a period of eighteen months. Appellant also appeals the trial
court’s deferral of adjudication on the charge of possession of marijuana (appellate
cause no. 07-16-00159-CR) and order that appellant complete a twelve-month term of
community supervision. By her appeal, appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of
her motions to suppress. We will affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Factual and Procedural Background
While on patrol just before midnight on January 19, 2015, Officer Cleburne
Eardley of the Tarrant County Sheriff’s Office noticed a car parked in a church parking
lot. Because it was a cold and dark night and the parking lot was located in a high
crime area, Eardley decided to investigate. Eardley parked his patrol car approximately
twenty feet behind the vehicle in a manner that did not block in the vehicle. He
activated his overhead lights for a short period of time as a means to activate the in-
dash camera in his patrol vehicle but turned them off before approaching the vehicle.
Eardley did, however, position his spotlight in such a manner that it illuminated the cab
of the vehicle. He approached the open driver’s side window and asked if everything
was alright. Appellant, who was in the driver’s seat of the vehicle, said that she was
checking her GPS. Eardley asked appellant and her passenger for identification. When
he smelled the strong odor of alcohol emanating from appellant, Eardley had appellant
perform field sobriety tests. Based on her performance on the field sobriety tests,
Eardley arrested appellant.3
3
Presumably, the marijuana was discovered in the search incident to arrest. However, this fact
was not developed during the suppression hearing or the plea proceedings.
2
Appellant moved to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the interaction
with Eardley on the basis that there was no reasonable suspicion to detain her and
community caretaking would not justify the encounter. After hearing the testimony of
Eardley and appellant’s passenger, the magistrate court that heard the matter denied
the motion. When appellant orally asked the magistrate court for findings of fact and
conclusions of law, the court stated,
Well, based upon the testimony of the officer at night, time of day, empty
parking lot, there is absolutely no reason the officer does not have the
right to approach that vehicle either for a short investigative detention or
for a public caretaking function to check upon the safety of the vehicles.
That’s my findings of fact and conclusion of law.
Appellant moved the trial court to modify, correct, reject, and reverse the magistrate’s
decision. At the subsequent hearing, the trial court adopted the ruling of the magistrate
denying the motion to suppress.4
After the trial court denied appellant’s motion, appellant entered open pleas of
guilty to each of the charged offenses. Following a brief hearing, the trial court found
appellant guilty of driving while intoxicated and deferred adjudication of guilt on the
possession of marijuana charge. The trial court also certified appellant’s right to appeal
in each cause and appellant timely filed the instant appeals.
4
While the trial court stated that it adopted the findings of the magistrate, a review of the
magistrate’s statement makes clear that it does not include any findings of fact but, rather, makes
conclusions of law that Eardley’s interaction with appellant was justified as community caretaking or
detention based on reasonable suspicion. As such, we will not treat this case as one in which the trial
court made findings of fact and conclusions of law.
3
Appellant’s sole issue on appeal contends that the trial court erred when it denied
appellant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained from her unlawful detention by law
enforcement.
Standard of Review
An appellate court reviews a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence
under a bifurcated standard of review. Abney v. State, 394 S.W.3d 542, 547 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2013). We must give almost total deference to a trial court’s determination
of historical facts supported by the record and application-of-law-to-fact questions that
turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor, but review de novo the trial court’s
application of the law to the facts. See id.; Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2007). When, as here, the trial court does not make findings of fact, 5 we are
to infer the necessary factual findings that support the trial court’s ruling if the evidence,
viewed in the light most favorable to the ruling, supports the implied fact findings. State
v. Garcia-Cantu, 253 S.W.3d 236, 241 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
Applicable Law
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 9,
of the Texas Constitution protect citizens against unreasonable searches and seizures
by government officials. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d
889 (1968); Franks v. State, 241 S.W.3d 135, 141 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, pet. ref’d).
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has recognized three categories of interactions
between police and citizens: arrests, investigative detentions, and encounters. State v.
5
See n.4.
4
Perez, 85 S.W.3d 817, 819 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Unlike arrests and investigative
detentions, which constitute seizures, an encounter is a consensual interaction which
the citizen may terminate at any time. State v. Bryant, 161 S.W.3d 758, 761 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.); see Gurrola v. State, 877 S.W.2d 300, 302 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1994) (en banc). So long as the person remains free to disregard the officer’s
questions and go about his business, the encounter is consensual and no seizure has
occurred. See Gurrola, 877 S.W.2d at 302. In determining whether the police
exercised sufficient force or authority to constitute a seizure, the totality of the police
conduct must be considered. See Garcia-Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 243-44. A court must
“step into the shoes of the defendant” to assess whether, from an objective perspective,
the defendant would have felt free to leave. Id. at 244. The subjective intent or
motivations of the police officer is not taken into account when considering the totality of
the circumstances. Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
Analysis
The facts, when viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling,
establish that Eardley’s initial approach was a consensual encounter. Appellant’s
vehicle was parked in a church parking lot near midnight. See Merideth v. State, 603
S.W.2d 872, 873 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980) (no detention for officer to
approach and knock on window of parked vehicle). Eardley pulled his vehicle behind
appellant’s vehicle in a manner that did not block appellant’s vehicle from being able to
exit. See Franks, 241 S.W.3d at 142 (no detention when police did not block avenue of
exit). Eardley activated his overhead lights for no longer than twenty seconds but
turned them off before approaching appellant’s vehicle. See Martin v. State, 104
5
S.W.3d 298, 301 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2003, no pet.) (no detention when officer
activated overhead lights before approaching citizen).6 Eardley walked to the opened
driver’s side window of appellant’s vehicle and asked if anything was wrong and if he
could see identification from the occupants. See State v. Castleberry, 332 S.W.3d 460,
466 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (no detention for officer to request identification and
information from a citizen in a public place). Looking at the totality of the circumstances,
we conclude that, from an objective perspective, appellant would have felt free to leave.
See Garcia-Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 244. As such, this interaction between Eardley and
appellant was an encounter rather than a seizure and, consequently, does not warrant
constitutional analysis. See Bryant, 161 S.W.2d at 761.
Once Eardley began speaking to appellant, he smelled the strong odor of alcohol
emanating from appellant. As a result, Eardley had appellant perform standardized field
sobriety tests. Based on her results on these tests, Eardley arrested appellant for
suspicion of driving while intoxicated. Appellant does not challenge Eardley’s authority
to perform the standardized field sobriety tests7 nor her subsequent arrest. As such, we
do not address that issue.
6
In its analysis, Martin quotes State v. Baldonado, 115 N.M. 106, 847 P.2d 751, 754 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1992), for the proposition that,
We can conceive of many situations in which people in stopped cars approached by
officers flashing their lights would be free to leave because the officers would be simply
communicating with them to ascertain that they are not in trouble. Under such
circumstances, depending on the facts, the officers may well activate their emergency
lights for reasons of highway safety or so as not to unduly alarm the stopped motorists.
See Martin, 104 S.W.3d at 301.
7
In Zamora v. State, No. 04-09-00722-CR, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 8934, at *5-6 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio Nov. 10, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication), the court held that the odor of
alcohol and bloodshot eyes were sufficient articulable facts establishing reasonable suspicion to justify
the officer having the defendant perform field sobriety tests.
6
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying
appellant’s motion to suppress evidence. We overrule appellant’s sole issue and affirm
the judgments of the trial court.
Mackey K. Hancock
Justice
Do not publish.
7