in the Interest of D.C. and G.M., Children ( 2016 )

COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-16-00303-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF D.C. AND
G.M., CHILDREN
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FROM THE 323RD DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
TRIAL COURT NO. 323-101576-15
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MEMORANDUM OPINION1
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Appellant D.C. (Mother) appeals the trial court’s order terminating her
parental rights to her son D.C. and her daughter G.M. The trial court found by
clear and convincing evidence that Mother’s actions satisfied the grounds listed
in Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), and (R) as alleged in the
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See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
petition for termination and that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in
D.C. and G.M.’s best interest. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E),
(R), (2) (West Supp. 2016). See generally In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 503 (Tex.
2014) (recognizing appellate court need not detail the evidence if affirming
termination judgment).
Mother’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw
as counsel and a brief in support of that motion. In the motion, counsel avers
that he has conducted a professional evaluation of the record and, after a
thorough review of the applicable law, has reached the conclusion that there are
no arguable grounds to be advanced to support an appeal of this cause and that
the appeal is frivolous. Mother was given the opportunity to file a pro se
response to the Anders brief but did not do so. The Department of Family and
Protective Services filed a letter stating that “[b]ecause Appellant has failed to
point to any arguable grounds for relief, the State will not reply to the motion to
withdraw filed by Appellant’s counsel.”
Counsel’s brief and motion meet the requirements of Anders v. California
by presenting a professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why there
are no reversible grounds on appeal and referencing any grounds that might
arguably support the appeal. See 386 U.S. 738, 744, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400
(1967); see also In re K.M., 98 S.W.3d 774, 776–77 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2003, no pet.) (holding Anders procedures apply in parental-rights termination
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cases), disp. on merits, No. 02-01-00349-CV, 2003 WL 2006583 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth May 1, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op.).
In reviewing an Anders brief, this court is not required to review the merits
of each claim raised in the brief or in a pro se response. See Bledsoe v. State,
178 S.W.3d 824, 827 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Rather, this court’s duty is to
determine whether there are any arguable grounds for reversal and, if there are,
to remand the case to the trial court so that new counsel may be appointed to
brief the issues. Id. Thus, we conduct an independent evaluation of the record
to determine whether counsel is correct in determining that the appeal is
frivolous. See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991);
K.M., 2003 WL 2006583, at *2.
We have carefully reviewed the appellate record and appellate counsel’s
brief. We agree with appellate counsel that the appeal is wholly frivolous and
without merit. We find nothing in the record that might arguably support Mother’s
appeal. See Bledsoe, 178 S.W.3d at 827; In re D.D., 279 S.W.3d 849, 850 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2009, pet. denied). Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s judgment
terminating Mother’s parental rights to D.C. and G.M.
However, we deny the motion to withdraw filed by Mother’s counsel in light
of In re P.M. because it does not show “good cause” other than counsel’s
determination that an appeal would be frivolous. See No. 15-0171, 2016 WL
1274748, at *3–4 (Tex. Apr. 1, 2016) (“[A]n Anders motion to withdraw brought in
the court of appeals, in the absence of additional grounds for withdrawal, may be
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premature.”); see also In re C.J., No. 02-16-00143-CV, 2016 WL 4491231, at *1
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 26, 2016, pet. filed) (denying a motion for
withdrawal in light of P.M. where it did not show “good cause” other than
counsels’ determination that an appeal would be frivolous); In re A.M., No. 01-16-
00130-CV, 2016 WL 4055030, at *7 & n.2 (Tex. App.––Houston [1st Dist.] July
28, 2016, pet. filed) (noting that since P.M. was handed down, “most courts of
appeals affirming parental termination orders after receiving Anders briefs have
denied the attorney’s motion to withdraw”). The supreme court has held that in
cases such as this, “appointed counsel’s obligations [in the supreme court] can
be satisfied by filing a petition for review that satisfies the standards for an
Anders brief.” P.M., 2016 WL 1274748, at *3. Accordingly, we deny the motion
to withdraw filed by Mother’s counsel in light of P.M., 2016 WL 1274748, at *3–4.
PER CURIAM
PANEL: WALKER, MEIER, and GABRIEL, JJ.
DELIVERED: November 17, 2016
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