Edinburg Consolidated Independent School District v. Cristina L. Esparza ( 2019 )

NUMBER 13-18-00540-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
EDINBURG CONSOLIDATED
INDEPENDENT SCHOOL
DISTRICT, Appellant,
v.
CRISTINA L. ESPARZA, Appellee.
On appeal from the County Court at Law No. 4
of Hidalgo County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Benavides, Hinojosa, and Perkes
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Benavides
Appellant Edinburg Consolidated Independent School District (ECISD) challenges
the trial court’s denial of its plea to the jurisdiction on appellee Cristina Esparza’s
employment discrimination suit. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.051. By two issues,
ECISD argues that the trial court erred by denying its plea to the jurisdiction because
Esparza’s administrative claim was filed too late to permit the trial court to exercise
jurisdiction over her claims, and that ECISD is immune from Esparza’s claim for
exemplary damages, which Esparza concedes on appeal.1 We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Esparza was the principal of one of ECISD’s middle schools in the summer of
2016. After school was dismissed for the summer, a private photo of Esparza that she
sent to her husband was widely disseminated on social media within the local community.
According to Esparza, the photo was not authorized to be publicly disseminated and she
complained to law enforcement.
On June 22, 2016, Esparza and the ECISD assistant superintendent had a
conversation in which Esparza was given the choice of resigning or being fired. Esparza
received a letter the next day that informed her that her employment was suspended with
pay while the district investigated. On July 20, 2016, Esparza received another letter
from ECISD that informed her that she was being reassigned from her principal position
and would be advised at a later date regarding her employment status. On August 25,
2016, Esparza received a notice of proposed termination of her employment from the
ECISD Board of Trustees.
Esparza filed a complaint with the Texas Workforce Commission (TWC) on
January 24, 2017 and received a right to sue letter on November 3, 2017. She filed suit
against ECISD alleging gender discrimination on December 22, 2017. ECISD filed its
answer and plea to the jurisdiction with exhibits on January 18, 2018. After an
1 Because Esparza has conceded that she may not recover exemplary damages, ECISD’s second
issue is moot.
2
evidentiary hearing at which Esparza testified and exhibits 2 were introduced, the trial
court denied the plea to the jurisdiction on September 13, 2018. ECISD filed this
interlocutory appeal. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.104(a)(8).
II. PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION
ECISD argues that the trial court erred because Esparza’s filing with TWC was
untimely. It argues that her filing occurred more than 180 days after June 22, 2016, the
day Esparza was told she would be fired and thus did not invoke the trial court’s
jurisdiction.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
Governmental units, including school districts, are immune from suit unless the
state consents. Texas Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 224 (Tex.
2004). The Legislature mandates that all statutory prerequisites to suit are jurisdictional
in suits against governmental entities. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.034; Prairie
View A & M Univ. v. Chatha, 381 S.W.3d 500, 514 (Tex. 2012). Here, it is undisputed
that compliance with section 21.202 of the labor code is mandatory.3 See TEX. LAB. CODE
ANN. § 21.202; Chatha, 381 S.W.3d at 514. Failure to comply with the time limit is a
jurisdictional bar to suit. Chatha, 381 S.W.3d at 514; Univ. of Tex.-Pan Am. v. De Los
2 Esparza objected to exhibits attached to ECISD’s plea to the jurisdiction from the administrative
proceedings on the grounds that they were from different litigation. The trial court sustained Esparza’s
objections in its written order denying the plea to the jurisdiction
.
3 Section 21.202 states:
(a) A complaint under this subchapter must be filed not later than the 180th day after the
date the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.
(b) The commission shall dismiss an untimely complaint.
TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.202.
3
Santos; 997 S.W.2d 817, 821 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1999, no pet.); see
also McAllen Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Espinosa, No. 13-11-00563-CV, 2012 WL 3012657, at
*6 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Jun. 15, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.).
“A jurisdictional plea may challenge the pleadings, the existence of jurisdictional
facts, or both. When a jurisdictional plea challenges the pleadings, we determine if the
plaintiff has alleged facts affirmatively demonstrating subject-matter jurisdiction.” Alamo
Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 544 S.W.3d 755, 770 (Tex. 2018); Miranda, 133 S.W.3d
at 227–28. If the plea challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, we must consider
evidence when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issue. Clark, 544 S.W.3d at 770.
If we consider evidence relating to the plea to the jurisdiction, a plaintiff must raise “at
least a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 771. “[W]e must take as true all evidence
favorable to the plaintiff, indulging every reasonable inference and resolving any doubts
in the plaintiff’s favor.” Id.; see also McAllen Indep. Sch. Dist.; 2012 WL 3012657, at *6.
But “we cannot disregard evidence necessary to show context, and we cannot disregard
evidence and inferences unfavorable to the plaintiff if reasonable jurors could not.”
Clark, 544 S.W.3d at 770; see also McAllen Indep. Sch. Dist.; 2012 WL 3012657, at *6.
Once a defendant challenges the plaintiff’s case with evidence, as here, “the jurisdictional
inquiry focuses on the evidence and whether the plaintiff can create a fact issue.” Id. at
785. If the evidence raises a fact issue, the trial court cannot grant the plea to the
jurisdiction. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228.
B. Accrual of Claim of Discrimination
ECISD argues that the date that triggered Esparza’s claim of gender discrimination
4
was June 22, 2016, the date on which she was given a choice between resigning or her
employment being terminated based upon Esparza’s conversation with the assistant
superintendent. ECISD relies on Specialty Retailers, Inc. v. DeMoranville, 933 S.W.2d
490, 492 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam) and Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep’t v. Dearing, 150 S.W.3d
452, 458 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, pet. denied).
Esparza disagrees. She argues that neither the superintendent nor the assistant
superintendent had the authority to terminate her employment on June 22, 2016; that only
the Board of Trustees could authorize the termination of her contract, and it did not do so
until August 25, 2016. Esparza cites to § 11.051 of the Texas Education Code to support
this proposition. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 11.051.4
1. Education Code
Esparza was employed by ECISD under a term contract that provided that the
Contract “will terminate if the Board determines any of the following exists: good cause,
financial exigency, or a program change . . . .” See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.211(a).
Section 11.1513 provides that the Board of Trustees “shall adopt a policy providing
for the employment and duties of district personnel . . . the superintendent has sole
authority to make recommendations to the board regarding the selection of all personnel
4 Governance of Independent School District; Number of Trustees
(a) An independent school district is governed by a board of trustees who, as a body
corporate, shall:
(1) oversee the management of the district; and
(2) ensure that the superintendent implements and monitors plans,
procedures, programs, and systems to achieve appropriate, clearly
defined, and desired results in the major areas of district operations.
TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 11.051.
5
. . . [and] [t]he board of trustees may accept or reject the superintendent’s
recommendation regarding the selection of district personnel.” Id. § 11.1513 (emphasis
added). A superintendent is responsible for “initiating the termination or suspension of
an employee or the nonrenewal of an employee’s term contract.” Id. § 11.201 (emphasis
added). A superintendent also has the authority to reassign a district employee within
the limits of the employee’s contract and the education code. See Jenkins v. Crosby
Indep. Sch. Dist., 537 S.W.3d 142, 155 (Tex. App.—Austin 2017, no pet.).
2. Charge of Discrimination
Esparza complained that her discharge on August 25, 2016, was the act of
discrimination. Up until that date, she claims her status was unclear based upon the
letters she received from ECISD: (1) she was suspended with pay, (2) she was
reassigned, (3) ECISD was investigating, and (4) the Board of Trustees had not decided
whether to terminate her employment until August 25, 2016. After they did so, according
to Esparza, her deadline to file her administrative complaint was February 20, 2017, a
deadline she met by filing on January 24, 2017.
3. Discussion
In Specialty Retailers, one of the cases on which ECISD relies, DeMoranville
worked for retailer Palais Royal, Inc. as a vice president. 933 S.W.2d at 491. Her
company was purchased by another company, merged, and reorganized. Id. After the
merger, DeMoranville accepted a demotion to a buyer and was assigned to a new
manager who favored younger workers, continually criticized her work, and asked her to
work long hours. Id. DeMoranville began suffering from stress. She took a leave of
6
absence to alleviate what she described as a hostile work environment. Id. at 492.
While on leave, she was replaced as a buyer and was told that if her leave lasted longer
than a year, company policy would terminate her employment. Id. DeMoranville did not
return and was fired on May 1, 1992. Id. She filed a complaint of discrimination on June
2, 1992. Id.
The Specialty Retailer Court held that DeMoranville’s complaint was untimely. Id.
“Even if the termination of DeMoranville’s employment in 1992 could be considered a
discriminatory act, her complaint is nevertheless untimely because she was notified on
May 10, 1991, that she would be terminated if she did not return to work within one year
of the start of her medical leave.” Id. at 493. Limitations begin when the employee
learns of the allegedly discriminatory employment decision, not when that decision comes
to fruition. Id. DeMoranville did not file a claim with the EEOC within 180 days after
May 10, 1991, the date on which she was told she would be terminated. Id.
Dearing, another case on which ECISD relies, analyzed things somewhat
differently. 150 S.W.3d at 452. In that case, Texas Parks & Wildlife was given authority
by the legislature to reclassify some of its game wardens. Id. at 456. Authorization took
place during the legislative session to become effective on September 1, 1999. Id. The
reclassification was discussed at a mandatory meeting on August 10, 1999. Id. at 458.
The appeals court held that the clock on Dearing’s complaint began to run from
September 1, 1999, because there was no evidence that he knew of the change at any
earlier time and because the workforce commission treated his administrative complaint
as timely. Id.
7
The difference between Esparza’s case and Specialty Retailer is significant. The
provisions of the education code and the terms of Esparza’s contract appear to grant to
the ECISD Board of Trustees the power to terminate her contract, not the superintendent
who has the statutory authority to initiate discussions of termination. See TEX. EDUC.
CODE. ANN. § 11.1513. Moreover, placing Esparza on administrative leave with pay and
full benefits is does not constitute the kind of adverse employment decision required to
constitute an act of discrimination. Instead, an adverse employment action requires a
significant change in employment status. See Esparza v. Univ. of Tex. at El Paso, 471
S.W.3d 903, 909 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.). Events such as disciplinary filings,
supervisor's reprimands, poor performance reviews, negative employment evaluations,
verbal threats to fire, reprimands, and criticism of the employee’s work do not constitute
actionable adverse employment decisions. Esparza, 471 S.W.3d at 909. However,
although some job transfers can qualify as adverse employment actions, if there is
evidence that the new position is much less desirable, Esparza’s reassignment was never
finalized. See Scott v. Godwin, 147 S.W.3d 609, 617 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–
Edinburg 2004, pet. dism’d).
As a result, the fact question created by Esparza’s contract and the education code
provisions, and the ambiguity created by ECISD’s correspondence at least raise a fact
question on the date Esparza’s discrimination case accrued. Only if Esparza’s
discrimination claim accrued in June is ECISD entitled to dismissal. Because there is a
fact question, the trial court may not grant the plea to the jurisdiction. Miranda, 133
S.W.3d at 228. In addition, the Dearing Court found it significant that the administrative
8
agency treated Dearing’s discrimination complaint as timely. The same holds true for
Esparza. Accordingly, we overrule ECISD’s first issue.
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s order denying the plea to the jurisdiction.
GINA M. BENAVIDES,
Justice
Delivered and filed the
22nd day of August, 2019.
9