Hattie Arnetta Harris v. State ( 2016 )

COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-15-00212-CR
HATTIE ARNETTA HARRIS APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
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FROM THE 396TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
TRIAL COURT NO. 1345001D
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MEMORANDUM OPINION1
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A jury found Appellant Hattie Arnetta Harris guilty of theft of property
valued at $20,000 or more but less than $100,000.2 Because Harris waived her
1
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2
Harris was convicted under the former version of section 31.03(e)(5) of
the Texas Penal Code, which made the offense a third-degree felony. See Act of
May 29, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 318, § 9, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 2734, 2738
(amended effective September 1, 2015). But the Texas Legislature changed that
section effective September 1, 2015; theft under $30,000 is now a state jail
right to have the jury assess punishment, the trial judge assessed her
punishment at ten years’ confinement, probated for ten years, and ordered her to
pay restitution of $26,515.06. Harris filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s
judgment, and the trial judge appointed her new counsel for appeal.
Harris’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw
as counsel and a brief in support of that motion. Counsel’s brief and motion meet
the requirements of Anders v. California by presenting a professional evaluation
of the record demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds for relief.
386 U.S. 738, 744–45, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967). We informed Harris by letter
that her court-appointed counsel had filed a motion to withdraw and a brief in
support of that motion and gave her the opportunity to file a pro se response.
After we provided Harris access to the appellate record, she filed a pro se
response to the Anders brief and motion to withdraw. The State responded by
letter agreeing with Harris’s court-appointed appellate counsel that there are no
arguable grounds for appeal.
Once an appointed attorney files a motion to withdraw on the ground that
the appeal is frivolous and fulfills the requirements of Anders, we must
independently examine the record. See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511
(Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Mays v. State, 904 S.W.2d 920, 922–23 (Tex. App.––
felony, and theft between $30,000 and $100,000 is a third-degree felony. Tex.
Penal Code Ann. § 31.03(e)(4) (West Supp. 2016).
2
Fort Worth 1995, no pet.). Only then may we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.
See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82–83, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988).
We have carefully reviewed counsel’s brief, Harris’s pro se response, the
State’s response, and the appellate record. We agree with counsel that this
appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit; we find nothing in the appellate
record that arguably might support this appeal. See Bledsoe v. State,
178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Accordingly, we grant
counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
/s/ Anne Gardner
ANNE GARDNER
JUSTICE
PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; DAUPHINOT and GARDNER, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: December 22, 2016
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