Shelly Blair v. State ( 2015 )

ACCEPTED
07-14-00360-CR
SEVENTH COURT OF APPEALS
AMARILLO, TEXAS
7/9/2015 8:48:23 PM
Vivian Long, Clerk
NO. 07-14-00360-CR
IN THE FILED IN
COURT OF APPEALS 7th COURT OF APPEALS
AMARILLO, TEXAS
SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 7/9/2015 8:48:23 PM
AMARILLO, TEXAS VIVIAN LONG
_________________________________ CLERK
SHELLY BLAIR
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
_________________________________
ON APPEAL FROM THE 364TH DISTRICT COURT
OF LUBBOCK COUNTY, TEXAS
CAUSE NO. 2014-401,146
_________________________________
BRIEF FOR THE STATE
_________________________________
MATTHEW D. POWELL
Criminal District Attorney
Lubbock County, Texas
K. SUNSHINE STANEK
AMANDA MCKINNEY SAY
CHRISTOPHER SCHULTE
Assistant Criminal District Attorneys
ORAL ARGUMENT WAIVED LAUREN MURPHREE
Assistant Criminal District Attorney
Lubbock County, Texas
State Bar No. 24085059
P.O. Box 10536, Lubbock, TX 79408
Phone (806)775-1100
FAX: (806)775-7930
E-mail: LMurphree@lubbockcda.com
(On Appeal)
ATTORNEY FOR THE STATE
Identity of Parties and Counsel
Appellant:
Shelly Blair
Appellant’s trial attorneys:
Mike Brown, 1601 Broadway, Lubbock, TX 79401; phone (806)763-9493; fax
(806)744-5411.
Audie Reese, 1616 Texas Avenue, Suite 4, Lubbock, TX 79401; (806)747-5676.
Appellant’s appellate counsel:
Jesse Mendez, 2833 74th St., Lubbock, TX 79423; phone (806)748-5287; fax
(806)748-5256.
State of Texas:
At trial:
K. Sunshine Stanek, Amanda Say, Christopher Schulte, Assistant Criminal
District Attorneys, Lubbock County Criminal District Attorney’s Office, P.O.
Box 10536, Lubbock, Texas 79408; phone (806) 775-1100; fax (806)775-7930
On appeal:
Lauren Murphree, Assistant Criminal District Attorney, Lubbock County
Criminal District Attorney’s Office, P.O. Box 10536, Lubbock, Texas 79408;
phone (806) 775-1100; fax (806)775-7930
Trial Judge:
Honorable Cecil Puryear, Presiding Judge, sitting by assignment, 364th District
Court of Lubbock County, Texas, Lubbock County Courthouse, 904
Broadway, Lubbock, TX 79401
Table of Contents
PAGE
Identity of Parties and Counsel ................................................................................................ i
Table of Contents ...................................................................................................................... ii
Table of Authorities ................................................................................................................. iv
Statement of the Case ............................................................................................................... 1
Statement of the Facts .............................................................................................................. 1
Summary of the Argument ...................................................................................................... 5
Argument and Authorities........................................................................................................7
First Issue Presented: Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient for the jury to
find beyond a reasonable doubt that she intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly caused
bodily injury to Officer Matsik. Where the jury heard testimony that Appellant
accelerated just before hitting Officer Matsik, and that after the offense Appellant told
people that she “did it” because she did not want to get caught, and that she killed a
cop, is the evidence sufficient to show that—at the very least—Appellant knew of the
risk of her conduct and consciously disregarded that risk when she struck Officer
Matsik? ……………………………………………………………………………...7
Standard of Review …………………….………………………………………………7
I. APPELLANT CANNOT PROVE THAT THE VERDICT IS SO CONTRARY TO
THE OVERWHELMING WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AS TO BE CLEARLY WRONG
AND UNJUST ………………………………………………………………………....8
A. Appellant’s statements after the offense support a finding of knowing or
intentional conduct .....................................................................................................10
ii
B. Appellant’s reckless driving at a high rate of speed, illegal passing, failure to
maintain a single lane, and failure to stop and render aid when she struck
Officer Matsik support—at the very least—a finding of recklessness................13
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................15
Conclusion and Prayer ...........................................................................................................15
Certificate of Service ..............................................................................................................16
Certificate of Compliance .....................................................................................................16
iii
Table of Authorities
SUPREME COURT CASE LAW PAGE
Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781 , 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979) ....................................................... 7
TEXAS CASE LAW
Brooks v. State,
323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) ............................................................................ 7
Brown v. State,
91 S.W.3d 353 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2002, no pet.) .....................................................10
Dewberry v. State,
4 S.W.3d 735 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) ................................................................................. 8
Dobbins v. State,
228 S.W.3d 761(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. dism'd .........................11
Hart v. State,
89 S.W.3d 61 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) ................................................................................. 9
Hartsfield v. State,
305 S.W.3d 859(Tex. App. Texarkana 2010), reh'g overruled (Mar. 9, 2010) ....... 9, 10
Henderson v. State,
825 S.W.2d 746(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, pet. ref'd ..............................11
Herrero v. State,
124 S.W.3d 827 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. ref'd) ............... 9, 10, 11
Lucio v. State,
351 S.W.3d 878 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) ............................................................................ 7
iv
Rodriguez v. State,
129 S.W.3d 551 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref'd) ...............................11
Smith v. State,
965 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) ............................................................................ 9
Will. v. State,
235 S.W.3d 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) ..........................................................................13
TEXAS RULES AND STATUTES
TEX. PENAL CODE § 6.03(a) ..................................................................................................10
TEX. PENAL CODE § 6.03(b) ..................................................................................................10
TEX. PENAL CODE § 6.03(c) ..................................................................................................13
TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.02(a)(2), (b)(2)(B) ............................................................................ 9
TEX. R. APP. P. 3.2....................................................................................................................vi
TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(1) ..........................................................................................................16
TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(3) ..........................................................................................................16
v
NO. 07-14-00360-CR
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS
SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
AMARILLO, TEXAS
_________________________________
SHELLY BLAIR
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
_________________________________
BRIEF FOR THE STATE
_________________________________
To the Honorable Court of Appeals:
The State of Texas, the prosecuting authority in Cause No. 2014-401,146 in the
364th District Court of Lubbock County, and Appellee before the Seventh Court of
Appeals, respectfully submits this brief in reply to the brief filed by Appellant
appealing his conviction for the offense of Aggravated Assault on a Public Servant.
The parties will be referred to as “Appellant” and “State.”1
1
TEX. R. APP. P. 3.2.
vi
Statement of the Case
Appellant was indicted for the offense of Aggravated Assault on a Public
Servant on January 22, 2014. (Clerk’s Record (CR) p. 8). Following a four-day trial,
from September 29, 2014 to October 2, 2014, Appellant was found guilty of the
offense as indicted. (CR p. 87). The trial court assessed punishment at fifty years
imprisonment and certified that Appellant has the right of appeal. (CR pp. 79, 97).
Statement of the Facts
Narcotics officers with the Lubbock Police Department were conducting
surveillance on a warehouse on January 10, 2014, when they observed a gray vehicle
driven by a white male and a white female passenger approach the warehouse.2 After
pulling up next to the officer’s vehicle and attempting to look inside, the individuals in
the gray vehicle knocked on the warehouse door and went inside.3 Noting the officers
outside, the driver of the vehicle told his counterpart inside the warehouse—William
Trae Groessbeck—that he was going to leave and wasn’t going to stop.4 Eventually,
the male and female returned to the gray vehicle and left the parking lot.5 This
2
(RR vol. 4, pp. 31-32).
3
(RR vol. 4, pp. 32-33).
4
(RR vol. 5, pp. 186-87).
5
(RR vol. 4 p. 38).
vii
information was relayed by surveilling officers to Officer Matsik, who began to follow
the gray vehicle.6
Once behind the vehicle, Officer Matsik activated his emergency lights to
perform a traffic stop.7 The gray vehicle began to pick up speed, and a high-speed
chase ensued in central Lubbock.8 At approximately 52nd Street and Slide Road, the
high speed chase ended when the driver of the gray vehicle crashed his vehicle into
Officer Matsik’s, and the driver fled on foot.9 Officer Matsik followed.10 The driver,
who was running very quickly—even breaking through a fence at one point during the
pursuit—ran through backyards and wove through alleys as he attempted to evade
Officer Matsik.11 The female passenger remained with the vehicle and drove away.12
As the male suspect turned onto Utica Avenue from the east via an alley,
Officer Matsik observed a mail truck driving north down Utica swerve to miss him.13
6
(RR vol. 4, pp. 38-40).
7
(RR vol. 5, p. 58).
8
(RR vol. 5, pp. 58-62).
9
(RR vol. 5, pp. 62, 79).
10
(RR vol. 5, p. 62).
11
(RR vol. 4, pp. 50-51).
12
(RR vol. 4, p. 56).
13
The exhibit, admitted at trial, is useful in visualizing the scene as it was described at trial.
2
14
The driver of the mail truck, Gary Davis, drove very slowly as he saw the gray
vehicle approaching at a high rate of speed from behind.15 At the same time, Officer
Matsik emerged from the alley and once again saw the gray vehicle—this time coming
directly towards him.16 To Davis’s surprise, the gray vehicle passed the mail truck on
14
(State’s Ex. 80).
15
(RR vol. 4, 81).
16
(RR vol. 4, p. 92).
3
the right.17 After accelerating, the gray vehicle hit Officer Matsik—who attempted to
minimize the impact by pushing off of the vehicle.18 After throwing Officer Matsik
over the hood of the mail truck and onto the ground, the vehicle sped away.19
Accident reconstruction officers later found no signs of braking prior to impact.20
Davis rendered aid to Officer Matsik until EMS arrived, likely saving his life.21
As law enforcement and medical assistance arrived, officers began to search for
both the suspect who had fled on foot and the driver of the gray vehicle.22 Civilians in
the area were instrumental in pointing law enforcement toward both of the fleeing
suspects.23 The male suspect (later identified as William Hill) was found hiding inside
of an elderly woman’s apartment.24 A separate search and witnesses led officers to
Natasha Sperling, who implicated Appellant as the driver of the vehicle when it hit
Officer Matsik. According to Sperling, Appellant fled to a nearby house where
Sperling was staying and told Sperling she “fucked off a cop” who was undercover.25
Sperling helped Appellant change clothes let Appellant use her phone to contact Hill
and Groesbeck, who Appellant told she might get out of town.26
17
(RR vol. 4, p. 81).
18
(RR vol. 5, p. 65).
19
(RR vol. 4, p. 83).
20
(RR vol. 5, p. 260).
21
(RR vol. 4, pp. 84-85).
22
(RR vol. 5, pp. 110-11).
23
(See, e.g., RR vol. 5, pp. 114-15).
24
(RR vol. 5, pp. 116-17).
25
(RR vol. 5, p. 168).
26
(RR vol. 5, p. 171).
4
Appellant ultimately gave Sperling more details: including that after Hill got out
and ran, she wanted to get away and ran over the “cop” because Hill was about to get
caught.27 Appellant was eventually apprehended at Sperling’s house wearing different
clothes than those described by Officer Matsik, and identified herself as “Sherry” to
officers upon arrest.
Summary of the Argument
The evidence presented at trial proved that Appellant intentionally hit Officer
Matsik with her vehicle to avoid her or her co-defendant, William Hill, from getting
caught. Before Hill even began to evade officers, he told his friends that he was going
to leave and not stop. As predicted, a high-speed chase ensued once Officer Matsik
began following the vehicle that resulted in Hill hitting Officer Matsik’s vehicle and
fleeing on foot. Officer Matsik followed, and Appellant took control of Hill’s vehicle
and drove in the direction of the individuals. When Appellant turned onto Utica
Avenue one can imagine she saw three things: a mail truck driving down the street,
Hill turning onto a street from an alley, and Officer Matsik close behind gaining
ground on Hill. At that time, Officer Matsik saw only one thing: Appellant driving
directly toward him. Crash.
The crime scene alone supports a finding of intentional conduct by Appellant.
But at the very least, Appellant’s actions support recklessness. Appellant had been in
27
(RR vol. 5, p. 68).
5
the vehicle when it struck Officer Matsik’s vehicle and the mail truck, yet consciously
disregarded that risk when she continued to drive in a reckless manner down a
residential street.
Appellant’s actions after the offense are also enlightening: telling her friend that
she “fucked off a cop,” saying that Hill was about to get caught and that she did not
want to get caught, and fleeing from the scene all point to a culpable mental state.
Deference to the fact finder’s deicions coupled with this Court’s ability to look to
circumstances before, during, and after the offense all lead to the conclusion that the
evidence was sufficient to support a culpable mental state of intentional, knowing, or
reckless behavior at trial.
6
Arguments and Authorities
First Issue Presented
Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient for the jury to find beyond a
reasonable doubt that she intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly caused bodily injury
to Officer Matsik. Where the jury heard testimony that Appellant accelerated just
before hitting Officer Matsik, and that after the offense Appellant told people that she
“did it” because she did not want to get caught, and that she killed a cop, is the
evidence sufficient to show that—at the very least—Appellant knew of the risk of her
conduct and consciously disregarded that risk when she struck Officer Matsik?
Standard of Review
The only standard that a reviewing court should apply in determining whether
the evidence is sufficient to support each element of a criminal offense the State is
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt is the standard set forth in Jackson v.
Virginia.28 In reviewing a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence, the
evidence must be examined in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine
whether, based on that evidence and reasonable inferences from it, any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.29 The standard gives “full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to
28
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); see Brooks v. State,
323 S.W.3d 893, 912, 925 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plur. op.).
29
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. at 2789; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 902 n. 19.
7
resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable
inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.”30 Each fact need not point directly and
independently to the guilt of the appellant, as long as the cumulative force of all the
incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction.31 In a sufficiency
review, all of the evidence in the record must be reviewed, “both direct and
circumstantial, whether admissible or inadmissible.”32
I. APPELLANT CANNOT PROVE THAT THE VERDICT IS SO CONTRARY TO THE
OVERWHELMING WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AS TO BE CLEARLY WRONG AND
UNJUST
Appellant was convicted of aggravated assault of a public servant. At trial, the
State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: 1) Shelly Blair; 2) on or
about the 10th day of January, 2014; 3) did then and there intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly; 4) cause bodily injury; 5) to Michael Matsik; 6) by striking him with a motor
vehicle; 7) and the defendant did then and there use or exhibit a deadly weapon, to
wit: a motor vehicle, during the commission of said assault; 8) and the defendant did
then and there know that Michael Matsik was then and there a public sevant, to wit: a
police officer; and 9) that Michael Matsik was then and there lawfully discharging an
30
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. at 2789; accord Lucio v. State, 351 S.W.3d 878, 894 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2011).
31
Lucio, 351 S.W.3d at 894.
32
Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
8
official duty, to wit; pursuing a fleeing suspect while on foot.33 The offense of
aggravated assault against a public servant—as indicted—requires that a person
intentionally or knowingly threaten another with imminent bodily injury, and “use, or
exhibit, a deadly weapon during the commission of the assault” against a person the
actor knows is a public servant while the public servant is lawfully discharging an
official duty.34
Appellant attacks only the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the mens rea
of the offense. A defendant’s culpable mental state is a question of fact to be
determined from the totality of the circumstances.35 In reviewing the sufficiency of
the evidence, the reviewing court should look at events occurring before, during, and
after the commission of the offense, and may rely on actions of the defendant which
show an understanding and common design to commit the offense.36 The jury may
infer the existence of a culpable mental state from any facts tending to prove its
existence—including the existence of a culpable mental state from any facts tending
to prove its existence—for example, the acts, words, and conduct of the accused.37
Each fact need not point directly and independently to the guilt of the appellant, so
33
(CR p. 8).
34
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02(a)(2), (b)(2)(B).
35
See Smith v. State, 965 S.W.2d 509, 513 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
36
Hartsfield v. State, 305 S.W.3d 859, 863 (Tex. App. Texarkana 2010), reh'g overruled, (Mar. 9, 2010).
37
See Hart v. State, 89 S.W.3d 61 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
9
long as the cumulative force is sufficient to support the conviction.38 In a legal
sufficiency analysis, the question is not whether a rational jury could have entertained
a reasonable doubt of guilt, but whether it necessarily would have done so based on
the evidence presented.39
A. Appellant’s statements after the offense support a finding of knowing or
intentional conduct
Intentionally, as defined in the Court’s Charge, means “a person acts
intentionally, or with intent, when it is his conscious objective or desire to cause the
result.”40 Knowingly, as defined in the court’s charge, means “a person acts
knowingly, or with knowledge, when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain
to cause the result.”41 Both can be shown by a defendant’s actions before, during, or
after an offense.42
In Brown v. State, 91 S.W.3d 353, 356-58 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2002, no pet.),
the appellant, while fleeing from a police officer, jumped in a utility truck with a boom
and bucket holding a utility worker raised thirty feet in the air. He then drove off in a
reckless manner and at a high rate of speed, crashed the vehicle, and the utility worker
suffered serious bodily injury.43 In that case, the court of appeals held that evidence
38
Hartsfield v. State, 305 S.W.3d at 863.
39
Herrero v. State, 124 S.W.3d 827 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. ref’d).
40
(CR p. 8); TEX. PENAL CODE § 6.03(a).
41
(CR p. 8); TEX. PENAL CODE § 6.03(b).
42
Hartsfield, at 863.
43
Id.
10
was sufficient to support the verdict in part because the jury heard Appellant’s
statements after the accident asking how the utility worker was and how badly he was
hurt.44 When viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational
trier of fact could have found that the appellant used the utility truck in a manner in
which it would be capable of causing death or serious bodily injury because his
statements after the fact showed an awareness of the risk to the utility worker.45
Similarly, flight after an offense can serve as indicia of guilt. In Dobbins v. State,
228 S.W.3d 761, 765 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. dism’d Dec. 5, 2007),
the appellant was convicted of aggravated assault on a public servant after running
over a deputy constable in his vehicle. After hitting the deputy constable, the appellant
fled.46 There, no evidence was presented that the appellant sped up to hit the officer,
but the appellant’s flight after hitting the officer supports a culpable mental state (in
that case, intentional or knowing conduct).47
Appellant’s case presents both: communications after the fact that indicate a
culpable mental state, and flight after the offense as indicia of guilt. The jury was
44
Id. at 357.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 763.
47
See id. at 763-65, (holding that after the vehicle stopped and the victim got off of the hood of the
vehicle, the appellant fled the scene); see also Rodriguez v. State, 129 S.W.3d 551, 564 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d) (holding that defendant’s attempt to flee cast doubt on his claim
of ignorance of the offense); Henderson v. State, 825 S.W.2d 746, 749-50 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 1992, pet. ref’d) (holding that in determining intent, the jury was entitled to consider events
occurring before, during, and after commission of the offense).
11
presented with the following facts that support finding a knowing or intentional
mental state:
• Officer Matsik was readily identifiable as law enforcement,
announced himself, and was wearing a LPD vest;
• Appellant knew that Hill and Officer Matsik were engaged in a
foot chase on the streets she was driving down;
• Appellant illegally passed a stopped mail truck on a two-lane road
on the right;
• Davis testified that the impact was not instantaneous with
Appellant turning onto the street and Officer Matsik exiting the
alley;
• Officer Matsik heard Appellant’s vehicle accelerate toward him;
• Crime scene investigation revealed no signs of Appellant braking
before impact;
• Appellant fled the scene after hitting Officer Matsik;
• Appellant told Sperling that Hill was about to get caught [by
Officer Matsik] and that she did not want to get caught;
• Appellant changed clothes after the offense to conceal her
identitity; and
• Appellant identified herself to police as “Sherry” when
apprehended
Individually and together, the facts support the verdict. Appellant’s statements
to others after the offense do not point to an “accident” or mere “failure to stop and
render aid” as she advocates for. Instead, her actions and conduct before, during, and
after the offense indicate a conscious objective or desire to cause the result.
12
B. Appellant’s reckless driving at a high rate of speed, illegal passing, failure to
maintain a single lane, and failure to stop and render aid when she struck
Officer Matsik support—at the very least—a finding of recklessness
Recklessly, as defined in the court’s charge, means “a person acts recklessly, or
is reckless, with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his
conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial or unjustifiable
risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a
nature or degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of
care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed
from the actor’s standpoint.”48 Distinguishing recklessness from criminal negligence is
instructive:
Criminal recklessness must not be confused with (or blended into)
criminal negligence, a lesser culpable mental state. With criminal
negligence, the defendant ought to have been aware of a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that his conduct could result in the type of harm that
did occur, and that his risk was of such a nature that the failure to
perceive it was a gross deviation from the reasonable standard of care
exercised by ordinary people.49
While both require a gross failure to adhere to a reasonable-person standard of
care, recklessness means that the actor was aware of the risk he was creating and
consciously disregarded it.50 In analyzing conduct for recklessness, courts consider
48
(CR pp. 7-8); TEX. PENAL CODE § 6.03(c).
49
Will. v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750-51 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
50
Id. at 751.
13
whether 1) the alleged act or omission—viewed objectively at the time of its
commission—created a substantial and unjustifiable risk of the type of harm that
occurred; and 2) the risk was of such a magnitude that disregarding it constituted a
gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would have
exercised in the same situation.51 Even removing Hill and Officer Matsik from the
scene, Appellant’s manner of driving—maintaining a high speed in a residential area
and passing a stopped vehicle on the right shoulder—at the time of the offense
created a substantial and unjustifiable risk of the type of harm that occurred.
In addition to facts supporting a knowing or intentional state of mind, the jury
also heard:
• Hill was going to get away at any cost, and Appellant was along for the
ride;
• Appellant had just been involved with Hill in a motor vehicle accident
following a high speed chase before Hill fled on foot;
• Prior to hitting Officer Matsik, Appellant struck the mail truck.
Each of the circumstances put before the jury demonstrate awareness of the
risk (accidents that had already occurred as a result of reckless driving) and a
conscious disregard of that risk. Perhaps most incriminating, however, is the fact that
Appellant drove at a high speed in the direction of the foot chase. Had Appellant
simply wanted to evade arrest herself and get away, she could have easily driven away
from the direction of the foot chase and avoided the situation entirely. Instead,
51
Will. v. State, 235 S.W.3d at 755.
14
Appellant drove directly toward both Hill and Officer Matsik. If her conduct was not
intentional or knowing, then it was at the very least reckless because she wholly
disregarded the extreme degree of risk driving recklessly at a high rate of speed in a
residential area posed to those who lived there and those engaged in a foot chase on
those very streets. Evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s conduct.
Conclusion
When viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational
trier of fact reasonably could have found that the appellant intentionally, knowingly,
or recklessly used her motor vehicle to cause bodily injury to Officer Matsik.
Conclusion and Prayer
For the reasons stated above, no reversible error has been committed and the
State respectfully requests that the Court should affirm the judgment and sentence in
all things.
Respectfully submitted,
MATTHEW D. POWELL
Criminal District Attorney
State Bar No. 00784782
By: /s/ Lauren Murphree
Lauren Murphree
Assistant Criminal District Attorney
Lubbock County, Texas
State Bar No. 24085059
P.O. Box 10536
Lubbock, Texas 79408
15
(806)775-1100
FAX (806)775-7930
E-mail: LMurphree@lubbockcda.com
Certificate of Service
I certify that a true copy of the foregoing brief has been delivered to Jesse
Mendez, Attorney for Appellant, by e-mail delivery to jessemendez@suddenlink.net
on July 9, 2015.
MATTHEW D. POWELL
Criminal District Attorney
State Bar No. 00784782
By: /s/ Lauren Murphree
Lauren Murphree
Certificate of Compliance
Pursuant to TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(3), I further certify that, relying on the word
count of the computer program used to prepare the foregoing State’s Response, this
document contains 3,267 words, inclusive of all portions required by TEX. R. APP. P.
9.4(i)(1) to be included in calculation of length of the document.
MATTHEW D. POWELL
Criminal District Attorney
State Bar No. 00784782
By: /s/ Lauren Murphree
Lauren Murphree
16