in Re: Gurdarshan Brar ( 2015 )

DENY; and Opinion Filed May 18, 2015.
S In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-15-00502-CV
IN RE GURDARSHAN BRAR, Relator
Original Proceeding from the 296th Judicial District Court
Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 296-00547-2014
OPINION
Before Justices Francis, Myers, and Schenck
Opinion by Justice Schenck
Relator filed this petition for writ of mandamus requesting that the Court order the trial
court to vacate its January 9, 2015 order denying relator’s plea to the jurisdiction, vacate its
March 16, 2015 order granting summary judgment declaring Brar is not president of the non-
profit corporation that is at the center of this dispute, dismiss the declaratory judgment portion of
this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and instruct the trial judge that he must
continue to hear pleas to the jurisdiction. Ordinarily, to obtain mandamus relief, a relator must
show both that the trial court has clearly abused its discretion and that relator has no adequate
appellate remedy. In re Prudential Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex. 2004) (orig.
proceeding). We conclude the relator has failed to establish a right to relief at this time.
In accordance with the supreme court’s rejection of a “categorical approach” to the
determination of when mandamus relief is appropriate, see In re McAllen Medical Center., Inc.,
275 S.W.3d 458, 469 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding), we have previously noted that where the
petition for writ of mandamus would frustrate, rather than enhance, the efficient resolution of the
case as a whole, the appropriate channel for review of a trial court’s order is appeal. In re City of
Dallas, 445 S.W.3d 456, 463 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, orig. proceeding). This case presents
such a situation.
We need not delve into the precise contours of quo warranto law and the manner in which
it intersects with declaratory relief to reach this conclusion. The trial court has granted summary
judgment declaring Brar is not president of the non-profit corporation without presently effecting
his removal. Whether the trial court’s determination of the motion for summary judgment was
correct or incorrect is a matter that may one day be presented on appeal and that overlaps
significantly with the determination of the merits of the plea to the jurisdiction.
All of the traditional reasons for denying mandamus relief in cases involving incidental
rulings apply with compelling force here. As the supreme court has noted, “Mandamus review
of incidental, interlocutory rulings by the trial courts unduly interferes with trial court
proceedings, distracts appellate court attention to issues that are unimportant both to the ultimate
disposition of the case at hand and to the uniform development of the law, and adds
unproductively to the expense and delay of civil litigation.” In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148
at 136; see also In re Entergy Corp., 142 S.W.3d 316, 320 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding) (“The
reluctance to issue extraordinary writs to correct incidental trial court rulings can be traced to a
desire to prevent parties from attempting to use the writ as a substitute for an authorized
appeal.”); Pope v. Ferguson, 445 S.W.2d 950, 954 (Tex. 1969) (orig. proceeding) (“Trials must
be orderly; and constant interruption of the trial process by appellate courts would destroy all
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semblance of orderly trial proceedings. Moreover, with this type of intervention, the fundamental
concept of all American judicial systems of trial and appeal would become outmoded.”).
In contrast, none of the traditional benefits of mandamus review are relevant in this case.
The posture of the case as it now stands means that relator will not be required to proceed to trial
on the claim he sought to dismiss via his jurisdictional plea. To the degree relator has a right,
otherwise sounding in mandamus, not to be compelled to go to trial on the declaratory judgment
claim, the posture of the case means he will not be required to do so. If this Court, on appeal,
later determines the trial court incorrectly granted summary judgment and incorrectly denied the
plea to the jurisdiction, that decision in itself will preserve the right the relator seeks to assert.
For the same reason, even to the very limited extent that the added costs of going to trial might in
some exceptionally burdensome situations militate towards mandamus relief, considerations of
waste of public and private resources from improperly conducted proceedings are also not
implicated in this case because the declaratory claim has been determined and simply awaits
disposition of the remainder of the case, which was not subject to the plea to the jurisdiction.
This case is also not one that will allow the Court to give needed and helpful direction to
the law that would otherwise prove elusive in appeals from final judgments. Unlike orders that
may be reviewed effectively only if reviewed on an interlocutory basis before the order becomes
effective, the issue relator asserts in this petition will survive through appeal of the remaining
issues in the case. Granting the relief relator seeks would result in nothing more than the
piecemeal resolution of the suit. In sum, this is not the sort of exceptional case that warrants the
extraordinary remedy of mandamus review.
Finally, we need not determine at this juncture whether the trial judge should be
compelled to hear further jurisdictional pleas. The mandamus record does not demonstrate that
relator has filed any new jurisdictional pleas the trial court has refused to consider.
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We deny the petition for writ of mandamus. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8.
/David J. Schenck/
DAVID J. SCHENCK
JUSTICE
150502F.P05
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