Ronnie Lawson and Leah Lawson v. Benjamin Keene, Kristi Keene, Gretchen Gayle Gullekson, Dayna Marie Twyman & KWI-8, L.L.C. D/B/A Keller Williams Realty ( 2015 )

ACCEPTED
03-13-00498-CV
6107077
THIRD COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
7/16/2015 11:39:01 PM
JEFFREY D. KYLE
CLERK
No. 03-13-00498-CV
In the FILED IN
3rd COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
Third Court of Appeals 7/16/2015 11:39:01 PM
JEFFREY D. KYLE
Clerk
at Austin
RONNIE LAWSON AND LEAH LAWSON,
Appellants,
v.
BENJAMIN KEENE, KRISTI KEENE, GRETCHEN GAYLE GULLEKSON,
DAYNA MARIE TWYMAN AND KWI-8, L.L.C.
D/B/A KELLER WILLIAMS REALTY,
Appellees.
On Appeal from the 200th District Court
of Travis County, Texas
M OTION FOR E N B ANC R EHEARING
Don Cruse
State Bar No. 24040744
LAW OFFICE OF DON CRUSE
1108 Lavaca Street,
Suite 110-436
Austin, Texas 78701
[Tel.] (512) 853-9100
[Fax] (512) 870-9002
don.cruse@texasappellate.com
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Contents .................................................................................................i
Index of Authorities.............................................................................................ii
Introduction.........................................................................................................1
Factual Background .............................................................................................2
I. The En Banc Court Should Clarify That Panels Can Examine, in the First
Instance, Whether a Prior Panel Decision Still Rests on a Solid Legal
Foundation Today......................................................................................3
A. The rule announced by the panel ..............................................3
B. Stare decisis is about the consistency of legal principles. ...........5
C. Texas appellate panels should be allowed to perform this core
part of the judicial function. .....................................................7
II. The Standard for Reviewing a No-Evidence Summary Judgment Is Now
Confused in Austin ..................................................................................10
A. The procedural posture of this summary judgment .................10
B. The record is not limited to the response evidence ..................10
C. Contradicting the Supreme Court’s test, the panel’s approach
would complicate, not simplify, litigation ................................13
Prayer ................................................................................................................17
Certificate of Service .........................................................................................18
Certificate of Compliance ..................................................................................18
i
INDEX OF A UTHORITIES
Cases
Am. Tobacco Co. v. Grinnell,
951 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. 1997) ....................................................................14
Ayeni v. State,
440 S.W.3d 707 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, no pet.) ..................................5
Binur v. Jacobo,
135 S.W.3d 646 (Tex. 2004) ....................................................................13
Boerjan v. Rodriguez,
436 S.W.3d 307 (Tex. 2014) ....................................................................12
Buck v. Palmer,
381 S.W.3d 525 (Tex. 2012) ..............................................................14, 16
Chase Home Fin., L.L.C. v. Cal W. Reconveyance Corp.,
309 S.W.3d 619 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.) ...........5
DeGrate v. Executive Imprints, Inc.,
261 S.W.3d 402 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2008, no pet.) ....................................8
Earthkeepers, LLC v. Haag, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 3997,
2014 WL 1432663 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 11, 2014, pet. denied) .......12
Epps v. Fowler,
351 S.W.3d 862 (Tex. 2011) ..............................................................4, 5, 6
Gonzalez v. Ramirez, ___ S.W.3d ___, No. 14-0102,
2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 441 (Tex. May 8, 2015) ......................................11
Gonzales v. Servs. Lloyds Ins. Co., No. 14-08-00377-CV, 2009 WL 1493039 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 21, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) .....8
Hight v. Dublin Veterinary Clinic,
22 S.W.3d 614 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2000, pet. denied) ........................13
International Group Partnership v. KB Home Lone Star, LP,
295 S.W.3d 650 (Tex. 2009) ......................................................................4
ii
Inv. Retrievers, Inc. v. Fisher, No. 03-13-00510-CV, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 6430
(Tex. App.—Austin June 25, 2015, no pet. h.) ........................................12
KCM Fin. LLC v. Bradshaw,
457 S.W.3d 70 (Tex. 2015) ......................................................................14
King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman,
118 S.W.3d 742 (Tex. 2003) ....................................................................13
Mack Trucks v. Tamez,
206 S.W.3d 572 (Tex. 2006) ....................................................................11
McAtee v. City of Austin, No. 03-10-00496-CV, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 12518,
2013 WL 5855638 (Tex. App.—Austin Oct. 10, 2013, no pet.)..............12
Merriman v. XTO Energy, Inc.,
407 S.W.3d 244 (Tex. 2013) ...............................................................14-15
Neely v. Wilson,
418 S.W.3d 52 (Tex. 2013) ................................................................14, 16
Public Util. Comm'n v. Gulf States Utils. Co.,
809 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. 1991) ......................................................................4
Roper v. CitiMortgage, Inc., No. 03-11-00887-CV, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 14518,
2013 WL 6465637 (Tex. App.—Austin Nov. 27, 2013, pet. denied) ......12
Ross v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., No. 13-0439, ___ S.W.3d ___,
58 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 766 (Tex. May 1, 2015) ...............................................6
Sierra Associate v. Hardeman, No. 03-0800324-CV, 2009 WL 416465 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 20, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) ...............3, 4, 5, 6
Sw. Bell Tel. Co., LP v. Mitchell,
276 S.W.3d 443 (Tex. 2008) ......................................................................6
Tex. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ruttiger,
381 S.W.3d 430 (Tex. 2012) ......................................................................6
Timpte Industries v. Gish,
286 S.W.3d 306 (Tex. 2009) ....................................................................11
iii
Webb v. Robins, No. 03-07-00686-CV, 2008 WL 2777399 (Tex. App.—Austin July 17, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.) ...............11, 12-13
Willis v. Owen,
43 Tex. 41 (Tex. 1875) ..............................................................................6
Wright's Adm'x v. Donnell,
34 Tex. 291 (1870) ....................................................................................6
Constitutions, Statutes, and Rules
TEX. R. APP. P. 41.2(c) ........................................................................................8
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.........................................................................................7, 8
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.7(b) ........................................................................................7
TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i) ......................................................................................13
5TH CIR. LOCAL R. 47.5.4 ...................................................................................7
5TH CIR. LOCAL R. 47.6 ......................................................................................7
Other Authorities
“Annual Statistical Report for the Texas Judiciary,”
Office of Court Administration (2014)...................................................8n.
Bryan A. Garner, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE (2d ed. 2001) ......1
“Judicial Workload Statistics,”
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ( June 2014) .........8n.
iv
INTRODUCTION
If the Court is entertaining Fifth Circuit notions of how panels relate to the
en banc court, it might ponder the word they have developed to bridge the gap:
“enbancworthy.”1 This case is that. It features: [1] a serious inconsistency within
this court’s holdings; [2] conflict between the panel’s narrow view of no-evidence
summary judgment records and the Supreme Court’s very different approach,
which leaves Austin trial courts facing conflicting commands; and [3] an underlying
subject matter of broad importance involving a real-estate form contract.
And this case particularly warrants en banc consideration because the panel
announces and applies a singularly broad rule of local practice, one that could
reshape how complex legal issues are briefed and argued to this Court. The panel
says that mere panels (such as it) are powerless to examine whether any previous
panel decision still rests on solid legal ground, absent some “clearly on point”
supreme court authority or unless this en banc court intervenes (Op. 3). This
motion explains how this rule is at odds with Texas principles of stare decisis and
unique features of Texas’s appellate system. But if it is to be Third Court practice
that only the en banc court can consider arguments that challenge the legal
foundation of any prior panel decision, it ought to be the en banc court that says so.
1 Bryan A. Garner, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 314 (2d ed. 2001).
1
F ACTUAL BACKGROUND
The claim is that the buyer’s own agent, the seller’s agent, and the sellers
misrepresented a key feature of the house, both by making affirmative claims that
were false and by failing to disclose material facts to induce this sale. The central
feature of the home listing was the sunroom—counted as one of the home’s living
areas and lumped together in the home’s claimed square footage. This roughly 450-
square-foot sunroom is what pushed the house above the square-footage threshold
that these buyers had instructed their agent was their minimum. And as Gullekson,
however reluctantly, eventually admitted, CR458 & CR463, square footage is
(obviously) a factor in pricing residential real estate.
The sellers were under a statutory duty to disclose certain facts. The agents
held fiduciary duties, including duties to disclose. As an email chain attached to the
motion for summary judgment suggests, they hid the details, with the email thread
even including an instruction not to bring up a square-footage discrepancy that
came to their attention during the lending-approval process.
The defendants contend that they were immunized from any liability—even
against claims that the Lawsons’ own agent breached fiduciary duties—by a non-
negotiable clause included in a TREC form contract between the seller and buyer
describing what repairs would be needed before closing. The defendants also
argued that the form contract entitled them to shift fees against anyone who might
question their conduct—even against Leah, who did not sign the contract.
2
The panel affirms the judgment on a different basis, saying that under its
(mistaken) view of the summary-judgment standard, it could only consider the
three documents attached to the Lawsons’ response papers—not the voluminous
other documents, such as the email exchange among the agents, the written
representations, and other depositions submitted by the movants. (Op. 3). On fees,
the panel further says that it lacks power to examine whether the legal reasoning
behind the Court’s 2008 Sierra Associate decision remains viable after more recent
Texas Supreme Court guidance about how to interpret a fee-shifting provision in
this type of form contract. (Op. 9). In the panel’s formulation, only the en banc
court can do so. (Op. 9).
I. THE EN BANC COURT SHOULD CLARIFY THAT PANELS CAN EXAMINE,
IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, WHETHER A PRIOR PANEL DECISION STILL
RESTS ON A SOLID LEGAL FOUNDATION TODAY.
A. The rule announced by the panel
The attorney’s fee question sets the stage for the panel’s announcement of
this rule. In 2008, a prior panel had decided Sierra Associate v. Hardeman, which
reasoned from principles of administrative law about the meaning of the contract
between the buyer and seller of real estate. No. 03-0800324-CV, 2009 WL 416465
(Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 20, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.). There was no discussion of
the parties’ intent. To the contrary, Sierra made clear that its opinion rested on the
idea that, “[b]ecause the contract at issue was promulgated by rule through the
3
agency rulemaking process, we construe the contract as an administrative rule.” Id.
From that premise, Sierra then applied robust administrative deference, saying that
a court will “defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own rule unless it is plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the rule.” Id. (citing Public Util. Comm'n v. Gulf
States Utils. Co., 809 S.W.2d 201, 207 (Tex. 1991)). The legal principles applied in
Sierra concerned agency deference, not party intent.
In Epps v. Fowler, the Supreme Court examined a later version of the same
form contract and focused on its fee-shifting language. 351 S.W.3d 862 (Tex. 2011).
The legal principles that it applied, however, are incompatible with Sierra. Instead
of treating this contract as a regulation accorded agency deference, the Supreme
Court looked to the parties’ intent. Id. at 865-66. Epps relied heavily on International
Group Partnership v. KB Home Lone Star, LP, another contract-interpretation case,
in which the Court stated,“[a] contract’s overriding purpose is to capture the
parties’ intent, meaning we must construe it in light of how the parties meant to
construe it.” 295 S.W.3d 650, 657-58 (Tex. 2009).
The Lawsons contend that the legal rationale for Sierra is now unsound, in
light of this intervening authority. The panel does not deny that the legal analysis
about agency intent that underpins Sierra is untenable in light of Epps. Instead, it
says that minor factual or procedural differences deprive the panel of power to
consider whether the legal analysis of Sierra remains good law:
4
The question before the Court in Epps was “whether a defendant is a
prevailing party entitled to attorney’s fees when the plaintiff nonsuits a
claim without prejudice,” a question distinct from the one before us.
(Op. 8-9). From that premise, the panel says that it must apply Sierra unless and
until some higher court speaks even more precisely to the same question:
Because the Lawsons have not drawn our attention to a supreme court
holding clearly on point, we decline to revisit the Sierra decision. See
Chase Home Fin., L.L.C. v. Cal W. Reconveyance Corp., 309 S.W.3d 619,
630 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (“Absent a deci-
sion from a higher court or this court sitting en banc that is on point
and contrary to the prior panel decision or an intervening and material
change in the statutory law, this court is bound by the prior holding of
another panel of this court.”); see also Ayeni v. State, 440 S.W.3d 707,
717 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, no pet.) (Pemberton, J., concurring)
(“We may not overrule a prior panel opinion of this court absent an
intervening change in the law by the Legislature or a higher court or by
decision of this court sitting en banc.”).
(Op. 9). But if Epps, which dealt with a newer version of the same clause of the very
same form contact as Sierra, is not “clearly [enough] on point,” what is?
And, not only did the panel rely on unsound law, it extended Sierra to new
contexts—imposing fees against a person who did not even sign the contract and
interpreting this agency-written contract to deter enforcement of fiduciary duties
created by the same agency elsewhere in its rules. The panel does not explain how
extending Sierra to these new alignments of parties or new claims fits Texas law.
B. Stare decisis is about the consistency of legal principles.
What is entitled to stare decisis effect is a case’s legal holding. But when the
panel says that the Lawsons “do not argue … the holding of Epps contradicts our
5
holding in Sierra,” (Op. 8) (emphasis added), it takes an unduly narrow view of how
two case holdings might conflict.
The Texas Supreme Court has emphasized that stare decisis attaches to the
legal principles behind the outcome. Ross v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., No. 13-0439,
___ S.W.3d ___, 58 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 766 (Tex. May 1, 2015). And later courts can
examine whether that legal foundation remains solid. “[W]e are called upon to re-
evaluate common-law rules, giving deference to stare decisis when warranted, but
departing when the prior rule no longer furthers the interests of efficiency, fairness,
and legitimacy. As we noted 142 years ago, ‘When the reason of the rule fails, the
rule itself should cease. Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex..’” Tex. Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Ruttiger, 381 S.W.3d 430, 457 (Tex. 2012) (Willett, J., concurring) (emphasis added)
(citing Wright's Adm'x v. Donnell, 34 Tex. 291, 306 (1870)).
Courts have an ongoing duty to examine the legal soundness of the rules they
apply. “[U]pon no sound principle do we feel at liberty to perpetuate an error, into
which either our predecessors or ourselves may have unadvisedly fallen, merely
upon the ground of such erroneous decision having been previously rendered.” Sw.
Bell Tel. Co., LP v. Mitchell, 276 S.W.3d 443, 447 (Tex. 2008) (quoting Willis v.
Owen, 43 Tex. 41, 48-49 (Tex. 1875)). A panel of elected Texas appellate judges
should not be barred from fulfilling this part of the judicial role.
6
C. Texas appellate panels should be allowed to perform this
core part of the judicial function.
Preventing panels from examining the legal basis for prior cases poorly fits
Texas appellate practice. First, it ignores the differences between how publication
decisions are made in the Texas and federal courts. The Texas appellate courts do
not have the option, available in some other systems, of summarily affirming
without explanation. Cf. 5TH CIR. LOCAL R. 47.6 (affirmance without opinion). Nor
can Texas appellate courts issue unpublished, non-precedential decisions for those
cases where the court does not wish intermediate legal holdings on procedural
points to ripple through the law. Compare TEX. R. APP. P. 47.7(b) (all after 2003 are
precedential), with 5TH CIR. LOCAL R. 47.5.4 (unpublished opinions after 1996 are
not precedent). Rather than permit summary disposition, the Texas rules require
written opinions addressing every necessary issue. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
Critically, the federal courts that follow this principle, such as the Fifth
Circuit, have safety valves to dispose of such routine cases without risking serious
damage to the jurisprudence—they can label a case unpublished or even just
summarily affirm. The Fifth Circuit is, like other federal circuits, built as a machine
for disposing of cases without creating precedent. Its most recent statistical report
shows that it issued 3037 opinions in the year ending 2014, but that only 404 of
7
those were given the status of precedential opinions.2 By contrast, the Texas system
issued more than 5000 such opinions last year, with the Third Court alone issuing
more than 600.3
The better view is that panels can consider the legal foundation of those
precedential Texas cases, grappling with their reasoning under principles of stare
decisis, to determine the correct law to apply to the facts before them. By contrast,
the panel’s approach would make every short footnote brushing aside a pro se
litigant’s off-kilter procedural theory into binding writ that a mere panel cannot
avoid—no matter whether the legal reasoning can withstand more serious study
once the Court is presented with more helpful legal arguments or, on its own,
recognizes some unanticipated implications. Having so many precedential opinions
makes it all the more important that future panels have flexibility to digest them.
Second, the Texas en banc rule does not have provisions for frequent en banc
sittings every time the courts must reconcile a new but far-reaching supreme court
decision with prior caselaw. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.2(c). If anything, that rule
suggests there should be few such sittings—not a flurry of them to process each
broad pronouncement from the Supreme Court that might ripple through the law.
2 “Judicial Workload Statistics,” United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, at 11
( June 2014), available at http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/docs/default-source/forms-and-
documents---clerks-office/statistics/arstats-2014.pdf In addition, almost 2000 other cases were
disposed of by the judges without an opinion, and over 1500 were disposed of by the clerk’s
office. Id. at 6. The vast bulk of the court’s work is processing cases that do not make law.
3 “Annual Statistical Report for the Texas Judiciary,” Office of Court Administration (2014),
available at http://www.txcourts.gov/media/885306/Annual-Statistical-Report-FY-2014.pdf.
8
Third, en banc math gets silly when divided among fourteen intermediate
courts, only five of which have total membership large enough that an en banc could
even theoretically outvote a panel. Austin is not in that group, instead sitting with
the Thirteenth Court at a membership of six justices, where each panel makes 50%
of the en banc. Two other courts have four justices, so a panel comprises 75% of the
en banc and in practical terms might as well reach the question. The final five of
Texas’s appellate courts have three justices—so the en banc is the panel.
The small sizes of Texas appellate courts do not suggest a need to adopt the
Fifth Circuit’s draconian rule about prior panels in order to maintain consistency.
Nor does it serve the interests of the courts to deter litigants from being candid
about the need for the Court to reconcile its web of older cases with more recent
legal developments by subjecting them to extra procedural steps to reach an en banc
court that might or might not offer the substantive answer that Rule 47.1 promises
to participants in Texas’s appellate system.
9
II. THE STANDARD FOR REVIEWING A NO-EVIDENCE SUMMARY
JUDGMENT IS NOW CONFUSED IN AUSTIN
A. The procedural posture of this summary judgment
This case involved multiple cross-motions for summary judgment briefed on
an overlapping schedule, argued at one hearing, and resolved in one order. The
defendants advanced both traditional grounds (attaching a significant volume of
evidence) and no-evidence grounds. The Lawsons presented their own no-evidence
motion about certain issues. The defendants responded to the Lawsons’ no-
evidence motion by attaching just a single exhibit—labeled “Exhibit L”, CR408,
building on the larger record assembled for the traditional motion. The next day,
the Lawsons filed their response, which added a few new pieces of evidence to the
stack—one more deposition, a new affidavit from Ronnie Lawson, and a recent
TCAD appraisal report. CR440-522. These motions were heard and decided
together. Under controlling precedent, the panel should have reviewed the whole
summary judgment record when determining whether a fact question exists.4
B. The record is not limited to the response evidence
The panel held that, when reviewing the no-evidence grounds, it was limited
to consider only the three specific exhibits that the Lawsons included in their own
response rather than the full summary-judgment record for these cross-motions:
In determining whether the Lawsons have raised more than a scintilla
4The motion for panel rehearing argues that even this limited record should have defeated the
no-evidence motion. Because that relates to evidentiary sufficiency, it is addressed to the panel.
10
of evidence regarding the grounds on which the defendants based their
no-evidence motion, we consider only the summary-judgment proof
produced in the Lawsons’ response. See Webb v. Robins, No.
03-07-00686-CV, 2008 WL 2777399, at *5 (Tex. App.—Austin July 17,
2008, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also Gonzales v. Servs. Lloyds Ins. Co.,
No. 14-08-00377-CV, 2009 WL 1493039, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] May 21, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.); DeGrate v. Executive
Imprints, Inc., 261 S.W.3d 402, 408 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2008, no pet.)
(citing Webb).
(Op. 3) (emphasis added). That string of cases comes from a Rule 38.7 letter
submitted by the Appellees.
The court may observe that these cases end in 2009. As it happens, that year
brought a decision in Timpte Industries, where the Supreme Court clarified that a
statement it had made about summary-judgment records in general was fully
applicable to no-evidence motions:
When reviewing a no-evidence summary judgment, we “review the
evidence presented by the motion and response in the light most fa-
vorable to the party against whom the summary judgment was ren-
dered, crediting evidence favorable to that party if reasonable jurors
could, and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors
could not.”
Timpte Industries v. Gish, 286 S.W.3d 306, 310 (Tex. 2009) (emphasis added)
(quoting Mack Trucks v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 582 (Tex. 2006)). The supreme
court still follows that principle. E.g., Gonzalez v. Ramirez, ___ S.W.3d ___, No.
14-0102, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 441, at *9-10 (Tex. May 8, 2015) (“We review the
evidence presented by a no-evidence motion for summary judgment and
11
response…”); Boerjan v. Rodriguez, 436 S.W.3d 307, 311-12 (Tex. 2014). The panel
opinion cannot be squared with this supreme court authority.
In failing to address Timpte, the panel also quietly disregards several opinions
from this Court that have echoed the supreme court’s formulation. See Roper v.
CitiMortgage, Inc., No. 03-11-00887-CV, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 14518, at *12-13,
2013 WL 6465637 (Tex. App.—Austin Nov. 27, 2013, pet. denied) (noting “movant
is not required to produce proof” but that “[w]e review the evidence presented by
the motion and response…”); see also Inv. Retrievers, Inc. v. Fisher, No.
03-13-00510-CV, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 6430, at *8-9 (Tex. App.—Austin June 25,
2015, no pet. h.) (“motion and response”) (quoting Mack Trucks); Earthkeepers,
LLC v. Haag, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 3997, at *9-11, 2014 WL 1432663 (Tex. App.
—Austin Apr. 11, 2014, pet. denied) (same); McAtee v. City of Austin, No.
03-10-00496-CV, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 12518, at *8, 2013 WL 5855638 (Tex. App.
—Austin Oct. 10, 2013, no pet.) (same). This inconsistency among this Court’s
own cases also warrants en banc scrutiny.
And while the Court need not evaluate why Webb reached the wrong result to
conclude that it conflicts with current supreme court guidance, it turns out to be a
cautionary tale about why later panels must be able to scrutinize the legal soundness
of the reasons behind a prior panel opinion. That’s because Webb applied the
outcome of a sister court’s opinion without evaluating whether the legal reasoning
was still valid in light of intervening authority. See Webb, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS
12
5342, at *14-15 (citing Hight v. Dublin Veterinary Clinic, 22 S.W.3d 614, 619 (Tex.
App.—Eastland 2000, pet. denied)). The two steps of Hight’s legal reasoning were:
(1) it expressly declined to follow sister courts that had viewed no-evidence motions
as analogous to directed verdicts, 22 S.W.3d at 618; and (2) it assumed that Rule
166a(i) would automatically transform a no-evidence motion that attached evidence
into a traditional motion, reasoning that meant no movant could even have evidence
to consider, id. at 618-19. Both of those premises were already unsound at the time
of Webb. The Texas Supreme Court had embraced the more lenient direct-verdict
analogy. King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 750-51 (Tex. 2003). And it
had held that a Rule 166a(i) movant could, if they wished, attach evidence without
having their motion automatically converted to something else. Binur v. Jacobo, 135
S.W.3d 646, 651-52 (Tex. 2004) (noting that evidence attached to the motion need
not be considered “unless it creates a fact question”). This Court should be
cautious before embracing a rule under which Webb would have been bound to
follow an unsound opinion—or which would bind current panels to Webb.
C. Contradicting the Supreme Court’s test, the panel’s
approach would complicate, not simplify, litigation
The panel may assume that its rule simplifies things for trial and appellate
courts. But the Texas Supreme Court has embraced a different simplification, one
that cannot be reconciled with the panel’s approach.
13
The supreme court has reasoned that, when an issue is presented both by a
no-evidence motion and by a traditional summary-judgment motion, the task of the
reviewing court should be simpler, not more complex. Traditional summary
judgment requires two steps of analysis: first, a traditional movant must bring
forward conclusive proof, and only then does a court consider the second question
whether a fact question exists. E.g., Am. Tobacco Co. v. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d 420,
425 (Tex. 1997). And a no-evidence motion has one step: does a fact question
exists? KCM Fin. LLC v. Bradshaw, 457 S.W.3d 70, 79 (Tex. 2015).
Because a non-movant can defeat either kind of motion by showing that a fact
question exists, the supreme court has observed that having both motions in play
should simplify the reviewing court’s task:
Though these burdens vary for traditional and no-evidence motions,
the summary judgment motion here was a hybrid motion and both
parties brought forth summary judgment evidence; therefore, the
differing burdens are immaterial and the ultimate issue is whether a
fact issue exists.
Neely v. Wilson, 418 S.W.3d 52, 59 (Tex. 2013); Buck v. Palmer, 381 S.W.3d 525, 527
& n.2 (Tex. 2012) (where both kinds of motion were in play, “the differing burdens
of the two forms of summary judgment are of no import here. The ultimate
question is simply whether a fact issue exists.”).
Fairly read, this is also the observation made in Merriman v. XTO Energy,
Inc., 407 S.W.3d 244, 248 (Tex. 2013), an opinion released between Buck and Neely
making the practical point that it makes sense to start with no-evidence issues. The
14
panel opinion, however, cites Merriman to suggest the proper record is limited—a
proposition that it does not support:
We begin by reviewing the evidence that the Lawsons produced in
response to the defendants’ no-evidence motion for summary
judgment. See Merriman, 407 S.W.3d at 248.
(Op. 3). Merriman does not say that it restricted its analysis to a subset of the
record. Instead, it says that when (as here) “both parties move summary judgment
and the trial court grants one motion and denies the other, we review all the
summary judgment evidence…” Merriman, 407 S.W.3d at 248 (emphasis added).5
If the panel’s approach is right, then the Supreme Court is wrong that having
both kinds of motion present simplifies things. The Supreme Court’s logic depends
on the shared element of the traditional and no-evidence motions being tested
against a shared record. If they were instead measured against different records, it
would no longer be true that the reviewing court need only conduct one analysis.
Instead, there would be two divergent records every time a no-evidence motion is
filed: the combined record of motion and response, and the subset consisting
merely of the response alone.6
5While Merriman does suggest that a court start with no-evidence grounds where possible, 407
S.W.3d at 248, that is a consequence of the practical point noted by Buck or Neely—that having
both motions means “there is no need to analyze whether the movant satisfied its burden under
the traditional motion.” Id.
6To be sure, it is possible that a response would attach documents that perfectly mirror those of
the motion. But that would relegate the supreme court’s simplification to a rare and special edge
case—not the general principle it claims to be.
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Indeed, under the panel’s approach, reversing a grant of summary judgment
could require three steps of analysis, not one: (1) does the subset of the record
attached to a response by itself raise a fact question? (2) does the submission the
movant makes in any traditional motion by itself present conclusive proof on those
elements? and (3) does the total record spanning both motion and response defeat
that conclusive proof by showing that at least some fact question remains? Rather
than Neely’s observation of “differing burdens [becoming] immaterial” as shared
terms that can be factored out of the equation, 418 S.W.3d at 59, the panel’s rule
would multiply a reviewing court’s burdens by splintering the record.
The solution is straightforward: As the Supreme Court has urged, a trial or
appellate court should consider the whole summary judgment record (“motion and
response”). By doing so, the analysis can be reduced to asking “simply whether a
fact issue exists.” Buck, 381 S.W.3d at 528 n.2. If it does, the movant can prevail on
neither motion. If it does not, the movant wins the no-evidence motion (and the
court need not worry about whether the movant also had the conclusive proof
required for a traditional motion).
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P RAYER
The Court should grant rehearing en banc and, based on the substantive
arguments that the panel did not reach, reverse and remand.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Don Cruse
_________________________
Don Cruse
State Bar No. 24040744
LAW OFFICE OF DON CRUSE
1108 Lavaca Street, Suite 110-436
Austin, Texas 78701
[Tel.] (512) 853-9100
[Fax] (512) 870-9002
don.cruse@texasappellate.com
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS
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CERTIFICATE OF S ERVICE
I certify that on July 16, 2015, this Motion for En Banc Rehearing was sent
by electronic service to appellate counsel of record:
D. Todd Smith
Smith Law Group, P.C.
1250 Capital of Texas Highway South
Three Cielo Center, Suite 601
Austin, Texas 78746
Lead Counsel for Appellees
/s/ Don Cruse
__________________________
Don Cruse
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
This brief complies with Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.4 because the
sections covered by the rule contain 4243 words. The font used in the body of the
brief is no smaller than 14 points, and the font used in the footnotes is no smaller
than 12 points.
/s/ Don Cruse
__________________________
Don Cruse
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