Rent-A-Center, Inc. v. Glenn Hegar, in His Capacity as Comptroller of Public Accounts of the State of Texas And Ken Paxton, in His Capacity as Attorney General of the State of Texas ( 2015 )


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  •                                                                                                        ACCEPTED
    03-13-00101-CV
    6067747
    THIRD COURT OF APPEALS
    AUSTIN, TEXAS
    7/14/2015 6:09:49 PM
    JEFFREY D. KYLE
    CLERK
    NO. 03-13-001 01-CV
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    FILED IN
    FOR THE THIRD COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT
    3rd COURT OF APPEALS
    AUSTIN, TEXAS             AUSTIN, TEXAS
    7/14/2015 6:09:49 PM
    JEFFREY D. KYLE
    Clerk
    RENT-A-CENTER, INC.,
    APPELLANT
    V.
    GLEN HEGAR, in his capacity as
    COMPTROLLER OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS OF THE STATE OF TEXAS;
    and
    KEN PAXTON, in his capacity as
    ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF TEXAS,
    APPELLEES
    On Appeal from the
    th
    250 Judicial District Court
    Travis County, Texas
    APPELLANTS                     REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR REHEARING
    Daniel L. Butcher                                     Farley P. Katz
    State Bar No. 03512050                                State Bar No. 11108790
    P. Michael Jung                                       Forrest M. (Teo) Seger III
    State Bar No. 11054600                                State Bar No. 24070587
    Strasburger & Price, LLP                              Strasburger & Price LLP
    901 Main Street, Suite 4300                           2301 Broadway
    Dallas, Texas 75202-3794                              San Antonio, Texas 78215
    (210) 250-6000 Telephone
    (210) 250-6100 Facsimile
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
    (Additional Counsel on Signature
    Page)
    1898612.2/SPSAl67691/0102/071415
    TABLE OF CONTENTS
    TABLE OF AUTHORITIES                                      ii
    ARGUMENT                                                  2
    CONCLUSION                                                4
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE                                    6
    CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE                                 6
    1898612.2/SPSAl67691/01   02/071415
    TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
    Page(s)
    CASES
    Bradleys' Elec. v. Cigna Lloyds Ins. Co.,
    
    995 S.W.2d 675
    (Tex. 1999)                                                  2
    Chrismon v. Brown,
    
    246 S.W.3d 102
    (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.)              4
    Hawkins v. EI Paso First Health Plans, lnc.,
    
    214 S.W.3d 709
    (Tex. App. - Austin 2007, pet. denied)                        4
    Q'Carolan v. Hopper,
    414 S.W.3d 288,304 (Tex. App. -                Austin 2013, no pet.)        .4
    PUC of Tex. v. City of Harlingen,
    
    311 S.W.3d 610
    (Tex. App. - Austin 2010, no pet.)                            3
    RULES
    Tex. R. App. P.
    . Rule 43.3                                                              2, 3
    ii
    1898612.2/SPSAl67691/0102/071415
    NO. 03-13-001 01-CV
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT
    AUSTIN, TEXAS
    RENT-A-CENTER, INC.,
    APPELLANT
    V.
    GLEN HEGAR, in his capacity as
    COMPTROLLER OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS OF THE STATE OF TEXAS;
    and
    KEN PAXTON, in his capacity as
    ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF TEXAS,
    APPELLEES
    On Appeal from the
    th
    250 Judicial District Court
    Travis County, Texas
    APPELLANT'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR REHEARING
    Appellant Rent-A-Center, Inc. ("Rent-A-Center") respectfully files this
    Reply in Support of its Motion for Rehearing.
    1
    1898612.2/SPSAl67691/0102/071415
    ARGUMENT
    Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 43.3 provides in relevant part that
    "[w]hen reversing a trial court's judgment, the court must render the
    judgment that the trial court should have rendered, except when ... a
    remand is necessary for further proceedings ... "
    Here the trial court ruled against Rent-A-Center as to whether it was
    primarily engaged in selling merchandise. As a result, the court did not
    reach the second issue, the total cost of goods sold, even though all the
    facts relevant to that issue were stipulated and undisputed.
    The Comptroller concedes that the facts relating to cost of goods are
    undisputed and that the question presented is purely one of law. See
    Petition for Rehearing pp. 4-8 & 7 n. 2. He asserts, however, that in these
    circumstances Rule 43.3 nevertheless requires this Court to remand the
    case in order to permit the trial court to "address that question in the first
    instance." See Appellees' Response in Opposition to Appellant's Motion
    for Rehearing p. 2. In other words, the Comptroller argues that Rule 43.3
    prohibits an appellate court that has reversed a trial court on an issue from
    going on to decide other issues that the trial court did not reach, even
    where those remaining issues are purely questions of law.
    2
    1 898612,2/SPSN67691/01   02/071415
    This turns Rule 43.3 on its head and is contrary to a multitude of
    appellate decisions. For example, Bradleys' Elec. v. Cigna Lloyds Ins. Co.,
    
    995 S.W.2d 675
    (Tex. 1999), presented the question whether a "court of
    appeals erred by remanding [a] case to the trial court without considering
    and deciding an issue upon which it could have rendered judgment."           
    Id. at 676.
    The Texas Supreme Court held that the remand violated Rule 43.3,
    and that the appellate court should have ruled on the issues presented
    "that would afford the party the greatest relief." 
    Id. at 677.
    The Court noted
    that the requirements of Rule 43.3 "are mandatory and that courts of
    appeals are not at liberty to disregard them." 
    Id. Applying this
    principle, this Court has consistently held that under
    Rule 43.3, where it reverses, it will go on to rule on other issues involving
    purely legal questions and will not remand those to the trial court. For
    example, in PUC of Tex. v. City of Harlingen, 
    311 S.W.3d 610
    ,625-626
    (Tex. App.-Austin                 2010, no pet.), this Court stated:
    "When reversing a trial court's judgment, the court must render the
    judgment that the trial court should have rendered, except when: (a) a
    remand is necessary for further proceedings; or (b) the interests of
    justice require a remand for another trial." Tex. R. App. P. 43.3. Given
    that the issue not decided by the district court is a question of law, we
    consider remand to the district court to be unnecessary, and we will
    rule on the issue so that we may render the judgment that the district
    court should have rendered.
    3
    1898612.2/SPSN67691/0102/071415
    Similarly, in Hawkins v. EI Paso First Health Plans, tnc., 
    214 S.W.3d 709
    ,
    719-720 (Tex. App.-Austin         2007, pet. denied), this Court explained:
    If reversal is warranted, the material facts are established, and there
    are no further proceedings necessitating a remand, then this Court
    has a duty to render the judgment the trial court should have
    rendered. See Rosen v. Wells Fargo Bank Tex., N.A., 
    114 S.W.3d 145
    , 149 (Tex. App.-Austin 2003, pet. filed); McAllen Police Officer's
    Union v. Tamez, 81 S.W.3d 401,405 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
    2002, pet. dism'd) (citing Tex. R. App. P. 43.3); City of Galveston v.
    Giles, 
    902 S.W.2d 167
    , 172 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no
    writ).
    It is only in circumstances where, for example, a party did not have
    an "opportunity to present evidence" that remand may be necessary.
    O'Carolan v. Hopper, 414 S.W. 3d 288,304 (Tex. App.-Austin                   2013, no
    pet.).
    The sole case cited by the Comptroller, Chrismon v. Brown,
    
    246 S.W.3d 102
    (Tex. App.-Houston               [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.), simply
    held that a court of appeals cannot reverse a decision that is not in error,
    an indisputable proposition having nothing to do with this issue.
    CONCLUSION
    For the reasons set forth in the Motion for Rehearing and above, this
    Court should rule that Rent-A-Center's cost of goods sold is original cost
    not reduced by depreciation taken on its federal tax return.' The
    1 Although Rent-A-Center suggested that the Court might remand the case for the
    limited purpose of calculating the amount of the refund due it (Petition for Rehearing
    4
    1898612.2/SPSN67691/0102/071415
    Comptroller has offered no argument against that proposition in its Brief on
    Appeal or in its Response to Rent-A-Center's Motion for Rehearing, tacitly
    conceding that it is correct.
    Respectfully submitted,
    Daniel L. Butcher
    State Bar No: 03512050
    dan. butcher@strasburger.com
    P. Michael Jung
    State Bar No. 11054600
    michael.jung@strasburger.com
    Strasburger & Price, LLP
    901 Main Street, Suite 4300
    Dallas, Texas 75202-3794
    lsI Farley P. Katz
    Farley P. Katz
    State Bar No. 11108790
    farley.katz@strasburger.com
    Forrest M. (Teo) Seger III
    State Bar No. 24070587
    teo. seger@strasburger.com
    Strasburger & Price, LLP
    2301 Broadway
    San Antonio, Texas 78215
    (210) 250-6000 Telephone
    (210) 250-6100 Facsimile
    And
    Robert M. Q'Boyle
    State Bar No. 15165425
    bob. oboyle@strasburger.com
    Clinton A. Rosenthal
    p. 10), that suggestion was only for the convenience of the Court. The calculation of
    Rent-A-Center's tax refund will be an undisputed matter which the parties could handle
    by agreement here or in the trial court.
    5
    1898612.2/SPSAl67691/0102/071415
    State Bar No. 24037393
    clint. rosenthal@strasburger.com
    Strasburger & Price, LLP
    720 Brazos Street, Suite 700
    Austin, Texas 78701
    (512) 499-3600 Telephone
    (512) 499-3660 Facsimile
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
    RENT-A-CENTER, INC.
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
    Pursuant to E-Filing Standing Order, I certify that on July 14, 2015, I
    electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of Court using the
    EFile.TXCourts.gov electronic filing system which will send notification of
    such filing to the following:
    Matthew H. Frederick, Esq.
    Jim B. Cloudt, Esq.
    Charles K. Eldred
    Assistant Attorney General
    Financial and Tax Litigation Division
    P.O. Box 12548
    Austin, Texas 78711-2548
    /s/ Farley P. Katz
    Farley P. Katz
    CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
    This motion complies with Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(i)(2)(D), because the
    brief contains 825 words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by Tex.
    R. App. P. 9.4(i)(1).
    /s/ Farley P. Katz
    Farley P. Katz
    6
    1898612.2/SPSAl67691/0102/071415
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 03-13-00101-CV

Filed Date: 7/14/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/30/2016