Thien Quoc Nguyen v. State ( 2015 )


Menu:
  •                                                                                     ACCEPTED
    06-15-00127-CR
    SIXTH COURT OF APPEALS
    TEXARKANA, TEXAS
    12/30/2015 11:47:27 AM
    DEBBIE AUTREY
    CLERK
    SIXTH COURT OF APPEALS
    FILED IN
    06-15-00127-CR                  6th COURT OF APPEALS
    TEXARKANA, TEXAS
    12/30/2015 11:47:27 AM
    DEBBIE AUTREY
    Thien Quoc Nguyen, Appellant                      Clerk
    v.
    State of Texas, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 19th Judicial District Court
    McLennan County
    Cause Number 2012-2444-C1
    Appellant’s Brief
    Michael Mowla
    P.O. Box 868
    Cedar Hill, TX 75106
    Phone: 972-795-2401
    Fax: 972-692-6636
    michael@mowlalaw.com
    Texas Bar No. 24048680
    Attorney for Appellant
    If the Court’s decisional process will be aided by
    oral argument, oral argument is requested
    I.    Identities of Parties, Counsel, and Judges
    Thien Quoc Nguyen, Appellant.
    Michael Mowla, attorney for Appellant on appeal
    Walter “Skip” Reaves, attorney for Appellant at trial
    Jessica Shaye “Jessi” Freud, attorney for Appellant at trial
    State of Texas, Appellee.
    Abel Reyna, McLennan County District Attorney
    Evan O’Donnell, McLennan County Assistant District Attorney
    Robert Moody, McLennan County Assistant District Attorney
    Sterling Harmon, McLennan County Assistant District Attorney
    Hon. Ralph T. Strother, Presiding Judge, 19th Judicial District Court, McLennan
    County
    2
    II.       Table of Contents
    I.       Identities of Parties, Counsel, and Judges ........................................................2
    II.      Table of Contents..............................................................................................3
    III.  Index of Authorities ..........................................................................................6
    IV.  Statement of the Case and Jurisdiction...........................................................13
    V.       Statement Regarding Oral Argument .............................................................16
    VI.  Issues Presented ..............................................................................................17
    VII.  Facts ................................................................................................................18
    VIII.  Summary of the Arguments............................................................................20
    IX.  Argument ........................................................................................................21
    1.  Issue One: The evidence is legally insufficient to prove that
    Appellant committed Aggravated Assault with a deadly weapon
    because no evidence was presented that Appellant intentionally,
    knowingly, or recklessly caused bodily injury to the CW by
    driving recklessly, causing the CW to crash his motorcycle
    while Appellant used an automobile as a deadly weapon. ............................21
    i.     Introduction .............................................................................................21
    ii.    Standard of review on claims of legal insufficiency under
    Jackson v. Virginia and Brooks. ..............................................................22
    iii.  Elements of Aggravated Assault .............................................................24
    iv.  The State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
    Appellant acted in a reckless manner, much less with intent
    or knowledge ...........................................................................................25
    v.     What occurred in this case is an accident and nothing more
    due to the careless operation of the motorcycle by the CW ....................27
    vi.  Appellant’s actions were at worst negligent, and not
    committed recklessly, intentionally, or knowingly .................................31
    vii.  The evidence was legally insufficient to show that
    Appellant used his vehicle as a deadly weapon because: (1)
    the manner of Appellant’s use of the vehicle or Appellant’s
    intended use of the vehicle was not capable of causing death
    or serious bodily injury, and (2) the vehicle did not
    “facilitate the associated felony.” ............................................................36
    3
    viii.  Public policy considerations ....................................................................40
    ix.  Conclusion ...............................................................................................41
    2.  Issue Two: Appellant’s Sixth Amendment rights to a speedy
    trial were violated because: (1) the trial court denied Appellant
    the benefit of a speedy trial because although Appellant had
    been incarcerated since October 24, 2012 and he requested a
    speedy trial on July 22, 2014, trial did not commence until June
    9, 2015; and (2) the State and trial court violated their duty,
    responsibility, and burden of bringing Appellant to trial within
    the time guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. .............................................42
    i.     Argument .................................................................................................42
    ii.    Conclusion ...............................................................................................47
    3.  Issue Three: The trial court erred and caused harm to Appellant
    because in its instructions to the jury, it failed to comply with
    Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 36.14 and the Sixth
    Amendment by committing the following errors: (1) submission
    of the option of the “reckless” mental state; (2) submission of
    the options of the “intentional” or “knowing” mental states; (3)
    submission of the deadly weapon theory; (4) failure to submit
    lesser-included offense options; and (5) submitting a misleading
    theory and commenting on causation and result. ..........................................49
    i.     Error in submission of the option of the “reckless” mental
    state ..........................................................................................................49
    ii.    Error in submission of the options of the “intentional” or
    “knowing” mental states ..........................................................................54
    iii.  Error in submission of the deadly weapon theory ...................................57
    iv.  Error in failure to submit lesser-included offense options ......................58
    v.     Error in submitting a misleading theory and comment on
    causation and result .................................................................................63
    vi.  Conclusion ...............................................................................................66
    4.  Issue Four: By excusing five prospective jurors “for cause”
    because of alleged prior arrests, but without legal cause in fact
    as required by Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 35.16,
    the trial court erred and deprived Appellant of the right of a jury
    selected in under Article 35.16 and as required by the Sixth
    4
    Amendment. A defendant’s substantial rights are violated when
    a trial court breaches the same procedural statute multiple
    times. ..............................................................................................................67
    i.     Argument .................................................................................................67
    ii.    Conclusion ...............................................................................................72
    5.  Issue Five: The trial court committed reversible error and
    violated Appellant’s Sixth Amendment rights to confront a
    material witness by refusing to permit Appellant to show the
    exceptional bias or interest of the complaining witness and
    admit evidence that the complaining witness had a pending civil
    suit against Appellant arising out of the same incident. ................................73
    i.     Argument .................................................................................................73
    ii.    Conclusion ...............................................................................................78
    X.      Conclusion and Prayer ....................................................................................79
    XI.  Certificate of Service ......................................................................................80
    XII.  Certificate of Compliance with Tex. Rule App. Proc. 9.4 .............................80
    5
    III.     Index of Authorities
    Cases
    Abdygapparova v. State, 
    243 S.W.3d 191
    (Tex. App. San
    Antonio 2007, pet. ref.) .................................................................................70
    Adames v. State, 
    353 S.W.3d 854
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) .....................................23
    Aliff v. State, 
    627 S.W.2d 166
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) .................................... 31, 33
    Almanza v. State, 
    686 S.W.2d 157
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (op.
    on rehearing) .......................................................................................... 55, 57
    Archie v. State, 
    511 S.W.2d 942
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) .......................................47
    Arzaga v. State, 
    86 S.W.3d 767
    (Tex. App. El Paso 2002, no
    pet.) ................................................................................................................29
    Avilez v. State, 
    333 S.W.3d 661
    (Tex. App. Houston [1st Dist.]
    2010, pet. ref.) ................................................................................................71
    Barker v. Wingo, 
    407 U.S. 514
    (1972) ....................................................... 42, 43, 44
    Bell v. State, 
    169 S.W.3d 384
    (Tex. App. Fort Worth 2005, pet.
    ref.) .................................................................................................................35
    Billodeau v. State, 
    277 S.W.3d 34
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) ....................................76
    Blount v. State, 
    257 S.W.3d 712
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) .......................................24
    Brewer v. State, 
    126 S.W.3d 295
    (Tex. App. Beaumont 2004) ..............................25
    Bridges v. State, 
    389 S.W.3d 508
    (Tex. App. Houston [14th
    Dist.] 2012) ....................................................................................................58
    Brown v. State, 
    122 S.W.3d 794
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) .......................................71
    Brumit v. State, 
    206 S.W.3d 639
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) ......................................70
    Byrd v. State, 
    336 S.W.3d 242
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) ..........................................40
    Cada v. State, 
    334 S.W.3d 766
    (2011) ....................................................................56
    Cantu v. State, 
    253 S.W.3d 273
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (en
    banc)........................................................................................................ 42, 43
    Carpenter v. State, 
    979 S.W.2d 633
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) .................................77
    Carroll v. State, 
    916 S.W.2d 494
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)............................... 73, 77
    Cates v. State, 
    102 S.W.3d 735
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) ........................................40
    Chappell v. State, 
    850 S.W.2d 508
    (1993) ..............................................................69
    6
    Clark v. Arizona, 
    548 U.S. 735
    (2006) ....................................................................34
    Conner v. State, 
    67 S.W.3d 192
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2001)........................................23
    Cox v. State, 
    523 S.W.2d 695
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) .................................... 73, 75
    Daniell v. State, 
    848 S.W.2d 145
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)......................................65
    Davis v. Alaska, 
    415 U.S. 308
    (1974) ......................................................................73
    DeJonge v. Oregon, 
    299 U.S. 353
    (1937) ...............................................................55
    Delapaz v. State, 
    228 S.W.3d 183
    (Tex. App. Dallas 2007, pet.
    ref.) .................................................................................................................65
    Dockstader v. State, 
    233 S.W.3d 98
    (Tex. App. Houston [14th
    Dist.] 2007, pet. ref.)......................................................................................70
    Doggett v. United States, 
    505 U.S. 647
    (1992)........................................................43
    Dover v. Baker, Brown, Sharman & Parker, 
    859 S.W.2d 441
         (Tex. App. Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ) ..............................................74
    Doyle v. State, 
    631 S.W.2d 732
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) ........................................66
    Dragoo v. State, 
    96 S.W.3d 308
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) .......................................42
    Duncan v. Louisiana, 
    391 U.S. 145
    (1968) .............................................................70
    Duren v. State, 
    87 S.W.3d 719
    (Tex. App. Texarkana 2002) ..................................26
    Easley v. State, 
    564 S.W.2d 742
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) .......................................47
    English v. State, 
    828 S.W.2d 33
    (Tex. App. Tyler 1991, pet.
    ref.) .......................................................................................................... 37, 38
    Ex parte McKithan, 
    838 S.W.2d 560
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)................................36
    Fisher v. State, 
    887 S.W.2d 49
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) .........................................50
    Forbes v. Lanzl, 
    9 S.W.3d 895
    (Tex. App. Austin 2000, pet.
    denied) ...........................................................................................................74
    Francis v. Marshall, 
    841 S.W.2d 51
    (Tex. App. Houston [14th
    Dist.] 1992, no writ).......................................................................................74
    Geick v. State, 
    349 S.W.3d 542
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) ........................................54
    Gollihar v. State, 
    46 S.W.3d 243
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) ......................................23
    Graham v. State, 
    657 S.W.2d 99
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) ......................................33
    Guzman v. State, 
    988 S.W.2d 884
    (Tex. App. Corpus Christi
    1999, no pet.) .................................................................................................24
    7
    Hall v. State, 
    145 S.W.3d 754
    (Tex. App. Texarkana 2004) ...................................24
    Hammer v. State, 
    296 S.W.3d 555
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)....................................76
    Henson v. State, 
    407 S.W.3d 764
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) .....................................46
    Henson v. State, 
    407 S.W.3d 764
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) .....................................44
    Hill v. State, 
    913 S.W.2d 581
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) ...........................................38
    Hoang v. State, 
    997 S.W.2d 678
    (Tex. App. Texarkana 1999,
    no pet.) ...........................................................................................................64
    Hogenson v. Williams, 
    542 S.W.2d 456
    (Tex. Civ. App.
    Texarkana 1976, no writ)...............................................................................75
    Hollander v. State, 
    414 S.W.3d 746
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) .................................52
    Hoyos v. State, 
    982 S.W.2d 419
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) .......................................73
    In re K.W.G., 
    953 S.W.2d 483
    (Tex. App. Texarkana 1997) ..................................27
    Isassi v. State, 
    330 S.W.3d 633
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) ........................................23
    Isbell v. State, 
    681 S.W.2d 640
    (Tex. App. Houston [14th Dist.]
    1984, pet. ref.) ................................................................................................32
    Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    (1979) ......................................................... 22, 23
    Jefferson v. State, 
    974 S.W.2d 887
    (Tex. App. Austin 1998) .................................36
    Johnson v. State, 
    364 S.W.3d 292
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) ....................... 23, 24, 50
    Johnson v. State, 
    452 S.W.3d 398
    (Tex. App. Amarillo 2014,
    pet. ref.) ..........................................................................................................71
    Jones v. State, 
    982 S.W.2d 386
    (1998) ....................................................................68
    Kincade v. State, 
    552 S.W.2d 832
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) ....................................64
    Kirsch v. State, 
    357 S.W.3d 645
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) .......................................65
    Klopfer v. North Carolina, 
    386 U.S. 213
    (1967) .....................................................42
    Knight v. State, 
    839 S.W.2d 505
    (Tex. App. Beaumont 1992, no
    pet.) ................................................................................................................72
    Laster v. State, 
    275 S.W.3d 512
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) ................................ 22, 23
    Lewis v. State, 
    529 S.W.2d 550
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) ........................... 27, 31, 33
    Louis v. State, 
    329 S.W.3d 260
    (Tex. App. Texarkana 2010),
    affirmed, 
    393 S.W.3d 246
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) ......................................34
    Malik v. State, 
    953 S.W.2d 234
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) ........................................52
    8
    Marlow v. State, 
    537 S.W.2d 8
    , 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) .....................................65
    Masterson v. State, 
    155 S.W.3d 167
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).................................63
    McCain v. State, 
    22 S.W.3d 497
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) .......................................60
    McCormick v. Texas Commerce Bank, 
    751 S.W.2d 887
    (Tex.
    App. Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, writ denied) ...............................................74
    McKay v. State, ___ S.W.3d ___, No. PD-1133-14, 2015 Tex.
    Crim. App. LEXIS 1171 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 4, 2015)............................59
    McKinney v. State, 
    505 S.W.2d 536
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) .................................46
    Mendieta v. State, 
    706 S.W.2d 651
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) ..................................32
    Montez v. State, 824 S.W2d 308 (Tex. App. San Antonio 1992,
    no pet.) ...........................................................................................................72
    Montgomery v. State, 
    369 S.W.3d 188
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) .............................33
    Mosley v. State, 
    545 S.W.2d 144
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) ......................................61
    Narvaiz v. State, 
    840 S.W.2d 415
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) .....................................23
    Northcutt v. City of Hearne, No. 10-14-00012-CV, 2015 Tex.
    App. LEXIS 7932 (Tex. App. Waco July 30, 2015, pet.
    filed) (mem. op.) ............................................................................................35
    Olden v. Kentucky, 
    488 U.S. 227
    (1988) .................................................................76
    Powell v. State, 
    194 S.W.3d 503
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) ......................................23
    Prible v. State, 
    175 S.W.3d 724
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)........................................22
    Ramos v. State, 
    407 S.W.3d 265
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).......................................50
    Ray v. State, 
    880 S.W.2d 795
    (Tex. App. Houston [1st Dist.]
    1994) ..............................................................................................................36
    Reed v. State, 
    117 S.W.3d 260
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)..........................................51
    Rivera v. State, 
    271 S.W.3d 301
    (Tex. App. San Antonio 2008) ..................... 24, 39
    Robalin v. State, 
    224 S.W.3d 470
    (Tex. App. Houston [1st
    Dist.] 2007, no pet.) .......................................................................................63
    Roberts v. State, 
    784 S.W.2d 430
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) .....................................70
    Robertson v. State, 
    109 S.W.3d 13
    (Tex. App. El Paso 2003, no
    pet.) ......................................................................................................... 32, 33
    Rodriguez v. State, 
    352 S.W.3d 548
    (Tex. App. Beaumont
    2011) ..............................................................................................................25
    9
    Romero v. State, 
    800 S.W.2d 539
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) .....................................68
    Saunders v. State, 
    913 S.W.2d 564
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1995)...................................63
    Schmuck v. United States, 
    489 U.S. 705
    (1989) ......................................................55
    Sheridan v. State, 
    950 S.W.2d 755
    (Tex. App. Fort Worth
    1997) ..............................................................................................................39
    Sierra v. State, 
    280 S.W.3d 250
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)........................................40
    Sneed v. State, 
    803 S.W.2d 833
    (Tex. App. Dallas 1991, pet.
    ref.) .................................................................................................................25
    Stadt v. State, 
    182 S.W.3d 360
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) .................................. 31, 33
    State v. Munoz, 
    991 S.W.2d 818
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (en
    banc)...............................................................................................................46
    State v. Rodriguez, 
    339 S.W.3d 680
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) .................................51
    Stirone v. United States, 
    361 U.S. 212
    (1960) .........................................................54
    Studer v. State, 
    799 S.W.2d 263
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) .......................................51
    Stuhler v. State, 
    218 S.W.3d 706
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) ......................................58
    Thomas v. State, 
    699 S.W.2d 845
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) .....................................34
    Thornton v. State, 
    377 S.W.3d 814
    (Tex. App. Amarillo 2012),
    vacated on another ground, No. PD-1517-12, 2013 Tex.
    Crim. App. Unpub. LEXIS 48, 
    2013 WL 105874
    (Tex.
    Crim. App. Jan. 9, 2013) (unpublished) ........................................................39
    Tucker v. State, 
    274 S.W.3d 688
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) ......................................59
    Turner v. State, 
    664 S.W.2d 86
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) ........................................36
    United States v. Miller, 
    471 U.S. 130
    (1985) ..........................................................54
    Waffle House, Inc. v. Williams, 
    313 S.W.3d 796
    (Tex. 2010).................................74
    Ward v. State, 
    72 S.W.3d 413
    (Tex. App. Fort Worth 2002) ..................................49
    Ward v. State, 
    72 S.W.3d 413
    (Tex. App. Fort Worth 2002, no
    pet.) ................................................................................................................64
    Whaley v. State, 
    717 S.W.2d 26
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1986)........................................65
    Williams v. State, 
    417 S.W.3d 162
    (Tex. App. Houston [1st
    Dist.] 2013, pet. ref.)......................................................................................69
    Wilson v. State, 
    625 S.W.2d 331
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) ......................................52
    10
    Winfrey v. State, 
    393 S.W.3d 763
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) .....................................23
    Wise v. State, 
    364 S.W.3d 900
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) ..........................................22
    Ybarra v. State, 
    890 S.W.2d 98
    (Tex. App. San Antonio 1994,
    pet. ref.) ..........................................................................................................33
    Zamorano v. State, 
    84 S.W.3d 643
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) ...................................43
    Statutes
    Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 21.15 (2015) ................................................................50
    Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 35.11 (2015) ................................................................71
    Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 35.16 (2015) ................................................................67
    Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 35.20 (2015) ................................................................71
    Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 36.14 (2015) ................................................................49
    Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 37.07 (2015) ................................................................14
    Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 44.25 (2015) ................................................................23
    Tex. Pen. Code § 22.01 (2012) ......................................................................... 21, 58
    Tex. Pen. Code § 6.03 (2012) ..................................................................... 25, 26, 33
    Other Authorities
    Comm. on Pattern Jury Charges, Texas Pattern Jury Charges—
    General Negligence § 6.6 (State Bar of Texas 2006) ....................................75
    Elizabeth A. Martin, Oxford Dictionary of Law. Oxford: Oxford
    University Press (2003) .................................................................................25
    Searcy, Pleading and Proving the Culpable Mental States
    Under the New Texas Penal Code, 6 Am. J. Crim. Law
    243 (1978) ......................................................................................................26
    Rules
    Tex. Rule App. Proc. 25.2 (2015) ............................................................................14
    Tex. Rule App. Proc. 26.2 (2015) ............................................................................14
    Tex. Rule App. Proc. 39 (2015) ...............................................................................16
    Tex. Rule App. Proc. 43.2 (2015) ............................................................................23
    Tex. Rule App. Proc. 44.2 (2015) ............................................................................77
    Tex. Rule App. Proc. 9.4 (2015) ..............................................................................80
    11
    Tex. Rule App. Proc. 9.5 (2015) ..............................................................................80
    Tex. Rule Evid. 401 (2015)......................................................................................56
    Tex. Rule Evid. 613 (2015)......................................................................................76
    Constitutional Provisions
    U.S. Const. Amend. V..............................................................................................23
    U.S. Const. Amend. VI ..................................................................................... 42, 70
    U.S. Const. Amend. XIV .........................................................................................23
    12
    To the Honorable Justices of the Court of Appeals:
    Appellant Thien Quoc Nguyen submits this Brief in support of the appeal:
    IV.    Statement of the Case and Jurisdiction
    This is an appeal of a Judgment of Conviction by Jury (“Judgment”) and
    sentence under cause number 2012-2444-C1 for Aggravated Assault with a Deadly
    Weapon (habitual offender), for which Appellant was sentenced to 47 years in
    prison. (CR 88-89).1
    On December 19, 2012, a grand jury indicted Appellant, alleging that on or
    about October 24, 2012, in McLennan County, Texas, Appellant “intentionally,
    knowingly, or recklessly cause bodily injury to Michael Jacob Willett” (“CW” or
    “Complaining Witness”) by driving recklessly, causing (the CW) to crash his
    motorcycle, and (Appellant) did then and there use or exhibit a deadly weapon, to-
    wit: an automobile, during the commission of said assault.” (CR 6). See Tex. Pen.
    Code § 22.02(a)(2) (2012).
    The indictment also contains an enhancement paragraph in which the grand
    jury alleged that prior to the commission of the alleged offense, on August 23,
    1
    The record on appeal consists of the Clerk’s Record, which is cited by “CR” followed by the
    page number, and the Reporter’s Record, which is cited as “RR” followed by the volume and
    page number, or the exhibit number (depicted as “SX” for State exhibits and “DX” for defense
    exhibits.
    13
    2004, in the Criminal District Court of Dallas County, Texas, in Cause Number F-
    0349278, Appellant was finally convicted of felony Aggravated Assault. (CR 6).
    Finally, the indictment contains a habitual offender paragraph, in which the
    grand jury alleged that prior to the commission of the primary offense and the
    enhancement offense, on August 29, 1997, in Criminal District Court 1 of Tarrant
    County, Texas, in Cause Number 0636021, Appellant was finally convicted of
    felony Aggravated Assault. (CR 7).
    After pleading “not guilty” to the primary charge in the indictment, a trial
    commenced, and on June 11, 2015, a jury found Appellant guilty of Aggravated
    Assault with a deadly weapon. (CR 75).
    After Appellant pleaded true to the enhancement and habitual allegations in
    the indictment, and after hearing punishment evidence, the jury sentenced
    Appellant to 47 years in prison, or until Appellant is 84 years old. (CR 87-89); see
    Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 37.07 § 2 (2015).
    Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. (CR 95); see Tex. Rule App. Proc.
    26.2(a) (2015). Appellant filed a motion for new trial, which was denied without a
    hearing. (CR 101-111, 121). The trial court signed a Certification of Defendant’s
    Right of Appeal, certifying that this is not a plea bargain case, and Appellant has
    the right of appeal. (CR 93). See Tex. Rule App. Proc. 25.2(a)(2) (2015). Under
    an order of the Supreme Court of Texas entered on June 23, 2015 (Misc. Docket
    14
    15-9114), this case was transferred to this Court from the Tenth Court of Appeals.
    See Tex. Gov. Code § 73.001. As a result, this Court has jurisdiction over this
    appeal.
    15
    V.    Statement Regarding Oral Argument
    Although the facts and arguments are thoroughly presented in this Brief, if
    the Court’s decisional process will be aided by oral argument, Appellant will be
    honored to present oral argument. See Tex. Rule App. Proc. 39 (2015).
    16
    VI.   Issues Presented
    Issue One: The evidence is legally insufficient to prove that Appellant committed
    Aggravated Assault with a deadly weapon because no evidence was presented that
    Appellant intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly caused bodily injury to the CW
    by driving recklessly, causing the CW to crash his motorcycle while Appellant
    used an automobile as a deadly weapon.
    Issue Two: Appellant’s Sixth Amendment rights to a speedy trial were violated
    because: (1) the trial court denied Appellant the benefit of a speedy trial because
    although Appellant had been incarcerated since October 24, 2012 and he requested
    a speedy trial on July 22, 2014, trial did not commence until June 9, 2015; and (2)
    the State and trial court violated their duty, responsibility, and burden of bringing
    Appellant to trial within the time guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.
    Issue Three: The trial court erred and caused harm to Appellant because in its
    instructions to the jury, it failed to comply with Texas Code of Criminal Procedure
    Article 36.14 and the Sixth Amendment by committing the following errors: (1)
    submission of the option of the “reckless” mental state; (2) submission of the
    options of the “intentional” or “knowing” mental states; (3) submission of the
    deadly weapon theory; (4) failure to submit lesser-included offense options; and
    (5) submitting a misleading theory and commenting on causation and result.
    Issue Four: By excusing five prospective jurors “for cause” because of alleged
    prior arrests, but without legal cause in fact as required by Texas Code of Criminal
    Procedure Article 35.16, the trial court erred and deprived Appellant of the right of
    a jury selected in under Article 35.16 and as required by the Sixth Amendment. A
    defendant’s substantial rights are violated when a trial court breaches the same
    procedural statute multiple times.
    Issue Five: The trial court committed reversible error and violated Appellant’s
    Sixth Amendment rights to confront a material witness by refusing to permit
    Appellant to show the exceptional bias or interest of the complaining witness and
    admit evidence that the complaining witness had a pending civil suit against
    Appellant arising out of the same incident.
    17
    VII. Facts
    Because Appellant allegedly slowed his vehicle too quickly after passing the
    CW, who was riding on a motorcycle, the CW claimed he was forced to “lay
    down” his motorcycle on its side, which caused him to slide for 150 feet along the
    road. (RR3 41-42). Neither the CW nor the motorcycle collided with Appellant’s
    vehicle. (RR3 28). The point on the roadway at which the motorcycle came to a
    stop is depicted in State’s Exhibit 46. (RR3 29; RR6, SX-46). The motorcycle
    stopped its slide a short distance from the rear of Appellant’s car, and the CW
    stopped about four feet behind the motorcycle. (RR3 44, 45, 109).
    As a result of the slide, the CW incurred abrasions, cuts, and bruising to his
    left knee, abdomen, and elbow. (RR3 21, 24, 26-27; RR5, SX-19 through SX-34).
    Aside from the CW, three other persons who were also travelling in vehicles down
    the same road testified to what they believed they saw taking place in front of them
    and gave their opinions as to what they saw. (RR3 59-110). The descriptions of
    Appellant’s operation of his vehicle are found at RR3, pages 18, 19-21, 37-42, 56-
    57, 64, 66, 69-72, 80, 84-85, 91, 92, 99-101, 103, 107-108, and 111. The
    conclusions of the witnesses about how Appellant operated his vehicle appear at
    RR3, pages 31, 65, 67-68, 96, and 104. The conclusions of the witnesses about
    how Appellant’s vehicle allegedly turned into a deadly weapon are found at RR3,
    18
    pages 25, 64, 96, and 104-105. The conclusions of the witnesses about what the
    CW avoided by laying down his cycle appear at RR3, pages 56-57, and 102.
    The incident occurred on October 24, 2012. (CR 6). Because Appellant
    received credit for time-served from October 24, 2012 to June 11, 2015 (the date
    sentence was imposed) (see Judgment, CR 88), it is clear that Appellant has been
    incarcerated since October 24, 2012.
    The indictment was returned on December 19, 2012 (CR 6). The case was
    first set for trial on June 25, 2013. (CR 20, 21). The case was postponed to July 2,
    2013, and then to October 8, 2013. (CR 22, 23). On July 22, 2014, Appellant
    requested a speedy trial. (CR 32). Trial did not commence until June 9, 2015.
    (RR2).
    19
    VIII. Summary of the Arguments
    In Issue One, Appellant will present a legal sufficiency argument. In Issue
    Two, Appellant will present a speedy trial argument. Issues Three, Four, and Five
    present arguments concerning improper jury selection and failure to allow
    Appellant the right to cross-examine a material witness. As to Issue One, Appellant
    will ask this Court to reverse the Judgment and sentence and enter a judgment of
    acquittal. As to Issue Two, Appellant will ask this Court to reverse the Judgment
    and sentence and dismiss the indictment with prejudice. As to Issues Three, Four,
    and Five, Appellant will ask this Court to reverse the Judgment and sentence and
    remand the case for a new trial.
    20
    IX.   Argument
    1. Issue One: The evidence is legally insufficient to prove that Appellant
    committed Aggravated Assault with a deadly weapon because no
    evidence was presented that Appellant intentionally, knowingly, or
    recklessly caused bodily injury to the CW by driving recklessly,
    causing the CW to crash his motorcycle while Appellant used an
    automobile as a deadly weapon.
    i. Introduction
    The facts of this case are simple and occurred over a span of a few minutes:
    through numerous witnesses, the State convinced a jury that Appellant drove his
    vehicle so poorly such that he somehow committed Aggravated Assault with a
    deadly weapon for road-rash injuries suffered by a motorcyclist (CW) who,
    travelling a short distance behind Appellant on the same roadway, purposely and
    recklessly laid his cycle over on its side.
    However, the State failed to prove that Appellant intentionally, knowingly,
    or recklessly assaulted the CW using a deadly weapon. Not only did the State fail
    to prove that Appellant “assaulted” the CW (as defined by Tex. Pen. Code § 22.01
    (2012)), but the State also failed to prove that that Appellant used his vehicle as a
    deadly weapon because: (1) the manner of Appellant’s use of the vehicle or
    Appellant’s intended use of the vehicle was not capable of causing death or serious
    bodily injury, and (2) the vehicle did not “facilitate the associated felony.”
    Appellant prays that this Court will agree, and reverse and render a judgment of
    acquittal on the Judgment of Conviction by Jury and sentence.
    21
    Appellant will begin by discussing the standard of review on claims of legal
    insufficiency under Jackson v. Virginia and Brooks. Then, Appellant will show
    why the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant acted in a
    reckless manner, much less with intent or knowledge, and why this Court should
    reverse the conviction and sentence and render a judgment of acquittal. Appellant
    will also show why the deadly weapon finding is incorrect.
    ii. Standard of review on claims of legal insufficiency under Jackson
    v. Virginia and Brooks.
    When reviewing a claim that the evidence is legally insufficient to support
    the conviction, an appellate court must determine whether “any rational trier of
    fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
    doubt.” Laster v. State, 
    275 S.W.3d 512
    , 517 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (emphasis
    added), quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 316-319 (1979); see also
    Brooks v. State, 
    323 S.W.3d 893
    , 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Prible v. State, 
    175 S.W.3d 724
    , 729-730 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Wise v. State, 
    364 S.W.3d 900
    , 903
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
    The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments require
    that a criminal conviction be supported not only by proof beyond a reasonable
    doubt regarding every essential element of a crime, but that such a determination
    be made by a rational trier of fact. U.S. Const. Amend. V; U.S. Const. Amend.
    XIV; 
    Laster, 275 S.W.3d at 517
    ; 
    Jackson, 443 U.S. at 316-319
    . After giving
    22
    “proper deference” (and not total deference) to the trier of fact, an appellate court
    must “uphold the verdict unless a rational factfinder must have had reasonable
    doubt as to any essential element.” 
    Laster, 275 S.W.3d at 518
    , citing Narvaiz v.
    State, 
    840 S.W.2d 415
    , 423 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); see Brooks, 
    id. at 902
    n.1.
    Should an appellate court find that the verdict is contrary to the evidence presented
    at trial, the court is empowered to reverse the conviction and enter a judgment of
    acquittal. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 44.25 (2015); Tex. Rule App. Proc. 43.2(c)
    (2015).
    Evidence is legally sufficient only if the State has affirmatively proven each
    of the essential elements of the offense. Isassi v. State, 
    330 S.W.3d 633
    , 638 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 2010); 
    Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319
    ; Adames v. State, 
    353 S.W.3d 854
    ,
    859-860 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). In doing so, the reviewing court considers all
    evidence in the record of the trial, whether it was admissible or inadmissible.
    Winfrey v. State, 
    393 S.W.3d 763
    , 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Conner v. State, 
    67 S.W.3d 192
    , 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); Powell v. State, 
    194 S.W.3d 503
    , 507
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). And, the State’s case falls short if there is a material
    variance between the indictment allegations and the proof at trial. Gollihar v. State,
    
    46 S.W.3d 243
    , 246 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); Johnson v. State, 
    364 S.W.3d 292
    ,
    294 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). This may occur when a statute specifies alternate
    23
    methods by which an offense could be committed, the charging instrument pleads
    one of those alternate methods, but the State proves, instead, an unpled method. 
    Id. iii. Elements
    of Aggravated Assault
    A person can commit Aggravated Assault in two ways: by committing an
    assault while using or possessing a deadly weapon, or by causing serious bodily
    injury. Aggravated Assault with a deadly weapon is a “nature of the conduct
    offense,” which means that the appropriate culpable mental state definition as used
    in the trial court’s charge to the jury are to guide the jury in determining whether
    the actor intended to use or exhibit the deadly weapon during the commission of
    the offense. See Blount v. State, 
    257 S.W.3d 712
    , 714-715 (Tex. Crim. App.
    2008); 
    Johnson, 364 S.W.3d at 298
    ; Guzman v. State, 
    988 S.W.2d 884
    , 887 (Tex.
    App. Corpus Christi 1999, no pet.); Tex. Pen. Code § 22.02(a)(2) (2012). Thus,
    regardless of the outcome of such conduct, a person commits Aggravated Assault
    with a deadly weapon if the person intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly commits
    an assault while using or possessing a deadly weapon. See Rivera v. State, 
    271 S.W.3d 301
    , 304-305 (Tex. App. San Antonio 2008) (Defining Aggravated Assault
    with a Deadly Weapon).
    On the other hand, Aggravated Assault with serious bodily injury is a
    “nature-of-the-result offense” because criminal liability is based upon the
    defendant’s intent to cause a specific result, which is the serious bodily
    24
    injury. See Hall v. State, 
    145 S.W.3d 754
    , 758-759 (Tex. App. Texarkana 2004)
    (Aggravated Assault with Serious Bodily Injury is a nature-of-the-result offense)
    (emphasis added); Rodriguez v. State, 
    352 S.W.3d 548
    , 553-554 (Tex. App.
    Beaumont 2011) (same); Sneed v. State, 
    803 S.W.2d 833
    , 835 (Tex. App. Dallas
    1991, pet. ref.) (The prohibition against assaulting a police officer proscribes a
    particular result, which is causing an injury to the officer, and is a result-oriented
    offense).
    iv. The State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
    Appellant acted in a reckless manner, much less with intent or
    knowledge
    There is no evidence that Appellant “intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly
    caused bodily injury” to the CW “by driving recklessly,” causing the CW to crash
    his motorcycle, while Appellant used his vehicle as a deadly weapon. Because
    aggravated Assault with a deadly weapon is a “nature of the conduct offense,”
    which requires proving a defendant’s culpable mental state, a review of the
    relevant mental states (mens rea) is appropriate.
    Mens rea is a state of mind in which the defendant is said to have a “guilty
    mind.” Elizabeth A. Martin, Oxford Dictionary of Law, Oxford University Press
    (2003). A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to the nature of the
    defendant’s conduct or to a result of the conduct when the defendant’s conscious
    objective or desire is to engage in the conduct or cause the result. Tex. Pen. Code
    25
    § 6.03(a) (2012); see Brewer v. State, 
    126 S.W.3d 295
    , 303 (Tex. App. Beaumont
    2004) (Definition of the mens rea of “intentionally”). The mental state of intent is
    not used to apply to circumstances surrounding conduct, but concerns the person’s
    perception of the existence of the circumstances, that is, knowledge, recklessness,
    or criminal negligence. See Searcy, Pleading and Proving the Culpable Mental
    States Under the New Texas Penal Code, 6 Am. J. Crim. Law 243, 244-247
    (1978). There was no evidence presented that Appellant intended for the CW to
    slide on the ground, which caused Appellant’s injuries.
    Nor did Appellant act knowingly or with knowledge because Appellant was
    not aware of the nature of the conduct or that the circumstances exist; nor was
    Appellant aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result of the
    CW sliding on the ground. See Tex. Pen. Code § 6.03(b) (2012); see also Duren v.
    State, 
    87 S.W.3d 719
    , 724 (Tex. App. Texarkana 2002) (Defining “knowingly” in
    the context of a capital murder trial, where the evidence was sufficient to sustain
    the defendant’s conviction because the child suffered such severe trauma to the
    head that a reasonable inference was that defendant knew his conduct was
    reasonably certain to cause death).
    Nor did Appellant act recklessly, which is the mens rea alleged in the
    indictment (CR 6). A person acts recklessly, or is reckless with respect to
    circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is
    26
    aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
    circumstances exist or the result will occur. Tex. Pen. Code § 6.03(c) (2012); see
    In re K.W.G., 
    953 S.W.2d 483
    , 487 (Tex. App. Texarkana 1997) (Defining
    “recklessly” in a case where a juvenile caused injuries to others by committing
    arson), citing Lewis v. State, 
    529 S.W.2d 550
    , 553 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
    v. What occurred in this case is an accident and nothing more due to
    the careless operation of the motorcycle by the CW
    Under the standards set forth above, the evidence was legally insufficient to
    prove that the CW was injured by any criminal conduct by Appellant. The
    evidence showed that as Appellant and the CW were each travelling eastbound on
    Lake Shore Drive, just west of Gholson Road in north Waco, Appellant pulled over
    to the right in front of the CW. Appellant was driving a car, and the CW was riding
    on a Ducati motorcycle. Appellant’s lane change was apparently made very
    quickly after he had passed the CW and thus was described as a “cutting off” of the
    CW. But, contrary to the testimony of one witness, there was no “collision”
    between their vehicles. Appellant then drove quite a bit farther ahead of the CW.
    As both vehicles approached the intersection, Appellant’s vehicle slowed to a stop
    well before reaching the intersection. The CW did not expect or anticipate
    Appellant’s action of slowing, and therefore the CW underestimated how soon he
    would need to reduce his (the CW’s) speed. As a result, the CW became frightened
    that he would crash into the rear of Appellant’s vehicle. Thus, the CW chose to
    27
    “lay over” his motorcycle, assuming this would assist him in stopping more
    quickly, or at least avoid hitting Appellant’s vehicle. The CW’s choice was clearly
    not wise, as he should have properly applied his brakes. (RR3 176). The CW’s
    maneuver resulted both in damage to the motorcycle and abrasive injuries to his
    body as he made contact with and slid along the roadway. The CW came to a
    position of rest several feet behind the Appellant’s vehicle.
    This sequence of events occurred primarily because the CW failed to operate
    the motorcycle in a safe manner. Nothing Appellant did created the “emergency”
    for the CW that caused the CW to lay down his motorcycle.
    The timing of each driver’s actions played a role in what occurred, but the
    primary reason for what occurred was the CW’s failure to operate the motorcycle
    in a safe manner. The distances and rate of closure between Appellant’s vehicle
    and the CW also played a role. In addition, the locations of each vehicle at the
    inception of the events also played a role. The lines of travel and the relative
    speeds of each vehicle were important factors as well, but again, none of the
    factors are as important as the CW’s failure to operate the motorcycle in a safe
    manner.
    As though Appellant were capable of sorcery with his vehicle, four
    witnesses, including the CW, concluded that Appellant manipulated these factors
    in such a way as to make it likely that the CW would suffer at least bodily injury as
    28
    a result of Appellant’s conduct. But, to reach this conclusion, the State offered
    nothing more than the lay opinions of those persons about the causation of the
    injuries and the criminal culpability of Appellant’s conduct. None of these
    witnesses were disinterested. Each described their own reasons for holding a
    grudge against Appellant. Bradford said that Appellant tried to “run” her over and
    was endangering everyone on the road. (RR3 63-64, 69-70). The Attaways were
    also upset with Appellant because he cut in front of their vehicle, forcing David
    Attaway to pull over to the median and back up to avoid a collision, almost losing
    control of his vehicle. (RR3 85, 88, 90, 99, 100). The State’s evidence omitted or
    left vague all of the details about the underlying circumstances necessary to prove
    causation and culpability to amount to Aggravated Assault with a deadly weapon.
    There was no precision in the explanations or descriptions of how the event
    unfolded. In fact, outside the presence of the jury, this was acknowledged by the
    prosecutor (“There weren’t any numbers given by the witnesses, there weren’t any
    angles, there weren’t any measurements.”). (RR3 140). Even adopting the
    approach that this court should “...look to the totality of the circumstances
    surrounding the entire incident in order to determine if the jury could have satisfied
    itself that all of the essential elements had been proven beyond a reasonable
    doubt,” such exercise is fruitless when the crucial factors are left to supposition.
    See Arzaga v. State, 
    86 S.W.3d 767
    , 778 (Tex. App. El Paso 2002, no pet.).
    29
    There was nothing inherently criminal about what Appellant did. He drove
    his vehicle down a public roadway, slowed as he approached a controlled
    intersection (perhaps also to make a right turn), and used functioning tail lights to
    warn the motorists travelling behind his car to apply their brakes. Perhaps to the
    surprise of the CW, Appellant got too close to the intersection before slowing and
    thus had to apply his brakes quickly, rather using than a more gradual and smooth
    process. None of the evidence presented suggests that Appellant recklessly
    operated his vehicle. Without better proof of the factors mentioned above and their
    interplay, no witness deciphered how to interpret Appellant’s actions. Because this
    ambiguity was not removed, it was not possible for the jurors to rationally
    conclude “beyond a reasonable doubt” that Appellant committed Aggravated
    Assault with a deadly weapon. Thus, this was not a rational juror that convicted
    Appellant.
    It is unjust to conclude that Appellant calculated where to place his vehicle
    and how hard to bring it to a stop with the hope of causing an injury to the CW.
    They were strangers who were merely using the same road to travel to their
    respective destinations. If Appellant really wanted to cause harm to a person riding
    a motorcycle, Appellant had a much easier and certain manner in which he could
    have done so. If, as the State argued (but failed to prove) that Appellant became
    enraged, it seems unlikely he had the time or thoughtfulness to plan an elaborate
    30
    scenario designed to cover up the extent of his rage or hopes to injure the CW.
    Moreover, merely stopping his vehicle as Appellant did would never by itself
    cause injury or an accident. The injuries caused to the CW depended on several
    other factors over which Appellant had no control.
    vi. Appellant’s actions were at worst negligent, and not committed
    recklessly, intentionally, or knowingly
    Appellant’s actions were at worst negligent, and not committed recklessly,
    intentionally, or knowingly. The underlying basis of reckless conduct is a
    conscious disregard of the risk created by the defendant’s conduct. See 
    Lewis, 529 S.W.2d at 553
    . As the Court of Criminal Appeals held, reckless conduct differs
    from criminally negligent conduct as follows:
    (reckless conduct involves) conscious risk creation, that is, the actor
    is aware of the risk surrounding his conduct or the results thereof, but
    consciously disregards that risk...Criminal negligence...involves
    inattentive risk creation, that is, the actor ought to be aware of the
    risk surrounding his conduct or the results thereof. At the heart of
    reckless conduct is conscious disregard of the risk created by the
    actor’s conduct; the key to criminal negligence is found in the failure
    of the actor to perceive the risk.
    See 
    Lewis, 529 S.W.2d at 553
    (emphasis supplied); see also Aliff v. State, 
    627 S.W.2d 166
    , 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (difference between recklessness and
    criminally negligent actions) and Stadt v. State, 
    182 S.W.3d 360
    , 364 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 2005) (same).     Another factor a reviewing court must consider when it
    determines whether a person acted recklessly is whether it is clear from the
    31
    evidence that the defendant perceived the risk in her actions. See Mendieta v.
    State, 
    706 S.W.2d 651
    , 653 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (A defendant who swings a
    knife to keep another away acts recklessly because the act shows a perception of
    the risk the defendant was creating); cf. Isbell v. State, 
    681 S.W.2d 640
    , 643 (Tex.
    App. Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, pet. ref.) (Trial court erred when it refused to
    provide jury instruction for criminally negligent homicide because the husband
    was killed due to the weapon discharging during a struggle between the husband
    and the defendant while the husband tried to disarm the defendant in order to
    prevent her suicide attempt).
    A good example of reckless conduct is discussed in Robertson v. State, 
    109 S.W.3d 13
    (Tex. App. El Paso 2003, no pet.). Here, while driving, the defendant
    had a grand mal seizure, causing his vehicle to drift off the road and crash into the
    living room of a house, crushing to death a nine-year-old child who was resting in
    the living room of the house. 
    Id. at 14.
    The court of appeals found that the record
    was “abundantly clear” that the defendant should not have been driving because:
    (1) the defendant had a history of past automobile accidents caused by his
    susceptibility to seizures; (2) there was inferential evidence that the defendant
    avoided or misrepresented his medical condition on his driver’s license renewal
    application, which tends to show conscious disregard of the danger to other
    motorists and the public because the defendant knew that he could lose physical
    32
    control over his body; and (3) the defendant’s decision to drive on the day of the
    accident “was a conscious choice in disregard of the unjustifiable danger his
    driving posed.” 
    Id. at 21.
    As a result, the court of appeals affirmed the defendant’s
    conviction for Manslaughter. 
    Id. Therefore, in
    Robertson, the defendant: (1) consciously created a risk that
    was proved by the attendant circumstances; (2) perceived the risk in his actions;
    and (3) created a risk that was of such a nature and degree that its disregard
    constituted a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person
    would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the person’s standpoint.
    See 
    Lewis, 529 S.W.2d at 553
    ; 
    Aliff, 627 S.W.2d at 171
    ; 
    Stadt, 182 S.W.3d at 364
    ;
    and Tex. Pen. Code § 6.03(c) (2012).
    On the other hand, the mens rea of criminal negligence is of a nature and
    degree that the failure to perceive the risk constitutes a gross deviation from the
    standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances
    as viewed from the person’s viewpoint. Tex. Pen. Code § 6.03(d) (2012);
    Montgomery v. State, 
    369 S.W.3d 188
    , 192-193 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (Listing
    what the State must prove to show criminal negligence); Graham v. State, 
    657 S.W.2d 99
    , 101 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (Discussion of the requirements to prove
    criminal negligence). The underlying factor of criminal negligence is the failure of
    the person to perceive the risk created by her conduct. See Ybarra v. State, 890
    
    33 S.W.2d 98
    , 110 (Tex. App. San Antonio 1994, pet. ref.) (The risk must be of such
    a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from
    the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the
    circumstances as viewed from the person’s standpoint) and Thomas v. State, 
    699 S.W.2d 845
    , 850 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (Criminal negligence involves inattentive
    risk creation where the person ought to be aware of the risk surrounding her
    conduct or the results of her conduct).
    There was no rational basis from which to infer the required culpable mental
    state existed in Appellant’s mind amounted to recklessness as opposed to mere
    negligence. “As applied to mens rea (and every other element), the force of the
    presumption of innocence is measured by the force of the showing needed to
    overcome it, which is proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant’s state of
    mind was in fact what the charge states.” Clark v. Arizona, 
    548 U.S. 735
    , 766
    (2006); Louis v. State, 
    329 S.W.3d 260
    , 269 (Tex. App. Texarkana 2010), affirmed,
    
    393 S.W.3d 246
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (deference to jury’s finding as to culpable
    mental state did not require acceptance thereof on appeal).
    Moreover, the causative link or cause-effect relationship between what
    Appellant did and the actual mechanism of the injury to the CW does not exist. In a
    recent case presenting a claim that operation of a vehicle in front of a motorcycle
    caused the deadly injury the motorcyclist ultimately suffered by reason his loss of
    34
    control of the motorcycle during a supposed evasive action, the Tenth Court of
    Appeals stated, “[W]ithout a number of unreasonable assumptions and stacked
    inferences, nothing in [the proof] creates a fact question as to whether or not [car
    driver’s] actions were negligent or actually caused [the motorcyclist’s] injury.”
    Northcutt v. City of Hearne, No. 10-14-00012-CV, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 7932, at
    *9-11 (Tex. App. Waco July 30, 2015, pet. filed) (mem. op.). It added that the
    cyclist’s “complaints about [the car driver’s] actions seem to be more properly
    classified as a condition that made the accident possible, rather than the actual
    cause of the accident itself.” Northcutt, 
    id. Highly pertinent
    to Appellant’s case, the
    Tenth Court of Appeals found that causation “cannot be established by mere
    conjecture, guess, or speculation.” 
    Id. at *7.
    Here, the CW was not injured by any act or omission by Appellant. The
    CW’s decision to “lay down” his motorcycle because he was not operating it safely
    was the sole cause of the CW’s injuries. A “defendant cannot be convicted if the
    additional cause, other than defendant’s conduct, is clearly sufficient by itself to
    produce the result, and the defendant’s conduct by itself is clearly insufficient to
    produce the result.” Bell v. State, 
    169 S.W.3d 384
    , 395 (Tex. App. Fort Worth
    2005, pet. ref.).
    35
    vii.      The evidence was legally insufficient to show that Appellant
    used his vehicle as a deadly weapon because: (1) the manner of
    Appellant’s use of the vehicle or Appellant’s intended use of the
    vehicle was not capable of causing death or serious bodily injury,
    and (2) the vehicle did not “facilitate the associated felony.”
    A deadly weapon can be a firearm or anything manifestly designed, made, or
    adapted for the purpose of inflicting death or serious bodily injury. Tex. Pen. Code
    § 1.07(a)(17)(A) (2012). A deadly weapon can also be “...anything that in the
    manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily
    injury.” Tex. Pen. Code § 1.07(a)(17)(B) (2012); See Jefferson v. State, 
    974 S.W.2d 887
    , 892 (Tex. App. Austin 1998). For instance, hands are not deadly
    weapons per se but can become deadly weapons in the manner of their use
    depending upon the evidence. 
    Id., see also
    Turner v. State, 
    664 S.W.2d 86
    , 89-90
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
    Like one’s hands, a vehicle is not a deadly weapon per se. However, a
    vehicle can become a deadly weapon if it is used in a manner capable of causing
    death or serious bodily injury. Tex. Pen. Code § 1.07(a)(17)(B) (2012); Ray v.
    State, 
    880 S.W.2d 795
    , 796 (Tex. App. Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no pet.); Ex parte
    McKithan, 
    838 S.W.2d 560
    , 561 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); Ray v. State, 
    880 S.W.2d 795
    (Tex. App. Houston [1st Dist.] 1994) (an intoxicated person could be found to
    have used his vehicle in such a manner so as to render it a deadly weapon).
    36
    For instance, in English v. State, 
    828 S.W.2d 33
    (Tex. App. Tyler 1991, pet.
    ref.), the defendant’s vehicle collided with a vehicle operated by the victim, and
    the victim was killed. 
    Id. at 34.
    Both drivers were legally intoxicated at the time of
    the accident: Appellant’s blood contained 0.33 grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters,
    and the victim’s contained 0.20 grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters. 
    Id. After the
    jury found that the defendant “...used or exhibited a deadly weapon, (a motor
    vehicle) during the commission of the offense,” defendant argued that he did not
    use the vehicle in a manner as to render it a deadly weapon because there is no
    evidence that: (1) he ran a red light, (2) he was speeding at the time of, or
    immediately before, the collision, or (3) that he otherwise operated the vehicle in a
    reckless manner. The State argued that because: (1) the defendant had a blood
    alcohol level of 0.33, (2) persons with that level of intoxication would be “near a
    comatose state,” and (3) the vehicle weighed 2,800 pounds, these factors alone
    made the vehicle capable of “causing serious bodily injury or death to other
    individuals.” 
    Id. at 34-35.
    However, using the legal sufficiency holding in Jackson,
    
    443 U.S. 307
    , the court of appeals concluded that no rational jury could have found
    beyond a reasonable doubt that the vehicle driven by Appellant while intoxicated
    was “in the manner of its use or intended use . . . capable of causing death or
    serious bodily injury.” The court found that there must be “some special
    37
    relationship between the [vehicle] by reason of the manner of its use and the
    “associated felony offense” for which the defendant was tried.” 
    Id. at 38.
    The English court did not deny that a motor vehicle operated by an
    intoxicated driver instantly becomes an instrument capable of inflicting death or
    serious bodily injury on any person, who by chance comes within its path. 
    Id. at 38
    (emphasis supplied). However, although evidence of the defendant’s intoxication
    while driving his vehicle is undisputed, the evidence shows only that a collision
    occurred in an intersection at which the flow of traffic in each direction is
    controlled by signal lights. 
    Id. at 38
    -39. There was no evidence showing that the
    other driver had the right-of-way, that the Appellant ran a red light, or was
    operating his vehicle in a reckless manner. 
    Id. Applying the
    standard of review
    in Jackson, when looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding,
    the court found that the jury’s finding that the defendant exhibited or used a deadly
    weapon during the commission of the felony DWI is not a rational finding. 
    Id. at 39.
    The English court’s holding leads to the final part of this analysis: a deadly
    weapon must actually facilitate the associated felony. Hill v. State, 
    913 S.W.2d 581
    , 583-584 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (For an affirmative finding of the use of
    deadly weapon to stand, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
    defendant employed or used a deadly weapon so as to facilitate the associated
    38
    felony.). In Hill, the defendants were charged with injury to a child under Texas
    Penal Code § 22.04. It was alleged that the defendants caused their son to starve to
    death by using chains, belts and locks in order to prevent the child from obtaining
    food, and that these devices were used as deadly weapons. The Court of Criminal
    Appeals found that because the defendants used the devices to restrain the child in
    order to deprive him of food (the injury to a child), the defendants committed an
    “affirmative, conscious and intentional act.” 
    Id. at 583.
    In other words, in Hill, the deadly weapons (chains, belts and locks)
    facilitated the associated felony (injury to a child). But in Appellant’s case, the
    vehicle did not “facilitate” any “associated felony.” What occurred was at worst a
    misdemeanor assault that was elevated to a felony only because it was alleged that
    Appellant used his vehicle to commit the assault.           See Tex. Pen. Code §
    22.02(a)(2) (2012) and 
    Rivera, 271 S.W.3d at 304-305
    . Thus, neither the deadly
    weapon finding nor the felony conviction should stand. See also Sheridan v. State,
    
    950 S.W.2d 755
    (Tex. App. Fort Worth 1997) (An accident in a vehicle could not
    have facilitated a failure to stop and render aid because the “gravamen of the
    offense relates to the actor’s failure to stop and render reasonable assistance after
    such an accident.”); Thornton v. State, 
    377 S.W.3d 814
    , 818 (Tex. App. Amarillo
    2012), vacated on another ground, No. PD-1517-12, 2013 Tex. Crim. App. Unpub.
    LEXIS 48, 
    2013 WL 105874
    (Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 9, 2013) (unpublished)
    39
    (meaning of statutory term describing conduct must fit what the defendant actually
    did before it can lead to a rational finding of guilt); Sierra v. State, 
    280 S.W.3d 250
    , 255 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (Whether a vehicle is used as a deadly weapon is
    determined by a two-prong evaluation: (1) the manner in which the defendant used
    the vehicle during the crime and (2) whether, during the commission of the crime,
    the vehicle was capable of causing death or serious bodily injury). In Appellant’s
    case, Appellant did not use his vehicle in a manner that could have led a rational
    trier of fact to conclude that with respect to circumstances surrounding what
    occurred on that street, Appellant was aware of but consciously disregarded a
    substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will
    occur. See Tex. Pen. Code § 6.03(c) (2012). The capabilities of the vehicle must be
    judged strictly according to its actual use in this case. See Byrd v. State, 
    336 S.W.3d 242
    , 258 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (to avoid failure of proof, State must
    prove the conduct as alleged, except for minor discrepancies in things such as
    spelling or numerical digits); see also Cates v. State, 
    102 S.W.3d 735
    , 739 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 2003) (evidence insufficient because it failed to show vehicle was
    “driven in a deadly manner”).
    viii.     Public policy considerations
    The verdict reached by the jury represents a dangerous proposition: if this
    Court allows the conviction to stand, violations of driving rules or expected norms
    40
    governing the operation of motor vehicles could very easily be routinely charged
    as Aggravated Assault with a deadly weapon, a felony of the second degree. Given
    the number of similar incidents that occur regularly in Texas and elsewhere, it
    would quickly prove impossible to justly or uniformly apply the law concerning
    Aggravated Assault to these situations. Some forms of driving are aggressive in
    nature, and although such forms should be frowned upon, they should not be
    criminalized as a second degree felony. Finally, the vast majority of incidents such
    as what occurred between Appellant and the CW represent only danger and not
    felonious criminal conduct.
    ix. Conclusion
    The evidence is legally insufficient to prove that Appellant committed
    Aggravated Assault with a deadly weapon because no evidence was presented that
    Appellant intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly caused bodily injury to the CW
    by driving recklessly, causing the CW to crash his motorcycle while Appellant
    used an automobile as a deadly weapon. As a result, Appellant asks this Court to
    reverse the Judgment and sentence and enter a judgment of acquittal. In the
    alternative, Appellant asks this Court to reverse the Judgment and sentence, and
    enter a judgment of conviction for misdemeanor assault, and remand this case back
    to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing.
    41
    2. Issue Two: Appellant’s Sixth Amendment rights to a speedy trial
    were violated because: (1) the trial court denied Appellant the benefit
    of a speedy trial because although Appellant had been incarcerated
    since October 24, 2012 and he requested a speedy trial on July 22,
    2014, trial did not commence until June 9, 2015; and (2) the State
    and trial court violated their duty, responsibility, and burden of
    bringing Appellant to trial within the time guaranteed by the Sixth
    Amendment.
    i. Argument
    The Sixth Amendment provides in part, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
    accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial.” U.S. Const. Amend. VI;
    Barker v. Wingo, 
    407 U.S. 514
    , 515 (1972). This right is made applicable to
    prosecutions in Texas by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
    Klopfer v. North Carolina, 
    386 U.S. 213
    , 223 (1967). If a violation of
    the speedy trial right is established, the only possible remedy is dismissal of the
    prosecution. Dragoo v. State, 
    96 S.W.3d 308
    , 313 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)
    (emphasis supplied).
    When faced with a speedy trial claim, courts must apply the four factors of
    the Barker balancing-test with “common sense and sensitivity to ensure that
    charges are dismissed only when the evidence shows that a defendant’s actual and
    asserted interest in a speedy trial has been infringed.” Cantu v. State, 
    253 S.W.3d 273
    , 281 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (en banc). The four factors of the
    Barker balancing-test are: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay;
    (3) the defendant’s assertion of the right; and (4) prejudice to the
    42
    defendant. 
    Barker, 407 U.S. at 530
    . While the State has the burden of justifying the
    length of delay, the defendant has the burden of proving the assertion of the right
    and showing prejudice. 
    Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 280
    . The defendant’s burden of
    proof on the two factors varies inversely with the State’s degree of
    culpability. 
    Id. The factors
    must be considered together along with other relevant
    circumstances and the court must engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing
    process in each case. 
    Id. at 281.
    There is a bifurcated review of a trial court’s ruling on a speedy trial claim:
    reviewing courts apply the abuse of discretion standard for facts, and the de novo
    standard for issues of law. 
    Id. at 282.
    Thus, this Court should independently
    weigh and balance the four Barker factors, but presumes the trial court resolved
    disputed fact issues in a manner that supports its ruling. Zamorano v. State, 
    84 S.W.3d 643
    , 648 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
    The State and the trial court had the burden of providing a speedy trial,
    particularly once Appellant demanded a speedy trial on July 22, 2014. See 
    Barker, 407 U.S. at 527
    (“A defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial; the State has
    that duty...”). “Affirmative proof of particularized prejudice is not essential to
    every speedy trial claim.” Doggett v. United States, 
    505 U.S. 647
    , 655 (1992).
    “Condoning prolonged and unjustifiable delays in prosecution would both penalize
    many defendants for the state’s fault and simply encourage the government to
    43
    gamble with the interests of criminal suspects assigned a low prosecutorial
    priority.” 
    Id. at 657.
    “[W]hen the presumption of prejudice, albeit unspecified, is
    neither extenuated, as by the defendant’s acquiescence, nor persuasively rebutted,
    the defendant is entitled to relief.” 
    Id. at 658
    (citations omitted). It seems highly
    unlikely that Appellant was tried as soon as was reasonably possible. The
    Government did not “move with the dispatch that [was] appropriate to assure him
    an early and proper disposition of the charges against him.” Cf. United States v.
    Marion, 
    404 U.S. 307
    , 313 (1971).
    Appellant did more than merely announce “ready” for trial: he asserted his
    right to a speedy trial. See Henson v. State, 
    407 S.W.3d 764
    , 769 (Tex. Crim. App.
    2013) (“[Defendant] claims that announcing ready was such a demand. However,
    this is not a demand for a speedy trial; instead, it merely asserts that he could go
    to trial at that moment should the State push for it. A speedy-trial demand should
    be, at the very least, unambiguous.”). And, Appellant’s assertion of his right to
    a speedy trial is entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining whether he has
    been deprived of his right. 
    Barker, 407 U.S. at 531-532
    . Failure to assert the right
    in a timely and persistent manner will make it difficult for a defendant to provide
    that he was denied a speedy trial. Id.at 529.
    Under the first Barker factor, the length of the delay, Appellant’s rights were
    clearly violated. Appellant was in jail for 32 months pending trial (October 24,
    44
    2012 until June 9, 2015), and nearly 11 months after asserting his right to a speedy
    trial (July 22, 2014 until June 9, 2015). (CR 32 and RR2). In United States v.
    MacDonald, 
    456 U.S. 1
    (1982), the Supreme Court made it clear that the primary
    purpose behind the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is not to prevent
    prejudice to the defense caused by the passage of time, but instead to minimize the
    possibility of lengthy incarceration prior to trial and to shorten the disruption of life
    caused by arrest and the presence of unresolved criminal charges. 
    Id. at 7-8.
    Here,
    32 months of total pretrial incarceration and nearly 11 months following the
    assertion of the right are clearly oppressive. Thus, the first Barker factor weighs
    heavily in favor of Appellant.
    Under the second Barker factor, the reason for the delay, the record is silent.
    When a court assesses this factor, different weights must be assigned to different
    reasons. For instance, a deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the
    defense should be weighted heavily against the government. 
    Barker, 407 U.S. at 531
    . On the other hand, a more “neutral” reason such as negligence or
    overcrowded courts should be weighted less heavily, and a valid reason, such as a
    missing witness, may justify an appropriate delay. 
    Id. Under the
    third Barker factor, Appellant’s assertion of the right, Appellant
    clearly asserted the right on July 22, 2014. (CR 32). Appellant then requested a
    priority trial setting on December 29, 2014, and trial was set for February 3, 2015,
    45
    but did not commence until June 9, 2015. (CR 33). The defendant’s assertion of his
    right to a speedy trial is entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining
    whether he has been deprived of his right. 
    Barker, 407 U.S. at 531
    -32. Thus, the
    third Barker factor weighs heavily in favor of Appellant.
    Under the fourth and final Barker factor, prejudice to Appellant, this Court
    should assess this factor in light of the interest a speedy trial is designed to
    protect. 
    Barker, 407 U.S. at 532
    . These interests are: (1) preventing oppressive
    pretrial incarceration; (2) minimizing anxiety and concern of the accused; and (3)
    limiting the possibility that the defense will be impaired. 
    Id. Of these
    three, the
    most serious is limiting the possibility that the defense will be impaired, because
    the inability of the defendant to prepare a defense skews the fairness of the
    criminal justice system. 
    Id. A defendant
    has the burden to make some showing of
    prejudice although a showing of actual prejudice is not required. State v. Munoz,
    
    991 S.W.2d 818
    , 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (en banc).
    With regards to this final factor, Appellant first notes that even if he had
    failed to raise the speedy trial claim in the trial court, this does not constitute a
    waiver. See Henson v. State, 
    407 S.W.3d 764
    , 768 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); see
    also McKinney v. State, 
    505 S.W.2d 536
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (When a speedy-
    trial complaint is raised for the first time on appeal, the issue is not waived, but
    constitutes only one factor to be considered in a Barker analysis.); Archie v. State,
    46
    
    511 S.W.2d 942
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (same); Easley v. State, 
    564 S.W.2d 742
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (same). Appellant raised the speedy trial claim in the trial
    court, but there was no hearing conducted to determine whether Appellant’s
    defense was impaired. Thus, the record is silent on this issue.
    In balancing the four Barker factors, factors one and three (the length of the
    delay and Appellant’s assertion of the right) weigh heavily in favor of Appellant.
    As for factors two and four (the reason for the delay and prejudice to Appellant),
    the reasons are not clear because the record is silent, so neither Appellant nor the
    State win on these factors.
    However, because the State and the trial court had the burden of providing a
    speedy trial, particularly once Appellant demanded a speedy trial on July 22, 2014,
    see 
    Barker, 407 U.S. at 527
    , and “[A]ffirmative proof of particularized prejudice is
    not essential to every speedy trial claim” under 
    Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655
    ,
    Appellant asks this Court to weigh the factors in his favor, especially considering
    that the “score” on the Barker factors is Appellant 2, State 0, with two “ties.”
    ii. Conclusion
    Appellant’s Sixth Amendment rights to a speedy trial were violated because:
    (1) the trial court denied Appellant the benefit of a speedy trial because although
    Appellant had been incarcerated since October 24, 2012 and he requested a speedy
    trial on July 22, 2014, trial did not commence until June 9, 2015; and (2) the State
    47
    and trial court violated their duty, responsibility, and burden of bringing Appellant
    to trial within the time guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. When considering the
    Barker factors, Appellant has established a violation of his right to a speedy trial,
    so Appellant asks this Court to reverse the Judgment and sentence, and dismiss the
    case with prejudice.
    48
    3. Issue Three: The trial court erred and caused harm to Appellant
    because in its instructions to the jury, it failed to comply with Texas
    Code of Criminal Procedure Article 36.14 and the Sixth Amendment
    by committing the following errors: (1) submission of the option of
    the “reckless” mental state; (2) submission of the options of the
    “intentional” or “knowing” mental states; (3) submission of the
    deadly weapon theory; (4) failure to submit lesser-included offense
    options; and (5) submitting a misleading theory and commenting on
    causation and result.
    As outlined below, the instructions submitted to the jury in the court’s
    charge were erroneous and harmful in several respects. Under Texas Code of
    Criminal Procedure Article 36.14, the trial court must set forth the applicable law
    in the form of a written charge that: (1) is neutral in tone; (2) does not sum up the
    testimony in any manner; (3) does not express any opinion as to the weight to be
    given the evidence in the case; (4) does not discuss any of the facts adduced in the
    case. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 36.14 (2015); see Ward v. State, 
    72 S.W.3d 413
    ,
    418-419 (Tex. App. Fort Worth 2002). The trial court erred with respect to Article
    36.14 and the Sixth Amendment in five different manners.
    i. Error in submission of the option of the “reckless” mental state
    The indictment accused Appellant of intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly
    causing bodily injury to another by “driving recklessly.” (CR 6). It did not allege
    what he was driving (e.g., construction equipment, vehicle, etc.) or how his
    conduct would constitute recklessness. The indictment thus did not comply with
    Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 21.15, which provides: “Whenever
    recklessness enters into or is a part or element of any offense, or it is charged that
    49
    the accused acted recklessly...in the commission of an offense, the...indictment in
    order to be sufficient in any such case must allege, with reasonable certainty, the
    act or acts relied upon to constitute recklessness..., and in no event shall it be
    sufficient to allege merely that the accused, in committing the offense, acted
    recklessly...” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 21.15 (2015). Thus, the trial court erred
    in submitting that theory of assault to the jury, as it was not supported by the
    essential pleading. The inclusion of “recklessly” as one of the culpable mental
    states in the indictment was surplusage when Article 21.15 is taken into account.
    There should be no “variance between the indictment and the jury instruction such
    that the instruction seemingly broadens the basis upon which the State can obtain a
    conviction.” Fisher v. State, 
    887 S.W.2d 49
    , 57 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
    Appellant points out two issues regarding this argument. First, this case did
    not involve use of “recklessly” in the jury charge as part of an unpled lesser-
    included offense or afterthought. This distinguishes the holdings in Johnson v.
    State, 
    364 S.W.3d 292
    , 298 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) and Ramos v. State, 
    407 S.W.3d 265
    , 272 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (Keller, P.J., dissenting) (there was no
    variance between pleading and proof because recklessness was not alleged in the
    murder indictment).
    Second, this complaint is not about the sufficiency of the indictment to
    invoke the jurisdiction of the court concerning a theory of recklessness because
    50
    such a complaint is barred by Studer v. State, 
    799 S.W.2d 263
    (Tex. Crim. App.
    1990). While Appellant challenges his conviction on the basis of a defective
    charging instrument, his claim is distinct from that alleged by Studer and is not
    about a “defect” as provided in the 1985 amendment to Art. 5, § 12 of the Texas
    Constitution. The problem here is not one of a lack of substance in the indictment
    under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 27.08. It arises because
    recklessness was not properly alleged due to the fact that recklessness can be
    alleged only in the manner mandated by Article 21.15. The problem is thus not a
    partial omission of an element for jurisdictional purposes, but rather that the
    indictment could not support or authorize a verdict or judgment based on reckless
    conduct because it fails to effectively allege recklessness as mandated by Article
    21.15.
    To allege recklessness, the indictment must state with reasonable certainty
    the act or acts relied upon to constitute what made the conduct reckless. 
    Id. The trial
    court cannot on its own cure such an omission in the State’s pleading by
    submitting language in the jury charge to the jury as it did here. When it does so,
    the verdict is void. See State v. Rodriguez, 
    339 S.W.3d 680
    , 684-685 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 2011) and Reed v. State, 
    117 S.W.3d 260
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (“when
    recklessness is left out of the indictment for the charged offense, and no lesser
    included offense is submitted to the jury...then Article 21.15 precludes the
    51
    inclusion of recklessness or criminal negligence in the jury instructions for the
    charged offense . . . we are saying that either the indictment should have accurately
    listed the applicable mental states or the charge should have limited the jury
    instructions to the mental states alleged in the indictment”); see also Wilson v.
    State, 
    625 S.W.2d 331
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
    Under Malik v. State, 
    953 S.W.2d 234
    , 239-240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997),
    issues pertaining to the sufficiency of the evidence are not measured by the jury
    charge actually given, but by the elements of the offense as defined by the
    hypothetically correct jury charge for the case, which is one that: (1) accurately
    sets out the law, (2) is authorized by the indictment, (3) does not unnecessarily
    increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of
    liability, and (4) adequately describes the particular offense for which the
    defendant was tried. In the case before this Court, the “reckless” theory submitted
    in the charge was not authorized by the indictment. Its inclusion created a tangible
    danger that the jury’s decision would become irrational because based on a law not
    properly part of the case. See Hollander v. State, 
    414 S.W.3d 746
    , 753 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 2013) (Where: (1) a jury was not told that it had to believe the evidence
    substantiating the presumption beyond a reasonable doubt before it could convict
    the defendant; (2) neither the balance of the jury charge nor the conduct of the
    parties served to correct the deficiency; and (3) the facts giving rise to the
    52
    presumption were hotly contested, the error in the jury charge both affected the
    basis of the case and deprived the defendant of a fair and impartial trial.). As was
    the case in Hollander, in the case before this Court, (1) the “reckless” theory
    submitted in the charge was not authorized by the indictment; (2) neither the
    balance of the jury charge nor the conduct of the parties served to correct the
    deficiency; and (3) the issue of whether Appellant acted recklessly was hotly
    contested, so the error in the jury charge both affected the basis of the case and
    deprived Appellant of a fair and impartial trial.
    Further, it is clear that there was a lesser likelihood “that a properly
    instructed jury would have found the predicate facts to the requisite level of
    confidence.” 
    Id. at 751.
    While it is not possible to know upon which of the three
    alternatives they were given the jurors actually cast their votes, plainly the
    evidence of an intentional or knowing mental state was weaker and those
    alternatives something more difficult for the State to prove than a reckless mental
    state (particularly on the facts of this case).
    Put another way, the decision of the petit jury must conform to the decision
    of the grand jury because otherwise the indictment process offers no protection or
    purpose. The judge and the petit jury must not effectively act as the grand jury.
    Indeed, they might be usurping the role of the prosecutor in choosing what specific
    crime to try, or the legal theories to be addressed during trial. See Stirone v. United
    53
    States, 
    361 U.S. 212
    , 218-19 (1960) (“The right to have the grand jury make the
    charge on its own judgment is a substantial right which cannot be taken away with
    or without court amendment. Here, ...we cannot know whether the grand jury
    would have included in its indictment a charge that commerce in steel from a
    nonexistent steel mill had been interfered with. Yet because of the court’s
    admission of evidence and under its charge this might have been the basis upon
    which the trial jury convicted petitioner. If so, he was convicted on a charge the
    grand jury never made against him. This was fatal error.”). Stirone was more
    recently discussed and reaffirmed in United States v. Miller, 
    471 U.S. 130
    , 138-39
    (1985). If Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 1.14(b) is interpreted to mean
    anything different, then it is unconstitutional not only under the Fourteenth
    Amendment, but also under Texas Constitution Article 1, §§ 10, 19, and 29.
    ii. Error in submission of the options of the “intentional” or
    “knowing” mental states
    The trial court also erred in permitting the State to use its chosen, narrowed
    description of Appellant’s conduct to support a finding that Appellant either
    intended to cause the bodily injury suffered by the CW or that Appellant’s manner
    of driving made it reasonably certain that such injury would occur. See Geick v.
    State, 
    349 S.W.3d 542
    , 548 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (The defendant’s conviction
    for theft by deception was overturned because the State unnecessarily pled that the
    theft was by deception but provided no proof of deception. Texas Penal Code §
    54
    31.03 did not force the State to make any choices, so the State used statutory
    definitions to allege a more narrow offense than was required.). Thus, the State
    should not be allowed to contradict its pleading by recharacterizing the nature of
    Appellant’s conduct or the culpability of Appellant’s mental state. Instead, the
    State should be limited by (or to proof of) the more restrictive, specific adjective it
    used in identifying the cause of the accusation.
    This charge error also goes to the very basis of the case, deprived Appellant
    of the valuable right to a fair jury charge under the Sixth Amendment, vitally
    affected Appellant’s principal defensive theory, and thus should result in reversal.
    See Almanza v. State, 
    686 S.W.2d 157
    , 172 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (op. on
    rehearing) (reviewing courts may reverse for error in the jury charge if: (1) the
    error, having been properly objected to at trial, is harmful and therefore “calculated
    to injure the rights of the defendant”; or (2) the error, even though not timely
    objected to, is so egregious and creates such harm that it deprives the accused of a
    “fair and impartial trial.”). It is axiomatic that due process does not permit one to
    be tried, convicted or sentenced for a crime with which he has not been charged or
    about which he has not been properly notified. Schmuck v. United States, 
    489 U.S. 705
    , 718-719 (1989); DeJonge v. Oregon, 
    299 U.S. 353
    , 362 (1937) (“Conviction
    upon a charge not made would be sheer denial of due process.”). While particular
    forms of driving a vehicle might be intended to cause (or are sufficiently aberrant
    55
    to involve near certainty in causing) a dangerous collision with other vehicles
    sharing the roadway, only reckless driving was alleged in this case. And driving
    recklessly is necessarily a lesser degree or likelihood of danger or harm.
    It makes no difference if some act of Appellant of a more dangerous type
    may have been shown by the evidence. Such evidence was not admissible or
    relevant to show anything other than recklessness. To be relevant, evidence must
    tend to prove a fact of consequence in determining the action, that is an element of
    the crime as pled. See Tex. Rule Evid. 401(b) (2015). While the definitions of
    “intentional,” “knowing,” and “reckless” may overlap, they are nevertheless
    distinct statutory alternatives regarding the culpable mental state element of
    Aggravated Assault. Proof of one does not allow conviction under another
    alternative that might have been chosen for inclusion in the indictment, but was
    not. Cada v. State, 
    334 S.W.3d 766
    , 773-774 (2011).
    In short, the reckless driving of a vehicle, though dangerous or risky in its
    own way, cannot by definition involve an intent to cause harm or knowledge that
    harm is reasonably certain to result. Proof of reckless driving does not support a
    finding of intent or recognition of reasonable certainty that bodily injury to another
    will occur.
    56
    iii. Error in submission of the deadly weapon theory
    Third, despite the indictment’s description of Appellant’s conduct as
    reckless driving, by its charge the court nevertheless permitted the jury to find that
    Appellant intended to use his vehicle in such a way as to cause serious bodily
    injury or death to the CW. When one is merely reckless with respect to natural,
    foreseeable results embodied in his conduct or acts, it cannot be said that he held a
    specific intent to cause a particular result. As explained in detail above,
    recklessness involves a disregard of a risk, and not a deliberate attempt to make the
    risk a reality. Thus, the court also erred in submitting any issue about Appellant’s
    intended (but unexecuted) manner of use of the vehicle. The definition of “deadly
    weapon” in the charge should instead have been limited to the capability of the
    vehicle to cause death or serious bodily injury in its manner of use, rather than
    encouraging jurors to speculate about any further or different use intended or
    contemplated by Appellant. After taking into account that no serious bodily injury
    occurred, the jury could have properly evaluated whether anything they heard
    about the actual use of the vehicle was sufficient to convert his vehicle into a
    deadly weapon. This charge error also goes to the very basis of the case, deprived
    Appellant of the valuable right to a fair jury charge under the Sixth Amendment,
    vitally affected Appellant’s principal defensive theory, and thus should result in
    reversal. See 
    Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 172
    .
    57
    iv. Error in failure to submit lesser-included offense options
    No serious bodily injury occurred in this case. “Serious bodily injury” means
    “bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes death, serious
    permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any
    bodily member or organ.” Tex. Pen. Code § 1.07(a)(46) (2012); Stuhler v. State,
    
    218 S.W.3d 706
    , 714 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (The risk of causing permanent
    impairment is determined based on injury “as it was inflicted, not after the effects
    had been ameliorated or exacerbated by other actors such as medical treatment.”).
    Thus, Appellant was entitled to have the jury consider whether he was guilty only
    of misdemeanor assault. Bridges v. State, 
    389 S.W.3d 508
    , 512-513 (Tex. App.
    Houston [14th Dist.] 2012) (The defendant was convicted of Aggravated Assault
    with a deadly weapon but was entitled to a jury instruction of the lesser-included
    offense of Assault by threat under Tex. Pen. Code § 22.01(a)(2) because the
    defendant contended that he did not have a knife during a physical altercation with
    his wife). Since the State did not charge an Assault by threat under Texas Penal
    Code § 22.01(a)(2), it was not entitled to base a conviction for Aggravated Assault
    on anything other than the more limited bodily injury that the CW suffered, with its
    strategy further troubled by the fact that the CW’s laying down of his motorcycle
    (and thus the nature of the injury he suffered) was caused by the CW’s chosen
    conduct. This was not a case where intent to cause a more serious injury might
    58
    logically have been inferred from the injury actually suffered by reason of the use
    of an instrument. Cf. Tucker v. State, 
    274 S.W.3d 688
    , 692 (Tex. Crim. App.
    2008).
    Regardless of the opinions of the witnesses who claimed that Appellant’s
    driving influenced the CW’s decision, it was still the CW who chose to create the
    risk and indeed, the virtual certainty of an injury associated with “laying down” his
    motorcycle rather than attempting to avoid a collision with Appellant’s vehicle in
    another way, such as simply braking or by keeping a proper lookout. There was no
    evidence that Appellant should be charged with constructive knowledge of, or the
    ability to perceive, that the CW would make the choice that he did. Cf. McKay v.
    State, ___ S.W.3d ___, No. PD-1133-14, 2015 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1171, *8
    (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 4, 2015) (“Although we assume that the jury resolved any
    conflicting inferences in favor of the prosecution, there was no such conflicting
    inference in this case at all”). The lack of wisdom in and necessity of the CW’s
    action militates against inferring recognition of this risk in Appellant’s mind. (RR3
    176).
    Even when this Court takes the lay opinions of the witnesses as true, and it
    may be assumed that Appellant stopped his vehicle too fast and too close to the
    CW and thus created the need for evasive action by the CW, because Appellant
    never caused his vehicle to collide with the motorcycle (or even close to it), it
    59
    cannot logically be said Appellant’s use of his vehicle was itself or alone capable
    of injuring the CW. There was no proof that the vehicle was capable of causing
    injury to the CW. Accordingly, the jury should have received the option of finding
    Appellant guilty of simple assault, and the trial court erred by refusing Appellant’s
    request. (RR3 231-232). The trial court clearly shared the prosecutor’s mistaken
    belief (which is clear when the prosecuted was permitted to include in his
    argument to the jury) that it was enough if Appellant’s conduct was “in the chain.”
    (RR4, 16).
    Further, “capable of” as used in the definition of a deadly weapon must
    mean “having the ability or qualities necessary for.” Appellant’s stopping or other
    maneuvering of his vehicle as he did was incapable causing the injury sustained by
    the CW, as it was contact between the CW’s body and the roadway that caused the
    injury. Near misses between two moving objects may constitute an assault, but
    only in the form of a threat. The State, in charging the offense as it did, chose to
    ignore whatever harm was threatened by Appellant’s conduct. The State therefore
    should not have been allowed to retrieve that theory to support its claim that
    Appellant’s vehicle constituted a deadly weapon. Thus, the State could not rely on
    the idea that “objects used to threaten deadly force are in fact deadly weapons.”
    See McCain v. State, 
    22 S.W.3d 497
    , 503 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (emphasis
    supplied). Instead, the State should have been “stuck” with the proof that, as used,
    60
    the vehicle “was not calculated to produce death or serious bodily injury.” See
    Mosley v. State, 
    545 S.W.2d 144
    , 146 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (evidence failed to
    show aggravating factor). In other words, under the indictment, it was immaterial
    that “[t]he placement of the word ‘capable’ in the provision enables the statute to
    cover conduct that threatens deadly force, even if the actor has no intention of
    actually using deadly force.” 
    McCain, 22 S.W.3d at 503
    .
    The CW’s injury was not caused by how Appellant used his vehicle. The
    evidence shows only that the CW laid down his motorcycle to avoid a collision
    with Appellant’s vehicle. This demonstrates that the operative factors of timing,
    distances, vectors, and speeds continued to actively protect the CW against that
    risk or danger. This also demonstrates that there was no use of a deadly weapon in
    what happened. The CW’s road rash injuries occurred for a different reason. Thus,
    this case illustrates the principle that although the conduct of a defendant may
    create a dangerous situation, and even if the situation threatened the harm that
    occurred, the harm may still ultimately be identified as occurring for other reasons.
    When this true, it is wrong to conclude that the defendant caused the harm.
    One of the prosecutors incorrectly argued that everyone could easily agree
    that a deadly weapon was used “here.” (RR4, 15, 19). The second prosecutor
    incorrectly argued that a vehicle was always capable of causing death or serious
    bodily injury. (RR4, 35) (“I’m not saying everybody uses a deadly weapon every
    61
    time they get in a car, but I am saying that we all exhibit one. We all know that is
    something that is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.”).
    Thus, it is thus little wonder that the jury found this incident involved a
    deadly weapon. Under the applicable definition of “deadly weapon,” the State’s
    evidence, however, failed to prove the use of the vehicle as a deadly weapon
    beyond a reasonable doubt. It was therefore incumbent on the trial court to provide
    the jury with the applicable law free of the State’s incorrect arguments about the
    existence of an aggravating element.
    The State plainly sought to prove Appellant used his vehicle to threaten
    serious bodily injury. (See RR2 54, 59). This claim may have been proper only if a
    conviction had been sought under Texas Penal Code § 22.01(a)(2). Even if
    Appellant braked suddenly and hard, the only thing this caused was a change in the
    speed of his vehicle and, to some unknown extent, the distance between his car and
    the CW’s motorcycle. The slowing of Appellant’s vehicle alone caused no injury
    to the CW. Whether Appellant’s intended a sudden, severe stop to increase or
    broaden the capability of his vehicle (so as to more clearly enable him to cause an
    injury to the CW through use of his vehicle) depended on the coalescence of a
    great many other factors that simply were not proved in this case to allow his
    vehicle to qualify as a deadly weapon.
    62
    At a minimum, Appellant was entitled to have the jury carefully consider the
    possibility that he was guilty only of assault rather than forcing them to accept the
    State’s improper arguments about the characterization of his vehicle. Because the
    trial court’s failure to submit the requested lesser-included-offense instruction “left
    the jury with the sole option either to convict the defendant of the greater offense
    or to acquit him,” a finding of harm is automatic. Saunders v. State, 
    913 S.W.2d 564
    , 571 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995); accord Robalin v. State, 
    224 S.W.3d 470
    , 477
    (Tex. App. Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.). And, “[T]he harm from denying a
    lesser offense instruction stems from the potential to place the jury in the dilemma
    of convicting for a greater offense in which the jury has reasonable doubt or
    releasing entirely from criminal liability a person the jury is convinced is a
    wrongdoer.” Masterson v. State, 
    155 S.W.3d 167
    , 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
    v. Error in submitting a misleading theory and comment on
    causation and result
    The jury charge essentially asked the jury to determine whether Appellant
    caused the CW “to crash his motorcycle.” This was not alleged in the indictment
    and thus was not authorized to be asked of the jury. But, more importantly, by
    incorrectly including this as an element of the offense, the trial court effectively
    linked the so-called motorcycle crash to Appellant even though the evidence
    showed the “crash” was exclusively the result of the CW’s decision to lay down
    his motorcycle. This part of the jury charge amounts to a comment by the trial
    63
    court on the weight of the evidence, implying that the CW’s decision was
    something foreseeable to Appellant and deflecting attention from the fact that the
    CW unexpectedly created the risk of any injury associated with sliding along the
    roadway. This error by the trial court reduced the State’s burden of proof by
    making Appellant responsible for the motorcycle crash and the resulting injury to
    the CW without sufficient proof of a causal connection. Inclusion of such a
    comment in the charge is improper.
    A trial court improperly comments on the weight of the evidence if it makes
    “a statement that implies approval of the State’s argument, that indicates any
    disbelief in the defense’s position, or that diminishes the credibility of the
    defense’s approach to its case.” Hoang v. State, 
    997 S.W.2d 678
    , 681 (Tex. App.
    Texarkana 1999, no pet.) (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted). For instance, an
    instruction that “a person’s mental state may be inferred from words spoken and
    acts done” is an impermissible comment on the weight of the evidence in violation
    of Article 36.14. Ward v. State, 
    72 S.W.3d 413
    , 418-419 (Tex. App. Fort Worth
    2002, no pet.). For a comment on the weight of the evidence to constitute
    reversible error, the trial court’s comment must be one that is reasonably calculated
    to benefit the state or prejudice the defendant. See Kincade v. State, 
    552 S.W.2d 832
    , 835 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977). A charge that “assumes the truth of a
    controverted issue” is an improper comment on the weight of the evidence. Whaley
    64
    v. State, 
    717 S.W.2d 26
    , 32 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Delapaz v. State, 
    228 S.W.3d 183
    , 212 (Tex. App. Dallas 2007, pet. ref.). “Article 36.14 does not authorize the
    judge to give instructions with regard to factual matters, but only as to the
    applicable law.” Daniell v. State, 
    848 S.W.2d 145
    , 147 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). A
    suggestion in a jury charge that certain evidence is true or untrue is a comment on
    the weight of the evidence. Russell v. State, 
    749 S.W.2d 77
    , 78 (Tex. Crim. App.
    1988). A court’s charge in a criminal case may not assume that any fact has been
    proved against the defendant, however strong the evidence may be. See Marlow v.
    State, 
    537 S.W.2d 8
    , 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976):
    [T]he trial court should never assume as true a fact based wholly upon
    the State’s testimonial, as opposed to physical, evidence. The jury is
    always entitled to doubt the credibility of any witness, and there are
    both statutory and constitutional inhibitions against any instruction of
    the trial court that tends to invade that province of the jury.
    
    Id. at 11.
    The jury charge must not “improperly focus the jury on the type of evidence
    that would support a finding” sought by the State. Kirsch v. State, 
    357 S.W.3d 645
    ,
    652 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). The court impermissibly guided the jury in their
    understanding of causation. 
    Id. “Jurors should
    not be required and expected, and
    they are not under our law, to put together pieces of what may appear to them to be
    a jigsaw puzzle to determine which elements must be proved in order to find that
    the defendant committed the offense which he was charged with committing.”
    65
    Doyle v. State, 
    631 S.W.2d 732
    , 737 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (emphasis in
    original).
    The error in this case was egregious because it treated the CW’s decision to
    incur road rash as something foreseeable to Appellant and muddled the
    requirement that Appellant must be found to have caused the bodily injury incurred
    by the CW rather than an amorphous “motorcycle crash.”                As a result, the
    comment on the weight of the evidence constitutes reversible error because it was
    reasonably calculated to benefit the State and prejudice Appellant.
    vi. Conclusion
    The trial court erred and caused harm to Appellant because in its instructions
    to the jury, it failed to comply with Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article
    36.14 and the Sixth Amendment by committing the following errors: (1)
    submission of the option of the “reckless” mental state; (2) submission of the
    options of the “intentional” or “knowing” mental states; (3) submission of the
    deadly weapon theory; (4) failure to submit lesser-included offense options; and
    (5) submitting a misleading theory and commenting on causation and result. As a
    result, Appellant asks this Court to reverse the Judgment and sentence and remand
    this case for a new trial.
    66
    4. Issue Four: By excusing five prospective jurors “for cause” because
    of alleged prior arrests, but without legal cause in fact as required by
    Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 35.16, the trial court
    erred and deprived Appellant of the right of a jury selected in under
    Article 35.16 and as required by the Sixth Amendment. A
    defendant’s substantial rights are violated when a trial court
    breaches the same procedural statute multiple times.
    i. Argument
    The Court granted challenges “for cause” made by the State to the
    qualifications of five prospective jurors and excused them from the jury panel.
    (RR2 184-186). The basis stated for the challenges was that the five jurors failed to
    truthfully answer a question posed to them about whether he or she had ever been
    arrested. (RR2 106-124, 183-184). The State argued that those jurors had not
    disclosed the arrests purportedly shown on their criminal histories (which the
    prosecutor had obtained before trial). The State sought to paint them as liars and
    unreliable. The criminal histories relied upon by the State are included (but sealed)
    in the appellate record. (Court Exhibit 1).
    The State made no effort to point out or question the prospective jurors
    about the discrepancy or even make it possible for defense counsel to do so.
    Defense counsel correctly argued that the court had no authority to grant the
    State’s requests on the basis asserted (that failure to disclose a prior arrest is not a
    basis for challenging for cause). (RR2 186); see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 35.16
    (2015) (stating the 14 reasons for dismissal of prospective jurors that are available
    to the State). The State failed to offer a valid reason for dismissal of the jurors, and
    67
    the trial court applied the wrong standard in sustaining the challenges. This was
    error. Jones v. State, 
    982 S.W.2d 386
    , 388 (1998).
    In Jones, the Court of Criminal Appeals reaffirmed the rule that to show
    error in the trial court’s grant of the State’s challenges for cause, a defendant “must
    demonstrate one of two things: (1) the trial judge applied the wrong legal standard
    in sustaining the challenge, or (2) the trial judge abused [his] discretion in applying
    the correct legal standard.” 
    Id. at 38
    9. A reviewing court must uphold the trial
    court’s decision if it was correct under any theory of law applicable to the case,
    even if the trial court gave an incorrect reason for its decision. Id.; citing Romero v.
    State, 
    800 S.W.2d 539
    , 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).             Further, the erroneous
    excusing of a veniremember will call for reversal only if the record shows that the
    error deprived the defendant of a lawfully constituted jury. Jones, 
    id. at 394.
    By granting the State’s challenge for cause of the five jurors for an invalid
    reason, the trial court effectively gave the State additional peremptory strikes
    (beyond the ten allowed by law), which excluded qualified jurors and, more
    importantly, altered the sequence and “strike zone” of the panel members by four
    persons (the fifth challenge for cause applied to a juror who would never have
    served anyway). This statement is made even though the Court of Criminal
    Appeals denied such rulings had the effect of adding peremptory strikes when it
    observed that raising a disqualification of a juror was not necessarily related to a
    68
    determination on a partisan basis that the juror was undesirable. Jones, 
    id. at 394.
    But, where the panel member is clearly not disqualified, the purpose of the
    objection has to be to deceive the trial court into removing from the panel someone
    whom the prosecutor does not desire to leave available for service on the jury
    selected (so that he does not have to use a peremptory strike or leave another
    undesirable on the jury). Here, five jurors were removed for an improper reason,
    not merely one.
    The Jones court also held that a “defendant’s only substantial right is that the
    jurors who do serve be qualified,” which is taken to mean that a “defendant’s rights
    go [only] to those who serve, not to those who are excused.” Jones, 
    id. at 393;
    see
    also Williams v. State, 
    417 S.W.3d 162
    , 174 (Tex. App. Houston [1st Dist.] 2013,
    pet. ref.) (“If the jurors who serve are qualified, then the jury is lawfully
    constituted, the defendant’s substantial rights are not affected, and reversal of the
    defendant’s conviction based on the erroneous granting of a challenge for cause is
    not required.”).
    But, a defendant has a substantial right have his case tried according to
    procedural rules established by law for selection of a jury. See Chappell v. State,
    
    850 S.W.2d 508
    , 512 (1993). And, “[I]n cases involving breach of many
    procedural statutes the record will contain no concrete data from which an
    appellate court can meaningfully gauge that the error did or did not contribute to
    69
    the conviction or punishment of the accused.” 
    Id. at 512;
    Roberts v. State, 
    784 S.W.2d 430
    , 435 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
    So the question becomes whether Appellant’s substantial rights were
    violated when the trial court breached the same procedural statute multiple times
    (five times in this case).   Appellant asks this Court to hold that Appellant’s
    substantial rights were indeed violated.
    A defendant has a right under the Sixth Amendment to an impartial tribunal:
    “In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have a speedy and public trial by an
    impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
    committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law.” U.S.
    Const. Amend. VI; see Duncan v. Louisiana, 
    391 U.S. 145
    , 149-150 (1968)
    (the Fourteenth Amendment makes the Sixth Amendment applicable to the states).
    A defendant is also entitled to a juror educated about and willing to follow the law
    and who does not go out of his way to favor one party over another.
    Abdygapparova v. State, 
    243 S.W.3d 191
    , 210 (Tex. App. San Antonio 2007, pet.
    ref.) (finding “a harm analysis is not warranted” because denial of the right to an
    impartial judge “is structural error”). Due process requires a neutral and detached
    judge. Brumit v. State, 
    206 S.W.3d 639
    , 645 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). A judge
    should not act as an advocate or adversary for any party. Dockstader v. State, 
    233 S.W.3d 98
    , 108 (Tex. App. Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. ref.). “[D]ue process
    70
    will not permit a judge to assume the role of a prosecutor.” Avilez v. State, 
    333 S.W.3d 661
    , 673 (Tex. App. Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. ref.). The trial court
    should always act as a neutral arbiter between the advocates. Brown v. State, 
    122 S.W.3d 794
    , 797 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); Johnson v. State, 
    452 S.W.3d 398
    , 405
    (Tex. App. Amarillo 2014, pet. ref.).
    Since those summoned as jurors are presumed to be qualified to serve, a
    defendant can never show that any of the twelve persons who actually serve on a
    jury could not lawfully do so. Where a prospective juror (although qualified) is
    excused without a valid reason, the most the defendant can show is that a different
    group of twelve persons would have constituted his jury and that the voting might
    have gone differently as a result. Excusing jurors without a legal reason also
    interferes with the implicit right of a defendant to have jurors chosen according to
    the order in which they are seated after a reshuffle. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art.
    35.11 (2015); see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 35.20 (2015). The advantage of
    requesting a reshuffle may be lost if someone’s position on the panel is again
    artificially altered. Allowing an improper challenge for cause could also easily
    allow for the exclusion of a juror in violation of Article 35.261, which prohibits the
    exclusion of persons from the jury on the basis of their race, but without the
    protective features of that statute.
    71
    Appellant was plainly entitled to have a different set jurors adjudicate his
    case and to have the State restricted to the legal number of strikes. He lost the
    benefit of the fact that “different jurors may have found a reasonable doubt as to
    [his] guilt.” Montez v. State, 824 S.W2d 308, 310 (Tex. App. San Antonio 1992, no
    pet.); see also Knight v. State, 
    839 S.W.2d 505
    , 511 (Tex. App. Beaumont 1992, no
    pet.). And, the State received something not allowed by law.
    ii. Conclusion
    By excusing five prospective jurors “for cause” because of alleged prior
    arrests, but without legal cause in fact as required by Texas Code of Criminal
    Procedure Article 35.16, the trial court erred and deprived Appellant of the right of
    a jury selected in under Article 35.16 and as required by the Sixth Amendment. A
    defendant’s substantial rights are violated when a trial court breaches the same
    procedural statute multiple times. As a result, Appellant asks this Court to reverse
    the Judgment and conviction and remand this case for a new trial.
    72
    5. Issue Five: The trial court committed reversible error and violated
    Appellant’s Sixth Amendment rights to confront a material witness
    by refusing to permit Appellant to show the exceptional bias or
    interest of the complaining witness and admit evidence that the
    complaining witness had a pending civil suit against Appellant
    arising out of the same incident.
    i. Argument
    It has long been established that the bias of a witness is a relevant issue at
    trial, and the Confrontation Clause gives a criminal defendant the right to explore
    potential biases of an accusing witness through cross-examination. Davis v. Alaska,
    
    415 U.S. 308
    , 316 (1974). Further, “[A] defendant is entitled to pursue all avenues
    of cross-examination reasonably calculated to expose a motive, bias, or interest for
    the witness to testify.” Carroll v. State, 
    916 S.W.2d 494
    , 497 (Tex. Crim. App.
    1996). And, “[T] he fact that a witness has brought a civil suit against the
    defendant growing out of the same incident is admissible as tending to show
    interest and bias.” Cox v. State, 
    523 S.W.2d 695
    , 700 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975). This
    is especially true when the witness against a defendant is the plaintiff against the
    same defendant in a pending civil suit (as opposed to the witness being a plaintiff
    against a third party). See, e.g., Hoyos v. State, 
    982 S.W.2d 419
    , 420-422 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 1998) (A defendant is not entitled to admit evidence of a witness’s
    civil suit against a third party where the defendant failed to demonstrate that
    the civil suit biased the complainant since the primary issue in the criminal trial
    73
    was the identity of the perpetrator, which was an issue of no consequence in
    the civil suit, and so the confrontation clause did not apply.).
    One of the reasons for the obvious bias of the CW is clear: a prior conviction
    may work a collateral estoppel in a subsequent proceeding if the identical issues
    for which estoppel is sought were litigated and directly determined in the prior
    criminal proceeding. McCormick v. Texas Commerce Bank, 
    751 S.W.2d 887
    , 889
    (Tex. App. Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, writ denied). When an “issue ... was
    litigated and critical to the prior criminal conviction, [the convicted party] ‘is
    estopped from attacking the judgment or any issue necessarily decided by the
    guilty verdict.’” Francis v. Marshall, 
    841 S.W.2d 51
    , 54 (Tex. App. Houston [14th
    Dist.] 1992, no writ). Thus, a criminal defendant may be simultaneously found
    guilty of both a criminal and civil wrong and cannot litigate the issue of his guilt
    again in a civil action, since a fully litigated issue should not be retried. Dover v.
    Baker, Brown, Sharman & Parker, 
    859 S.W.2d 441
    , 447 (Tex. App. Houston [1st
    Dist.] 1993, no writ). This principle is particularly true here because except for the
    lesser burden of proof, the civil cause of action for assault is identical to a criminal
    prosecution for the same conduct. See Waffle House, Inc. v. Williams, 
    313 S.W.3d 796
    , 801 n.4 (Tex. 2010) (noting several courts’ observation that the elements of
    civil and criminal assault are the same); Forbes v. Lanzl, 
    9 S.W.3d 895
    , 900 (Tex.
    App. Austin 2000, pet. denied) (noting that elements of assault are the same in both
    74
    civil and criminal cases); Hogenson v. Williams, 
    542 S.W.2d 456
    , 458 (Tex. Civ.
    App. Texarkana 1976, no writ) (same); see also Comm. on Pattern Jury Charges,
    Texas Pattern Jury Charges—General Negligence § 6.6 (State Bar of Texas 2006)
    (using Penal Code’s definition of assault in civil cases).
    Appellant sought to offer proof that the CW was exceptionally biased and
    that his testimony should accordingly be even more carefully scrutinized for
    exaggeration or shading by the jury. (RR3 48-51). Appellant wanted to inform the
    jury that, based on a favorable finding of fact by them here, the CW was hoping to
    improve his position in a separate civil suit he had pending against Appellant for
    recovery of money damages as compensation for the personal injuries and damage
    to his motorcycle suffered as a result of the alleged assault.
    The State objected to Appellant’s offer of proof and the trial court denied
    Appellant the right to question the CW about this bias. (RR3 50-51). Appellant was
    deprived of his due-process right to cross-examine a material witness offering
    testimony against him (a witness rarely is more “material” than the complaining
    witness). Despite the State’s objections, “[t]he fact that a witness has brought a
    civil suit against the defendant growing out of the same incident is admissible as
    tending to show interest and bias.” Cox v. State, 
    523 S.W.2d 695
    , 700 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 1975). Appellant had the right for the jury to understand the CW’s motives
    75
    and desires fully and completely before it could be fair and accurate in judging his
    ability to recall the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
    While a trial court has discretion to limit cross-examination, it is
    constitutional error to limit excessively a defendant’s cross-examination of a
    witness regarding the credibility of the witness especially cross-examination
    concerning the witness’s bias, prejudice, or motive for testifying. See Olden v.
    Kentucky, 
    488 U.S. 227
    , 231 (1988). The Sixth Amendment right to confront
    witnesses “includes the right to cross-examine witnesses to attack their general
    credibility or to show their possible bias, self-interest, or motives in testifying.”
    Hammer v. State, 
    296 S.W.3d 555
    , 561 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). And, the Texas
    Rules of Evidence permit a defendant to “cross-examine a witness for his
    purported bias, interest, and motive without undue limitation or arbitrary
    prohibition.” 
    Id. at 563;
    see also Tex. Rule Evid. 613(b) (2015) (providing for
    impeachment of witness by evidence of alleged bias or interest in favor or against
    party); Billodeau v. State, 
    277 S.W.3d 34
    , 42-43 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). (“The
    possible animus, motive, or ill will of a prosecution witness who testified against
    the defendant is never a collateral or irrelevant inquiry, and the defendant is
    entitled, subject to reasonable restrictions, to show any relevant fact that might
    tend to establish ill feeling, bias, motive, interest, or animus on the part of any
    witness testifying against him.”); Carpenter v. State, 
    979 S.W.2d 633
    , 634 (Tex.
    76
    Crim. App. 1998) (“Exposing a witness’s motivation to testify for or against the
    accused or the State is a proper and important purpose of cross-examination.”) The
    scope of permissible cross-examination is “necessarily broad.” 
    Carroll, 916 S.W.2d at 497
    . “A defendant is entitled to pursue all avenues of cross-examination
    reasonably calculated to expose a motive, bias, or interest for the witness to
    testify.” 
    Id. The State
    appears to have argued that because it sought to prove that
    Appellant intentionally created the danger that led to the CW’s decision to lay
    down his motorcycle, Appellant might actually be harming the CW by giving
    Appellant’s insurer a basis on which to deny coverage or protection of Appellant
    against the CW’s claim. Particularly because the State did not offer to restrict the
    State’s claim of criminal liability against Appellant exclusively to an intentional
    culpable mental state, there was no merit to the State’s argument that the verdict in
    the criminal case would have no effect on the outcome of the civil case (even
    assuming Appellant had insurance and that it afforded no protection for claims
    based on intentional harm to another).
    It is clear that the trial court’s exclusion of this evidence contributed to the
    jury’s conclusion that Appellant caused the CW to injure himself. Thus, the error
    calls for reversal of the judgment. See Tex. Rule App. Proc. 44.2(a) (2015). The
    jury was strongly influenced by the CW’s testimony concerning his opinions about
    77
    whether Appellant used his vehicle as a deadly weapon and acted with intent to
    harm the CW, but did not hear about the CW’s financial motives for testifying as
    he did. (RR3 25, 31).
    ii. Conclusion
    The trial court committed reversible error and violated Appellant’s Sixth
    Amendment rights to confront a material witness by refusing to permit Appellant
    to show the exceptional bias or interest of the complaining witness and admit
    evidence that the complaining witness had a pending civil suit against Appellant
    arising out of the same incident. Appellant asks this Court to reverse the Judgment
    and sentence and remand this case for a new trial.
    78
    X.    Conclusion and Prayer
    For the above reasons, Appellant prays that as argued in Issue One, this
    Court reverse the Judgment and sentence and enter a judgment of acquittal. As to
    Issue Two, Appellant prays that this Court reverse the Judgment and sentence and
    dismiss the indictment with prejudice.     As to Issues Three, Four, and Five,
    Appellant prays that this Court reverse the Judgment and sentence and remand the
    case for a new trial.
    Respectfully submitted,
    Michael Mowla
    P.O. Box 868
    Cedar Hill, TX 75106
    Phone: 972-795-2401
    Fax: 972-692-6636
    michael@mowlalaw.com
    Texas Bar No. 24048680
    Attorney for Appellant
    /s/ Michael Mowla
    Michael Mowla
    79
    XI.   Certificate of Service
    I certify that on December 30, 2015, a true and correct copy of this
    document was served on Abel Reyna and Sterling Harmon of the District
    Attorney’s Office, McLennan County, by email to abel.reyna@co.mclennan.tx.us
    and sterling.harmon@co.mclennan.tx.us. See Tex. Rule App. Proc. 9.5 (2015).
    /s/ Michael Mowla
    Michael Mowla
    XII. Certificate of Compliance with Tex. Rule App. Proc. 9.4
    This certifies that this document complies with the type-volume limitations
    because it is computer-generated and does not exceed 15,000 words. Using the
    word-count feature of Microsoft Word, the undersigned certifies that this document
    contains 14,950 words in the entire document except in the following sections:
    caption, identity of parties and counsel, statement regarding oral argument, table of
    contents, index of authorities, statement of the case, statement of issues presented,
    statement of jurisdiction, statement of procedural history, signature, proof of
    service, certification, certificate of compliance, and appendix. This document also
    complies with the typeface requirements because it has been prepared in a
    proportionally-spaced typeface using Microsoft Word in 14-point font. See Tex.
    Rule App. Proc. 9.4 (2015).
    /s/ Michael Mowla
    Michael Mowla
    80