Wright, Sir Melvin Jr. ( 2015 )


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  •                                                                                        PD-1137-15
    COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
    AUSTIN, TEXAS
    Transmitted 10/5/2015 2:19:56 PM
    Accepted 10/7/2015 2:38:31 PM
    ABEL ACOSTA
    NO. PD-1137-15                                                 CLERK
    IN THE
    COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
    OF TEXAS
    AT AUSTIN
    _________________________
    SIR MELVIN WRIGHT, JR.,
    Appellant
    v.
    October 7, 2015
    THE STATE OF TEXAS,
    Appellee
    _________________________
    On appeal in Cause No. F11-72119-T
    from the 283rd Judicial District Court
    Of Dallas County, Texas
    And on Petition for Discretionary Review from
    the Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
    In Cause No. 05-14-00641-CR
    _________________________
    APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
    _________________________
    Counsel of Record:
    Lynn Richardson                    Nanette Hendrickson
    Chief Public Defender              Assistant Public Defender
    Dallas County Public Defender’s Office
    Katherine A. Drew                  State Bar Number: 24081423
    Chief, Appellate Division          133 N. Riverfront Blvd., LB 2
    Dallas, Texas 75207-399
    (214) 653-3550 (telephone)
    (214) 653-3539 (fax)
    ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONER/APPELLANT
    LIST OF PARTIES
    TRIAL COURT JUDGE
    Rick R. Magnis – 283rd Judicial District Court
    APPELLANT
    Sir Melvin Wright
    APPELLANT’S ATTORNEYS
    AT TRIAL
    Mark L. Watson, State Bar No. 20954800
    5646 Milton St., Ste. 330
    Dallas, TX 75206
    ON REVOCATION
    Stephen Duplantis, State Bar No. 24052192
    Public Defender’s Office
    Frank Crowley Courts Building
    133 N. Riverfront Blvd.
    Dallas, TX 75207
    ON REVOCATION
    Adolpho Lopez, State Bar No. 24070169
    1231 E. Missouri Ave.
    El Paso, TX 79902
    ON APPEAL
    Nanette R. Hendrickson, State Bar No. 24081423
    Assistant Public Defender
    Dallas County Public Defender’s Office
    Frank Crowley Courts Building
    133 N. Riverfront Blvd., LB 2
    Dallas, Texas 75207-4399
    STATE’S ATTORNEYS
    AT TRIAL
    Rachel Burris, State Bar No. 24030870
    Mark Scott, State Bar No. 24067109
    Chris Pryor, State Bar No. 24046661
    Assistant District Attorneys
    ii
    ON APPEAL
    Shelley O’Brien Yeatts, State Bar No. 24033487
    Assistant District Attorney
    Dallas County District Attorney’s Office
    Frank Crowley Courts Building
    133 N. Riverfront Blvd., LB-19
    Dallas, Texas 75207-4399
    iii
    TABLE OF CONTENTS
    LIST OF PARTIES ................................................................................................... ii
    INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ..................................................................................... v
    STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT ............................................... 1
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................................. 1
    STATEMENT OF THE PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE CASE .................... 2
    STATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................................................................ 2
    GROUND FOR REVIEW ......................................................................................... 2
    Whether the Court of Appeals incorrectly applied the habeas
    harmless error analysis in Ex parte Parrott and Ex parte Rich to
    Appellant’s case on direct appeal.
    ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................. 3
    PRAYER FOR RELIEF ..........................................................................................10
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................10
    CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE .......................................................................11
    iv
    INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
    Cases
    Bullard v. State,
    
    5483 S.W.2d 13
    (Tex. Cr. App. 1977) ..............................................................6
    Ex parte Parrott,
    
    396 S.W.3d 531
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) ................................................. 3, 5, 6
    Ex parte Rich,
    
    194 S.W.3d 508
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) ............................................. 3, 4, 5, 6
    Ex parte Tovar,
    
    901 S.W.2d 484
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) ..........................................................5
    Jackson v. State,
    
    680 S.W.2d 809
    (Tex. Cr. App. 1984) ..............................................................6
    Levy v. State,
    
    818 S.W.2d 801
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) ............................................... 6, 7, 10
    Wright v. State,
    No. 05-14-00641-CR, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 8161 (Tex. App.—Dallas
    August 4, 2015) .............................................................................................2, 6
    Statutes
    TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. 62.102(c) .......................................................................8
    TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ART. 62.102(b)(1) ..........................................................9
    TEX. PEN. CODE § 12.35(a) ...............................................................................8, 9
    TEX. PEN. CODE § 21.11 (a)(1)..............................................................................8
    TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC art. 62.102(a) ...................................................................7
    TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 44.29(b) ....................................................................6
    TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 62.101(a) ..................................................................7
    TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 62.101(c)(1) .........................................................8, 9
    TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 62.102(b) ..................................................................7
    Rules
    TEX. R. APP. P. 68.4(i) ..........................................................................................2
    v
    TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS:
    Sir Melvin Wright, Jr., Appellant, respectfully presents to this Honorable
    Court his Petition for Discretionary Review of the Fifth District Court of
    Appeals’ Opinion affirming the trial court’s judgment.
    STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
    Appellant requests oral argument because this case presents a question of
    law on issues having statewide impact and possible reoccurrence. Oral
    argument may be helpful to the members of this Court in the resolution of the
    issues presented.
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE
    Appellant was indicted and pled guilty to the charge of failure to
    register as a sex offender enhanced in the 283rd Criminal District Court in
    Dallas County, Texas. (RR2: 6; CR: 11). On September 24, 2012, the trial
    court sentenced Appellant to ten years to serve, but suspended the sentence.
    (RR2: 17). The trial court placed Appellant on five years’ community
    supervision and assessed a fine of $500.00. (RR2: 17). On November 7,
    2013, after a hearing on the State’s motion to revoke, the trial court denied
    the State’s motion to revoke, but modified Appellant’s probation rules to
    include seven days in the county jail. (RR3: 9-10). On May 16, 2014, after a
    1
    hearing on the State’s motion to revoke, the trial court sustained the motion
    and sentenced Appellant to five years’ incarceration. (RR4: 22; CR: 70).
    STATEMENT OF THE PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE CASE
    On August 4, 2015, in an unpublished opinion authored by Justice
    Brown, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas affirmed the trial
    court’s judgment. Wright v. State, No. 05-14-00641-CR, 2015 Tex. App.
    LEXIS 8161, *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas August 4, 2015). This Court granted
    an extension of time to file a Petition for Discretionary Review, which is
    timely if filed on or before October 5, 2015.
    STATEMENT OF FACTS
    The facts of this case, which are extensive, are adequately recited in
    the Court of Appeals’ opinion, which is attached to this Petition as required
    by TEX. R. APP. P. 68.4(i).
    Suffice it to say that Appellant was charged with and convicted of
    failure to register as a sex offender. (CR: 11; RR2: 6).
    GROUND FOR REVIEW
    Whether the Court of Appeals incorrectly applied the habeas harmless
    error analysis in Ex parte Parrott and Ex parte Rich to Appellant’s case on
    direct appeal.
    2
    ARGUMENT
    The Court of Appeals incorrectly applied the habeas harmless error
    analysis set out by this Court in Ex parte Rich and Ex parte Parrott to
    Appellant’s case on direct appeal. Ex parte Rich, 
    194 S.W.3d 508
    (Tex. Crim.
    App. 1973); Ex parte Parrott, 396, S.W.3d 531, 537-38 (Tex. Crim. App.
    2013).
    FACTS
    Appellant was indicted on the charge of failure to register as a sex
    offender. (CR: 11). On September 24, 2012, Appellant pled guilty to the
    pending indictment. (RR2: 6). The trial court informed Appellant as to the
    applicable range of punishment: “You’re charged with failure to register as a
    sex offender. That’s a third degree felony and carries a punishment range of
    two to ten years in the penitentiary and optional fine not to exceed $10,000.”
    (RR2: 5). After testifying in mitigation, Appellant was sentenced by the trial
    court that same day to ten years, suspended and five years community
    supervision. (RR2: 11-12).
    The State filed a motion to revoke on July 11, 2013. (CR: 34).
    Appellant entered a plea of true to the motion. (RR3: 5). The trial court
    admitted Appellant’s written plea of true and stipulation of evidence as
    State’s exhibit number one. (RR3: 6). The trial court, however, denied the
    3
    State’s motion and modified Appellant’s probation to include seven days to
    serve in the Dallas County Jail. (RR4: 9; CR: 51).
    The State filed a final motion to revoke on March 12, 2014. (CR: 53-
    54). Appellant entered a plea of true to the motion. (RR4: 5-6). The State
    entered Appellant’s written plea of true and stipulation of evidence as State’s
    exhibit number one. (RR5: 6). Appellant testified in mitigation that he had
    completed his ten year registration requirement. (RR4: 11-13; Defendant’s
    Exhibit 1). The trial court granted the motion to revoke and sentenced
    Appellant to five years’ incarceration. (RR4: 22).
    THE COURT OF APPEALS’ HOLDING IS INCORRECT
    The Court of Appeals’ decision is in conflict with the holding of this
    Court. This Court held in Ex parte Rich that an illegal sentence “may be
    cognizable on a writ of habeas corpus.” Ex parte Rich, 
    194 S.W.3d 508
    , 511
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). In determining if a sentence was “actually illegal,” this
    Court distinguished between a clerical error in a judgment which can be
    corrected by a nunc pro tunc order and an error that “resulted from judicial
    reasoning or determination.” 
    Id. at 512.
    Ultimately, this Court ruled that where
    the record on appeal did not reveal the illegality in the defendant’s sentence, he
    could challenge the illegality by applying for a writ of habeas corpus. 
    Id. 4 In
    Ex parte Parrott, this Court held that in order to receive habeas relief
    due to an illegal sentence, an applicant must show harm. Ex parte Parrott, 396,
    S.W.3d 531, 537-38 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). “[A] post-conviction habeas
    corpus application must allege facts which show both a cognizable irregularity
    and harm.” 
    Id. at 534,
    quoting Ex parte Tovar, 
    901 S.W.2d 484
    , 486 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 1995). Proof of harm in a habeas case may be developed with new
    evidence beyond the appellate record. 
    Id. This “affords
    the habeas judge, and
    ultimately this Court, an opportunity to evaluate that evidence.” 
    Id. at 535.
    Furthermore, this Court then interpreted Ex parte Rich to include a
    harmless error analysis applicable in habeas cases alleging an illegal sentence.
    
    Id. at 536.
    More specifically, a habeas court must determine “whether Rich had
    other prior convictions that the State could have properly used to enhance his
    sentence or, stated differently, whether Rich was actually harmed by the
    erroneous enhancement.” 
    Id. According to
    Ex parte Parrott, the harmless error
    analysis stated in Ex parte Rich is as follows:
    (1) An applicant is harmed by an illegal sentence when the
    appellate and habeas records show that he has no other
    conviction that could support the punishment range within
    which he was sentenced; and
    (2) An applicant is not harmed by an illegal sentence when the
    appellate and habeas records show that there was another
    conviction that could properly support the punishment range
    within which he was sentenced.
    5
    
    Id. (emphasis added).
    In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals’ opinion incorrectly applied the
    harmless error analysis in Ex parte Rich to Appellant’s case on direct appeal.
    The Court of Appeals’ analysis was as follows:
    …appellant must show the sentence assessed was “actually
    illegal.” See Ex parte Rich, 
    194 S.W.3d 508
    , 511 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 2006). And appellant’s sentence was only actually illegal
    if the conviction was unavailable for enhancement. Cf. Ex parte
    Parrott, 396, S.W.3d 531, 537-38 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
    Wright, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 8161, at *3-4.
    This Court held the harm analysis in Ex parte Rich and Ex parte Parrott
    applicable specifically to habeas cases because the law requires proof of harm
    when habeas relief is sought. However, in the case at bar, Appellant is not
    seeking habeas relief, but is on direct appeal. Therefore, the Court of Appeals
    incorrectly applied a habeas standard to Appellant’s case on direct appeal.
    Instead, the Court of Appeals should have determined if there was error, and if
    so, applied the standard found in Levy v. State as follows:
    when an appellate court finds error at the punishment stage of
    the trial, the case may be remanded to the trial court for the
    proper assessment of punishment. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art.
    44.29(b); Bullard v. State, 
    5483 S.W.2d 13
    , 18 (Tex. Cr. App.
    1977); Jackson v. State, 
    680 S.W.2d 809
    , 814 (Tex. Cr. App.
    1984). In cases where a defendant enters a plea of guilty or nolo
    contendere without the benefit of a plea bargain agreement with
    the State and the trial judge assesses a punishment not
    authorized by law, the appropriate remedy is to allow the
    6
    finding of guilt to remain and to remand the case to the trial
    court for the proper assessment of punishment.
    Levy v. State, 
    818 S.W.2d 801
    , 803 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
    The Court of Appeals should have found error in Appellant’s case.
    Article 62.102 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides the
    following:
    (a) A person commits an offense if the person is required to
    register and fails to comply with any requirement of this
    chapter.
    (b) An offense under this article is:
    (1) A state jail felony if the actor is a person whose duty to
    register expires under Article 62.101(b) or (c);
    (2) a felony of the third degree if the actor is a person whose
    duty to register expires under Article 26.101(a) and who is
    required to verify registration once each year under Article
    62.058;
    (c) If it is shown at the trial of a person for an offense or an attempt
    to commit an offense under this article that the person has
    previously been convicted of an offense or an attempt to
    commit an offense under this article, the punishment for the
    offense or the attempt to commit the offense is increased to the
    punishment for the next highest degree of felony.
    Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 62.102(a), (b). Article 62.101(a), applies to those
    who are not adjudicated of delinquent conduct and mandates registration for
    life. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 62.101(a) (emphasis added). Offenders not
    subject to Texas Code of Procedure Article 62.101(a) are subject to Article
    62.101(b) or (c). Anyone who is adjudicated of delinquent conduct must
    register for ten years from the date on which “the disposition is made or the
    7
    person completes the terms of the disposition, whichever date is later.” Tex.
    Code Crim. Proc. art. 62.101(c)(1). Any offense under Article 62.101(c) is
    punished as a state jail felony pursuant to Article 62.102(b)(1) unless the
    punishment is increased pursuant to Article 62.102(c). A state jail felony is
    punishable by no more than two years or less than 180 days. Tex. Pen. Code
    § 12.35(a).
    Punishment for an offense under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure
    article 62.102 may be enhanced in some circumstances. Tex. Code Crim.
    Proc. 62.102(c). If it is shown at the trial of an offense that an offender was
    previously convicted of an offense under article 62.102, the current offense
    is then “increased to the punishment for the next highest degree of felony.”
    
    Id. According to
    the indictment, Appellant was adjudicated of delinquent
    conduct, specifically, indecency with a child by contact pursuant to Texas
    Penal Code § 21.11(a)(1) and required to register for ten years. TEX. PEN.
    CODE § 21.11 (a)(1); (CR: 11). Appellant judicially confessed to the same
    facts as stated in the indictment. (CR: 22). Since Appellant was adjudicated
    of delinquent conduct, Appellant’s case was subject to Article 62.101(c)
    which addresses those adjudicated of delinquent conduct. TEX. CODE CRIM.
    PROC.    ART.   62.101(c)(1). According to the Texas Code of Criminal
    8
    Procedure, offenders subject to article 62.101(c) must register for ten years
    and failure to do so is a state jail felony. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.         ART.
    62.102(b)(1). A state jail felony is punishable by no more than two years or
    less than 180 days. TEX. PEN. CODE § 12.35(a). Therefore, the range of
    punishment in Appellant’s case should have been a minimum of 180 days up
    to a maximum of two years.
    Appellant entered a plea of guilty to the original charge, but the record
    does not reflect a plea to any enhancement paragraphs, nor did the trial court
    give Appellant notice of any enhancement paragraphs. (RR2: 6, passim).
    Furthermore, Appellant did not judicially confess to a conviction of any
    prior offense under article 62.102. (RR2: passim; CR: 22). At no time during
    Appellant’s plea did the State prove Appellant had a final conviction of a
    previous offense under Article 62.102. (RR2: passim). Therefore,
    Appellant’s case could not have been enhanced according to Article 62.102
    (c).
    As such, the charge in Appellant’s case was a state jail felony and he
    should not have received a sentence above two years during his original
    sentencing. Consequently, Appellant’s sentence of ten years, suspended with
    five years community supervision was illegal as was his final sentence at his
    revocation hearing of five years’ incarceration. Therefore, the Court of
    9
    Appeals should have found error in Appellant’s case and remanded it back
    to the trial court for a new punishment hearing pursuant to Levy v. State.
    
    Levy, 818 S.W.2d at 803
    .
    CONCLUSION
    The Court of Appeals’ decision to affirm the trial court’s illegal
    sentencing of Appellant is contradictory to the rulings of this Court. This Court
    should grant discretionary review to resolve this discrepancy between the Court
    of Appeal’s ruling and the ruling of this Court.
    PRAYER FOR RELIEF
    For the reasons herein alleged, Appellant prays this Court grant this
    petition and, upon reviewing the judgment entered below, remand the case for a
    new punishment hearing.
    Respectfully submitted,
    Lynn Richardson
    Chief Public Defender
    /s/ Nanette Hendrickson
    Nanette Hendrickson
    Assistant Public Defender
    State Bar No. 24081423
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
    I hereby certify that on the 5th day of October, 2015, a true copy of the
    foregoing petition for discretionary review was served on Lori Ordiway,
    Assistant District Attorney, Dallas County Criminal District Attorney’s Office,
    133 N. Riverfront Blvd., LB-19, 10th Floor, Dallas, Texas, 75207, by electronic
    and hand delivery; and was also served on, Lisa C. McMinn, State Prosecuting
    10
    Attorney, P.O. Box 13046, Austin, Texas, 78711 by electronic delivery and by
    depositing same in the United States Mail, Postage Prepaid.
    /s/ Nanette Hendrickson
    Nanette Hendrickson
    CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
    I certify that the foregoing Petition for Discretionary Review contains
    2,801 words.
    /s/ Nanette Hendrickson
    Nanette Hendrickson
    11
    User Name: nanette hendrickson
    Date and Time: Oct 05, 2015      1:42 p.m. EDT
    Job Number: 24600858
    Document(1)
    1.   Wright v. State, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 8161
    Client/Matter: -None-
    | About LexisNexis | Privacy Policy | Terms & Conditions | Copyright © 2015 | LexisNexis.
    nanette hendrickson
    No Shepard’s Signal™
    As of: October 5, 2015 1:42 PM EDT
    Wright v. State
    Court of Appeals of Texas, Fifth District, Dallas
    August 4, 2015, Opinion Filed
    No. 05-14-00641-CR
    Reporter
    2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 8161
    SIR MELVIN WRIGHT, JR., Appellant v. THE STATE OF                   LexisNexis® Headnotes
    TEXAS, Appellee
    Criminal Law & Procedure > Criminal Offenses > Classification
    Notice: PLEASE CONSULT THE TEXAS RULES OF                              of Offenses > Felonies
    APPELLATE PROCEDURE FOR CITATION OF
    Criminal Law & Procedure > Sentencing > Ranges
    UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS.
    Criminal Law & Procedure > Postconviction Proceedings > Sex
    Prior History: [*1] On Appeal from the 283rd Judicial                  Offenders > Registration
    District Court, Dallas County, Texas. Trial Court Cause No.            Family Law > Delinquency & Dependency > Delinquency
    F-1172119-T.                                                           Proceedings
    HN1 If a person is required to register as a sex offender
    Core Terms                                                          based on an adjudication of delinquency, and fails to comply
    with the registration requirements, the offense is a state jail
    sentence, prior conviction, fail to register, enhanced, parte,      felony. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.102. If a person
    sex offender, trial court, indictment, asserts, felony, revoke      has a prior conviction for failure to register, the punishment
    range is increased to a third-degree felony. Art. 62.102.
    Case Summary
    Criminal Law & Procedure > Sentencing > Appeals >
    Appealability
    Overview
    Criminal Law & Procedure > Sentencing > Corrections,
    Modifications & Reductions > Illegal Sentences
    HOLDINGS: [1]-Although defendant, who pleaded guilty
    Criminal Law & Procedure > Sentencing > Ranges
    to the offense of failure to register as a sex offender, asserted
    his sentence was illegal because of the State’s failure to             Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Probation > Revocation >
    provide him with notice that it was seeking an enhanced                General Overview
    punishment range and its failure to provide evidence of a              Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Reviewability > General
    prior conviction, defendant failed to show his sentence was            Overview
    illegal; [2]-Defendant’s sentence was only actually illegal if
    the conviction was unavailable for enhancement;                     HN2 Generally, an appeal from an order revoking probation
    is limited to the propriety of the revocation and does not
    [3]-Although defendant asserted his guilty plea was
    include a review of the original conviction. However, a
    involuntary because he was improperly admonished as to
    sentence outside the range of punishment is void and may
    the range of punishment, defendant could not raise a
    be challenged at any time.
    complaint regarding the involuntariness of his original plea
    in an appeal from the revocation of his probation.
    Criminal Law & Procedure > Sentencing > Corrections,
    Modifications & Reductions > Illegal Sentences
    Outcome
    HN3 A defendant who contends he received an illegal
    Judgment affirmed.                                                  sentence must show the sentenced assessed was actually
    illegal.
    nanette hendrickson
    Page 2 of 3
    2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 8161, *1
    Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Entry of Pleas > Guilty       register as a sex offender. The indictment stated the ″charge″
    Pleas > Voluntariness                                          was ″FAIL REG SEX OFFEND ENH F3,″ and alleged
    Criminal Law & Procedure > Sentencing > Appeals >              appellant’s duty to register was based on an adjudication of
    Appealability                                                  delinquent conduct. The indictment did not, however, allege
    appellant had a prior conviction for failure to register.
    Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Probation > Revocation >
    General Overview
    Appellant pleaded guilty to the offense. At the plea hearing,
    Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Reviewability > General   the trial court admonished appellant he was being charged
    Overview                                                       with ″failure to register as a sex offender″ and that the
    punishment range was two to ten years’ confinement and a
    HN4 An appellant may not raise a complaint regarding the          $10,000 fine. Appellant entered a plea of guilty. His also
    involuntariness of his original plea in an appeal from the        signed a judicial confession in which he admitted committing
    revocation of his probation.                                      the offense as alleged in the indictment. During the hearing,
    appellant and his attorney both made references to appellant’s
    Counsel: For Appellants: Nanette Hendrickson, Dallas, TX.         prior conviction. For example, appellant conceded he had
    already had ″problems″ with the ″criminal justice system″
    For Appellees: Michelle (Shelly) O’Brien, Susan Hawk,             for failing to comply with the registration requirements, and
    Dallas, TX.                                                       he did not want ″another case.″ His attorney then, in arguing
    for leniency, acknowledged ″there’s no good reason for
    Judges: Before Justices Bridges, Fillmore, and Brown.             failing to register once, let alone twice.″ The State [*3] did
    Opinion by Justice Brown.                                         not, however, offer formal proof of his prior conviction.
    Opinion by: ADA BROWN                                             The trial court found appellant guilty of the offense, and
    sentenced him to ten years in prison, but suspended
    Opinion                                                           imposition of the sentence. The trial court’s judgment
    reflects appellant was convicted of ″failure to
    register/enhanced.″ Appellant did not appeal his conviction.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    The trial court subsequently revoked appellant’s probation.
    Opinion by Justice Brown
    At the hearing on the motion to revoke, appellant testified
    Sir Melvin Wright, Jr. appeals his conviction for failure to      and admitted he had been sentenced to twelve months for
    register as a sex offender. In two points of error, appellant     the ″2007″ offense. The trial court found the allegations in
    contends (1) he received an illegal sentence, and (2) his         the State’s motion to revoke true, and sentenced appellant to
    guilty plea was involuntary. For the following reasons, we        five years in prison.
    affirm.
    In his first issue, appellant asserts he was assessed an illegal
    On November 1, 2011, a warrant issued for appellant’s             sentence because his five-year sentence was outside the
    arrest based on an affidavit alleging appellant had committed     range of punishment for a state jail felony. HN1 If a person
    the offense of failure to register as a sex offender, ″Felony     is required to register as a sex offender based on an
    3.″ The warrant was based on an affidavit stating probable        adjudication of delinquency, and fails to comply with the
    cause existed that appellant committed the offense. The           registration requirements, the offense is a state jail felony.
    affidavit stated appellant had been ″convicted″ of indecency      TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § art. 62.102 (West). If a person
    with a child and was sentenced to two years in the Texas          has a prior conviction for failure to register, the punishment
    Youth Commission. The affidavit further stated appellant          range is increased to a third-degree felony. SEE TEX. CRIM.
    was then later convicted of failing to register as a sex          PROC. CODE ANN. § 62.102 (West); [*4] see also Ford v.
    offender and sentenced to 365 days in jail. Finally, the          State, 
    334 S.W.3d 230
    , 234 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)
    affidavit alleged appellant committed the instant failure to
    register offense, which was enhanced ″due to the prior            Appellant asserts his five-year sentence was illegal because
    conviction.″                                                      he was convicted of a state jail felony, for which the
    maximum period of confinement allowable is two years. See
    Appellant was arrested [*2] and arraigned on the charges.         TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.35 (West 2011). He further
    The grand jury subsequently indicted him for failing to           asserts his punishment could not be enhanced because (1)
    nanette hendrickson
    Page 3 of 3
    2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 8161, *4
    the indictment did not allege a prior conviction, (2) he was     complaint regarding defects in the evidence show his
    not given notice of a prior conviction, (3) he did not plead     conviction could not be used to enhance his punishment. Cf.
    true to any allegations of a prior conviction, and (4) the       Ex parte 
    Parrott, 396 S.W.3d at 537-38
    (Tex. Crim. App.
    State did not otherwise prove he had a prior conviction.         2013). We conclude appellant has failed to show his
    sentence was illegal. See Ex parte 
    Rich, 194 S.W.3d at 511
    ;
    HN2 Generally, an appeal from an order revoking probation        see also. Ex Parte Parrott, 396 S.W.3d a 537-38. We
    is limited to the propriety of the revocation and does not       overrule appellant’s first point of error.
    include a review of the original conviction. Traylor v. State,
    
    561 S.W.2d 492
    , 494 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978).          In his second point of error, appellant asserts his guilty plea
    However, a sentence outside the range of punishment is           was involuntary because he was improperly admonished as
    void and may be challenged at any time. See Ex parte Rich,       to the range of punishment. It is well established HN4 an
    
    194 S.W.3d 508
    , 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Mizell v.State,      appellant may not raise a complaint regarding the
    
    119 S.W.3d 804
    , 806 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); Baker v. State,      involuntariness of his original plea in an appeal from the
    
    278 S.W.3d 923
    , 926 (Tex. App.—Houston 2009, pet.                revocation of his probation. Jordan v. State, 
    54 S.W.3d 783
    ,
    ref’d).                                                          785 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). That issue must be raised in an
    appeal from the original conviction. See 
    id. We overrule
    Here, appellant does not dispute he was sentenced within         appellant’s second point of error.
    the range of punishment if the State showed he had a prior
    conviction. Nor does appellant dispute that he had a prior       We affirm the trial court’s judgment revoking [*6]
    conviction that would allow for enhancement. Cf. Ex parte        appellant’s probation.
    Parrott, 
    396 S.W.3d 531
    , 537-38 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (in       /Ada Brown/
    habeas proceeding defendant failed to show harm when
    ADA BROWN
    actual criminal history would support punishment). He
    nevertheless asserts his sentence was illegal because of the     JUSTICE
    State’s failure to [*5] provide him with notice that it was
    Do Not Publish
    seeking an enhanced punishment range and its failure to
    provide evidence of a prior conviction. However, HN3             TEX. R. APP. P 47.2(b)
    appellant must show the sentenced assessed was ″actually
    illegal.″ See See Ex parte Rich, 
    194 S.W.3d 508
    , 511 (Tex.       JUDGMENT
    Crim. App. 2006). And appellant’s sentence was only
    Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of
    actually illegal if the conviction was unavailable for
    the trial court is AFFIRMED.
    enhancement. Cf. Ex parte Parrott, 
    396 S.W.3d 531
    , 537-38
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Neither appellant’s complaint            Judgment entered this 4th day of August, 2015.
    regarding the State’s failure to provide him notice nor his
    nanette hendrickson