Lherault, Charles Anthony ( 2015 )

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NO.04-15-00018-CR
ORIGINAL
IN THE TEXAS COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
CHARLES ANTHONY LHERAULT
APPELLANT
THE STATE OF TEXAS
APPELLEE
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PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
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ON APPEAL FROM THE 175TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF BEXAR COUNTY, TEXAS
CAUSE NUMBER 2013-CR-10281 FILED |j\j
COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
p.D.R. FROM APPELLANT Abel Acosta, Cierk
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CHARLES ANTHONY LHERAULT
T.D.C.J.-C.I.D.#1972430
2400 WALLACE PACK ROAD
NAVASOTA, TEXAS 77868
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RECEIVED IN OCT 2 7 2015
COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
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OCT 27 2015
^bet Acosta,Clerk
(A)IDENTITY OF JUDGE, PARTIES, AND COUNSEL.
CHIEF JUSTICE SANDEE BRYAN MARION, KAREN ANGELINI, JASON PULLIAM
NICHOLAS LaHOOD CRIMINAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY
ANDREW N. WARTHEN. ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY
MICHAEL D. ROBBINS ASSISTANT PUBLIC DEFENDER
(B)TABLE OF CONTENTS: N/A
(C)INDEX OF AUTHORITIES: N/A
(D)STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENTS: N/A
(E)STATEMENT OF THE CASE:N/A
(F.) STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY:N/A
(G)GROUNDS FOR REVIEW:N/A
(H)ARGUMENT: N/A
PRAYER
Appellant PRAYS this P.D.R. is processed as soon as possible, in
that he is able to file his 11.07/§2254 within the time limits set
by the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.
(J)APPENDIX: N/A
UNSWORN DECLARATION
COMES NOW, Charles Anthony Lherault, Petitioner in the above
styled and numbered cause, declares under the penalty of perjury
that the above is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.
Charles Anthony Lherault
2400 Wallace Pack Road
Navasota, Texas 77868
PRO SE
jfourtl) Court of Appeals
^>an Antonio, tEexas
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-15-00018-CR
Charles Anthony LHERAULT,
Appellant
v.
• The STATE of Texas,
Appellee
From the 175th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2013CR10281
Honorable Mary D. Roman, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Jason Pulliam, Justice
Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice
Karen Angelini, Justice
Jason Pulliam, Justice
Delivered and Filed: September 30, 2015
AFFIRMED
Background
Charles Lherault was charged with the offenses of assault-family violence by choking or
strangulation and continuous family violence. Prior to trial on the merits, a jury was empaneled
to determine whether Lherault was competent to stand trial. That jury found Lherault competent
to stand trial. Subsequently, another jury convicted Lherault and assessed punishment at
confinement for twenty-six years and ten years, respectively.
04-15-00018-CR
In one issue on appeal, Lherault contends the first jury's finding that he was competent to
stand trial was against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Lherault's argument
is construed as a challenge to the factual sufficiency of the first jury's competency determination.
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Standard of Review
In reviewing a defendant's factual-sufficiency challenge to a jury's competency verdict,
the appellate court must consider all the evidence relevant to the issue at hand, and determine
whether thejudgment is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence so as to be
manifestly unjust. Meraz v. State, 785 S.W.2d 146, 155 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); Lasiter v. State,
283 S.W.3d 909, 916 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2009, pet. ref d). The appellate court "views the
entirety of the evidence in a neutral light, but it may not usurp the function of the jury by
substituting its judgment in place of the jury's assessment of the weight and credibility of the
witnesses' testimony." Matlock v. State, 392 S.W.3d 662, 671 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); see
Musgrove v. State, 422 S.W.3d 13, 17 (Tex. App.—Waco 2013, pet. ref d). In this neutral light,
the appellate court determines whether the evidence supporting the jury'sfinding is "so obviously
weak as to undermine confidence in the jury's determination," or the proof supporting the jury's
finding, "although adequate iftaken alone, is greatly outweighed by contrary proof." See Johnson
v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1,11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Aclearly wrong and unjust verdict occurs where
the jury's finding "shocks the conscience," or"clearly demonstrates bias." Santellan v. State, 939
S.W.2d 155, 164-65 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The appellate court may disagree with the jury's
finding even if probative evidence exists that supports the finding. Id. at 164; see also Johnson,
23 S.W.3d at 7. However, "it is the exclusive province of the jury to resolve conflicts" in the
evidence presented. Williams v. State, 191 S.W.3d 242, 248 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, no pet.).
As the arbiter of conflicting evidence, the jury may accept or reject any part of a witness's
04-15-00018-CR
testimony. Lasiter, 283 S.W.3d at 917; see also Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 111 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2000).
Analysis
Lherault contends the evidence presented to the jury proved he was incompetent to stand
trial. Lherault argues the evidence showed he became so fixated and obsessed over minute and
unimportant details that he lost the ability to engage in a reasoned choice of legal strategies and
options. This, Lherault argues, left him unable to consult with his attorney with a reasonable
degree of rational understanding. Lherault bases this argument on the testimony of the expert
witnesses and on his own testimony.
A defendant is presumed competent to stand trial and holds the burden to prove
incompetency by a preponderance of the evidence. TEX. CODE CRIM. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.003(b)
(West 2006). A defendant is not competent to stand trial if the defendant lacks: "(1) sufficient
present ability to consult with the defendant's attorney with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding; or (2) a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against the
defendant." Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.003(a).
Inthe eventa defendant utilizes an expert to demonstrate or evaluate competency, the Code
of Criminal Procedure sets out the factors experts should use to conduct this evaluation. TEX.
Code Crim. PROC. Ann. art. 46B.024 (West Supp. 2014); see Morris v. State, 301 S.W.3d 281,
286 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). These factors include whether a defendant can (1) rationally
understand the charges against him and the potential consequences of the pending criminal
proceedings; (2) disclose to counsel pertinent facts, events and states of mind; (3) engage in a
reasoned choice of legal strategies and options; (4) understand the adversarial nature of criminal
proceedings; (5) exhibit appropriate courtroom behavior; and (6) testify. Tex. Code Crim. PROC.
Ann. art. 46B.024(1)(A)-(F).
04-15-00018-CR
At the competency trial, the jury heard the expert testimony of forensic psychologist Dr.
Jack Ferrell and Brian Skop, M.D., a psychiatrist, who both evaluated Lherault for competency
using the factors set out in article 46B.024. Both Dr. Ferrell and Dr. Skop testified Lherault had
an above average understanding of the charges against him, the adversarial nature of the
proceedings and of the potential consequences he faced. Dr. Ferrell and Dr. Skop testified Lherault
had no difficulty discussing the facts and events surrounding his case. Both experts believed
Lherault could exhibit appropriate courtroom behavior and testify if the need arose. Further, Dr.
Ferrell and Dr. Skop declined to diagnose Lherault with any mental disease or disorder, although
both concluded Lherault exhibited narcissistic personality traits. According to both experts,
Lherault held a superior belief in his opinions and did not take criticism or disagreement well,
which manifested itself in stubborn and insistent behavior. However, Dr. Ferrell and Dr. Skop
differed in their conclusion as to whether this behavior rendered Lherault incompetent to stand
trial.
In Dr. FerrelPs opinion, Lherault's narcissism prevented him from engaging in a reasoned
choice of legal strategies and options. According to Dr. Ferrell, Lherault had spenta great deal of
time studying the facts of his case and researching the law and had very specific opinions about
how he wanted his defense to be handled. Dr. Farrell testified that Lherault would become fixated
on his defensive theories or thoughts on a detail of the case, and when fixated, Dr. Ferrell had
difficultly redirecting Lherault to a different topic.
Dr. Ferrell expressed concern this fixation created a bad working relationship between
Lherault and his attorney. Dr. Ferrell testified Lherault had grown to distrust his attorney because
Lherault did not think his attorney was following through with the defensive strategies Lherault
wanted accomplished. Dr. Ferrell testified that while observing Lherault and his attorney
conferring, he saw this distrust and opined that Lherault's tendency to fixate impaired their ability
04-15-00018-CR
to communicate. Dr. Ferrell opined this impairment was directly related to Lherault's narcissistic
tendency to place his own opinions—particularly those regarding legal strategy—over those of his
attorney, and for this reason, Lherault did not have sufficient present ability to consult with his
attorney with a reasonable degree of rational understanding.
Conversely, Dr. Skop testified that although Lherault's narcissistic tendencies created
difficulties, he possessed sufficient ability to consult with his attorney. Dr. Skop testified that
Lherault would engage in "diatribes" about details of his case, but Lherault was "interruptible," an
indication of his ability to control himself. Dr. Skop testified Lherault could communicate
effectively if provided the ability to "give his two cents." Dr. Skop also watched Lherault and his
attorney confer and observed the same insistence and stubbornness described by Dr. Ferrell. Dr.
Skop agreed this behavior could negatively impact Lherault's ability to collaborate with his
attorney; however, in his experience it is common for a defendant to be frustrated with or distrust
his attorney. Dr. Skop opined distrust of an attorney, by itself, is not a factor in determination
whether a defendant is incompetent to stand trial. Dr. Skop concluded that although Lherault's
behavior would make communication with his attorney difficult, he did not lack the capacity to do
so.
Additionally, Lherault testified at the competency trial. Lherault testified he believed he
and his attorney could communicate most ofthe time, including the ability to discuss legal strategy;
however, Lherault said he could not get certain questions answered and this left him distrustful of
her. Lherault testified he had researched the law and determined the charges against him should
be dismissed, but felt his attorney was not working adequately to have the charges dismissed.
Lheraultcomplained his attorneywouldnot file the motionshe had writtenfor her to file. Lherault
expressed his belief that because his attorney was appointed, she would not do what he wanted.
04-15-00018-CR
Lherault denied ever receiving any mental health treatment and described his personality as
"quirky" and "very strong headed."
We have reviewed in a neutral light all the evidence presented to the first jury to determine
competency. With regard to the first factor to indicate competency, the jury heard conflicting
evidence on the issue whether Lherault had the present sufficient ability to consult with his attorney
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding. As discussed, Dr. Ferrell and Dr. Skop
provided differing testimony about whether Lherault's narcissistic personality traits rendered him
unable to consult with his attorney. Because the jury is the arbiter of conflicting evidence, this
court will not substitute its judgment in place of the jury's. See Matlock, 392 S.W.3d at 671;
Lasiter, 283 S.W.3d at 917. Given the testimony presented, the jury could have weighed the
conflicting evidence and reasonably found Lherault was sufficiently capable of consulting with his
attorney with a reasonable degree of rational understanding. See Lasiter, 283 S.W.3d at 917.
With respect to the second factor to indicate competency, Lherault concedes he held a
rational and factual understanding of the proceedings against him. Further, Dr. Ferrell and Dr.
Skop's testimony supports the conclusion that Lherault had such an understanding.
Upon reviewof the evidence in a neutral light, givingdeference to the jury's determination
of the conflicting evidence, we conclude the jury's determination that Lherault was competent to
stand trial was not so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be
manifestly unjust. See id.
Conclusion
For the above reasons, we overrule Lherault's sole issue on appeal and affirm the trial
court's judgment.
Jason Pulliam, Justice
DO NOT PUBLISH
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