Leticia Loya v. Miguel Angel Loya ( 2015 )

ACCEPTED
14-14-00208-CV
FOURTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS
HOUSTON, TEXAS
8/13/2015 1:51:27 PM
CHRISTOPHER PRINE
CLERK
No. 14-14-00208-CV
In the FILED IN
14th COURT OF APPEALS
Fourteenth Court of Appeals HOUSTON, TEXAS
Houston, Texas 8/13/2015 1:51:27 PM
CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
Clerk
LETICIA B. LOYA, Appellant
vs.
MIGUEL ANGEL LOYA, Appellee
Appeal
Arising from the 257th District Court
Harris County, Texas
No. 2012-32502
Hon. Judy Warne
LETICIA LOYA’S REPLY TO MIGUEL LOYA’S
MOTION FOR REHEARING (CORRECTED)
TO THE HONORABLE JUSTICES OF THE FOURTEENTH COURT OF
APPEALS:
Miguel Loya has moved for rehearing, asking this Court to reconsider its
decision that any community property interest in the bonus was not partitioned in the
divorce. He argues that the community interest was partitioned to him as his separate
property, either (i) as his “future income” or (ii) as “past income.”
1
Miguel has shifted away from his legal argument that the community estate can
have no interest in a bonus received after divorce for work done during marriage. He
is now advancing a contractual argument that the compensation received after
divorce for work done during marriage constitutes “future earnings,” which where
partitioned to him in the divorce. The underpinning of Miguel’s contractual argument
is the same as the underpinning for his earlier legal argument. He is arguing that a
bonus should be characterized based on when it is received, and not based on the
work that it compensates.
In his Brief, Miguel relied on Echols v. Austron, Inc., 529 S.W.2d 840, 846
(Tex. App.–Austin 1975, writ ref’d n.r.e.), for the proposition that the character of a
bonus received after divorce depends on when it is received, and not whether it
compensates work done during marriage. As this Court noted in its Opinion, p. 10 n.
7, that decision is not binding authority, and has been supplanted by a change in the
common law made by Cearley v. Cearley, 5444 S.W.2d 661, 662, 665-66 (Tex.
1976), and by the subsequent adoption of Texas Family Code Section 7.003. Miguel’s
argument about future income is based on the same premise. He is saying that income
is “past” or “future” based on when it is received, and not based on when the work
was done. His contractual argument is invalid for the same reason that his legal
argument was invalid.
2
Miguel also argues in his Motion for Rehearing that any part of the bonus
received after divorce, that compensated work done during marriage, was partitioned
as “past income” under a clause in the Agreement Incident to Divorce that said: “This
Agreement Incident to Divorce shall serve as a partition of community income,
setting aside to each spouse all income earned by each such spouse and/or attributable
to property awarded to each such spouse or contained as each such spouse’s separate
property herein.” See Miguel Loya’s Motion for Rehearing, p. 7. As this Court noted
in its Opinion, p. 3 n. 3, the Agreement Incident to Divorce was not signed by either
party and has no effect as a partition agreement.
Miguel Loya’s arguments are without merit, and Leticia Loya prays that his
Motion for Rehearing be denied. Leticia Loya prays for relief generally.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Richard R. Orsinger
RICHARD R. ORSINGER
State Bar No. 15322500
ORSINGER, NELSON, DOWNING &
ANDERSON, LLP
5950 Sherry Lane, Suite 800
Dallas, Texas 75225
Tel: (214) 273-2400
Fax: (214) 273-2470
E-mail: richard@ondafamilylaw.com
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ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT,
LETICIA LOYA
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a true copy of Leticia Loya’s Corrected Reply to Miguel Loya’s
Motion for Rehearing was served by e-file, and email on the following:
Mr. Randall B. Wilhite
Fullenweider & Wilhite
4265 San Felipe Street
Houston, Texas 77027
rwilhite@fullenweider.com
on August 12, 2014.
/s/ Richard R. Orsinger
RICHARD R. ORSINGER
Attorney for Appellant, LETICIA LOYA
4