State v. Joshua Lindsey ( 2015 )

ACCEPTED
13-15-00292-CR
THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS
CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS
11/18/2015 2:53:32 PM
Dorian E. Ramirez
CLERK
DOCKET NO. 13-15-00292-CR
FILED IN
13th COURT OF APPEALS
CORPUS CHRISTI/EDINBURG, TEXAS
11/18/2015 2:53:32 PM
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FORDORIAN E. RAMIREZ
TH Clerk
THE 13 DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
APPELLANT
vs.
JOSHUA LINDSEY,
APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM CAUSE NO. 13-CR-4068-D
IN 105TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF NUECES COUNTY, TEXAS
AMENDED APPELLEE’S BRIEF
CELINA LOPEZ LEON
LAW OFFICE OF SCOTT M. ELLISON, P.L.L.C.
410 PEOPLES ST.
CORPUS CHRISTI, TX 78401
TELEPHONE: (361) 887-7600
FACSIMILE: (361) 882-4728
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Oral Argument is Requested.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS .......................................................................................... ii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES.................................................................................... iii
ISSUES PRESENTED...............................................................................................1
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THE SEARCH
OF LINDSEY'S TRUNK WAS UNLAWFUL AND GRANTING
APPELLEE’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE ILLEGALLY
SEIZED EVIDENCE IN PART
STATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................................................................2
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ........................................................................ 5
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES ........................................................................ 5
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THE SEARCH
OF LINDSEY'S TRUNK WAS UNLAWFUL AND GRANTING
APPELLEE’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE ILLEGALLY
SEIZED EVIDENCE IN PART ..........................................................5
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF ......................................................11
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................12
RULE 9.4(i) CERTIFICATION ..............................................................................12
ii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007)......................................... 6
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, (1969).............................................................11
Delgado v. State, 718 S.W.2d 718 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986) ..................................9, 10
Fla. v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990) ....................................................................... 9
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). ...................................................... 7
Madden v. State, 242 S.W.3d 504, 517 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007) ..................................... 6
Manns v. State, 122 S.W.3d 171, 178 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003)................................... 6
Moskey v. State, 333 S.W.3d 696, 700 (Tex.App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 2010) ......... 9
Powell v. State, 898 S.W.2d 821, 827 (Tex.Crim.App. 1994) .................................. 7
Sieffert v. State, 290 S.W.3d 478, 482 (Tex.App. – Amarillo 2009)......................... 6
St. George v. State, 197 S.W.3d 806, 815 (Tex.App. – Fort Worth 2006)............... 6
State v. Cashion, 2012 WL 5278509 (Tex.App. – Dallas [5th Dist.])......................10
State v. Cook, 389 S.W.3d 376, 380 (Tex.App. – Texarkana 2012) ......................... 8
State v. Stauder, 264 S.W.3d 360, 364 (Tex.App. – Eastland 2008) ................10, 11
United States v. Castro, 129 F.3d 752, 755 (1997) .................................................. 9
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) ...........................................................7, 8
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DOCKET NO. 13-15-00292-CR
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE 13TH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
APPELLANT
vs.
JOSHUA LINDSEY,
APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM CAUSE NO. 13-CR-4068-D
IN 105TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF NUECES COUNTY, TEXAS
AMENDED APPELLEE’S BRIEF
Appellee, Joshua Lindsey, submits this Response Brief pursuant to Tex. R.
App. Proc. 38.
ISSUES PRESENTED
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THE SEARCH
OF LINDSEY'S TRUNK WAS UNLAWFUL AND GRANTING
APPELLEE’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE ILLEGALLY
SEIZED EVIDENCE IN PART
1
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Illegally Seized Evidence was heard in this
Court on June 5, 2015. Reporter’s Record, page 1 (hereinafter “RR” followed by
the page number and line number if applicable). Appellee Lindsey challenged the
detention, arrest, and search of his vehicle in his motion and at the suppression
hearing. Lindsey argued that the officers were unlawful in detaining him based on
an “odor of marijuana,” unlawfully prolonged his detention by keeping him for
thirty minutes before opening the trunk to find narcotics, and that the impound and
inventory of his vehicle was improper.
Corpus Christi Police Department Officer Vicente Ortiz testified at the
hearing as the State’s only witness. RR p. 9. According to his testimony, Officer
Ortiz and Officer Gonzalez were dispatched to the Stripes convenience store in
reference to a “beer run.” RR p. 10, Ln. 8-10, 18. The officers approached two
vehicles parked in front of the store, and Ortiz could smell a strong odor of
marijuana emitting from the vehicles. RR p. 11, Ln. 21-23. Officer Ortiz advised
dispatch to hold the “beer run” call to further investigate the two vehicles. RR p.
12, Ln. 2-3. After approaching the vehicle that did not belong to Lindsey, Officer
Ortiz released them despite the car “reeking of weed.” RR p. 30, Ln. 9-20.
Officer Ortiz then turned the focus on Lindsey, approached him when he
was outside his vehicle, immediately detained him, and handcuffed Lindsey to his
2
unit. RR p. 16, Ln. 5-13; p. 25, Ln. 24-25 – p. 26, Ln. 1. Officer Ortiz did not see
Lindsey smoking, commit any drug transactions, or physically possess any
marijuana. RR p. 25, Ln. 19-23. Officer Ortiz then did a pat-down search of
Lindsey for officer safety, despite not having any reason to believe that Mr.
Lindsey had any weapons on him. RR p. 24, Ln. 11-22. According to Officer
Ortiz’ testimony, the odor was “freshly burnt marijuana,” and that the smell
became stronger when the door was opened. R.R. p. 15, Ln, 1-3, 19-21; p. 14, Ln,
13-15.
Officer Ortiz asked Lindsey to search his vehicle several times, and Lindsey
denied permission to search. RR p. 29, Ln. 3-5, 12-13; Def. Ex. 1 (Video). Officer
Ortiz testified that he was going to check the immediate area of the vehicle due to
the smell coming from Mr. Lindsey’s person and his vehicle. R.R. p. 26, Ln. 7-9.
Both Officer Ortiz and Officer Gonzalez then did a search of the car. RR p. 33, Ln.
6-8. Despite Officer Ortiz’ testimony that he found marijuana residue, a white
substance on the floor, and a scale when he opened the door to Lindsey’s vehicle
(RR p. 17, Ln. 15-18), the video of the incident contradicted this testimony. See
Def. Ex. 1 (Video); see also p. 37, Ln. 8-11; p. 40, Ln. 11-17. The search went on
for 11 minutes when Officer Ortiz asked Officer Gonzalez if he had found
anything, and Officer Gonzalez said “nada,” or nothing. RR p. 33, Ln. 9-25; p. 35,
Ln. 7-16; p. 51, Ln. 10-20; Def. Ex. 1 at Back camera 10:54. Officer Gonzalez
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then asked Officer Ortiz if he was going to “double check,” and the officers kept
searching for another twenty minutes. RR p. 34, Ln. 1-9, 12-17. Def. Ex. 1
(Video). Despite the video footage, Officer Ortiz testified that he did find
marijuana residue and a crack rock inside the vehicle, and that he qualified Lindsey
as being under arrest at that point. R.R. p. 42, Ln. 23-24.
After Lindsey had been sitting in the unit for twenty-one minutes, multiple
members of Lindsey’s family began approaching the officers. Def. Ex. 1 at Back
camera 21:01-27:27. Officer Ortiz did not ask any of Lindsey’s family members if
they had a valid license or insurance or if they were able to drive the vehicle home.
RR p. 36, Ln. 3-7.
Officer Ortiz opened the trunk of Lindsey’s vehicle after Lindsey had been
in the unit for thirty minutes, pursuant to an inventory search after he decided to
impound the car because of what he stated he found inside of it. RR p. 35, Ln. 24-
25; p. 36, Ln. 1-2, 8-11; Def. Ex. 1 at Back camera 30:45; R.R. p. 36, Ln. 8-11;
R.R. p. 37, Ln. 2-3 (“due to what was found in the vehicle, that’s why it was
inventoried and impounded”). Officer Ortiz found crack cocaine rocks in the trunk
of Lindsey’s vehicle. RR p. 19, Ln. 9-14. Officer Ortiz conceded in his testimony
that Corpus Christi Police Department does not have any policies and procedures
regarding the impoundment of vehicles and no inventory sheet was provided on
4
this case; they do an inventory at the officer’s discretion when there is an arrest.
RR p. 36, Ln. 12-22; p. 50, Ln. 14-23.
When Lieutenant Bauer arrived at the scene after the trunk was opened,
Officer Ortiz told Officer Bauer that all he had was a “strong odor of marijuana.
That’s all I have.” RR p. 38; Def. Ex. 1 at Back camera 31:00. One officer asked
Officer Ortiz, “where was it,” to which Officer Ortiz responded, “in the back.” RR
p. 39, Ln. 9-20; Def. Ex. 1 at Back camera 31:44. Officer Ortiz never mentioned
to Lieutenant Bauer that anything was found inside the vehicle. RR. P. 41, 17-20;
see Def. Ex. 1.
Based on the above findings, the trial court concluded that probable cause
did not exist to search the trunk of Defendant’s vehicle, thus suppressing the
cocaine found only in the trunk of the car.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Appellee submits in this response that the 105th District Court was correct in
ruling the search of Lindsey’s trunk was improper. Pursuant to an inventory
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
IN RESPONSE TO APPELLANT’S ISSUES PRESENTED
III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THE SEARCH
OF LINDSEY'S TRUNK WAS UNLAWFUL AND GRANTING
APPELLEE’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE ILLEGALLY
SEIZED EVIDENCE IN PART
5
Trial court properly granted Lindsey’s Motion to Suppress based on the
unlawful inventory and impound of his vehicle.
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is reviewed under a
bifurcated standard for abuse of discretion. Sieffert v. State, 290 S.W.3d 478, 482
(Tex.App. – Amarillo 2009). If the parties are not in dispute as to the facts of the
case and have conflicting views on the issues of reasonable suspicion and probably
cause, the reviewing court conducts a de novo review. See Manns v. State, 122
S.W.3d 171, 178 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003). Whether an officer’s reasonable suspicion is
sufficiently supported by the totality of the circumstances is a legal question that is
reviewed de novo. Sieffert, 290 S.W.3d at 482; see Madden v. State, 242 S.W.3d 504,
517 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007). In other words, a de novo review is conducted to
determine whether a specific search and/or seizure were “reasonable” as an
ultimate question of Fourth Amendment law. St. George v. State, 197 S.W.3d 806,
815 (Tex.App. – Fort Worth 2006) (hereinafter “St. George II”).
Furthermore, when reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress,
an appeals court gives almost total deference to the trial court’s findings which are
supported by the record and any questions of mixed law and fact that turn on the
credibility and demeanor of witnesses. Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673
(Tex.Crim.App. 2007). The reviewing court must uphold the trial court’s ruling if
6
it is right for any reason. Powell v. State, 898 S.W.2d 821, 827 (Tex.Crim.App.
1994).
B. IF THE TRIAL COURT FOUND PROBABLE CAUSE TO SEARCH THE VEHICLE
BASED ON THE SMELL OF MARIJUANA, THAT STILL DOES NOT JUSTIFY A
SEARCH OF THE TRUNK
Searches and seizures without a warrant are per se unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment, subject to only a few exceptions. Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 357 (1967). Here, officers did not have a warrant and do not meet any of
the exceptions to qualify a search of Appellee’s trunk.
The State relies on probable cause to search the vehicle as a justification to
search the trunk. At the suppression hearing, Appellee argued that probable cause
did not exist to search the vehicle, that Lindsey was unlawfully detained, and that
the search resulted in a prolonged detention of his person. However, even if the
Trial Court had determined probable cause existed to search the interior of the
vehicle, Appellee submits that this does not automatically translate to a permissible
search of the trunk of Lindsey’s car.
Appellant cites United States v. Ross to argue their point, which held that
officers have the right to search an entire vehicle when they believe there is
contraband somewhere in the vehicle “but do not know where it is located.” United
States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); see Appellant’s Brief, p. 9-10. Ross goes on
to articulate that the existence of probable cause to believe that a container, placed
7
in the trunk of a taxi, has contraband in it does not justify the search of the entire
cab. Id. at 824.
In this case, Officer Ortiz’ testimony only spoke to a smell of marijuana
emitting from the cab of the vehicle, and testified repeatedly that the smell was
“very strong,” and he could smell it as soon as the door was opened. R.R. p. 15,
Ln, 1-3, 19-21; p. 14, Ln, 13-15. If the trial court relied on this information to
reach the threshold of probable cause to search the vehicle, Appellee submits that
the probable cause did not extend to the trunk. According to Officer Ortiz, he
found marijuana residue on the floor, along with cocaine rocks. RR p. 17, Ln. 15-
18. This testimony, coupled with Ortiz’ statement that he considered Lindsey
under arrest at that time, show that the contraband (marijuana residue) was already
found and seized. Thus the purpose of the trunk search in Ross based on not
knowing “where the contraband was located” was dispelled by that point,
rendering the justification in Ross inapplicable.
Furthermore, the State failed to present any evidence linking the “smell of
marijuana” supposedly on Lindsey’s person to the trunk of his car.
C. THE INVENTORY SEARCH WAS IMPROPER
An inventory search is part of the impoundment process designed to produce
an inventory of an automobile’s contents. State v. Cook, 389 S.W.3d 376, 380
(Tex.App. – Texarkana 2012). The main purposes of an inventory search is to
8
protect the owner’s property, protect police against disputes over stolen or lost
property, and protect police from danger. Moskey v. State, 333 S.W.3d 696, 700
(Tex.App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.). An inventory search is permissible
under the constitution so long it is not a “ruse for a general rummaging in order to
discover incriminating evidence.” Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990); see
United States v. Castro, 129 F.3d 752, 755 (1997) (finding an inventory lawful
only if “conducted for purposes of an inventory and not as an investigatory tool to
produce or discover incriminating evidence”).
The State bears the burden of proving the inventory lawful, and it must be
conducted in good faith pursuant to standardized police procedure. Moskey, at 700.
The State can satisfy their burden by showing that 1) the driver was arrested, 2) no
alternatives to impoundment were available to insure the protection of the
automobile, 3) impounding agency had an inventory policy, and 4) that policy was
followed. Delgado v. State, 718 S.W.2d 718, 721 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986).
Here, Officer Ortiz conceded in his testimony that Corpus Christi Police
Department does not have any policies and procedures regarding the impoundment
of vehicles, no inventory sheet was provided on this case; and they do an inventory
at the officer’s discretion when there is an arrest. RR p. 36, Ln. 12-22; p. 50, Ln.
14-23. This lack of inventory procedure cannot justify a lawful impoundment of
9
any vehicle by the Corpus Christi Police Department. See Delgado v. State, 718
S.W.2d 718, 721 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986).
In State v. Cashion, the Court of Appeals found the impoundment unlawful
when an alternative to impoundment was available – by means of another
individual present whom could have taken the vehicle – thus ruling the subsequent
inventory of the vehicle impermissible. State v. Cashion, 2012 WL 5278509
(Tex.App. – Dallas [5th Dist.]). Here, multiple members of Lindsey’s family began
approaching the officers at the scene, before the vehicle was inventoried pursuant
to the impoundment. Def. Ex. 1 at Back camera 21:01-27:27. Despite the fact that
multiple people were available, Officer Ortiz did not ask any of Lindsey’s family
members if they had a valid license or insurance or if they were able to drive the
vehicle home. RR p. 36, Ln. 3-7. Just like in Cashion, the impoundment and
inventory was unlawful here.
i. THE INVENTORY SEARCH CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED AS A SEARCH
INCIDENT TO ARREST
In State v. Stauder, an officer testified that the evidence was found during an
“inventory” search, not a search incident to arrest. State v. Stauder, 264 S.W.3d
360, 364 (Tex.App. – Eastland 2008). The Appellate Court held that the State
failed to satisfy its burden of showing officer compliance with inventory standards
and procedures by not filling out the requisite inventory form, and found the
officers’ actions were a mere “ruse to search” the pickup. Id. at 364. In one last
10
ditch effort, the State proffered that the search was incident to a lawful arrest. Id.
However, the Court of Appeals reasoned that officers may search incident to arrest,
they may search only the person arrested and the “area within his immediate
control.” Id., citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). Because there
was no evidence presented that the items in the bed of the pickup were in the
Appellant’s immediate control in compliance with Chimel, the search of the bed of
the truck incident to arrest was invalid. Such is the case here. The State cannot
qualify the search as lawful incident to arrest because it exceeds the scope of
Chimel. Lindsey had no access to the trunk of his vehicle and the contraband
found in it was not in his immediate reach.
Because there was no probable cause to search the trunk of the vehicle and
unlawful inventory of the car, the trial court did not err in suppressing the evidence
found in the trunk of Lindsey’s vehicle.
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Based on the foregoing argument and case law, Appellee submits that he is
entitled to the relief requested in this Amended Appellee Brief. Appellee
respectfully prays that this Honorable Court of Appeals affirm the decision of the
Trial Court.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/Celina Lopez Leon
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CELINA LOPEZ LEON
State Bar No. 24070170
LAW OFFICE OF SCOTT M. ELLISON, P.L.L.C.
410 Peoples St.
Corpus Christi, TX 78401
Telephone: (361) 887-7600
Telecopier: (361) 882-4728
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE,
JOSHUA LINDSEY
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
As Attorney of Record for Appellant, I do hereby certify that a copy of the
foregoing Amended Appellee Brief has been hand delivered to Mark Skurka, Esq.,
District Attorney, Nueces County, TX at 901 Leopard St., Room 206, Corpus
Christi, TX 78401 on this 16th day of November, 2015.
/s/Celina Lopez Leon
CELINA LOPEZ LEON
RULE 9.4(i) CERTIFICATION
I certify that the brief contains 2,438 words, excluding those matters listed in
Rule 9.4(i)(1), and is in compliance with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure
9.4(i)(3).
/s/Celina Lopez Leon
CELINA LOPEZ LEON
12