William K. Lester v. Harold Conway ( 2016 )

Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-15-00730-CV
William K. LESTER,
Appellant
v.
Harold CONWAY,
Appellee
From the 216th Judicial District Court, Gillespie County, Texas
Trial Court No. 13820
Honorable N. Keith Williams, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
Sitting: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
Jason Pulliam, Justice
Delivered and Filed: December 14, 2016
AFFIRMED
William K. Lester appeals the trial court’s judgment granting an easement of necessity to
Harold Conway for the purpose of running electric service to Conway’s property. Lester contends
the trial court erred in applying the law governing necessity easements as opposed to the law
governing prior use easements. Lester also contends the evidence is legally and factually
insufficient to support the trial court’s findings that the easement is necessary now and was
necessary when Conway purchased his property. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
04-15-00730-CV
BACKGROUND
In 2009, Lester conveyed a 46.21-acre tract of land to Conway out of Lester’s 1,088-acre
ranch. At the time of the conveyance, electrical power lines and poles were in place on Lester’s
property on easements held by Central Texas Electric Cooperative which owned and maintained
the lines and poles. When Lester conveyed the property to Conway, Conway’s property did not
have access to electricity, and the property was being used for camping, hunting, and hiking.
In 2014, Conway sued Lester seeking a declaration that he was entitled to an easement for
the purpose of running electrical service to his property. After a bench trial, the trial court found
electrical service to Conway’s property was necessary at the time the property was severed from
Lester’s larger tract of land and continues to be necessary. Therefore, the trial court concluded
Conway was entitled to an implied easement by necessity to a specific electrical pole on Lester’s
property to provide electrical service to Conway’s property. Lester appeals.
NECESSITY EASEMENT V. PRIOR USE EASEMENT
In his first issue, Lester asserts the trial court erred in applying the law governing necessity
easements as opposed to the law governing prior use easements. Although Lester cites Hamrick
v. Ward, 446 S.W.3d 377 (Tex. 2014) to support this assertion, he admits “the Court in Hamrick
does not hold that a party claiming a utility easement cannot pursue a necessity easement.” Lester
contends, however, “there is reason to believe that this is the case under Texas Law.” Conway
responds, “While the vast majority of necessity easement cases involve roadway access, there has
never been any Texas authority that holds a party may not pursue an implied necessity easement
for a purpose other than roadway access.”
In Hamrick, the Texas Supreme Court recognized the distinction between necessity
easements and prior use easements as follows:
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For over 125 years, we have distinguished between implied easements by way of
necessity (which we refer to here as “necessity easements”) and implied easements
by prior use (which we refer to here as “prior use easements”). We created and
have utilized the necessity easement for cases involving roadway access to
previously unified, landlocked parcels. Roadways by nature are typically
substantial encumbrances on property, and we accordingly require strict,
continuing necessity to maintain necessity easements. By contrast, we created and
have primarily utilized the prior use easement doctrine for lesser improvements to
the landlocked parcel, such as utility lines that traverse the adjoining tract. We have
required, to some degree, a lesser burden of proof for prior use easements
(reasonable necessity at severance rather than strict and continued necessity)
because they generally impose a lesser encumbrance on the adjoining tract (e.g., a
power line compared to a roadway).
446 S.W.3d at 379. In Hamrick, a party was claiming an implied prior use easement for a road.
Id. The court held “the necessity easement is the legal doctrine applicable to claims of landowners
asserting implied easements for roadway access to their landlocked, previously unified parcel.”
Id.
The court’s holding that the law governing necessity easements is applicable when a party
claims roadway access does not, however, mean the law governing prior use easements is always
applicable when a party claims a lesser improvement. In fact, the court recognized that the prior
use easement doctrine is only “primarily” used for such lesser improvements. Id. Furthermore,
the court also recognized necessity easements “are implied out of the desire to avoid the
proliferation of landlocked—and therefore, unproductive—parcels of land.” Id. at 383. In this
case, Conway testified he needs the electrical access to make his property productive. Finally, we
do not believe the Texas Supreme Court would hold that landowners, who are asserting an implied
easement for electrical access to their landlocked, previously unified parcels of property, are
required to rely on the “lesser burden of proof” applicable to prior use easements. Id. at 379.
Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not err in applying the law governing necessity
easements. Lester’s first issue is overruled.
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NECESSITY EASEMENT
“To successfully assert a necessity easement, the party claiming the easement must
demonstrate: (1) unity of ownership of the alleged dominant and servient estates prior to severance;
(2) the claimed access is a necessity and not a mere convenience; and (3) the necessity existed at
the time the two estates were severed.” Id. at 382. “As this analysis makes clear, a party seeking
a necessity easement must prove both a historical necessity (that the way was necessary at the time
of severance) and a continuing, present necessity for the way in question.” Id.
In his second and third issues, Lester contends the evidence is legally and factually
insufficient to establish a present necessity or a historical necessity.
A. Standards of Review
1. Findings of Fact
In an appeal from a bench trial, the trial court’s findings of fact have the same force and
dignity as a jury verdict. See Anderson v. City of Seven Points, 806 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tex. 1991);
Villarreal v. Guerra, 446 S.W.3d 404, 411 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, pet. denied). We
review a trial court’s factual findings under the same legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence
standards used in determining whether sufficient evidence exists to support a jury’s finding.
Anderson, 806 S.W.2d at 794; Villarreal, 446 S.W.3d at 411.
As the factfinder, the trial court is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the
weight to be given their testimony. See City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 819 (Tex. 2005).
“The trial court may believe or disbelieve the testimony of a witness, in whole or in part, and it
may resolve any inconsistencies in a witness’s testimony.” Villarreal, 446 S.W.3d at 411. We
may not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court, even if the evidence would clearly
support a different result. Maritime Overseas Corp. v. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 402, 407 (Tex. 1998);
Villarreal, 446 S.W.3d at 411.
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2. Legal Sufficiency
The test for legal sufficiency is “whether the evidence at trial would enable reasonable and
fair-minded people to reach the verdict under review.” City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 827. In
making this determination, we credit evidence favoring the finding if a reasonable factfinder could,
and disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not. Id. If there is more than
a scintilla of evidence to support the finding, the legal sufficiency challenge fails. BMC Software
Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 795 (Tex. 2002).
3. Factual Sufficiency
In reviewing a factual sufficiency issue, we consider all the evidence supporting and
contradicting the finding. Maritime Overseas Corp., 971 S.W.2d at 406–07. When a party attacks
the factual sufficiency of the evidence pertaining to an adverse finding on which the party did not
have the burden of proof, the party must “demonstrate there is insufficient evidence to support the
adverse finding.” Flying J Inc. v. Meda, Inc., 373 S.W.3d 680, 690–91 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
2012, no pet.) (citing Croucher, 660 S.W.2d at 58). We will not reverse the judgment unless “‘the
evidence which supports the jury’s finding is so weak as to [make the finding] clearly wrong and
manifestly unjust.’” Id. (quoting Star Enter. v. Marze, 61 S.W.3d 449, 462 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 2001, pet. denied)); see Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986).
B. Current Necessity
1. Use of Property
Lester contends electrical access is not necessary for the continued productive use of
Conway’s property for hunting, hiking, and camping. Lester argues Conway used the property for
those purposes after the conveyance and only now wants to build a cabin on the property. In
addition, Lester points to a provision in the contract between the parties stating “NOTICE: Buyer
should determine the availability of utilities to the Property suitable to satisfy Buyer’s needs” and
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further notes Conway agreed to purchase the property “in its present condition” or as-is. 1 Lester
argues if Conway believed the property needed electrical access, Conway was required to negotiate
and pay for an express easement providing electrical access to the property just as he negotiated
and paid for express easements providing him physical access to the property.
At trial, Conway testified his “intent was to build a cabin,” and “we were looking at peach
orchards, we were looking at grape orchards or grape arbors, that kind of thing, in addition to
running cattle.” (emphasis added). Deferring to the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of
the witnesses, we conclude the trial court could have found that at the time Conway purchased the
property, Conway intended to build a cabin and conduct agricultural operations on the property.
See City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 827; Villarreal, 446 S.W.3d at 411.
In addition, Conway testified he had discussions with Lester regarding tapping into the
power line on Lester’s property. From Conway’s testimony, the trial court could have found both
Lester and Conway believed Conway’s property needed electrical access, and Conway determined
his discussions with Lester would ensure suitable utilities were available to his property. The trial
court also could have found Conway only became aware suitable utilities were not available when
Lester later refused to provide the electrical access—despite their prior discussions—due to
animosity that arose after the conveyance.
Although Lester testified to the contrary, the trial court could disbelieve it. See City of
Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 827; Villarreal, 446 S.W.3d at 411. Therefore, we conclude the evidence
is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that electrical service to
Conway’s property is necessary and a continuing, present necessity for an implied easement exists.
1
Lester argues this provision in the contract gave rise to a presumption that Conway “did not see any need for utilities
to satisfy his intended use of the Property.” The only law Lester cites to support this presumption is Hamrick, 446
S.W.3d at 383. The quoted portion of the opinion, however, relates to the court’s discussion of prior use easements
not necessity easements and, therefore, is inapplicable. See id.
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2. Other Sources of Electrical Access
Lester next contends the evidence is insufficient to establish the necessity of an easement
because Conway could obtain electrical access through a generator, solar panels, or wind power.
The evidence, however, established the operation of a generator cost $30.00 per day, and Conway
testified building a cabin and drilling and operating a well would not be feasible using a generator.
Although Lester’s attorney argued Conway could access electricity through solar panels or wind
power, no testimony was presented addressing the feasibility of electrical access through these
alternative sources. Conway, however, generally testified the feasibility of developing the
property in the intended matter would not be possible without electrical power access.
Deferring to the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, we conclude
the trial court could have found electrical access through utility poles and wires was necessary
based on Conway’s general testimony regarding the feasibility of developing his property in the
absence of such access. See City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 827; Villarreal, 446 S.W.3d at 411.
Therefore, the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that
“placing utility poles and electric lines” was the only means for Conway’s property to have access
to electricity.
3. Location of Easement
Finally, Lester contends the evidence is insufficient to establish the necessity for the
easement because Conway could have obtained an easement by necessity either from a different
adjoining landowner or to a different utility pole in Conway’s existing right-of-way easement over
Lester’s property.
With regard to the property owned by the adjoining landowner, Lester testified he sold the
property to its current owner three years before trial. Because the adjoining landowner never
owned Conway’s property, the evidence does not establish Conway could have obtained a
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necessity easement in a lawsuit against the adjoining landowner. See Hamrick, 446 S.W.3d at 382
(noting party claiming necessity easement must establish unity of ownership of the alleged
dominant and servient estates). Therefore, the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to
support the trial court’s finding that Conway’s property “cannot have access to electricity except
by placing utility poles and lines over Lester’s Property.” See id.
Lester cites no authority to support his contention that once the trial court determined
Conway was entitled to an easement by necessity from Lester, the trial court was bound to choose
one possible necessity easement over another possible necessity easement. 2 The cases cited by
Lester pertain to alternative access other than through an easement by necessity and are readily
distinguishable. See Duff v. Matthews, 311 S.W.2d 637, 639–40, 642–43 (Tex. 1958) (alternative
access through dedicated road reserved on subdivision plat); Scott v. Cannon, 959 S.W.2d 712,
721 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, pet. denied) (alternative access through an existing public road);
Adams v. Norsworthy Ranch, Ltd., 975 S.W.2d 424, 429 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, no pet.)
(alternative access through existing express easement).
“The right to select the location of the easement belongs initially to the owner of the
servient estate at the time the dominant estate is created, which right is to be exercised in a
reasonable manner, having due regard for the rights and interests of the dominant estate owner.”
Samuelson v. Alvarado, 847 S.W.2d 319, 323 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1993, no writ). “If the servient
owner fails to do so, then the owner of the dominant estate may locate the easement of necessity
with due regard for the convenience of the parties.” Id.2
Lester argues the trial court should have granted the easement to a utility pole located in Conway’s existing right-of-
way easement. Conway’s right-of-way easement did not, however, grant Conway any access to the utility pole for
purposes of obtaining electrical access. See Marcus Cable Assocs., L.P. v. Krohn, 90 S.W.3d 697, 700 (Tex. 2002)
(noting easement “authorizes its holder to use the property for only particular purposes”). Therefore, an easement
granted to that utility pole would still be a necessity easement.
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In this case, the trial court heard evidence that Lester preferred the easement run to a utility
pole located on Lester’s property approximately three hundred yards from the southern boundary
of Conway’s property but within an existing easement Lester granted to Conway for right-of-way
access. The evidence also established another utility pole was located on Lester’s property within
fifty yards of the northern boundary of Conway’s property. Because this pole was located adjacent
to the green for the sixth hole of a golf course, Lester testified running an electrical wire to that
pole would interfere with the golf course. However, the trial court was also provided pictures of
the green showing its unmaintained status, and although Lester testified his property was listed for
sale, he admitted the golf course had not been used since 2013. 3 Although the trial court was
initially inclined to run the easement to the pole located three hundred yards from the southern
boundary of Conway’s property, the following exchange then occurred:
THE COURT: Now I know that Mr. Conway wants that which is the closest
proximity across the golf course on hole six or across the river.
For the reasons stated by Mr. Lester, I believe there’s some legitimate
complaints about that. And I believe the—the—the fairest route to go to grant your
easement is from—if this is—is this north?
MR. CONWAY: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: That it would be from the—The utility pole closest to the
southern border here is that one, I guess, you mentioned. Now this is the one I think
ya’ll offered before, right?
MR. DAVIS: [Lester’s attorney]: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And if that’s just 300-yards there, I mean it is—it is still
going to be a lot less expensive than going under water or underground and so I’m
granting you a utility easement by necessity from your southern border, beginning
at the—from the pole on Mr. Lester’s property that is closest to what I’m describing
in this area as a southern border. Okay?
MR. DAVIS: Okay.
THE COURT: And that way, that seems like that—that seems to me that’s
a good way to accomplish your—to address your concerns about the water and the
golf course.
3
The bench trial was held in June of 2015.
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MR. LESTER: Do I receive compensation for this?
THE COURT: You know what, Mr. Lester, I tell you what, I may just go
back to the water or to the golf course.
You know what, would you rather go across the water or would you rather
go from hole six?
MR. CONWAY: I’d rather go from hole six.
THE COURT: Okay. All right. Well, we will—we will—I’m trying to
think here. I was trying to accommodate your concerns, Mr. Lester, and so the—
you totally—you—
MR. DAVIS: Your Honor, please.
THE COURT: No, no, Stewart. You’ve argued extremely well for Mr.
Lester today, but I’m afraid that’s probably been the attitude all along and I think
these—all three are good options. And the—the creek is closest and the golf course
thing is closest. And—and—
Following this exchange, the trial court announced the easement would run from the pole adjacent
to the sixth hole of the golf course.
As previously noted, Lester’s right to select the location of the easement was required to
be exercised in a reasonable manner, having due regard for Conway’s rights and interests. See id.Based on the exchange, the trial court could have found Lester was not exercising his right to select
the location in a reasonable manner. See City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 819 (noting factfinder is
the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses). Therefore, the trial court could have found
Conway had the right to locate the easement and that the location Conway chose was “with due
regard for the convenience of the parties.” Samuelson, 847 S.W.2d at 323. We conclude the
evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s location of the implied
easement.
C. Historical Necessity
In his third issue, Lester contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to
establish historical necessity. In this issue, Lester repeats his argument regarding electrical access
only becoming necessary because Conway intends to make a different use of his property than the
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use intended at the time he purchased the property. Based on Conway’s testimony, however, the
trial court could have found Conway always intended to build a cabin, develop orchards, and run
cattle, and the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support that finding. See City of Keller,
168 S.W.3d at 827; Villarreal, 446 S.W.3d at 411.
CONCLUSION
The trial court did not err in applying the law governing necessity easements, and the
evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s findings of historical and
present necessity. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
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