San Antonio Housing Authority v. Serento Apartments, LLC ( 2015 )

ACCEPTED
04-15-00075-CV
FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS
5/26/2015 2:56:08 PM
KEITH HOTTLE
CLERK
Cause No. 04-15-00075-CV
FILED IN
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 4th COURT OF APPEALS
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TEXASSAN ANTONIO, TEXAS
AT SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS 05/26/2015 2:56:08 PM
KEITH E. HOTTLE
Clerk
SAN ANTONIO HOUSING AUTHORITY
Appellant/Defendant,
v.
FILED IN
4th COURT OF APPEALS
SERENTO APARTMENTS, LLC, SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS
05/26/2015 2:56:08 PM
Appellee/Plaintiff.
KEITH E. HOTTLE
Clerk
ON APPEAL FROM
TH
288 JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
BEXAR COUNTY, TEXAS
CAUSE NO. 2014-CI-16503
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF
N. MARK RALLS
State Bar No. 16489200
Email: mralls@hfdlaw.com
APRIL Y. QUIÑONES
State Bar No. 24079167
Email: aquinones@hfdlaw.com
HOBLIT DARLING RALLS
HERNANDEZ & HUDLOW LLP
Bank of America Plaza
300 Convent Street, Suite 1450
San Antonio, Texas 78205
Telephone No. (210) 224-9991
Facsimile No. (210) 226-1544
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT,
SAN ANTONIO HOUSING AUTHORITY
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
TABLE OF CONTENTS
List of Authorities ............................................................................................................... iii
Reply Brief of Appellant ..................................................................................................... 1
I. Plaintiff’s/Appellee’s Pleadings Affirmatively Negated the Existence of
Jurisdiction and Therefore, the Trial Court Should Have Granted SAHA’s Plea ... 1
II. The East Houston Estate Apts., L.L.C. v. City of Houston Court’s Ruling is
Controlling in this Matter ......................................................................................... 5
III. If Applied in the Context of Contract Cases, The Proprietary/Governmental
Dichotomy Entitles SAHA to its Shield of Immunity.............................................. 6
IV. Prayer ........................................................................................................................ 7
Certificate of Service ........................................................................................................... 8
ii
LIST OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
E. Houston Estate Apts., L.L.C. v. City of Houston, 294 S.W.3d 723 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.) .............................................................................. 3, 5, 6
Hendee v. Dewhurst, 228 S.W.3d 354 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, pet. denied)................... 10
Tex. Ass’n. of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. 1993) ..............................2
Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice v. Miller, 51 S.W.3d 583 (Tex. 2001) ............................ 2, 3
Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2004) ......................... 2
Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325 (Tex. 2006) ........................................................ 6, 7
Statutes and Rules:
TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 271.151 .................................................................................. 2, 6
TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 271.152 .............................................................................. 2, 3, 6
TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 373.002 ...................................................................................... 7
TEX. R. APP. P. 38.3 ............................................................................................................. 1
iii
Cause No. 04-15-00075-CV
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS
SAN ANTONIO HOUSING AUTHORITY
Appellant/Defendant,
v.
SERENTO APARTMENTS, LLC,
Appellee/Plaintiff.
ON APPEAL FROM
TH
288 JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
BEXAR COUNTY, TEXAS
CAUSE NO. 2014-CI-16503
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF
TO THE HONORABLE JUSTICES OF THE FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS:
Appellant, SAN ANTONIO HOUSING AUTHORITY (“SAHA” or “Appellant”
or “Defendant” hereafter) files this Reply Brief of Appellant pursuant to Texas Rule of
Appellate Procedure 38.3 and would respectfully show the following:
I.
Plaintiff’s/Appellee’s Pleadings Affirmatively Negated the Existence of Jurisdiction
and Therefore, the Trial Court Should Have Granted SAHA’s Plea
SAHA was not required to produce any evidence to the trial Court, as SAHA’s
challenge to the trial Court’s jurisdiction was based on Plaintiff’s pleadings. (See
Appellant’s Brief, pgs. 7–11). Nothing in the law or procedural rules required SAHA to
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bring forth evidence to the trial court when the Plaintiff’s pleadings did not assert facts
that demonstrated a waiver of SAHA’s immunity, but rather, affirmatively negated the
existence of jurisdiction. See Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217,
226–27 (Tex. 2004). It is well recognized that the sufficiency of pleading’s requirement
to establish jurisdiction is a burden imposed upon the Plaintiff, not a Defendant; hence,
the requirement that in a jurisdictional challenge, a Court must first examine the
pleadings. Id. (citing Tex. Ass’n. of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446
(Tex. 1993)); Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice v. Miller, 51 S.W.3d 583, 587 (Tex. 2001).
In this case, Plaintiff’s pleadings, alone, clearly negated the trial court’s jurisdiction, as
the facts that Plaintiff alleged about the contract in question clearly demonstrated that its
essential terms were not for goods or services that were being directly provided to SAHA
by the Plaintiff that would invoke the limited waiver to SAHA’s entitlement to immunity
under Texas Local Government Code, Sections 271.151(2)(A) and 271.152.
Notwithstanding its ultimate ruling, even the trial Court believed that Plaintiff did
not plead facts that would show goods or services that would waive SAHA’s immunity:
COURT [To Appellee’s Counsel]: So how is that goods and services, that
cause of action? I mean, I read your cause of action and I don’t see in there
anywhere where you’re suing [Defendant] for failing to provide goods or
services.
R.R. P. 13/L. 24–P. 14/L. 2. While arguments of Counsel are not evidence under the
Rules, Plaintiff’s Counsel then apprised the trial Court that the “service” Plaintiff
provided to SAHA was affordable quality housing to low income families, along with
managing and maintaining Plaintiff’s own apartment complex for the tenants referred
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through the Section 8 program. See R.R. P. 15/L. 20–P. 17/L. 24. Still, the trial Court
appeared unpersuaded:
COURT [To Appellee’s Counsel]: Mr. Jones, I want to know what good or
service you’re providing to SAHA that would get you underneath the
governmental immunity. It sounds to me that you’re not providing anything
to SAHA.
R.R. P. 17/L. 25–P. 18/L. 3.
Plaintiff did not make a prima facie showing of waiver of immunity by merely
amending its petition and citing, with no supporting facts, that jurisdiction was invoked
pursuant to Texas Local Government Code, Section 271.152 (See C.R. at 23–24). See
Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice v. Miller, 51 S.W.3d at 586–87.
Furthermore, an attenuated or indirect benefit to a governmental entity provided
for in a contract is insufficient to waive immunity. See E. Houston Estate Apts., L.L.C. v.
City of Houston, 294 S.W.3d 723, 736–37 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.)
(concluding that “while the City would benefit in a general way from the availability of
more housing for low-income families” there was no “service” provided directly to the City
and low-income housing was “clearly not the type of ‘service’ envisioned by section
271.152”).
It would be a mischaracterization to assert, as Appellee is alleging, that the
contract in question is some type of a management contract that benefited SAHA because
Plaintiff was providing housing to low income families (Appellee’s Brief at 2, 10).
Common sense would not allow such a conclusion and Appellant would direct the
Court’s attention to the title of the Contract: a Housing Assistance Payments Contract
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(HAP Contract) Pursuant to the Section 8 Tenant-Based Assistant Housing Choice
Voucher Program, which is a standard form contract prescribed by the U.S. Department
of Housing and Urban Development. See C.R. at 2 and 24. The essential terms of the
contract in question provided for Plaintiff receiving federal funds through the Housing of
Urban Development (“HUD”) in exchange for providing low income housing that met
housing quality standards to qualified families in the community. As asserted in
Plaintiff’s pleadings, SAHA was merely an administrator of the funds and ensured that
the quality housing standards were met by conducting inspections. See C.R. at 2–3, 25,
27. If anyone received a direct benefit from the contract, it was the Plaintiff and the low
income families. They were the primary beneficiaries of the contract.
Additionally, Plaintiff references in its Response Brief to SAHA’s Mission,
Housing Choice Voucher Guideline Book and all references to SAHA’s website should
be disregarded. It in no way evidences that the contract was a services contract that would
waive SAHA’s immunity. Furthermore, this was not before the trial Court and therefore,
should be disregarded. See Hendee v. Dewhurst, 228 S.W.3d 354 (Tex. App.—Austin
2007, pet. denied) (analyzing the scope of evidentiary review for a plea to the
jurisdiction). In this case, the Court’s evidentiary review solely turns on the Plaintiff’s
pleadings, which affirmatively negates the existence of jurisdiction.
For the foregoing reasons, the trial Court should have granted Defendant’s Plea to
the Jurisdiction and further, Appellee’s unsubstantiated request for Sanctions should be
denied.
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II.
The East Houston Estate Apts., L.L.C. v. City of Houston
Court’s Ruling is Controlling in this Matter
Appellant concedes that the contract the subject of suit in East Houston Estate
Apartments, L.L.C. v. City of Houston, was not a Housing Assistance Payments Contract,
but the facts related to the contract in East Houston significantly parallel those in this
matter and therefore, the Court’s holding is instructive herein. In East Houston, the City
of Houston loaned the Plaintiff, East Houston Estate Apartments, funds that were
furnished by the federal government, as in this case, via the U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development, to assist in the rehabilitation of Plaintiff’s apartment complex.
E. Houston Estate Apartments, 294 S.W.3d at 726. Additionally, as in this case, in order
to receive the federal funding, the Agreement in East Houston required the apartment
owner to provide housing to low income families, in addition to regulating the rent that
the Plaintiff apartment owner could charge for its units pursuant to HUD’s standards. Id.
at 727. Serento attempts to distinguish this matter from the case in East Houston by
claiming that Serento had a “continuing and on-going agreement to continue to provide
low income housing” to SAHA, while the Plaintiff apartment owner in E. Houston did
not. (Appellee’s Brief at 6–7). This is simply untrue. The facts noted in East Houston
explicitly state that the terms of the contract in question required that the Plaintiff
apartment owner provide low income housing for a period of 15 years from completion
of the rehabilitation project. E. Houston Estate Apartments, 294 S.W.3d at 727, 733 (The
Court stated, “Here, the loan agreement was made to provide funding to a private entity,
East Houston [apartment owner], for the purpose of rehabilitating an apartment complex
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to provide very low-income and low-income housing . . . .”). The Houston Court of
Appeals rejected the Plaintiff’s argument, as Serento asserts herein, that it provided the
“service” of low income housing to the City’s residents and found that this did not waive
immunity pursuant to Sections 271.151 and 271.152 of the Texas Local Government
Code. Id. at 634–37.
For the foregoing reasons, the trial Court should have granted Defendant’s Plea to
the Jurisdiction and Appellee’s improper request for Sanctions should be denied.
III.
If Applied in the Context of Contract Cases, the Proprietary/Governmental
Dichotomy Entitles SAHA to its Shield of Immunity
Appellee quoted in its Brief that the Texas Supreme Court in Tooke v. City of
Mexia stated that “‘[t]he Texas Tort Claims Act clearly waives a municipality’s
governmental immunity from liability and suit for certain tort claims arising out of its
governmental functions. A municipality’s ‘governmental functions’ are those functions
conducted ‘in the performance of purely governmental matters solely for the public
benefit.”’ (Appellee’s Brief at 12). This alleged quoted statement is found nowhere in the
Tooke opinion and instead, is in stark contrast to what the Texas Supreme Court actually
stated. Instead, the Tooke Court indicated:
The proprietary-governmental dichotomy has been used to determine a
municipality’s immunity from suit for tortious conduct. The distinction has
not been a clear one, but generally speaking, a municipality’s proprietary
functions are those conducted ‘in its private capacity, for the benefit only of
those within its corporate limits, and not as an arm of the government,’
while its governmental functions are ‘in the performance of purely
governmental matters solely for the public benefit.’ A municipality is not
immune from suit for torts committed in the performance of its proprietary
functions, as it is for torts committed in the performance of its
6
governmental functions. But we have never held that this same distinction
determines whether immunity from suit is waived for breach of contract
claims, and we need not determine that issue here.
Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325, 343 (Tex. 2006) (emphasis added) (internal
citations omitted). Indeed, providing low income housing is considered a governmental
function pursuant to the Texas Legislature. See TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 373.002.
However, this matter is a breach of contract claim, not a tort claim, and therefore, the
foregoing principle is irrelevant and not controlling herein.
Nonetheless, while the Supreme Court in Tooke and this Appellate Court has not
applied the proprietary-governmental dichotomy to contract cases, assuming, merely for
the sake of argument, that it did apply, SAHA would also be entitled to immunity because
providing low income housing is considered a governmental function as defined by the
Texas Legislature. Id.
IV.
Prayer
Appellant, SAN ANTONIO HOUSING AUTHORITY, respectfully prays this
Court deny Appellee’s Motion for Sanctions, reverse the trial court’s Order of January
22, 2015, denying SAHA’s Plea to the Jurisdiction, and dismiss Plaintiff’s suit against
SAHA for want of subject matter jurisdiction. Appellant prays for such other and further
relief, at law or in equity, to which it may be justly entitled.
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Respectfully submitted,
_______________________________
N. MARK RALLS
State Bar No. 16489200
Email: mralls@hfdlaw.com
APRIL Y. QUIÑONES
State Bar No. 24069756
Email: aquinones@hfdlaw.com
HOBLIT DARLING RALLS
HERNANDEZ & HUDLOW LLP
Bank of America Plaza
300 Convent Street, Suite 1450
San Antonio, Texas 78205
Telephone No. (210) 224-9991
Facsimile No. (210) 226-1544
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT,
SAN ANTONIO HOUSING AUTHORITY
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been served upon
on all counsel named below in the manner indicated below, on the 26th day of May, 2015.
James A. Rickerson Via Facsimile: 210-734-8097
Law Office of James A. Rickerson & File Time E-Service:
111 E. Euclid rickersonlaw@aol.com
San Antonio, Texas 78212
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee
Charles P. Jones Via Facsimile: 210-526-0207
Law Office of Charles P. Jones & File Time E-Service:
115 N. Cibolo Street cpjlaw@yahoo.com
San Antonio, Texas
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee
By: ______________________________
N. MARK RALLS
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