Sonya Kay Hargett v. State ( 2015 )


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  •                                                                          ACCEPTED
    06-15-00022-CR
    SIXTH COURT OF APPEALS
    TEXARKANA, TEXAS
    6/4/2015 5:41:25 PM
    DEBBIE AUTREY
    CLERK
    No. 06-15-00022-CR
    IN THE
    FILED IN
    6th COURT OF APPEALS
    SIXTH COURT OF APPEALS                  TEXARKANA, TEXAS
    at TEXARKANA                   6/4/2015 5:41:25 PM
    DEBBIE AUTREY
    _____________________________                  Clerk
    SONYA KAY HARGETT,
    Appellant,
    v.
    STATE OF TEXAS,
    Appellee.
    _____________________________
    Appealed from the 71st District Court
    for Harrison County, Texas
    APPELLANT’S BRIEF
    Jason D. Cassel
    Texas State Bar No. 24006970
    jdc@emafirm.com
    ALBRITTON LAW FIRM
    P.O. Box 2649
    Longview, Texas 75606
    Telephone (903) 757-8449
    Facsimile (903) 758-7397
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
    Sonya Kay Hargett
    APPELLANT REQUESTS ORAL ARGUMENT
    No. 06-15-00022-CR
    SONYA KAY HARGETT,
    Appellant,
    v.
    STATE OF TEXAS,
    Appellee.
    ______________________________________________________
    IDENTITY OF THE PARTIES AND COUNSEL
    ________________________________________________________
    Appellant certifies that the following is a complete list of the parties,
    attorneys and any other person who has any interest in the outcome of this
    lawsuit:
    Sonya Kay Hargett
    APPELLANT
    Jason D. Cassel
    Texas State Bar No. 24006970
    jdc@emafirm.com
    ALBRITTON LAW FIRM
    P.O. Box 2649
    Longview, Texas 75606
    Telephone (903) 757-8449
    Facsimile (903) 758-7397
    ATTORNEY FOR THE APPELLANT ON APPEAL & TRIAL
    ii
    THE STATE OF TEXAS
    APPELLEE
    Coke Solomon
    Harrison County District Attorney
    Shawn Connally
    Harrison County Assistant District Attorney
    200 West Houston, Suite 206
    Marshall, Texas 75670
    Telephone (903) 935-8408
    Facsimile (903) 938-9312
    ATTORNEYS FOR THE STATE OF TEXAS
    iii
    TABLE OF CONTENTS
    IDENTITY OF THE PARTIES AND COUNSEL .................................................. ii
    TABLE OF CONTENTS ..........................................................................................iv
    INDEX OF AUTHORITIES...................................................................................... v
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................................................................................. 1
    ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ..................................................................... 3
    The drug testing results and expert testimony were not admissible
    under Article 38.35(d)(1) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure
    where the evidence showed the lab was not accredited by DPS as
    required, the testing was confirmatory and the lab was not under
    contract with the probation department at the time of the analysis. Ms.
    Hargett was harmed by this error.
    STATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................................................................ 3
    SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ........................................................................ 5
    ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................. 5
    CONCLUSION AND PRAYER ............................................................................. 11
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ………………..………….....................................11
    iv
    INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
    A. Cases
    Casey v. State, 
    215 S.W.3d 870
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2007 ........................................... 5
    Ellison v. State, 
    201 S.W.3d 714
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) ........................................ 5
    Ex parte Doan, 
    369 S.W.3d 205
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) ......................................... 9
    Ex parte Roberts, 
    409 S.W.3d 759
    (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, no pet.) .... 5, 10
    Kelly v. State, 
    824 S.W.2d 568
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) ........................................... 2
    B.      Statutes
    Tex. Code. Crim. Proc. Art. 38.35 ...................................................2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10
    Texas Government Code §411.0205 ...............................................................6, 7, 10
    v
    No. 06-15-00022-CR
    SONYA KAY HARGETT,
    Appellant,
    v.
    STATE OF TEXAS,
    Appellee.
    _________________________________________________________
    APPELLANT’S BRIEF
    _________________________________________________________
    Appellant, Sonya Hargett, submits her brief. Appellant will be referred to
    as Ms. Hargett. Appellee, the State of Texas, will be referred to as the State.
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE
    On June 18, 2009, Ms. Hargett was arrested for felony Driving While
    Intoxicated and indicted on November 23, 2009. CR 6-7. Approximately a year
    later, on November 1, 2010, Ms. Hargett pleaded guilty to felony DWI and,
    pursuant to a plea agreement, was sentenced to 10 years in prison probated for 5
    years. CR23-33. One of the conditions was that Ms. Hargett abstain from the use
    of alcohol and controlled substances. CR 32. On or about August 27, 2014, the
    State filed an Application for Revocation of Probation alleging that Ms. Hargett
    tested positive for methamphetamine on July 21, 2014 and methamphetamine and
    ETG/Alcohol on August 18 2014. CR 54.
    1
    The State’s Application was set for hearing on October 6, 2014. CR 68. On
    the same day the State filed a Motion for Continuance and the case was reset until
    December 17, 2014 to subpoena the chemist that performed the testing from
    Redwood Toxicology in California. CR 68, 71.
    On December 17, 2014, the State abandoned the July 21 allegation,
    proceeding with August 18, 2014 allegations. RR 4. Ms. Hargett pleaded not true1.
    RR 6. During the hearing, Ms. Hargett objected to the admission of the results of
    testing on two grounds, that the State failed to prove the scientific predicate of the
    testing under Kelly v. State, 
    824 S.W.2d 568
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) and that the
    results were not admissible under the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article
    38.35(d)(1) because “The Lab” was not a DPS accredited lab and that they were
    performing “confirmatory testing” while they were not under contract with the
    probation department. RR 24, 28-37. Ultimately, Ms. Hargett’s objection were
    overruled and the results were admitted. RR 35-38. The court found that Ms.
    Hargett had “violated her probation,” revoked her probation and sentenced her to 2
    years in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. RR 78 and CR 87. Ms. Hargett
    timely filed a notice of appeal. CR 92.
    1
    The judgment revoking probation mistakenly indicates that Ms. Hargett pleaded true to the
    allegations in the motion to revoke. CR87.
    2
    ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
    1.    The drug testing results and expert testimony were not admissible
    under Article 38.35(d)(1) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure
    where the evidence showed the lab was not accredited by DPS as
    required, the testing was confirmatory and the lab was not under
    contract with the probation department at the time of the analysis.
    Ms. Hargett was harmed by this error.
    STATEMENT OF FACTS
    On December 17, 2014, the court heard the application to revoke Ms.
    Hargett’s probation. RR 4. The only allegations were that Ms. Hargett tested
    positive for methamphetamine and ETG/alcohol on or about August 18, 2014. RR
    6. The State first called, Tanya Boyd, a Harrison County Probation Officer that
    testified she obtained the urine sample from Ms. Hargett on the date in question.
    RR 8-9. Ms. Boyd testified that she had Ms. Hargett urinate in a “plain foam cup,”
    like a coffee cup. RR 14. The urine was then poured into a separate container,
    which is depicted in State’s Exhibit 1 and 2. RR 14-15. Ms. Boyd then packed the
    sample and it was then sent to Redwood Laboratory. RR 13, 15. The sample was
    later “split” and a portion sent to “The Lab” in Tyler, Texas. RR 21-22.
    3
    The State next called Tommy Thompson, the director of “The Lab.” RR 16.
    Mr. Thompson testified that “The Lab” is a DPS and DEA registered lab, meaning
    they are registered to handle controlled substances. RR 17, 28. Mr. Thompson,
    however, testified they are not a DPS accredited lab nor has they ever applied for
    accreditation. RR 28, 29, 31. Mr. Thompson testified that he was asked to
    perform confirmatory testing on Ms. Hargett’s urine in this case. RR 19, 24, 28.
    Furthermore, he testified that he had been in communication about “providing
    confirmation testing for the county” and believed or thought he was at the time he
    testified, under contract with the county, but ultimately did not know if the contract
    had been fully executed. RR 24, 26-28. Ms. Hargett objected on the basis of
    Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 38.35(d)(1) that the results were
    inadmissible because “The Lab” was not accredited by DPS under the Government
    Code and they were performing confirmation testing while not under contract with
    the probation department. RR 29-31. The objection was overruled. RR 30. Later,
    the trial court pointed out the exclusion for presumptive testing if performed under
    contract with a probation department. RR 78. Ms. Hargett repeated her objections
    and noted Mr. Thompson testified he was performing confirmatory testing and he
    was not even sure he was under contract at the time he testified, much less when he
    performed the analysis as required by statute. RR 78. Ms. Hargett’s probation was
    revoked, assessing her punishment at 2 years in TDCJ-ID. RR78.
    4
    SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
    The trial court erred by overruling Ms. Hargett's objection to the testimony
    of purported expert and the results of the testing performed by Mr. Thompson
    under Article 38.35(d)(1) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.
    ARGUMENT
    The standard of review in evaluating a trial court's decision to admit or
    exclude expert testimony is an abuse of discretion. Ellison v. State, 
    201 S.W.3d 714
    , 723 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). A trial court abuses its discretion when its
    decision lies outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. Casey v. State, 
    215 S.W.3d 870
    , 879 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). However, the trial court's application of
    the law to undisputed facts is reviewed de novo. Ex parte Roberts, 
    409 S.W.3d 759
    , 762 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, no pet.).
    Article 38.35 provides in relevant part:
    “Except as provided by Subsection (e), a forensic analysis of physical evidence
    under this article and expert testimony relating to the evidence are not admissible
    in a criminal action if, at the time of the analysis, the crime laboratory conducting
    the analysis was not accredited by the director under Section 411.0205,
    Government Code.”2”
    2
    This a link to a list in state labs accredited by the Texas Department of Public Safety as
    provided by the Government Code.
    https://www.txdps.state.tx.us/CrimeLaboratory/documents/List_Texas_LabsAccredited
    5
    Subsection (e) provides:
    “A forensic analysis of physical evidence under this article and expert
    testimony relating to the evidence are not inadmissible in a criminal action based
    solely on the accreditation status of the crime laboratory conducting the analysis if
    the laboratory:
    (A)   except for making proper application, was eligible for accreditation by
    the director at the time of the examination or test; and
    (B)   obtains accreditation from the director before the time of testimony
    about the examination or test.”
    Lastly, “[f]orensic analysis" means a medical, chemical, toxicologic,
    ballistic, or other expert examination or test performed on physical evidence,
    including DNA evidence, for the purpose of determining the connection of the
    evidence to a criminal action. The term includes an examination or test requested
    by a law enforcement agency, prosecutor, criminal suspect or defendant, or court.
    The term does not include:
    (A)   latent print examination;
    (B)   a test of a specimen of breath under Chapter 724, Transportation
    Code;
    (C)   digital evidence;
    6
    (D)   an examination or test excluded by rule under Section 411.0205(c),
    Government Code;
    (E)   a presumptive test performed for the purpose of determining
    compliance with a term or condition of community supervision or parole and
    conducted by or under contract with a community supervision and corrections
    department, the parole division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, or the
    Board of Pardons and Paroles; or
    (F)   an expert examination or test conducted principally for the purpose of
    scientific research, medical practice, civil or administrative litigation, or other
    purpose unrelated to determining the connection of physical evidence to a criminal
    action.” Emphasis added.
    Here, Mr. Thompson purported to testify about the results of his
    toxicological testing of Ms. Hargett’s urine. RR 38. He testified his testing was
    confirmatory in nature. RR 19, 24, 28. He testified that he performed testing on or
    about October 24, 2014. RR 44. Mr. Thompson indicated he had sent a contract to
    “Mr. Cooper in the probation department” sometime between November and
    September but was unsure if it had been executed at the time he testified. RR 27-
    28. Mr. Thompson testified unequivocally that he was not accredited by the Texas
    Department of Public Safety. RR 28, 29, 31.
    7
    Ms. Hargett contends the results were inadmissible because the results were
    a toxicological test performed by an unaccredited lab and alternatively, that the
    testing was confirmatory in nature, performed by a lab not under contract with the
    probation department at the time of the analysis.
    First, the analysis of Ms. Hargett’s urine is a “forensic analysis.” A forensic
    analysis includes chemical and toxicological testing. Tex. Code. Crim. Proc. Art.
    38.35 (a)(4). However, Article 38.35(a)(4)(E) provides an exclusion to “forensic
    analysis.”   Specifically, “a presumptive test performed for the purpose of
    determining compliance with a term or condition of community supervision or
    parole and conducted by or under contract with a community supervision and
    corrections department, the parole division of the Texas Department of Criminal
    Justice, or the Board of Pardons and Paroles.” The State’s contention was that a
    probation revocation hearing is a “quasi-criminal action” and “not fully a criminal
    action.” RR 29-30.
    However, Article 38.35(a)(2) defines “criminal action as including “an
    investigation, complaint, arrest, bail, bond, trial, appeal, punishment or other
    matter related to conduct proscribed by a criminal offense.”     Furthermore, in Ex
    parte Doan, 
    369 S.W.3d 205
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2012), the Court of Criminal
    Appeals held that a probation revocation and a separate criminal prosecution were
    “criminal, judicial proceedings with nearly identical procedural rules.” While the
    8
    issue Doan revolved around double jeopardy concerns related to a theft allegation,
    the Court pointed out that a probation revocation “sought to prove theft in order
    have the appellant's criminal punishment from a prior case altered to his
    detriment.” Ex parte 
    Doan, 369 S.W.3d at 212
    . Here, it is clear that the State
    sought to prove a forensic analysis of her urine in order to impose Ms. Hargett’s
    criminal punishment. Accordingly, the probation revocation is a criminal action as
    defined by Article 38.35.
    Next, the trial court noted the exclusion of presumptive testing performed
    under contract with a community supervision department. RR 78. This, however,
    provides no refuge for the State.    Mr. Thompson repeatedly testified he was
    performing confirmatory testing.     RR 19, 24, 28.      Secondly, he could not
    equivocally state he was under contract with the “probation department” at the
    time of the hearing much less at the time of the analysis. RR 27-28. Thus, the
    State has failed to prove they are entitled to the exclusion provided by Article
    38.35 (a)(4)(E).
    This brings to the forefront section (d)(1) which provides that forensic
    analysis and expert testimony relating to the evidence are not admissible if at the
    time of the analysis, the laboratory is not accredited as provided by the Texas
    Government Code. Tex. Code of Crim. Proc. Art. 38.35(d)(1). It is undisputed
    9
    that “The Lab” was not accredited by the Texas Department of Public Safety as
    required by Texas Government Code §411.205. RR 28, 29, 31.
    Where the facts are undisputed, the trial court's application of the law is
    reviewed de novo. Ex parte Roberts, 
    409 S.W.3d 759
    , 762 (Tex. App.—San
    Antonio 2013, no pet.). Accordingly, this Court should review the decision to
    allow Mr. Thompson’s testimony de novo.
    The testimony reflects that Mr. Thompson performed a forensic analysis of
    Ms. Hargett’s urine to determine whether she violated probation and punishment
    should be imposed. The Lab was not properly accredited and his testimony was
    inadmissible under Article 38.35(d)(1) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.
    The trial court abused his discretion in admitting Mr. Thompson’s testimony and
    the results of his testing.
    CONCLUSION AND PRAYER
    Based on the record and the law before it, Ms. Hargett prays that the Court
    of Appeals reverse the trial court’s decision to revoke her probation on the basis of
    the erroneously admitted test results.
    Respectfully submitted,
    _________________________
    JASON D. CASSEL
    Texas State Bar No. 24006970
    jdc@emafirm.com
    10
    ALBRITTON LAW FIRM
    P.O. Box 2649
    Longview, Texas 75606
    Telephone (903) 757-8449
    Facsimile (903) 758-7397
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
    SONYA KAY HARGETT
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
    This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing
    Appellant’s Brief has been forwarded to the Harrison County District Attorney’s
    Office on this 4th day of June, 2015.
    _________________________
    JASON D. CASSEL
    11
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 06-15-00022-CR

Filed Date: 6/4/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/29/2016