Steven Lamon Moore v. State ( 2015 )


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  •                                                                      ACCEPTED
    12-15-00195-CR
    TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS
    TYLER, TEXAS
    11/30/2015 12:00:00 AM
    Pam Estes
    CLERK
    ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED
    NO. 12-15-00195-CR            FILED IN
    12th COURT OF APPEALS
    TYLER, TEXAS
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS    11/28/2015 5:41:54 PM
    12TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT          PAM ESTES
    Clerk
    TYLER, TEXAS
    STEVEN MOORE,
    APPELLANT
    VS.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS,
    APPELLEE
    ON APPEAL IN CAUSE NUMBER 007-0446-15
    FROM THE 7TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
    OF SMITH COUNTY, TEXAS
    HONORABLE KERRY RUSSELL, JUDGE PRESIDING
    APPELLANT’S BRIEF
    JAMES W. HUGGLER, JR.
    100 E. FERGUSON, SUITE 805
    TYLER, TEXAS 75702
    903-593-2400
    STATE BAR NUMBER 00795437
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
    IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
    APPELLANT:
    Steven Moore
    APPELLANT’S TRIAL COUNSEL:
    O.W. Loyd
    1507 Frost Street
    Gilmer, Texas 75644
    903-843-9469
    APPELLANT’S APPELLATE COUNSEL
    James Huggler
    100 E. Ferguson, Suite 805
    Tyler, Texas 75702
    903-593-2400
    903-593-3830 (fax)
    APPELLEE
    The State of Texas
    APPELLEE’S TRIAL COUNSEL
    Morgan Biggs
    Brent Ratekin
    Smith County Criminal District Attorney’s Office
    100 N. Broadway, 4th Floor
    Tyler, Texas 75702
    903-590-1720
    903-590-1719 (fax)
    APPELLEE’S APPELLATE COUNSEL
    Michael West
    Smith County Criminal District Attorney’s Office
    100 N. Broadway, 4th Floor
    Tyler, Texas 75702
    903-590-1720
    903-590-1719 (fax)
    ii
    TABLE OF CONTENTS
    PAGE
    IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
    TABLE OF CONTENTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
    TABLE OF AUTHORITIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
    ISSUES PRESENTED. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
    Issue One: By entering a finding of guilt, prior to receiving any
    evidence as to punishment, the trial court foreclosed deferred
    adjudication as a possible sentence violating his right to due
    process of law under the United States Constitution.
    Issue Two: By entering a finding of guilt, prior to receiving any
    evidence as to punishment, the trial court foreclosed deferred
    adjudication as a possible sentence violating his right to due
    course of law under the Texas Constitution.
    STATEMENT OF THE FACTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
    SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
    ARGUMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
    ISSUE ONE, RESTATED. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
    ISSUE TWO, RESTATED.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
    A. The Law Requires a Neutral Tribunal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
    B. Application to These Facts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
    C. Structural Error Analysis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
    iii
    D. Remedy and Relief Requested.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
    PRAYER FOR RELIEF. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
    CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
    iv
    TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
    CONSTITUTIONS
    U.S. CONST. Amend. XIV.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
    TEX. CONST. art. I, §19. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
    STATUTES
    TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(d) (West 2014). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
    TEX. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE ANN. §481.112 (West 2014).. . . . . . . 1, 3
    CASES
    Arizona v. Fulminante, 
    4449 U.S. 279
    , 
    111 S. Ct. 1246
    ,
    
    113 L. Ed. 2d 302
    (1991).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
    Ex parte Brown, 
    158 S.W.3d 449
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). . . . . . . . . . . . 5
    Brumit v. State, 
    206 S.W.3d 639
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). . . . . . . . . . . . 5
    Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 
    411 U.S. 778
    , 
    93 S. Ct. 1756
    , 36 L.Ed.2d (1973). . 5
    Lagrone v. State, 
    84 Tex. Crim. 609
    , 
    209 S.W. 411
    (1919). . . . . . . . . . . 5
    McClenan v. State, 
    661 S.W.2d 108
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1983). . . . . . . . . . 6
    Texeira v. State, 
    89 S.W.3d 190
    (Tex. App. – Texarkana
    2002, pet. ref’d). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
    RULES
    TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
    TEX. R. APP. P. 38.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
    v
    NO. 12-15-00195-CR
    STEVEN MOORE                                  ,§   IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    APPELLANT                                      §
    §
    VS.                                            §   12TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
    §
    THE STATE OF TEXAS,                            §
    APPELLEE                                       §   TYLER, TEXAS
    APPELLANT’S BRIEF
    TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
    AND THE JUSTICES THEREOF:
    Steven Moore (“Appellant”), by and through his attorney of record,
    James Huggler, and pursuant to the provisions of TEX. R. APP. PROC.38,
    et seq., respectfully submits this brief on appeal.
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE
    Appellant       was indicted for the first degree felony offense of
    possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance, cocaine, in an
    amount of between four and two hundred grams. I CR 4.1 TEX. HEALTH
    1
    References to the Clerk’s Record are designated “CR” with a roman numeral preceding CR
    specifying the correct volume and an arabic numeral following “CR” specifying the correct page
    in the record.
    1
    AND   SAFETY CODE ANN. §481.12(a) and (d) (West 2014). Prior to jury
    selection, Mr. Moore entered a plea of guilty without an agreement to the
    indictment, and true pleas to the enhancements. I CR 43 and 46, III RR
    54, 55 and 64.2 Following evidence and argument of counsel at a later
    hearing, the trial court imposed a thirty-five year sentence. I CR 59; IV
    RR 20. Notice of appeal was timely filed on August 6, 2015. I CR 66.
    This brief is timely filed on or before November 30, 2015.
    ISSUES PRESENTED
    Issue One: By entering a finding of guilt, prior to receiving any evidence
    as to punishment, the trial court foreclosed deferred adjudication as a
    possible sentence violating his right to due process of law under the
    United States Constitution.
    Issue Two: By entering a finding of guilt, prior to receiving any evidence
    as to punishment, the trial court foreclosed deferred adjudication as a
    possible sentence violating his right to due course of law under the Texas
    Constitution.
    2
    References to the Reporter’s Record are made using “RR” with a roman numeral preceding
    “RR” indicating the correct volume and an arabic number following specifying the correct page.
    2
    STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
    The case involves possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. I
    CR 4; TEX. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE §§ 481.112(a) and (d) (West 2014).
    This first degree felony was enhanced to a habitual offense by the
    inclusion of two previous sequential felony convictions. I CR 4. TEX.
    PENAL CODE ANN. §12.42(d) (West 2014). Prior to the selection of a jury,
    and on the day of trial, Mr. Moore entered a plea of guilty without an
    agreement to the offense as alleged including the enhancement
    paragraphs.   I CR 43; III RR 54.       Following the admission of the
    stipulation, the trial court found Mr. Moore guilty of the offense, the
    enhancement paragraphs true and recessed for a later punishment
    hearing. III RR 73. Following evidence and argument of counsel, the
    court sentenced Mr. Moore to thirty-five years confinement, no fine and
    court costs were assessed. IV RR 20; I CR 59-60.
    Counsel has reviewed the record in the case thoroughly, and
    presents two issues. A discussion of relevant facts for those issues is
    included in the argument section of this brief.
    3
    SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
    By finding Mr. Moore guilty of the offense with only the stipulation
    of evidence before him, the trial court necessarily foreclosed any option,
    even a remote one, of allowing the finding of guilt be deferred. This
    prevented even the opportunity to seek a possible resolution in the case.
    ARGUMENT
    Issue One, Restated: By entering a finding of guilt, prior to receiving any
    evidence as to punishment, the trial court foreclosed deferred
    adjudication as a possible sentence violating his right to due process of
    law under the United States Constitution.
    Issue Two, Restated: By entering a finding of guilt, prior to receiving any
    evidence as to punishment, the trial court foreclosed deferred
    adjudication as a possible sentence violating his right to due course of
    law under the Texas Constitution.
    A. The Law Requires a Neutral Tribunal
    The Fourteenth Amendment provides that the state may not
    “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.
    U.S. CONST. Amend. XIV. No citizen of this State shall be deprived of life,
    liberty, property, privileges or immunities, or in any manner
    4
    disenfranchised, except by the due course of the law of the land. TEX.
    CONST. art. I, §19. Due process requires that the trial court conduct itself
    in a neutral and detached manner. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 
    411 U.S. 778
    ,
    786, 
    93 S. Ct. 1756
    , 1762, 36 L. Ed. 2d (1973); Brumit v. State, 
    206 S.W.3d 639
    , 645 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). A trial court’s arbitrary refusal to
    consider the entire range of punishment in a particular case violates due
    process. Ex parte Brown, 
    158 S.W.3d 449
    , 456 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005);
    Brumit at 645.
    The law contemplates that the trial judge shall maintain an attitude
    of impartiality throughout the trial. Lagrone v. State, 
    84 Tex. Crim. 609
    ,
    
    209 S.W. 411
    , 415 (1919). A court denies due process and due course of
    law if it arbitrarily refuses to consider the entire range of punishment for
    an offense or refuses to consider the evidence and imposes a
    predetermined punishment. Teixeira v. State, 
    89 S.W.3d 190
    , 192 (Tex.
    App. – Texarkana 2002, pet. ref’d).
    A court denies due process and due course of law if it arbitrarily
    refuses to consider the entire range of punishment for an offense or
    refuses to consider the evidence and imposes a predetermined
    punishment. Ex parte Brown, 
    158 S.W.3d 449
    , 454 (Tex. Crim. App.
    5
    2005); McClenan v. State, 
    661 S.W.2d 108
    , 110 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
    B. Application to These Facts
    Mr. Moore entered his plea of guilty, the stipulation of evidence and
    was almost immediately found guilty by the trial court prior to any
    evidence regarding punishment in the case. While the trial court knew
    the state had alleged prior convictions, the court, at that point in time, did
    not know if there might be some set of circumstances which would make
    the appropriate resolution in the case being to defer a finding of guilt and
    allow Mr. Moore the opportunity to prove himself to the court. I CR 4, 15-
    16. While that possibility is remote for a habitual offender, the law still
    allows a deferral of guilt to occur in this case.
    The State may argue that because of the motion to suppress, and a
    lengthy discussion of the facts and a review of video evidence prior to the
    entry of the plea, the trial court had enough information to make this
    determination. III RR 4-48. However, that only concerned the actions on
    the day alleged in the indictment, and the court would not have been
    aware of any other circumstances in Mr. Moore’s life which might affect
    a sentencing decision.
    6
    C. Structural Error Analysis
    These errors in conjunction constitute structural error and need not
    be preserved by contemporaneous objection and require a reversal of these
    judgments. Structural error affects the conduct of the trial and is not
    subject to a harm analysis. Arizona v. Fulminante, 
    449 U.S. 279
    , 309-310,
    
    111 S. Ct. 1246
    , 
    113 L. Ed. 2d 302
    (1991). Structural error has been found
    in the deprivation of the right to an impartial judge. 
    Id. It is
    anticipated that the State will object to these two points of error
    by arguing that there were no timely objections to the trial court’s
    comments. However, that analysis side-steps the issue of whether or not
    this is structural error. If it is structural error as Appellant contends, no
    contemporaneous objection is necessary.
    D. Remedy and Relief Requested
    The judgment of conviction should be reversed and the case
    remanded to the trial court, the trial court should be recused and a
    neutral magistrate should hear the revocation proceedings or assess
    sentence.
    7
    PRAYER FOR RELIEF
    WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Appellant respectfully
    pays that the trial court’s judgment be reversed in accordance with the
    first and second issues.
    Respectfully submitted,
    /s/ James Huggler
    James W. Huggler, Jr.
    State Bar Number 00795437
    100 E. Ferguson, Suite 805
    Tyler, Texas 75702
    903-593-2400
    903-593-3830 fax
    jhugglerlaw@sbcglobal.net
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
    8
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
    A true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of the Appellant has been
    forwarded to counsel for the State by regular mail or electronic filing on
    this the 28th day of November, 2015.
    /s/ James Huggler
    James W. Huggler, Jr.
    Attorney for the State:
    Mr. Mike West
    Smith County Criminal District Attorney’s Office
    100 N. Broadway, 4th Floor
    Tyler, Texas 75702
    CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
    I certify that in compliance with TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4, this document
    contains 1, 906 words as calculated by Corel WordPerfect version X5 using
    14 point Century font and complies with the other requirement of Rule
    9.4.
    /s/ James Huggler
    James W. Huggler, Jr.
    9