Kevin Mauldin v. Ransom Industries, Inc. D/B/A Tyler Pipe and McWane, Inc. ( 2014 )


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  •                                  NO. 12-14-00071-CV
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT
    TYLER, TEXAS
    KEVIN MAULDIN,                                  §      APPEAL FROM THE 241ST
    APPELLANT
    V.                                              §      JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
    RANSOM INDUSTRIES, INC. D/B/A
    TYLER PIPE AND MCWANE, INC.,                    §      SMITH COUNTY, TEXAS
    APPELLEES
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Kevin Mauldin appeals from the trial court’s order dismissing his suit against Ransom
    Industries, Inc. d/b/a Tyler Pipe and McWane, Inc. for want of prosecution. In one issue,
    Mauldin contends that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing his suit for want of
    prosecution. We affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    In 2003, Mauldin joined several others in suing Ransom and McWane over their alleged
    improper treatment of employees, including wrongful discharge. In 2007, Mauldin and the other
    plaintiffs agreed with Ransom and McWane to a severance so that each plaintiff’s case would be
    tried separately. The record provides no indication that Mauldin’s case was set for trial at any
    point after the severance.
    In 2014, the trial court provided Mauldin with notice of a dismissal for want of
    prosecution hearing. In its notice, the trial court informed Mauldin that it was dismissing his
    claims against Ransom and McWane unless Mauldin made (1) a written request for a trial setting
    and (2) a written motion to retain “showing good and sufficient cause” that his claims should not
    be dismissed for want of prosecution.
    Mauldin filed a motion to retain and request for jury trial. In his motion, Mauldin
    claimed that he still desired to prosecute his claims against Ransom and McWane. He further
    stated that he had requested a jury trial setting in 2011. He also contended that he had exercised
    due diligence in prosecuting his claims and that he was ready for trial. Although he referenced
    an attachment in his motion, Mauldin did not attach any exhibits.
    At the hearing on Mauldin’s motion to retain, Mauldin’s attorney reiterated that he had
    requested a jury trial setting in 2011. Mauldin’s attorney also claimed that he had contacted the
    trial court’s office regarding his request for a jury trial setting. However, he provided no proof
    of any additional contact with the trial court regarding the request for trial setting. At the
    conclusion of the hearing, the trial court dismissed Mauldin’s claims against Ransom and
    McWane based on Mauldin’s want of prosecution.
    This appeal followed.
    DISMISSAL FOR WANT OF PROSECUTION
    In his sole issue, Mauldin argues that the trial court abused its discretion by arbitrarily
    dismissing his cause of action for want of prosecution.
    Standard of Review
    We review a dismissal for want of prosecution under a clear abuse of discretion standard.
    MacGregor v. Rich, 
    941 S.W.2d 74
    , 75 (Tex. 1997) (per curiam). A trial court abuses its
    discretion if it acts in an unreasonable or arbitrary manner, without reference to any guiding rules
    or principles. Walker v. Gutierrez, 
    111 S.W.3d 56
    , 63 (Tex. 2003). A trial court acts arbitrarily
    and unreasonably if it could have reached only one decision, but instead reached a different one.
    See Teixeira v. Hall, 
    107 S.W.3d 805
    , 807 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet.). To that end, a
    trial court abuses its discretion when it fails to analyze or apply the law correctly. In re Sw. Bell
    Tel. Co., L.P., 
    226 S.W.3d 400
    , 403 (Tex. 2007). We may not substitute our judgment for that
    of the trial court. 
    Walker, 111 S.W.3d at 63
    .
    Applicable Law
    A trial court’s authority to dismiss a case for want of prosecution can be based upon
    either (1) Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 165a or (2) the court’s inherent power. Villareal v. San
    Antonio Truck & Equip., 
    994 S.W.2d 628
    , 630 (Tex. 1999). As applicable to this case, under
    Rule 165a, a trial court may place a case on the dismissal docket when a party seeking
    2
    affirmative relief fails to comply with the time standards promulgated by the Supreme Court of
    Texas under its Administrative Rules. TEX. R. CIV. P. 165a(2). Rule 6.1(b) of the Rules of
    Judicial Administration provides that, so far as reasonably possible, civil jury cases, other than
    family law cases, should be disposed of within eighteen months from the appearance date. TEX.
    R. JUD. ADMIN. 6.1(b). A trial court shall dismiss a case placed on the dismissal docket unless
    there is good cause for the case to be maintained on the docket. TEX. R. CIV. P. 165a(1).
    When a trial court utilizes its inherent power to dismiss a case for want of prosecution,
    the central issue is whether the plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence. 
    MacGregor, 941 S.W.2d at 75
    . The trial court may consider the entire history of the case, including the length of time the
    case was on file, the amount of activity in the case, the request for a trial setting, and the
    existence of reasonable excuses for delay. City of Houston v. Thomas, 
    838 S.W.2d 296
    , 297
    (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no pet.). The complaining party has the burden to bring
    forth a record to support its contention. Tex. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Olivas, 
    323 S.W.3d 266
    , 274 (Tex.
    App.—El Paso 2010, no pet.). The trial court's decision will be reviewed to determine whether
    the litigant demonstrated good cause for not prosecuting with greater diligence. 
    Id. When the
    record before us does not contain findings of fact or conclusions of law, and
    the trial court did not specify the standard of dismissal used, we must affirm on the basis of any
    legal theory supported by the record. City of Houston v. Robinson, 
    837 S.W.2d 262
    , 264 (Tex.
    App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no pet.).
    Analysis
    Mauldin had the burden to produce evidence at the hearing showing good cause for not
    prosecuting his case with greater diligence. See 
    Olivas, 323 S.W.3d at 274
    . To attempt to satisfy
    this burden, he told the trial court that, in 2011, he had requested a trial setting. He also claimed
    that he had contacted the trial court to follow up on the request, but he produced no proof of any
    follow up communications.
    By the time Mauldin’s case was placed on the dismissal docket, it had been pending for
    more than a decade. Mauldin had allowed years to go by with no activity in the case. In fact, in
    the last five years that the case was pending in the trial court, the only activity that Mauldin
    proved was a bare bones motion for a trial setting. Mauldin failed to prove good cause to keep
    his case on the docket. See 
    Olivas, 323 S.W.3d at 274
    . He also failed to prove that he exercised
    reasonable diligence. See 
    MacGregor, 941 S.W.2d at 75
    .
    3
    Under the record before us, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing
    Mauldin’s case for want of prosecution under either Rule 165a(2) or its inherent powers. See
    
    Teixeira, 107 S.W.3d at 807
    . Accordingly, we overrule Mauldin’s sole issue.
    DISPOSITION
    Having overruled Mauldin’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s order of dismissal.
    BRIAN HOYLE
    Justice
    Opinion delivered October 30, 2014.
    Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Griffith, J., and Hoyle, J.
    (PUBLISH)
    4
    COURT OF APPEALS
    TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    JUDGMENT
    OCTOBER 30, 2014
    NO. 12-14-00071-CV
    KEVIN MAULDIN,
    Appellant
    v.
    RANSOM INDUSTRIES, INC. D/B/A TYLER PIPE
    AND MCWANE, INC.,
    Appellees
    Appeal from the 241st District Court
    of Smith County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 03-0046-B/C/S13)
    THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record and briefs filed
    herein, and the same being considered, it is the opinion of this court that there was no error in the
    order of dismissal.
    It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the order of
    dismissal of the court below be in all things affirmed, and that all costs of this appeal are
    hereby adjudged against the appellant, KEVIN MAULDIN, for which execution may issue, and
    that this decision be certified to the court below for observance.
    Brian Hoyle, Justice.
    Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Griffith, J., and Hoyle, J.