in the Matter of the Estate of Willie Sue Hammack ( 2015 )


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  •                                                                                       ACCEPTED
    12-15-00246-CV
    TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS
    TYLER, TEXAS
    12/29/2015 2:24:05 PM
    Pam Estes
    CLERK
    DOCKET NO. 12-15-00246-CV
    ________________________________________________________
    FILED IN
    12th COURT OF APPEALS
    TYLER, TEXAS
    IN THE
    12/29/2015 2:24:05 PM
    TWELFTH COURT of APPEALS
    PAM ESTES
    OF TEXAS                               Clerk
    at Tyler
    ____________________________________________
    In the Matter of the Estate of Willie Sue Hammack, Deceased
    LARRY GENE MARSH, BILLIE MARIE BUCKLEY, DEBORAH SUE STUART,
    AND
    TERRY LYN MARSH,
    Appellants,
    v.
    ESTATE OF WILLIE SUE HAMMACK BY MORRISON HAMMACK, JR.,
    Appellee.
    ____________________________________________
    Appeal in Cause No. PB1412226
    From the County Court at Law, Nacogdoches County, Texas
    The Honorable Jack Sinz, Judge
    ____________________________________________
    BRIEF FOR APPELLEE ESTATE OF WILLIE SUE HAMMACK BY
    MORRISON HAMMACK, JR.,
    -1-
    I. Identity of Parties, Counsel and Trial Court
    APPELLEE / APPLICANT
    ESTATE OF WILLIE SUE HAMMACK BY MORRISON HAMMACK, JR.
    COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE / TRIAL COUNSEL FOR APPLICANT
    Christopher C. Hughes
    1801 North St.
    Nacogdoches, Texas 75963
    Tex. Bar No. 24074452
    Ph: (936)-569-2327Fax: (936)-569-7932
    Email: chughes@chugheslaw.com
    Russell R. Smith
    1801 North St.
    Nacogdoches, Texas 75963
    Tex. Bar No. 24074452
    Ph: (936)-569-2327Fax: (936)-569-7932
    Email: rsmith@fairchildlawfirm.com
    APPELLANTS / CONTESTANTS
    LARRY GENE MARSH
    BILLIE MARIE BUCKLEY
    DEBORAH SUE STUART, AND
    TERRY LYN MARSH
    COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS / CONTESTANTS
    TRIAL COUNSEL:
    Robert M. Minton
    Texas Bar No. 14195000
    Minton & Brown, PLLC
    P.O. Box 1688
    Henderson, Texas 75653
    Ph: 903-657-3543
    Fax: 903-657-3545
    Email: mintonbrown@suddenlinkmail.com
    -2-
    APPELLATE COUNSEL:
    Robert M. Minton
    Texas Bar No. 14195000
    Minton & Brown, PLLC
    P.O. Box 1688
    Henderson, Texas 75653
    Ph: 903-657-3543
    Fax: 903-657-3545
    Email: mintonbrown@suddenlinkmail.com
    TRIAL COURT
    The Honorable Jack Sinz
    County Court at Law
    Nacogdoches County, Texas
    -3-
    II. Table of Contents
    I. Identity of Parties and Counsel ...................................................................................... .2
    II. Table of Contents ........................................................................................................... 4
    III. Index of Authorities ...................................................................................................... 5
    IV. Statement of the Case ................................................................................................... 1
    V. Issues Presented ............................................................................................................. 7
    VI. Statement of Facts ........................................................................................................ 9
    VII. Summary of the Argument ......................................................................................... 10
    VIII. Argument .................................................................................................................. 11
    IX. Conclusion/Prayer ...................................................................................................... 21
    -4-
    III. Index of Authorities
    Cases
    In re Estate of Allen, 
    407 S.W.3d 335
    , (Tex. App. Eastland 2013) ......................... 11,12,13
    In re Estate of Perez, 
    324 S.W.3d 257
    , 262 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2010, no pet.)…….….11
    In re Estate of Cornes, 
    175 S.W.3d 491
    , 495 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, no
    pet.)………………………………………………………………………………..11,17,19
    Schindler v. Schindler, 
    119 S.W.3d 923
    , 929 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, pet. den'd)…11,19
    Chovanec v. Chovanec, 
    881 S.W.2d 135
    , 137 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no
    writ………………………………………………………………………………...11,12,14
    Kamoos v. Woodward, 
    570 S.W.2d 6
    , 8-9 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1978, writ ref'd
    n.r.e.)…………………………………………………………………………...12,13,14,18
    Estate of Everett H. Rothrock Deceased, 
    312 S.W.3d 271
    (2010)…………………...17,18
    In Re Estate of Campbell, 
    343 S.W.3d 899
    (Tex. App. Amarillo, 2011) ........................... 18
    Brown v. Byrd, 
    512 S.W.2d 753
    (Tex. Civ. App. Tyler, 1974)………………………..18,19
    Orr v. Walker, 
    438 S.W.3d 766
    (Tex. App. Houston-1st Dist., 2014). ............................... 19
    In Re Estate of Williams, 
    111 S.W.3d 259
    (Tex. App. Texarkana, 2003)………………..20
    Statutes
    Texas Estate Code 256.003 ................................................................................................ 11
    -5-
    IV. Statement of the Case
    This is an Appeal from the Order Admitting Will to Probate as Muniment of Title. Entered
    by the County Court at Law of Nacogdoches County, Texas, of a Will filed more than four
    years after the death of the Testatrix. The evidence at the Trial Court was factually and
    legally sufficient to support the Judgment of the Court, finding that Applicant, Morrison
    Hammack, Jr. was not in default for failing to present the will for probate within four years
    of the date of death of Testatrix.
    -6-
    V. Issues Presented for Review
    Appellant presented the following issues for review:
    1. The evidence supporting the Trial Court’s finding that the Applicant was not in
    default for failing to present the will for probate within four years of the date of
    death of Decedent was factually insufficient, (CR-56, CR 74-75).
    2. The Trial Court’s finding that the Applicant was not in default for failing to present
    the will for probate within four years of the date of Decedent’s death was so
    against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly
    unjust, (CR-56, CR 74-75).
    3. The evidence supporting the Trial Court’s finding that the Applicant was not in
    default for failing to present the will for probate within four years of the date of
    death of Decedent was legally insufficient, (CR-56, CR 74-75).
    7
    DOCKET NO. 12-15-00246-CV
    ________________________________________________________
    IN THE
    TWELFTH COURT of APPEALS
    OF TEXAS
    at Tyler
    ____________________________________________
    In the Matter of the Estate of Willie Sue Hammack, Deceased
    LARRY GENE MARSH, BILLIE MARIE BUCKLEY, DEBORAH SUE STUART,
    AND
    TERRY LYN MARSH,
    Appellants,
    v.
    ESTATE OF WILLIE SUE HAMMACK BY MORRISON HAMMACK, JR.,
    Appellee.
    ____________________________________________
    Appeal in Cause No. PB1412226
    From the County Court at Law, Nacogdoches County, Texas
    The Honorable Jack Sinz, Judge
    ____________________________________________
    BRIEF FOR APPELLEE ESTATE OF WILLIE SUE HAMMACK BY
    MORRISON HAMMACK, JR.,
    TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:
    The Trial Court’s Order Admitting Will to Probate as Muniment of Title entered on June
    25, 2015 should be affirmed.
    8
    Statement of Facts
    1. This is an Appeal from an Order Admitting Will to Probate as Muniment of Title. (CR-56).
    Willie Sue Hammack passed away on July 2, 2006 in Nacogdoches County. Morrison Hammack,
    Jr. was the husband of Willie Sue Hammack at the time of her death. Willie Sue Hammack left a
    valid will dated April 2, 1986, which was never revoked. (CR-17). Morrison Hammack, Jr. was
    named as Independent Executor in the will. Generally, the will provided for the transfer of Willie
    Sue Hammack’s separate property to her children from a prior marriage. Additionally, the will
    provided for the residue of Willie Sue Hammack’s estate to pass to Morrison Hammack, Jr. Mor-
    rison Hammack, Jr. was unaware of the necessity to probate the will nor did he know there was a
    statute of limitations. Morrison Hammack, Jr. became aware of the necessity to probate the will
    in May 2014, when attempting to sell his house. He subsequently retained counsel and then filed
    an Application for Probate of Will as Muniment of Title with the County Court at Law in Nacog-
    doches County, Texas on July 17, 2014, in order to remedy the title issues. (CR-8). Contestants
    Larry Gene Marsh, Billie Marie Buckley, Deborah Sue Stuart, and Terry Lyn Marsh filed their
    Contest to Probate of Last Will and Testament of Willie Sue Hammack, and Codicils (if any) on
    July 31, 2014, on grounds that the will could not be probated due to the passing of the statute of
    limitations. (CR-26). Contestants filed their contest despite the concession that it was Willie Sue
    Hammack’s wishes for the residue of the estate to pass to Morrison Hammack, Jr. (RR-49-50). As
    such, this case is motivated by Appellants attempts to subvert the intentions of Willie Sue Ham-
    mack and prevent Morrison Hammack Jr. from inheriting by and through the will.
    9
    Summary of the Argument
    The Trial Court correctly determined and the evidence legally and factually supports that
    Morrison Hammack, Jr. was not in default for failing to probate the will of Willie Sue
    Hammack within four years of her death. The Trial Court correctly determined and the
    evidence shows that there was good cause to explain the failure of Morrison Hammack,
    Jr. to present the will for probate within four years from the date of Willie Sue
    Hammack’s death.
    10
    Argument
    Appellee hereby responds to the issues presented for review by Appellant. Appellee’s reply
    points can all be covered at one time and in one argument to avoid duplication of same.
    Appellee’s reply points to the issues presented for review by Appellant are as follows:
    A. The evidence supporting the Trial Court’s finding that Applicant was not in
    default was legally and factually sufficient. The Trial Court’s finding that
    Applicant was not in default for failing to present the will for probate within 4
    years of the date of Decedent’s death was not against the great weight and
    preponderance of the evidence. The arguments supporting same are as follows:
    1. The Texas Estates Code provides for the following as it relates to the probate of
    a will: “A will may not be admitted to probate after the fourth anniversary of the
    testator's death unless it is shown by proof that the applicant for the probate
    of the will was not in default in failing to present the will for probate on or
    before the fourth anniversary of the testator's death.” Tex. Est. Code 256.003(a)
    (emphasis added). A long line of Texas case law has determined that “"default"
    means the "failure to probate a will because of the absence of reasonable
    diligence on the part of the party offering the instrument."” See In re Estate of
    Allen, 
    407 S.W.3d 335
    , (Tex. App. Eastland 2013); In re Estate of Perez, 
    324 S.W.3d 257
    , 262 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2010, no pet.); In re Estate of Cornes, 
    175 S.W.3d 491
    , 495 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, no pet.); Schindler v. Schindler,
    
    119 S.W.3d 923
    , 929 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, pet. den'd); Chovanec v.
    11
    Chovanec, 
    881 S.W.2d 135
    , 137 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ);
    Kamoos v. Woodward, 
    570 S.W.2d 6
    , 8-9 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1978,
    writ ref'd n.r.e.).
    2. Similarly, “The case law in Texas is quite liberal in permitting a will to be offered
    as a muniment of title after the statute of limitations has expired upon the
    showing of an excuse by the proponent for the failure to offer the will earlier.”
    In re Estate of Allen, 
    407 S.W.3d 335
    ; 
    Chovanec, 881 S.W.2d at 137
    ; 
    Kamoos, 570 S.W.2d at 8
    . Furthermore, “[t]he tendency of our courts has been from its
    earliest decisions to permit wills to be filed after the four-year period, where
    there is any evidence of a probative force which would excuse the failure to offer
    the will sooner.” In re Estate of Allen, at 335.
    3. “The court in Chovanec, reversing a summary judgment, held that the evidence
    raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the decedent's husband was
    in default for failing to timely offer her will for probate within four years of her
    death; he offered the will for probate thirteen years after her death. The court
    reasoned that the summary judgment evidence showed that the husband was not
    aware that it was necessary to probate the will, that he did not believe probate
    was necessary because he inherited everything from his wife, that he believed
    the land was his separate property, and that he was unaware of any title problems
    during a period when three successive mineral leases had been executed on the
    land” In re Estate of Allen, 
    407 S.W.3d 335
    ; Chovanec, 
    881 S.W.2d 135
    .
    12
    4. “Kamoos stands for the proposition that a proponent's belief that probate was
    unnecessary, coupled with a concern over the cost of probate, can constitute
    legally and factually sufficient evidence to support admitting a will to probate
    after four years” In re Estate of Allen, 
    407 S.W.3d 335
    ; 
    Kamoos, 570 S.W.2d at 8
    -9.
    5. “Similar to the facts in Kamoos, the court in Perez found that the wife's limited
    financial resources and belief that probate was unnecessary were legally
    sufficient to uphold the trial court's conclusion that the wife was not in default
    for failing to present the will for probate within four years after her husband's
    death. She testified that she did not know that there was a time limit in which to
    probate a will and that she thought her husband's lawyer had taken care of the
    matter regarding the will.” In re Estate of Allen, 
    407 S.W.3d 335
    ; 
    Perez, 324 S.W.3d at 263
    .
    6. In this case, Morrison Hammack, Jr. was not in default according to the case law
    outlined above. According to Morrison Hammack, Jr.’s deposition testimony,
    he (1) did not know he was supposed to do anything with his wife’s will (RR-11
    through 12); (2) did not know what probate means (RR-17); (3) did not know
    there was a time limit to file the will (RR-12); (4) thought everything had been
    done as far as the will goes (RR-12); (5) did not have the money to file the will
    even if he had known to do so (RR-12); (6) only filed the will because he needed
    to clear up title issues to sell his house (RR-12); and (7) he hired an attorney to
    13
    file the will almost immediately after he learned the will must be filed (RR-12
    through 13).
    7. As such, the evidence supporting the Trial Court’s finding that Applicant was
    not in default was legally and factually sufficient. Additionally, the Trial Court’s
    finding that Applicant was not in default for failing to present the will for probate
    within 4 years of the date of Decedent’s death was not against the great weight
    and preponderance of the evidence.
    B. Rebuttal of Appellant’s argument and suggestions as to ability of Morrison
    Hammack, Jr.’s financial ability.
    1. At trial and here, Appellants have focused almost wholly on disproving
    Appellee’s contention that he lacked the financial resources to proceed with
    probating the will even if he had been aware that probate was necessary.
    However, Appellee points out that the financial consideration is only a piece of
    the reasoning behind the holding in Kamoos. 
    Kamoos, 570 S.W.2d at 8
    -9. In a
    very similar factual scenario, the Court in Chovanec said a fact issue existed
    because the proponent was “not aware that it was necessary to probate the will,
    but also that he did not believe probate was necessary because he inherited
    everything from his wife and he believed the land was his separate property.
    [Proponent] also was unaware of any title problems during a period when three
    successive mineral leases had been executed on the land. When [proponent]
    realized there may be title problems, he immediately offered the will for probate.”
    
    Chovanec, 881 S.W.2d at 137
    . The same scenario existed here. There was a fact
    14
    issue as to whether Appellee was in default and the Trial Court properly
    determined based upon the evidence that Appellee was not in default.
    Appellant’s attempts to show that Appellee had the financial capability to
    proceed with probate are 1) lacking based on the evidence, and 2) not persuasive
    even if found to be true based upon the relevant case law. However, in an effort
    to thoroughly address all of Appellant’s points, rebuttal arguments are outlined
    below.
    2. Appellants make reference in their brief to Appellee’s testimony regarding
    “money in account in the bank” (Appellant’s Brief page 7). In particular, Mr.
    Minton’s question to Appellee was “Did you-all have any money in the bank or
    any accounts in the bank at the time of her death?” (RR-20). Mr. Minton failed
    to specify whether his question was inquiring as to 1) money in the bank or 2)
    accounts in the bank. (RR-20). Nevertheless, the record does not reflect any
    evidence or testimony concerning 1) the amount in the bank account (although
    Appellee was asked (RR-20-21)); or 2) the type of account. For example, if the
    account was a payable on death account and payable to John Doe upon the death
    of Willie Sue Hammack, Mr. Hammack would not have had the benefit of the
    funds in said account to use for the probate of the will. Hypothetically, if the
    account had a balance of $5.00 upon the death of Willie Sue Hammack, Mr.
    Hammack again would not have been in possession of financial resources
    necessary to proceed with the probate of the will.
    15
    3. Next, Appellants make reference Appellee’s testimony concerning his
    community property interest in the home he occupied with his late wife.
    Appellants argument that Appellee had sufficient funds to pay for the probate
    process seems disingenuous to the extent Appellants insinuate that Appellee
    should have sold the home he occupied to liquidate his one-half community
    property interest in order to probate the will in which his wife devised her one-
    half community property interest in the home to Appellee. In short, these are not
    funds that Appellee should have been expected to liquidate to probate a will that
    he did not know needed to be probated.
    4. Thirdly, Appellees refer to testimony concerning the value of the estate
    (Appellant’s Brief page 7). As discussed above, estate assets are not funds that
    Appellee should have been expected to liquidate to probate a will that he did not
    know needed to be probated. Because there were no issues surrounding the
    distribution of separate property remaining, Mr. Hammack only became aware
    of the necessity for probate when trying to sell the only substantial asset
    remaining in the estate, the home. According to the will, this property was to
    pass to Mr. Hammack. (CR-19).
    5. Lastly, Appellants generally refer to testimony from Mr. Marsh concerning
    accounts of Mr. and Mrs. Hammack (Appellant’s Brief page 8). Appellants make
    reference to testimony from Mr. Marsh concerning the balance of accounts of
    Mr. and Mrs. Hammack’s approximately two years and two strokes prior to Mrs.
    Hammack’s death. Of course, the record reflects no evidence of the balances on
    16
    the accounts upon the death of Mrs. Hammack. Similarly, the record reflects no
    evidence concerning the amounts that were necessary to be expended from the
    accounts to pay for medical care of Mrs. Hammack. Lastly, the record reflects
    no evidence concerning the types of the accounts and/or their disposition upon
    the death of Mr. and Mrs. Hammack. Again, Appellant’s arguments as to the
    financial ability of Appellee are lacking and futile.
    C. Appellants’ case law references are not on point. A detailed analysis of each main
    case referenced by Appellants to support their position is outlined below with a
    brief explanation as to why each case is not applicable and/or not persuasive.
    1. Estate of Everett H. Rothrock Deceased, 
    312 S.W.3d 271
    (2010). There are
    numerous issues that are immediately clear when reviewing this case. In
    Rothrock, the children of the deceased chose and agreed not to probate the will
    within the four-year time period. 
    Id. At 273.
    Rather, the proponent requested
    and received two cameras from the deceased’s estate. 
    Id. Proponent testified
    that
    he performed an investigation into decedent’s property holdings. See generally,
    
    Id. He also
    testified that he was a very successful lawyer in Washington D.C. 
    Id. One would
    think this would provide him with both the knowledge of the
    necessity to probate and the finances with which to do so. Upon analysis, the
    Court stated “[a] family agreement is not sufficient to excuse Jerry's
    noncompliance with the four-year limitation. See In re Estate of 
    Cornes, 175 S.W.3d at 496
    . In other words, Jerry cannot rely on the agreement with his five
    siblings as an excuse for noncompliance with the statutory period and for making
    17
    what was, in hindsight, the wrong decision.” Id at 275. The main difference
    between Rothrock and this case is that there was a conscious decision by the
    parties in Rothrock to not probate the will. Here, Appellee did not know probate
    was necessary and did not make a conscious decision to not probate the will. In
    fact, upon his learning that probate was necessary, he immediately commenced
    the process. In short, Rothrock is not analogous to this case.
    2. In Re Estate of Campbell, 
    343 S.W.3d 899
    (Tex. App. Amarillo, 2011).
    Appellants point out that Campbell cites language indicating that a person is
    charged with knowledge that a will must be filed for probate within four years.
    However, Appellants omitted the Court in Campbell’s next sentence which states
    “[b]ut see Kamoos v. Woodward, 
    570 S.W.2d 6
    , 8-9 (Tex.App.--San Antonio
    1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that proponent of will was not in default for
    failing to present the will for probate within four years of the testator's death
    where due to the nature of the property of which she was aware and her limited
    resources, she didn't think it necessary to probate the will). In Re Estate of
    Campbell, 
    343 S.W.3d 899
    , 903 (Tex. App. Amarillo, 2011). As such, Campbell
    is not persuasive in the case at hand.
    3. Brown v. Byrd, 
    512 S.W.2d 753
    (Tex. Civ. App. Tyler, 1974). In this 1974 case,
    the proponent offered the will for probate 27 years after the death of the decedent.
    Additionally, the holding in the Byrd case seemed to be reasoned around
    circumstances surrounding a family agreement during the years after the
    decedent’s death. Moreover, the proponent in Byrd said it would have been hard
    18
    to travel from California to Texas to probate the will. Id at 755. Although it is an
    excuse, it does not appear to be a reasonable excuse. In the case at hand,
    Appellee’s reasoning for not having probated the will within four years run
    deeper than inconveniences of travel. As such, the facts of the Byrd case do not
    match with the facts of the case at hand. Moreover, the Byrd case is another
    example (as in Rothrock) of the failure to probate the will contingent upon a
    peripheral family agreement. Conversely, in the case at hand, Appellee had no
    discussions or knowledge surrounding the probate of the will until immediately
    before the filing in the trial court. Byrd is not persuasive.
    4. In Re Estate of Ruby Fowler Cornes, 
    175 S.W.3d 491
    (Tex. App. Beaumont,
    2005). The Cornes case is off target as it relates to Appellants’ argument. In
    Cornes, the proponent’s only excuse for not offering the will for probate within
    the four years was “out of respect” for the relatives. Id at 495. First, in this case,
    there is a multitude of evidence supporting the Trial Court’s ruling that Appellee
    was not in default for failing to probate the will within four years. Secondly, the
    testimony in Cornes again represents a conscious decision to not probate the will.
    Such a decision was not a factor in the case at hand. Cornes is not persuasive.
    5. Orr v. Walker, 
    438 S.W.3d 766
    (Tex. App. Houston-1st Dist., 2014). The Walker
    case is not on point merely for the fact that upon a reading of the case it is clear
    that the proponents did not offer an excuse for the failure to file the within the
    requisite four-year time period. Therefore, the Court held that the applicants
    were in default. The fact scenario is completely different in the case at hand
    19
    because Appellee proffered evidence supporting an excuse for not filing the will
    within the four-year time period. The Walker case does not stand for any
    proposition in contradiction to Appellee’s argument.
    6. Schindler v. Schindler, 119 S.W.3d (Tex. App. Dallas, 2003). Again, Appellants’
    reference to the Schindler case is off target and is not analogous to the case at
    hand. Some of the parties in Schindler were devisees of persons who were found
    to be in default. The parties that were found to be in default were labelled such
    because there was no evidence of an excuse. Similarly, other parties were found
    to be in default because they presented no evidence tending to support not being
    in default. Id at 930. Wholly, the Schindler case is not persuasive and/or
    analogous to the case at hand.
    7. In Re Estate of Williams, 
    111 S.W.3d 259
    (Tex. App. Texarkana, 2003). The
    Williams case is yet another example of the proponent not offering an excuse or
    evidence of not being in default for failure to offer the will within four years of
    the death of the decedent. Again, the Williams case is not relevant to the case at
    hand because, as cited above, the evidence in this case is clear that Appellee had
    multiple reasonable excuses for not offering the will to probate within 4 years of
    the death of Mrs. Hammack and therefore the Trial Court properly found that he
    was not in default.
    20
    X. CONCLUSION
    From the evidence presented at trial, the Trial Court properly found the following:
    1) Appellee was not in default for failing to probate the will within four years from the date
    of Willie Sue Hammack’ s death, 2) there was good cause to explain the failure of Appellee
    to present the will for probate within four years after the death of Willie Sue Hammack. As
    such, the Trial Court properly admitted the will as a muniment of title. The evidence
    supporting the Trial Court’s finding that Applicant was not in default was legally and
    factually sufficient. The Trial Court’s finding that Applicant was not in default for failing
    to present the will for probate within four years of the date of Willie Sue Hammack’s death
    was not against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.
    XI. PRAYER
    WHEREFORE PREMISES CONSIDERED, Appellee prays that this Court uphold
    and affirm the Trial Court’s Order Admitting Will to Probate as Muniment of Title and also
    prays for all other and further relief which may, under the circumstances shown, be required.
    Respectfully Submitted,
    FAIRCHILD, PRICE, HALEY & SMITH, LLP
    By: /s/ Christopher C. Hughes
    Christopher C. Hughes
    State Bar No. 24074452
    Russell R. Smith
    State Bar No. 18682310
    1801 North St.
    Nacogdoches, Texas 75935-1719
    (936) 564-8785 phone
    21
    (936) 559-5000 fax
    chughes@chugheslaw.com
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
    In compliance with Rule 21a, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, I hereby certify that a
    true and correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument was served upon all attorneys
    of record on this the 29th day of December, 2015 by one and/or more of the following
    methods: (1) depositing said instrument in a post office or official depository under the care
    and custody of the United States Postal Service, postage prepaid, certified mail, return receipt
    requested, or first class mail; (2) telephonic transfer to recipient's current telecopier num-
    ber, or (3) hand delivered.
    /s/ Christopher C. Hughes
    Christopher C. Hughes
    22
    CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
    The undersigned certifies that the Appellee’s Brief, except for the caption, identity
    of parties and counsel, statement regarding oral argument, table of contents, index of
    authorities, statement of the case, statement of issues presented, statement of jurisdiction,
    statement of procedural history, signature, proof of service, certification, certification of
    compliance, and appendix, as set out in Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(i)(1), hereby contains the total
    of 3,297 words.
    Respectfully Submitted,
    FAIRCHILD, PRICE, HALEY & SMITH, LLP
    By: /s/ Christopher C. Hughes
    Christopher C. Hughes
    State Bar No. 24074452
    1801 North St.
    Nacogdoches, Texas 75935-1719
    (936) 564-8785 phone
    (936) 559-5000 fax
    chughes@chugheslaw.com
    23