Jefferson County, Texas v. Donna Davis ( 2014 )


Menu:
  • Supplemental Memorandum Opinion on Denial of Rehearing filed October
    30, 2014.
    In The
    Fourteenth Court of Appeals
    NO. 14-13-00663-CV
    JEFFERSON COUNTY, TEXAS, Appellant
    V.
    DONNA DAVIS, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 60th District Court
    Jefferson County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. B-182,252
    SUPPLEMENTAL  MEMORANDUM  OPINION
    ON DENIAL  OF REHEARING
    Although we deny the parties’ respective motions for rehearing, we issue
    this supplemental memorandum opinion to briefly address a jurisdictional
    argument raised by the County.
    In its motion for rehearing, the County attempts to challenge damage
    findings other than the assessment of damages for future mental anguish. Because
    future mental anguish was the only damage finding that was even arguably
    challenged in the County’s brief, its challenge to the other damage findings are
    waived. See Cajun Constructors, Inc. v. Velasco Drainage Dist., 
    380 S.W.3d 819
    ,
    821 n.1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. denied) (sub. op.); Harris
    County v. Nagel, 
    349 S.W.3d 769
    , 790 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011,
    pet. denied) (sub. op.).
    The County contends, however, that if the award of front pay constitutes
    compensable damages, then that award is subject to a $300,000 damages cap. The
    County further asserts that “the front pay issue implicates subject matter
    jurisdiction,” and suggests that we properly can consider its application whenever
    the issue is raised. See Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 
    852 S.W.2d 440
    ,
    443–44 (Tex. 1993) (“Subject matter jurisdiction is never presumed and cannot be
    waived.”).
    The County is mistaken in asserting that we can consider this argument. The
    damages cap concerns immunity from liability, not immunity from suit; thus,
    contrary to the County’s argument, a damages cap does not affect subject-matter
    jurisdiction. It instead is an affirmative defense that is waived if not pleaded. See
    Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Jones, 
    8 S.W.3d 636
    , 638 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam); Tex.
    Comm’n on Human Rights v. Morrison, 
    346 S.W.3d 838
    , 850 (Tex. App.—Austin
    2011), rev’d on other grounds, 
    381 S.W.3d 533
    (Tex. 2012) (per curiam); O’Dell
    v. Wright, 
    320 S.W.3d 505
    , 515–16 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, pet. denied);
    Shoreline, Inc. v. Hisel, 
    115 S.W.3d 21
    , 25 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, pet.
    denied); see also Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. v. Auld, 
    34 S.W.3d 887
    , 896–97,
    904 (Tex. 2000) (determining that a damages cap was adequately raised in
    plaintiff’s pleading and referring to such a “liability limitation” as an affirmative
    defense).
    2
    Because the damages cap was neither pleaded nor argued before now, the
    arguments concerning its application are waived.
    /s/       Tracy Christopher
    Justice
    Panel consists of Justices Christopher, Jamison, and McCally.
    3