Garcia, Jose Miguel ( 2015 )

PD-0787-15
IN THE TEXAS COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
_________________________________________________
JOSE MIGUEL GARCIA
APPELLANT
vs.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
APPELLEE
_________________________________________________
FROM THE FIFTH COURT OF APPEALS
CAUSE NO. 05-13-01578-CR
APPEAL FROM CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT NO. 2 OF
DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS, CAUSE NO. F12-35086-I
_________________________________________________
APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR
DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
_________________________________________________
BRUCE ANTON SORRELS, UDASHEN & ANTON
State Bar No. 01274700 2311 Cedar Springs, Suite 250
ba@sualaw.com Dallas, Texas 75201
214-468-8100 (office)
BRETT E. ORDIWAY 214-468-8104 (fax)
State Bar No. 24079086
bordiway@sualaw.com Counsel for Appellant
July 22, 2015
Ground for Review
Whether evidence that is merely legally sufficient
to support a conviction necessarily indicates the
conviction was “certain.”
2
Table of Contents
Ground for Review ...................................................................................... 2
Index of Authorities .................................................................................... 4
Identity of Parties and Counsel ................................................................. 5
Statement Regarding Oral Argument ....................................................... 6
Statement of the Case and Procedural History ........................................ 7
Argument .................................................................................................... 9
Evidence that is merely sufficient to support a conviction does not
necessarily mean the conviction was certain. They are related, yet
distinct, inquiries. ................................................................................... 9
Prayer ........................................................................................................ 17
Certificate of Service ................................................................................ 19
Certificate of Compliance ......................................................................... 19
Appendix ................................................................................................... 20
3
Index of Authorities
Cases
Alvarado v. State, 775 S.W.2d 851, 857 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1989,
pet. ref’d) ................................................................................................ 13
Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 135 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) ................ 16
Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 88 (1963) ............................................ 17
Garcia v. State, No. 05-13-01578-CR, 2015 WL 3451867 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2015)........................................................................... 8, 12, 14, 15
Gardner v. State, 730 S.W.2d 675, 698 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) ............. 11
Garrett v. State, 641 S.W.2d 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) ....................... 13
Harris v. State, 790 S.W.2d 568, 587–88 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) .......... 13
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) ........................................ 16
Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946) ............................. 17
Lopez v. State, 288 S.W.3d 148, 178 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 2009,
pet. ref’d) ................................................................................................ 17
Marshall v. State, 210 S.W.3d 618, 625 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)............ 16
Menefee v. State, 614 S.W.2d 167, 168 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) .............. 13
Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 259 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).......... 12, 14
Nauert v. State, 838 S.W.2d 328, 329 (Tex. App.—Austin 1992, pet.
ref’d) ....................................................................................................... 11
Rabb v. State, 434 S.W.3d 613, 616 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) .................. 16
Swearingen v. State, 101 S.W.3d 89, 95 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) ........... 16
Vasquez v. State, 819 S.W.2d 932, 936 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1991,
pet. ref’d) ................................................................................................ 11
Statutes
TEX. PEN. CODE § 21.02 .............................................................................. 8
Rules
TEX. R. APP. P. 21.8(c) ................................................................................. 8
TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b)............................................................................... 12
Treatises
George E. Dix & John M. Schmolesky, 43A TEXAS PRACTICE: CRIMINAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 51:1 (3d ed.) ............................................ 15
4
Identity of Parties and Counsel
For Appellant Jose Miguel Garcia:
RUSS HENRICHS
Trial counsel of record
RUSS HENRICHS & ASSOCIATES
P.O. Box 190983
Dallas, Texas 75291
JOHN HEATHER
Trial counsel of record
3409 Oak Grove Avenue, Suite 303
Dallas, Texas 75204
BRUCE ANTON
BRETT E. ORDIWAY
Appellate counsel of record
SORRELS, UDASHEN & ANTON
2311 Cedar Springs, Suite 250
Dallas, Texas 75201
For Appellee the State of Texas:
ROBBIE PFEIFFER
RENEE HARRIS
Trial counsel of record
DALLAS COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE
133 North Riverfront Boulevard
Dallas, Texas 75207
LISA MCMINN
Appellate counsel of record
DALLAS COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE
5
Statement Regarding Oral Argument
Garcia waives oral argument.
6
Statement of the Case and Procedural History
Garcia met Tania Aleman at the restaurant in which she worked.
(RR3: 14). They soon had two children together, in addition to Aleman’s
daughter from a previous relationship, the complainant, who Aleman
nonetheless raised to believe Garcia was her biological father. (RR3: 13-
15, 32).
When the complainant was a teenager, she accused Garcia of fon-
dling her beginning when she was seven years old. (RR3: 70). She al-
leged it progressed to oral sex, and then intercourse when she was ten
years old. (RR3: 78). A pediatric nurse practitioner found no physical ev-
idence of the complainant’s allegations, though, and, despite the com-
plainant’s contentions that the abuse occurred when others were in the
home, the complainant’s family members never observed any suspicious
behavior. (RR3: 212-213; RR4: 41-42, 50, 54). Additionally, two or three
weeks prior to the complainant’s outcry Aleman had confessed that
Garcia was not her biological father, and, in fact, even Aleman assumed
the complainant’s allegations were made in rebellion to learning Garcia
was not her biological father. (RR3: 32-35). Further, soon after accusing
7
Garcia the complainant was hospitalized for depression and suicidal
behavior. (RR3: 37-38).
A Dallas County grand jury nonetheless indicted Garcia on Janu-
ary 23, 2013, for continuous sexual abuse of a child. See TEX. PEN. CODE
§ 21.02. The State offered a plea bargain of 25 years’ imprisonment, but
there was “never really negotiat[ion] because Garcia “was [n]ever going
to accept.” (RR2: 5). He pleaded not guilty, and jury selection for his tri-
al began October 9, 2013. (RR2: 6-7). The trial spanned the following
two days, at the conclusion of which the jury found Garcia guilty. (RR4:
97). Approximately one month later, the parties reconvened and the
court sentenced Garcia to 35 years’ imprisonment. (RR5: 18; CR: 63-64).
Garcia then timely filed notice of appeal and a motion for a new trial,
the latter of which was overruled by operation of law. (CR: 68, 70); see
TEX. R. APP. P. 21.8(c).
Garcia then appealed to the Fifth Court of Appeals, raising one is-
sue. See Garcia v. State, No. 05-13-01578-CR, 2015 WL 3451867 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2015). The court overruled the issue and affirmed the trial
court’s judgment. Id. No motion for rehearing was filed.
8
Argument
Evidence that is merely sufficient to support a
conviction does not necessarily mean the convic-
tion was certain. They are related, yet distinct,
inquiries.
I
Upon the conclusion of the State’s short case-in-chief, in which the
State produced no forensic, eyewitness, or circumstantial evidence, but
instead relied solely on the complainant’s accusations, the State repeat-
edly argued to the jury, over objection, that it should nonetheless be-
lieve the complainant because others already had:
Prosecutor: [The complainant] was forensically inter-
viewed.
They’re trained to look for signs of coaching
and signs that they’re lying. And guess
what, [the police detective] was standing
out there watching that forensic interview.
If he thought she was lying, would he have
filed a case?
Defense: Objection, Judge. Improper argument re-
garding the credibility of the alleged victim.
The court: Overruled.
9
Prosecutor: Think about it. We brought you people who
know [the complainant]. All right? Your job
is to judge witness credibility.
Think about it. You do it every day in your
normal life. Somebody you don’t know well
comes up to you and says some story that
sounds a little bit outlandish, okay, and you
kind of call them on their bull crap; right?
Somebody you know that says something
that exaggerates something and you just
know they’re exaggerating.
We brought you the people who knew her.
When [her best friend] hears from her what
happened, he knew it was true. That’s why
he took her into [the dean of students].
When [the dean of students] saw how she
was acting and her demeanor, she knew it
was true. She called in an officer.
When [the police detective] was watching
that forensic interview, he knew what he
was hearing was the absolute truth.
Defense: Judge, objection to the bolstering and the
argument about the truth of the alleged vic-
tim, the alleged victim being the truth-
teller by these witnesses.
The court: Overruled.
10
(RR4: 90-92). In effect, then, the prosecutor argued to the jury that the
police, the complainant’s teacher, and the complainant’s best friend be-
lieved her to be telling the truth, and that, therefore, she was.
There is little question that the trial court erred in overruling
Garcia’s objections. This Court has clearly held that it is improper to
suggest to the jury during closing that it should defer to another’s as-
sessment of the truthfulness of testimony, no matter how “experienced”
that other may be, and in this case, it is plain that the State did just
that. Gardner v. State, 730 S.W.2d 675, 698 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
This Court held as much because, “[p]atently, determination of the cred-
ibility of a witness is the job of the factfinder.” Id. Accordingly, in Gar-
cia’s brief on appeal, he argued that the trial court erred in overruling
his objection to the prosecutor’s argument to the jury that it should be-
lieve the complainant simply because another did. (Ap. Br. at 11) (citing
id; see also Nauert v. State, 838 S.W.2d 328, 329 (Tex. App.—Austin
1992, pet. ref’d); Vasquez v. State, 819 S.W.2d 932, 936 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi 1991, pet. ref’d)).
11
The court of appeals didn’t disagree. Garcia v. State, No. 05-13-
01578-CR, 2015 WL 3451867, *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015). Instead, it
addressed “[t]he real question”: whether the trial court’s error affected
Garcia’s substantial rights. See (Ap. Br. at 12) (characterizing the harm
analysis as “[t]he real question) (citing Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249,
259 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (improper comments by the prosecutor re-
garding the honesty or credibility of participants are not considered
constitutional errors); TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b) (a non-constitutional error
must be disregarded unless it affected a substantial right); see also id.
As to that question, Garcia argued in his brief on appeal that, in
this case, where there was a total lack of evidence absent the complain-
ant’s testimony, the court should have grave and severe doubts that the
jury’s guilty verdict was free from the substantial influence of the pros-
ecutor’s improper argument suggesting her testimony was credible. (Ap.
Br. at 13-14) (citing Lopez v. State, 288 S.W.3d 148, 178 (Tex. App.–
Corpus Christi 2009, pet. ref’d) (in evaluating whether a non-
constitutional error affected an appellant’s substantial right, and where
the evidence is otherwise “not overwhelming,” even the uncertainty of
12
harm requires reversal); Menefee v. State, 614 S.W.2d 167, 168 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1981) (finding reversible error where prosecutor’s remarks
bolstered the testimony of the only witness); Garrett v. State, 641
S.W.2d 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (hearsay testimony offered to bolster
testimony of State’s principal witness was prejudicial)). “In this case, as
in almost any case, ‘[i]t is difficult to determine what evidence influ-
enced the jury in reaching [its] criminal verdict, without such a judicial
incursion into the mental processes of jurors.’” Lopez, 288 S.W.3d at 179
(quoting Alvarado v. State, 775 S.W.2d 851, 857 (Tex. App.—San Anto-
nio 1989, pet. ref’d)). But this reality, coupled with the improper argu-
ment’s great potential to disrupt the juror’s evaluation of the evidence,
should cause the reviewing court to seriously question whether the ju-
rors were properly able to apply law to facts in order to reach a just ver-
dict. See generally Harris v. State, 790 S.W.2d 568, 587–88 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1989) (“[T]he reviewing court should focus not on the weight of the
other evidence of guilt, but rather on whether the error at issue might
possibly have prejudiced the jurors' decision-making; it should ask not
whether the jury reached the correct result, but rather whether the ju-
13
rors were able properly to apply law to facts in order to reach a ver-
dict.”).
This time, the court of appeals disagreed. For three reasons:
1) The complainant’s “testimony alone was sufficient to support ap-
pellant's conviction”;
2) “The prosecutor's statements came after defense counsel had
characterized G.A. as someone who ‘heard voices’ and was there-
fore not credible”;
3) The court instructed the jury both orally and in writing that it was
“the exclusive judges of the facts proved, of the credibility of the
witnesses and the weight to be given to the testimony....”
Garcia, 2015 WL 3451867 at *3-4. The court’s opinion was entirely
based upon this Court’s in Mosley, in which this Court applied a three-
factor analysis “generally” used by federal courts in evaluating harm-
less error. Id. (citing Mosley, 983 S.W.2d at 259 (“In applying the federal
rule to improper argument cases, federal courts generally look to three
factors: (1) severity of the misconduct (the magnitude of the prejudicial
effect of the prosecutor's remarks), (2) measures adopted to cure the
14
misconduct (the efficacy of any cautionary instruction by the judge), and
(3) the certainty of conviction absent the misconduct (the strength of the
evidence supporting the conviction”)).
II
It is clear from the court of appeals’s opinion that it considered the
final Mosley factor—“the certainty of conviction absent the miscon-
duct”—as weighing in favor of a finding of harmlessness. See Garcia,
2015 WL 3451867 at *3. But the only basis on which the court conclud-
ed as much was that the complainant’s “testimony alone was sufficient
to support appellant’s conviction.” And while related, that is an entirely
distinct inquiry.
Evidence sufficiency “addresses not the persuasion of the trial fact
finder—the jury or if jury trial is waived the trial judge—on the basis of
this evidence but rather the scrutiny of this evidence to assure that it is
sufficient for the trial fact finder to reach a finding of guilt.” George E.
Dix & John M. Schmolesky, 43A TEXAS PRACTICE: CRIMINAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 51:1 (3d ed.). To that end, in evaluating the legal suf-
ficiency of the evidence, all that matters is whether, viewing the evi-
15
dence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational trier of fact
could have found the defendant guilty of all of the elements of the of-
fense beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Rabb v. State, 434 S.W.3d
613, 616 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307, 319 (1979); Swearingen v. State, 101 S.W.3d 89, 95 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2003)). This is far short of the standard required to find a person
guilty in the trial court. Indeed, evidence that rationally supports a ver-
dict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt under the Jackson v. Virginia
legal sufficiency standard does not even necessarily meet the since-
discarded factual sufficiency standard. Marshall v. State, 210 S.W.3d
618, 625 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). And that, too, required a “deferential
standard[ ] of review applied” to jury verdicts. Clewis v. State, 922
S.W.2d 126, 135 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Whether the evidence was le-
gally sufficient, then, is hardly indicative of whether Garcia’s conviction
was “certain” absent the trial court’s error. The former is insulated by
far too much deference.
It is for this reason that, in determining whether a substantial
right was affected, a reviewing court should not be concerned “with
16
whether there was sufficient evidence on which [Garcia] could have
been convicted.” Lopez, 288 S.W.3d at 178 (quoting Fahy v. Connecticut,
375 U.S. 85, 88 (1963)). The question, instead, is whether there is a rea-
sonable possibility that the prosecutor’s closing argument “might have
contributed to the conviction.” Fahy, 375 U.S. at 88. As the United
States Supreme Court explained in Kotteakos:
[I]f one cannot say, with fair assurance, after pondering all
that happened without stripping the erroneous action from
the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed
by the error, it is impossible to conclude that substantial
rights were not affected. The inquiry cannot be merely
whether there was enough to support the result, apart from
the phase affected by the error. It is rather, even so, whether
the error itself had substantial influence. If so, or if one is left
in grave doubt, the conviction cannot stand.
Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946) (emphasis added).
The court of appeals in this case did just the opposite: it evaluated
whether the evidence was sufficient, and, upon concluding it was, af-
firmed Garcia’s conviction. This was incorrect.
Prayer
Accordingly, Garcia respectfully requests this Court to grant this
petition so that it may reverse and remand this case to the court of ap-
17
peals to properly evaluate whether Garcia’s conviction was certain ab-
sent the trial court’s error.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Bruce Anton
BRUCE ANTON
Bar Card No. 01274700
/s/ Brett E. Ordiway
BRETT E. ORDIWAY
Bar Card No. 24079086
SORRELS, UDASHEN & ANTON
2311 Cedar Springs Road
Suite 250
Dallas, Texas 75201
bordiway@sualaw.com
(214)-468-8100 (office)
(214)-468-8104 (fax)
Attorneys for Appellant
18
Certificate of Service
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Appellant’s Petition for Discretionary Review was elec-
tronically served to the Dallas County District Attorney’s office on July
20, 2015.
/s/ Bruce Anton
Bruce Anton
Certificate of Compliance
Pursuant to TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(3), undersigned counsel certifies
that this brief complies with:
1. the type-volume limitation of TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(2)(D) because
this brief contains 1,702 words, excluding the parts of the brief ex-
empted by TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(1).
2. the typeface requirements of TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(e) and the type
style requirements of TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(e) because this brief has
been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft
Word 2011 in 14-point Century.
/s/ Bruce Anton
Bruce Anton
19
Appendix
20
Affirmed and Opinion Filed May 29, 2015
S In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-13-01578-CR
JOSE MIGUEL GARCIA, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 2
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F-12-35086-I
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Bridges, Lang-Miers, and Myers
Opinion by Justice Bridges
Jose Miguel Garcia appeals his continuous sexual abuse of a child conviction. A jury
convicted appellant, and the trial court sentenced him to thirty-five years’ imprisonment. In a
single issue, appellant argues the trial court erred in permitting the State to argue at closing that
the jury should believe the complainant’s accusations because others already had. We affirm the
trial court’s judgment.
Because appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support his
conviction, only a brief recitation of the facts is necessary. The complainant, G.A., was three
years old when her mother met appellant. G.A. grew up thinking that appellant was her
biological father. G.A. was “about seven” when appellant began touching her over her clothes
“and then he progressed to touching, going under [her] shirt and under [her] pants.” When G.A.
was eight, appellant began making her put her mouth on his penis. Eventually, appellant began
putting his penis in G.A.’s vagina, and this happened “over fifty times.” When G.A. was
fourteen, her mother told her that appellant was not her biological father. A “couple of weeks”
later, G.A. was “playing a game of telling secrets” with two friends at school by passing notes.
G.A. wrote “my dad touches me” in a note, and her friend responded with a “disgusted kind of
look” and initiated a follow-up conversation. The friend advised G.A. to go to the counselor,
Tracy Bennett. In response to G.A.’s disclosure, Bennett followed the protocol of notifying an
administrator, who in turn involved the school resource officer, Tom Goane, who was the “police
officer on campus.” Goane briefly questioned G.A. and contacted an Irving police detective,
Stephen Lee.
Appellant was subsequently indicted on a charge of continuous sexual abuse of a child.
In closing argument, defense counsel asserted the State had spent “the lion’s share of their time”
telling the jury why there was no proof of the underlying offense. Defense counsel argued, “the
only thing [the State has] is the assertions of [G.A.] and they spent their entire time telling you
why.” Defense counsel argued G.A. “changed her story . . . on the stand even.” Characterizing
G.A. as “embellishing” and adding to her story, defense counsel stated, “They said, well that’s
normal. The more she tells it the better it gets and the more she adds and the more she opens up.
Can you believe that beyond a reasonable doubt?” Defense counsel argued G.A.’s mother, when
first told of the allegations of abuse, did not believe G.A. and thought G.A. had made the
allegations “because she was mad because she had just found out [appellant] was to [sic] her
biological father.” Defense counsel argued the State was asking jurors to “Trust us. Why would
[G.A.] go through this.” Immediately, defense counsel raised the issue of G.A.’s mental health:
Well, they did find out that she was having a mental problem. She was having
ideation. She was hearing voices. She did hear voices say hurt people, hurt
people in the family. Well, this happened after she said all this began? But the
–2–
development preceded any of these allegations. She’s relating these things prior
to the allegations being made, these occurrences of hearing things.
Co-counsel for the defense emphasized that “whether she was sexually abused or not,”
G.A. was “a young girl with severe problems.” Co-counsel made the following argument:
The thing that [G.A.] said on the stand that which is telling is that she does hear
voices. That’s quite an astonishing thing. I’m so sorry to hear that, but it has to
be considered. The voices tell her to do things. They told her to harm her sister
and her brother. They told her to push down the grandfather, the shadowy figure
out there, the grandfather. Push him down. She was somewhat evasive. She
couldn’t remember when those voices talked to her but she did remember they
started a long time ago. So she is a person – if that doesn’t raise a reasonable
doubt, you might wonder what could. Can you base the verdict on the credibility
of a person who hears voices? It’s that simple really.
In his closing argument, the prosecutor urged the jury to “Remember the evidence. I’m
not going to try to mischaracterize it, all right, or change anything that people really said up
there. I’m just going to ask you to listen and you decide what’s reasonable and what makes
sense.” The prosecutor emphasized the many opportunities G.A. had to “take it back” and the
“financial ruin” that followed for the family once appellant went to jail. As to G.A.’s suicidal
thoughts and cutting, the prosecutor stated those behaviors started when G.A. was ten years old,
at the same time appellant began having sex with her. After the prosecutor raised the subject of
G.A.’s forensic interview, the following exchange occurred:
[PROSECUTOR]: [G.A.] was forensically interviewed. They’re trained to look
for signs of coaching and signs that they’re lying. And guess what, Detective Lee
was standing out there watching that forensic interview. If he thought she was
lying, would he have filed a case?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection, judge. Improper argument regarding the
credibility of the alleged victim.
[THE COURT]: Overruled.
[PROSECUTOR]: Think about it. We brought you people who know G.A. All
right? Your job is to judge witness credibility. Think about it. You do it every
day in your normal life. Somebody you don’t know well comes up to you and
says some story that sounds a little bit outlandish, okay, and you kind of call them
on their bull crap; right? Somebody you know that says something that
exaggerates something and you just know they’re exaggerating. We brought you
–3–
the people who knew her. When [[G.A.]’s friend from school] hears from her
what happened, he knew it was true. That’s why he took her in to Ms. Bennett.
When Ms. Bennett saw how she was acting and her demeanor, she knew it was
true. She called in an officer. When Detective Lee was watching that forensic
interview, he knew what he was hearing was the absolute truth.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, objection to the bolstering and argument about
the truth of the alleged victim, the alleged victim being the truth-teller by these
witnesses.
[THE COURT]: Overruled.
[PROSECUTOR]: So right up through . . . the therapist. She’s been seeing her
now for eleven months. Not one time did she ever have any reason to believe that
nothing happened. I mean, so you’re being asked -- folks, think about this. All
right? This is what you’re being asked to do. You’re being asked to believe that
G.A. made this all up, but for what? Okay? So let me get this straight then. The
smoking gun is that we have a teenager who would rather listen to music and not
do chores, and so therefore something must be wrong. All right? That’s absurd.
And how about finding out that that’s not really her biological dad. Think about
that. So let me get this straight. She finds out it’s not her biological dad. But I
guess then -- what does she gain then from saying that he sexually abused her?
What would she gain from that? All right?
The jury convicted appellant of continuous sexual abuse of a child, and this appeal followed.
In his sole point of error, appellant argues the trial court erred in permitting the State to
argue at closing that the jury should believe the complainant’s accusations because others
already had.
The trial court’s ruling on an objection to improper jury argument is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion. Garcia v. State, 126 S.W.3d 921, 924 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Proper areas
of jury argument are: (1) summation of the evidence; (2) reasonable deductions from the
evidence; (3) answers to argument of opposing counsel; and (4) pleas for law enforcement. See
Brown v. State, 270 S.W.3d 564, 570 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Counsel is generally given wide
latitude in drawing inferences from evidence as long as they are reasonable, fair, legitimate, and
offered in good faith. See Gaddis v. State, 753 S.W.2d 396, 398 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). We
review a trial court’s ruling on an objection to improper jury argument for abuse of discretion.
See Garcia, 126 S.W.3d at 924.
–4–
The State argues the prosecutor’s argument was a proper response to defense counsel’s
argument that G.A. was not credible. But see Gardner v. State, 730 S.W.2d 675, 698 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1987) (it is error to argue jury should believe witness simply because prosecutors and
investigators do).
However, even assuming without deciding the trial court erred in overruling appellant’s
objections, he cannot show he was harmed. Even if jury argument falls outside permissible
areas, an appellate court will not reverse unless the error is harmful. See Mosley v. State, 983
S.W.2d 249, 259 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). Improper jury argument is reviewed under rule
44.2(b) of the rules of appellate procedure and must be disregarded unless it affected appellant’s
substantial rights. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b); see Martinez v. State, 17 S.W.3d 677, 692-93 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2000). In determining whether appellant’s substantial rights were affected, we
consider: (1) the severity of the misconduct (the magnitude of the prejudicial effect of the
prosecutor’s remarks); (2) the measures adopted to cure the misconduct (the efficacy of any
cautionary instructions by the judge); and (3) the certainty of conviction absent the misconduct
(the strength of the evidence supporting the conviction). Mosley, 983 S.W.2d at 259.
Here, G.A. testified she was “about seven” when appellant began touching her over her
clothes “and then he progressed to touching, going under [her] shirt and under [her] pants.”
When G.A. was eight, appellant began making her put her mouth on his penis. Eventually,
appellant began putting his penis in G.A.’s vagina, and this happened “over fifty times.” This
testimony alone was sufficient to support appellant’s conviction. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art 38.07 (West Supp. 2014). The prosecutor’s statements came after defense counsel had
characterized G.A. as someone who “heard voices” and was therefore not credible. Prior to
either side presenting argument, the trial court gave the jury the following instruction:
Once the charge is read to you, you will hear arguments from the lawyers. The
purpose of the argument is to try to guide you to the conclusion that the person
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giving the argument believes is appropriate under the evidence. But I want to
remind you that the arguments themselves do not constitute evidence. Evidence
is what you heard from the witness stand from witnesses who were sworn in and
questioned, or evidence is whatever was introduced into evidence by way of
photographs or reports. So again, you will base your verdict on the law that I give
you and the evidence as it was developed during the trial, and the argument is to
try to guide you to the conclusion the arguer believes is appropriate.
In its charge to the jury, the trial court once again instructed the jury that they were “the
exclusive judges of the facts proved, of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given
to the testimony . . . .” After examining the record as a whole, we have a fair assurance that the
error did not influence the jury, or had but a slight effect. See Mosley, 983 S.W.2d at 259. We
overrule appellant’s sole issue.
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b) /David L. Bridges/
DAVID L. BRIDGES
131578F.U05 JUSTICE
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S
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
JOSE MIGUEL GARCIA, Appellant On Appeal from the Criminal District Court
No. 2, Dallas County, Texas
No. 05-13-01578-CR V. Trial Court Cause No. F-12-35086-I.
Opinion delivered by Justice Bridges.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Justices Lang-Miers and Myers
participating.
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered May 29, 2015.
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