Trent Lindig v. Pleasant Hill Rocky Community Club ( 2015 )

ACCEPTED
03-15-00051-CV
4905311
THIRD COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
4/15/2015 4:19:13 PM
JEFFREY D. KYLE
CLERK
NO. 03-15-00051-CV
FILED IN
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 3rd COURT OF APPEALS
THIRD COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT AUSTIN, TEXAS
AUSTIN, TEXAS 4/15/2015 4:19:13 PM
JEFFREY D. KYLE
Clerk
TRENT LINDIG,
Appellant,
V.
PLEASANT HILL ROCKY COMMUNITY CLUB,
Appellee.
ON APPEAL FROM THE 33RD DISTRICT COURT, BLANCO COUNTY, TEXAS
HONORABLE J. ALLAN GARRETT PRESIDING
CAUSE NO. CV07580
APPELLANT’S BRIEF
HOUSTON DUNN, PLLC
Samuel V. Houston, III
State Bar No. 24041135
4040 Broadway, Suite 440
San Antonio, Texas 78209
(210) 775-0882 – Telephone
(210) 826-0075 – Fax
sam@hdappeals.com
ZACHARY P. HUDLER, P.C.
Zachary P. Hudler
State Bar No. 24032318
100 E. Pecan Street, Suite One
Johnson City, Texas 78636
(830) 868-7651 – Telephone
(830) 868-7636 – Fax
zachary@hudlerlaw.com
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
The following is a list of all parties to this appeal and the names and
addresses of those parties’ counsel:
APPELLANT APPELLATE COUNSEL
Trent Lindig Samuel V. Houston, III
HOUSTON DUNN, PLLC
4040 Broadway, Suite 440
San Antonio, Texas 78209
TRIAL/APPELLATE COUNSEL
Zachary P. Hudler
ZACHARY P. HUDLER, P.C.
100 E. Pecan Street, Suite One
Johnson City, Texas 78636
APPELLEE APPELLATE COUNSEL
Pleasant Hill Rocky Jeff Small
Community Club LAW OFFICE OF JEFF SMALL
12451 Starcrest Drive, Suite 100
San Antonio, Texas 78216
TRIAL/APPELLATE COUNSEL
Norman L. Nevins
THE NEVINS LAW FIRM
206 West Main Street
Fredericksburg, Texas 78624
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL ..................................................... i
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................. ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................... iv
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ....................................................................... vi
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT....................................... vii
ISSUE PRESENTED ................................................................................... vii
STATEMENT OF FACTS ............................................................................... 1
I. The Lindig Family Has Owned the 1.3 Acre Tract in Blanco
County That Is at Issue in this Appeal For Many Years. ............ 1
A. Trent’s Great Grandfather, Albert Lindig, Conveyed
the Disputed Property Subject to a Limitation That It
Could Only Be Used for School Purposes.......................... 1
B. Acknowledging That a School Was No Longer Being
Operated on the Property, the Blanco County School
Board Trustees Execute a Deed Purporting to Convey
the Property to the Pleasant Hill Improvement
Association. ....................................................................... 2
C. The Lindigs Continued To Assert Their Ownership
Rights in the Property After 1952. ..................................... 3
D. The Lindigs Assert That Any Use By the Club or Other
Groups Was Done with the Lindigs’ Permission. .............. 4
II. Trent Files Suit to Confirm His Ownership in the Property,
Leading the Club to Assert a Competing Ownership Claim
to the Property. ........................................................................... 4
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT................................................................ 6
ARGUMENT.................................................................................................. 7
I. The Trial Court’s Construction of the 1927 Deed and the
Reverter Clause Is Reviewed De Novo on Appeal. ..................... 7
II. Applying Well-Established Legal Principles, the Court Should
Conclude That Trent Owns the Property Because the Reverter
ii
Clause Was Triggered. ................................................................ 8
A. The 1927 Deed Created a Possibility of Reverter and
Vested Albert Lindig’s Heirs with a Future Possessory
Interest in the Property. .................................................... 8
B. The Limitation in the 1927 Deed Was Breached When
a School No Longer Operated on the Property. .............. 10
C. The Club’s Construction of the 1927 Deed Is Flawed
and Unsupported By Any Authority................................ 12
III. Conclusion and Prayer.............................................................. 13
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE .............................................................. 14
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE........................................................................15
APPENDIX ....................................................................................................A
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
Bagby v. Bredthauer, 627 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. App.—Austin 1981, no writ) ... 9
City of Houston v. Van De Mark,
83 S.W.3d 864 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, pet. denied) ....................... 7
Cooke v. Morrison,
404 S.W.3d 100 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.) ............... 7
Cypress-Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Glenn W. Loggins, Inc.,
115 S.W.3d 67,(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, pet. denied) ...................... 9
El Dorado Land Co. v. City of McKinney, 395 S.W.3d 798 (Tex. 2013) ... 8, 9
Eyssen v. Zeppa,
100 S.W.2d 417 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1936, writ ref’d) ................. 12
Hausser v. Cuellar,
345 S.W.3d 462 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, pet. denied) (en banc) .... 8
Leeco Gas & Oil Co. v. Cnty. of Nueces, 736 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. 1987) ........... 8
Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. 1991) ....................................... 7, 8, 12
Mickens v. Longhorn DFW Moving, Inc.,
264 S.W.3d 875 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet. denied) ............................ 7
Monroe v. Scott,
707 S.W.2d 132 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.) .......... 8
Stew. v. Blain,
159 S.W. 928 (Tex. Civ. App.—Galveston 1913, no writ)............... 10, 12, 13
Teal Trading & Dev., LP v. Champee Springs Ranches Prop. Owners Ass’n,
432 S.W.3d 381 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, pet. denied)................... 11
XTO Energy Inc. v. Nikolai,
357 S.W.3d 47 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, pet. denied) ....................... 11
STATUTES & RULES
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(d) ....................................................... 7
TEX R. CIV. P. 248 .......................................................................................... 5
iv
OTHER AUTHORITIES
36 David B. Brooks, Texas Practice Series:
County and Special District Law § 30.10 (2d ed.) .................................... 3
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 716 (7th ed. 1999) .................................................. 9
v
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case:
Appellant Trent Lindig brought suit to confirm his ownership in a 1.3
acre tract of land in Blanco County, alleging a trespass to try title action, a suit
to quiet title, and declaratory judgment claim. CR 439-43. Trent’s principal
argument is that a reverter clause in a 1927 Deed executed by his great
grandfather had been triggered when the property was no longer being used
for school purposes. CR 441. As a result, Trent claimed fee simple ownership
of the property. CR 441. Appellee Pleasant Hill Rocky Community Club
challenged Trent’s ownership claim by first asserting that the reverter clause
had not been triggered. CR 454-55. Alternatively, even if the clause was
triggered, the Club claimed title through adverse possession. CR 455-57. After
denying the parties’ summary judgment motions, the trial court addressed the
reverter clause in connection with a motion filed by Trent pursuant to Texas
Rule of Civil Procedure 248. 4 RR 4-5.
Trial Court:
District Judge J. Allan Garrett considered Trent’s Rule 248 Motion.
Trial Court Disposition:
The trial court interpreted the 1927 Deed in the Club’s favor, ruling that
“the circumstances have not occurred to trigger the reverter clause.” CR 475;
Appx. A. The trial court also granted the parties’ agreed request to permit an
immediate appeal of the order on Trent’s Rule 248 Motion. CR 479; Appx. B.
vi
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
This appeal presents a straightforward issue regarding the construction
of a deed. The authorities cited herein compel the result advanced by Trent.
Nonetheless, should the Court determine that oral argument is necessary,
Trent reserves the right to participate in any future oral argument.
ISSUE PRESENTED
Appellant believes this case presents the following issue:
1. Did the trial court err when it concluded that Trent Lindig was
not the rightful owner of the disputed property by virtue of the
reversionary interest created in the 1927 Deed from Albert
Lindig to the Blanco County Board of Trustees?
vii
TO THE HONORABLE THIRD COURT OF APPEALS:
Appellant Trent Lindig respectfully presents this brief requesting that
the Court reverse the trial court’s order denying the relief requested in his Rule
248 Motion.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
I. The Lindig Family Has Owned the 1.3 Acre Tract in Blanco
County That Is at Issue in this Appeal for Many Years.
A. Trent’s Great Grandfather, Albert Lindig, Conveyed the
Disputed Property Subject to a Limitation That It Could
Only Be Used for School Purposes.
The Lindig family has owned a multi-acre tract of land in Blanco County
since the early 1900s. See CR 104, 385. That tract of land, which is described
in deeds as being part of the Seaborn Hopper Survey, includes the disputed 1.3
acre tract of land that is at the center of the dispute between Trent and the
Pleasant Hill Rocky Community Club. See CR 101, 116. This appeal concerns
the interpretation of a deed executed by Trent’s great grandfather, Albert
Lindig, in 1927 (hereinafter the “1927 Deed”). See CR 96-98.1
Albert Lindig conveyed the 1.3 acre tract to “J.C. Goar, T.E. Patton, Scott
Klett, J.J. Fuchs and Gus Artzt, constituting the County Board of Trustees for
Blanco County, Texas.” CR 96. The deed limited the type of activity that could
be conducted on the property in three separate clauses. In describing the
consideration being exchanged in the conveyance, the deed recites “that the
1
The 1927 Deed appears multiple times in the appellate record. Trent references the most
legible copy in this brief.
1
land herein conveyed shall be used for School purposes only.” CR 96. The
deed’s granting clause provides that the property “shall be used for School
purposes for the Pleasant Hill School District No. 21.” CR 96. The deed’s
habendum clause confirms that the property was being conveyed to the
County Board of School Trustees “for School Purposes.” CR 97. Consistent
with this limitation, the deed contains a reverter clause setting forth the
following: “But it is understood that in case the said School House or any other
house which may be built and used for a School house is removed from said
land herein described then the said above described land shall revert back to
me, my heirs, assigns or legal representatives.” CR 96.
A school operated on the property in the years following 1927. See CR
102, 116. It is undisputed, however, that a school was no longer being operated
on the property by 1952. CR 102, 110, 116, 132, 458; see also CR 253. The same
remains true today. CR 102.
B. Acknowledging That a School Was No Longer Being
Operated on the Property, the Blanco County School
Board Trustees Execute a Deed Purporting to Convey the
Property to the Pleasant Hill Improvement Association.
In August 1952, the Blanco County Board of School Trustees attempted
to convey the property to the Pleasant Hill Improvement Association for use
“as a Community Center for the benefit of Pleasant Hill Community in Blanco
County, Texas.” CR 381.2 The deed recites that the property was “formerly
2
The grantees in the 1927 Deed comprise the “County Board of Trustees for Blanco County,
Texas.” CR 96. The grantors in the 1952 Deed are identified collectively as the “Blanco
2
used for school purposes but now [is] no longer so used.” CR 381. The deed
also acknowledges the reversionary interest created in the 1927 Deed. CR 382.
In particular, the conveyance “is made subject to the reversionary interest of
Albert Lindig, his heirs or assigns, as set forth in his deed to the Blanco County
School Trustees dated September 10, 1927.” CR 382.
C. The Lindigs Continued To Assert Their Ownership Rights
in the Property After 1952.
After a school ceased to operate on the property, the Lindigs continued
to assert their ownership rights in the property. Lindig family members have
maintained the property and made improvements on it, including putting up
fences, putting up a gate, and clearing the property on a regular basis. CR 94.
The Lindigs have also been paying the property taxes. CR 94, 98-99, 260-305.
Real property and probate records also demonstrate that the Lindig
family continued to assert its ownership interest in the property. Following
Albert Lindig’s death, the property passed to Trent’s grandfather (Felix Lindig)
and then to his grandmother (Addie Lindig). CR 117, 396, 401; see also CR
106. In a series of transfers, Trent’s grandmother eventually conveyed the
entirety of her interest in the property to Trent’s parents, Al Louis Lindig and
Brenda Lindig. CR 116, 117, 387-92. Then, on December 4, 2006, Al Louis
County Board of School Trustees.” CR 381. Presumably, these references are synonymous
given that Texas law has provided, in some instances, that “the management and control of
the public schools within a county” may be “vested in a ‘board of county school trustees.’”
36 David B. Brooks, Texas Practice Series: County and Special District Law § 30.10 (2d
ed.).
3
Lindig and Brenda Lindig conveyed their interest in the property to Trent. CR
393; see also CR 204.
D. The Lindigs Assert That Any Use By the Club or Other
Groups Was Done with the Lindigs’ Permission.
The Lindigs maintain that they permitted the Pleasant Hill community
to use the property. CR 115, 118; see also CR 94. The Pleasant Hill Rocky
Community Club, 3 along with other groups, had been given permission to use
the property for various functions. CR 103, 104, 106. In June 2013, the Lindigs
withdrew any previously-granted permission to the Club. CR 103, 115. Club
members, however, refused to vacate the property. See 438.
II. Trent Files Suit to Confirm His Ownership in the Property,
Leading the Club to Assert a Competing Ownership Claim to
the Property.
Trent filed suit in September 2013, seeking to confirm his ownership
rights in the property. CR 5. The Club responded, asserting that it was the
rightful owner of the property. CR 30. In that regard, the Club asserted a
counterclaim seeking a ruling that the 1952 Deed vested it with title and
challenging Trent’s assertion that the reverter clause in the 1927 Deed had
been triggered. CR 31-35. Alternatively, the Club claimed ownership through
adverse possession. CR 31-35.
3
There is a dispute between the parties as to whether the Pleasant Hill Rocky Community
Club is a successor in interest of the Pleasant Hill Improvement Association and able to
claim an ownership interest by virtue of the 1952 Deed. See CR 351; see also CR 118.
4
The parties submitted traditional and no-evidence motions for summary
judgment. CR 3, 80, 83, 367, 370, 373. Those motions were denied. CR 361,
363; 3 RR 34. The week before trial, Trent sought a ruling from the trial
court—through Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 248—with respect to his
construction of the 1927 Deed and its reverter clause. CR 460.
The trial court held a hearing on Trent’s Rule 248 Motion. The parties
were permitted to re-urge their respective motions for summary judgment “on
the legal issue of reverter and the interpretation of the 1927 deed.” 4 RR 5. In
connection with Trent’s motion, the trial court further clarified that—
consistent with the parties’ agreement—the ruling on the reverter issue would
be subject to an immediate appeal pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code section 51.014(d). 4 RR 7.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court made two findings: (1)
the 1927 Deed is unambiguous; and (2) the Club “has current title to the
subject property” because “the circumstances that give rise to that reverter
have not occurred.” 4 RR 14. Those oral rulings were reduced to a written
order. CR 475; Appx. A. Further, pursuant to the parties’ agreement, the trial
court signed an order permitting Trent to seek an immediate appeal of the
order. CR 479; Appx. B.
5
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The possibility of reverter created in the 1927 Deed unequivocally vests
Trent with title to the disputed property. Reading the entire deed and giving
effect to all relevant clauses, the only reasonable construction is that the
Lindigs’ reversionary interest became a present possessory interest once a
school was no longer operating on the property. Obviously, without a school,
the property could not be used for school purposes. It is undisputed that the
property has not been used for school purposes since August of 1952. Thus,
Trent is the rightful owner of the property.
The Court should reject the Club’s flawed argument. The Club posits that
the reversionary interest created in the 1927 Deed does not become a present
possessory interest so long as the building that once housed the now-
abandoned school is still on the property. Not only does this argument violate
well-established rules for deed construction, which require the Court to
harmonize all parts of a deed, but this same argument has been expressly
rejected in a prior appeal involving substantially similar deed provisions.
While the building may still be on the property, it cannot be a schoolhouse if
there is no school. Accordingly, the trial court’s order must be reversed.
6
ARGUMENT
I. The Trial Court’s Construction of the 1927 Deed and the
Reverter Clause Is Reviewed De Novo on Appeal.
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 248 permits a trial court to resolve
questions of law in a pretrial hearing. Mickens v. Longhorn DFW Moving,
Inc., 264 S.W.3d 875, 880 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet. denied). The
construction of the 1927 Deed was appropriately raised through Trent’s Rule
248 Motion because “[t]he construction of an unambiguous deed is a question
of law for the court.” Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. 1991). The
construction of a reverter clause also presents a question of law. City of
Houston v. Van De Mark, 83 S.W.3d 864, 867 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002,
pet. denied). 4 Thus, the trial court’s construction of the 1927 Deed and its
reverter clause is reviewed de novo on appeal. Cooke v. Morrison, 404 S.W.3d
100, 111 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.).
In construing a deed, the Court’s primary duty “is to ascertain the intent
of the parties from all of the language in the deed by a fundamental rule of
construction known as the ‘four corners’ rule.” Luckel, 819 S.W.2d at 461. The
Court does this by examining and considering “the entire writing in an effort
to harmonize and give effect to all the provisions of the agreement, even if
different parts of the deed appear inconsistent or contradictory.” Hausser v.
Cuellar, 345 S.W.3d 462, 466 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, pet. denied) (en
4
The trial court found the 1927 Deed to be unambiguous. CR 475. Trent agrees that the
deed is unambiguous.
7
banc). It is presumed that every clause is “to have some effect; therefore, the
language of the deed should be interpreted so that no provision is rendered
meaningless.” Id.
II. Applying Well-Established Legal Principles, the Court Should
Conclude That Trent Owns the Property Because the Reverter
Clause Was Triggered.
A. The 1927 Deed Created a Possibility of Reverter and
Vested Albert Lindig’s Heirs with a Future Possessory
Interest in the Property.
A person conveying property can retain an interest in the property
through a reversionary interest. El Dorado Land Co. v. City of McKinney, 395
S.W.3d 798, 802 (Tex. 2013). There are a number of reversionary interests
that are recognized in Texas. Id. They include reversions, possibilities of
reverter, and rights of entry. Id. Collectively, reversionary interests represent
“future interests that remain with the grantor . . . and may be viewed ‘as claims
to property that the grantor never gave away.’” Id. at 802-03 (citation
omitted).
A possibility of reverter describes “a future interest retained by a grantor
that conveys a determinable fee.” Id. at 801 n.6. Stated differently, “it is the
grantor’s right to fee ownership in the real property reverting to him if the
condition terminating the determinable fee occurs.” Luckel, 819 S.W.2d at
464. It is a property interest that has value. Leeco Gas & Oil Co. v. Cnty. of
Nueces, 736 S.W.2d 629, 631 (Tex. 1987). It can be assigned or sold. Monroe v.
Scott, 707 S.W.2d 132, 134 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
8
The interest cannot be destroyed through a subsequent conveyance of the
property. See id. Finally, title vests in the grantor (or his heirs) immediately
once the limitation imposed by the deed is breached. Cypress-Fairbanks
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Glenn W. Loggins, Inc., 115 S.W.3d 67, 71 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 2003, pet. denied); see also El Dorado Land Co., 395 S.W.3d at 803.
No particular words are required to create a possibility of reverter.
Bagby v. Bredthauer, 627 S.W.2d 190, 196 n.4 (Tex. App.—Austin 1981, no
writ). Rather, the Court’s analysis focuses upon the grantor’s intent as
expressed in the deed. Id. A possibility of reverter is created by a deed that (1)
prescribes a limitation on the grantee’s rights with respect to the property, and
(2) contains a reverter clause that does not require the grantor to re-enter the
property to claim the reversionary interest. See id.
The 1927 Deed can only be characterized as having created a possibility
of reverter in Albert Lindig and his heirs should the property cease to be used
for school purposes. As consideration for the transaction between Albert
Lindig and the Blanco County Board of Trustees, the deed recites “that the
land herein conveyed shall be used for school purposes only.” CR 96. Further,
the granting clause in the deed provides that the property “shall be used for
School purposes for the Pleasant Hill School District No. 21.” CR 96. The
habendum clause 5 reflects that the property is being conveyed “for School
5
The habendum clause is the “part of a deed that defines the extent of the interest being
granted and any conditions affecting the grant.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 716 (7th ed. 1999).
9
Purposes.” CR 97. Finally, the deed’s reverter clause acknowledges that “in
case the said School House or any other house which may be built and used for
a School house is removed from said land herein described then the said above
described land shall revert back to me, my heirs, assigns or legal
representatives.” CR 96. If a school was not being operated on the property
then it is obviously not being used for “school purposes.”
Similar language has previously been found to create a possibility of
reverter. In Stewart v. Blain, the deed recited that the grantor was conveying a
tract of land “‘for the purpose of erecting a schoolhouse.’” 159 S.W. 928, 929
(Tex. Civ. App.—Galveston 1913, no writ). The deed went on to explain that
“‘in the event of the removal of the schoolhouse therefrom by said county
judge and his successors in office the said acre of land shall revert back to me
or my heirs or assigns, and this deed shall become void and inoperative.’” Id.
Analyzing the deed, the court held the following:
It seems to us that these provisions mean, and were intended to
mean, that the grantees should own and use and enjoy the
property so long as it was so used for the purpose for which it was
conveyed, and that when this condition ceased the title and right
of possession should at once revert to the grantor, “or his heirs or
assigns.”
Id. at 931. The Court should reach the same result in this case.
B. The Limitation in the 1927 Deed Was Breached When a
School No Longer Operated on the Property.
It is undisputed that a school was not operating on the property by the
time that the 1952 Deed was signed. The witnesses offering affidavit and
10
deposition testimony all confirm that the school closed in the early 1950s. See
CR 102, 110, 116, 132, 253, 458. Indeed by the time that the property is
(purportedly) conveyed to the Pleasant Hill Improvement Association, a
school was not being operated on the property. The 1952 Deed confirms this
fact. See CR 381. The granting clause in the deed recites that the property was
“formerly used for school purposes but now no longer [is] so used.” CR 381.
This recitation is conclusive.
“The doctrine of estoppel by deed precludes parties to a deed from
denying the truth of any material fact asserted in the deed.” Teal Trading &
Dev., LP v. Champee Springs Ranches Prop. Owners Ass’n, 432 S.W.3d 381,
388 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, pet. denied); XTO Energy Inc. v. Nikolai,
357 S.W.3d 47, 56 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, pet. denied). “Estoppel by
deed binds, not only the parties to the deed, but also their successors-in-
interest.” Teal Trading & Dev., LP, 432 S.W.3d at 388. The doctrine “may
arise from the recitals, reservations, and exceptions within a deed.” Id.
Given that it is undisputed that a school no longer operated on the
property by 1952, the reverter clause has been triggered. Based upon the
record, title vested in Albert Lindig and his heirs once the property was no
longer being used for school purposes. Thus, the trial court’s order must be
reversed.
11
C. The Club’s Construction of the 1927 Deed Is Flawed and
Unsupported By Any Authority.
The Club’s construction of the 1927 Deed must be rejected because it is
based upon an isolated reading of the 1927 Deed. According to the Club, the
possibility of reverter is dependent upon a single fact: whether the actual
building that once housed the school is still on the property. See CR 471-72.
This position, of course, violates well-established principles for deed
construction. Namely, the Court must “harmonize all parts of the deed.”
Luckel, 819 S.W.2d at 462. In that connection, Albert Lindig’s intent could not
be more clear. The land was to “be used for school purposes only.” CR 96. This
limitation is also found in the 1927 Deed’s granting and habendum clauses. CR
96-97. Thus, giving effect to the entire deed, the possibility of reverter sprang
to life once the property was no longer being used for school purposes. See
Eyssen v. Zeppa, 100 S.W.2d 417, 419 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1936, writ
ref’d) (holding that “the words ‘so long as said tract or parcel of land is used
for school purposes’ . . . created a conditional limitation and that the title
thereto ipso facto reverted to the grantor”).
The argument advanced by the Club has already been rejected. As was
discussed in section II.A, supra, the deed in Stewart v. Blain provided that the
property was being conveyed “‘for the purpose of erecting a schoolhouse.’” 159
S.W. at 929. Similar to the 1927 Deed, the reverter clause in Stewart provided
that “‘in [the] event of the removal of the schoolhouse therefrom . . . said acre
of land shall revert back to me or my heirs or assigns.’” Id. The grantor’s heirs
12
sought to confirm their ownership interest given that a school was no longer
operating on the property. Id. 930-31. While the property was no longer being
used for school purposes, the building that once housed the school was still on
the property. Id. at 930.
The court concluded that the possibility of reverter was triggered once
the property was no longer used for school purposes, i.e., when there was no
longer a school operating on the property. Id. at 931. The reverter was not
dependent upon whether the building was still on the property. Id. According
to the court, the “sale and the abandonment of the land for school purposes
was to all intents and purposes ‘a removal of the schoolhouse therefrom.’ The
building may be there yet, but it is not a schoolhouse.” Id. The Court should
reach the same result in this case. Accordingly, the trial court’s order should be
reversed.
III. Conclusion and Prayer.
Trent is the rightful owner of the disputed property. The limitation
found in the 1927 Deed has been breached. Under the deed’s unambiguous
terms, the reversionary interest became a present possessory interest once a
school ceased to operate on the property. Because there was no school, the
building could not be a schoolhouse. Therefore, the trial court’s order must be
reversed.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Appellant Trent Lindig
respectfully prays that the Court reverse the trial court’s order on Appellant’s
13
Rule 248 Motion, declare that Appellant holds title to the disputed property,
and grant other and further relief to which he may be justly and equitably
entitled.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Samuel V. Houston, III
SAMUEL V. HOUSTON, III
State Bar No. 24041135
HOUSTON DUNN, PLLC
4040 Broadway, Suite 440
San Antonio, Texas 78209
Telephone: (210) 775-0882
Fax: (210) 826-0075
sam@hdappeals.com
Zachary P. Hudler
State Bar No. 24032318
ZACHARY P. HUDLER, P.C.
100 E. Pecan Street, Suite One
Johnson City, Texas 78636
(830) 868-7651 – Telephone
(830) 868-7636 – Fax
zachary@hudlerlaw.com
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
In accordance with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4, the
undersigned certifies that the foregoing computer-generated brief contains
3,399 words.
/s/ Samuel V. Houston, III
SAMUEL V. HOUSTON, III
14
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document
has been served in accordance with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure on
the 15th day of April, 2015, to the following:
Jeff D. Small Via email/e-service
LAW OFFICE OF JEFF SMALL
12451 Starcrest Dr. #100
San Antonio, Texas 78216
jdslaw1951@gmail.com
Norman L. Nevins Via email/e-service
THE NEVINS LAW FIRM
206 West Main Street
Fredericksburg, Texas 78624
nnevinslaw@yahoo.com
/s/ Samuel V. Houston, III
SAMUEL V. HOUSTON, III
15
APPENDIX
A. Rule 248 Hearing Order
B. Order pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 51.014(d)
A
NO.CV07580
TRENT LINDIG § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
§
v. s 33td JUDICIAL DISTRlCT
§
PLEASANTIIlLL ROCKY §
COMMUNITY CLUB § BLANCO COUNTY~ TEXAS
RUUf 248 HEARING ORDJ'£R
On December 11, 2014, the trial court heard Plaintiff Trent .Llndig's MOTIONFORRULE
248 HEARING. The parties appeared in person and by their attomey8. By agreement, the parties
re-urged their respective motion$ for summary judgment asking the Court to determine
unresolved questions of law. The Court considered the evidence and arguments of counsel, and
finds and concludes that the 1927 Deed dated and recorded September 10, 1927, fu:lm Albert
Lindig to the County Board of Trustees for Blanco County5 Texas (attached hereto as Exhibit
"A") is hOt ambiguous. The Court finds further that the circumstances h~ve not·occutted to
trigger the reverter clause contained in the foregoing deed.
It is, thereforej ORDERED and DECLARJID that the above-referenced 1927 Deed is
unambiguous and no reversion has occutted under the terms of that deed.
Signed~':"~ -1£.., 201r
Judge Presiding
JAN - 9 201("
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: l'hat x,'am:1a~ien lLindig h:U.e~ 11.;lmn11l~dgod l\1'Yl!IOD1' 1~ £1111 Df 'tba ~Q· llG\u ror tho a;.' I I
~ Orr& '?h~u.aaml ·``iqrumlrad, :&'U'ty (Uq;-o.oo):Da~iuin 111i11. 1,n'"!f'•lli doucribu4 in lload·11Xaa11tedl
'IJ;r'U1 I?', Ltndig ``II`` ohi:tati~n Ltmlig to ;r, D, ltlnnoY ;n tba J.Jth. d..; at llo11tamllol',
a.91f, 1U1d1r1111ordatl 1~ .B~d ;i111pa l.Ja lloa~11ll• ot lli.ui11a· Ooullty, ToXIJ.o, IUtl\ liains tha ~eglll
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DJ.' fiha 8111111','1 do hOllaby rl!l-•aa, 1111d aaqu11: to ;r, Ji. X111110,.- Mu hdza '111111.
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11qa1snu; tha :iu:a11llt'ty donuriba~a~·-~n~;,.'..n~! ~: · .· ' . ·
.lll. that a~t~ l.a~· or ~ur:~l ~ltllcl ~l~uo.t`` •~n .Dtuaa Coun~;r, ~8lb)' allknmr1ndgad,1
~d "tl~a :rurtbBl' o.11~01durat~an
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llaroln aonyayo4.almµ.bn uae.i. ro.r aoholll. puq11isoa. '
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•HO.vu grantM, sold., lli~on nml i.onyoy111I, and by tlloue }U'aaant.a ta ((l'ant, ooU, Siva nnd.
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oan'H/(. Ullta the 11nid
. lllatt,;t~J'.l'uoho And .oll 111114 vba11
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fo 111r-vo nnit· to bu+tl· tha 111i0Tia· ~aa~111e4 Pl:'Bllll.aaa1\'1:oliathai: il.j:ii:nll'·~rni: !nlnauhi:- tbn,''
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ai:·d a;ii_p'``Ob``11a,."thor~t11:.1·n aml``q· i411~g~g ,Uat.,o ·:tba;~ai~ !i;~·~,Oo``. ·f.)Mlatt~u·,~aott
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EXHIBIT I!
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477
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Xlnt\, J.~.li'uoba, ~nun Allt:t, ao tha DblliltirnGJl~d ot Hoban1 :J.'ruataoa, otlll11110~.0o~ntY,;
J: ltorllll;y "1ll:rant nnd ·dDi'aolf tbo titla to tbn nboYn
Tl!lClln, Dttd their nttaoanaura in oi'tioa,.
. And . ' .
den11.dbail
.. , Pl'l!llllann
.
in :oi'.r~oo,, tar Sahool P11tposoa.
1111to • tha a:boTo · urua11d oounty
-. . llo~d of Bohaal
. !i'ruotoon,
. and
. tbui.J: ~una11nnol:'11 ·
l'litliDDa 1117 hlllid tbla tho 10th. dn;ir ~ Do.;ptam1>al', .A.D. 1927 •
.AJ.bor1' Lilldlg
Tho Stnte of Texnu,
County. a!' nlnnco.. ) . llo:roro 111e, tho U»da~oignod auth11d ty in 01111 fl11' lllnnl!_o Caunt;v, !l'axaa, an
thia W.;y :paraonally a;ppQarud Albort Ll.111lig 1 lmollll to 110 tu b11 thq ;paraan whoaa lllltle in .allbM 1 ~ ..
pcrl)ia~ t11 tlla Corel!Ding i1111t.;U1Dimt 1 1111d aolmowled'l!arl to me tlsut ho exebutotl the ~a tm; tba -t1
lJllrponea Ibid conoiduation thuain uxplleoasd.
Olvan under llll' band und aelll. or a1'1'illa thla tho lOf:ll., dD.Y ol' Bo;ptl!llb.a:ir._ t..~ll. 1927.
. (S!W'.)
y, JI. Gour,
Uotury l'llhl111, lllanva llo11nty, 'h::cn••.
1..
I
I
l!rII• llota lloluaidt at viii
li'l'all.11l'iak11burg lt. li'.
.taoii
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'1'11.B &'Lmt o:r
lloun ty 01' :alonQa.
T&XA.9 •• ,
SBOOl!D i.mr ~mm:l.ll!:ll!
llllOl'I Jl.J>. l!Ell DY 5!.llllBB :!!1111S111'JlS I 'Illa'!:
\'l1181lJUS 1 '?llnodaro ltlnmhealt11, tho log11l. lllli!Bl' and· boldor of aurtaln inllabtadll''' fl'l'idonoed
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by.Ma nota far &5'00.00, dun two Ylllll'D artor-lla~11,: al.x notais 1'01! 175'9:0~ a~o~(~ 2, 4, -,; 6,.
'I and B .)'alU'D ai'teJ: d11to 111111 ana nota :Ul.' #3'/l.·Ollt' :1111 9 ;Yo..ru attar .~tn,.Jllld. aoom:'!.4 by lion
on·oe.rt111n lnnd moro tul~ d1111orilloil in lleed dat.acl Detiember l!j', 1!1Jl31 o:c.fuutocl by .ll.borl. :r.
K1:'11ua t,~ 31.'n.qt 9chni1dt and wi:ro 1md now aha;,,. at roaol'd in Vol. ~9 ;4" lill Dom llaoudo o:r
lllanoo llounty, '!'axon, to wb.iah tno1'l'lllll111d: and tha .u:aca11d 'lhersot reflll'QllGG in hl!l!ll Jiadll fol'
o 11111:ro 001FJ11qt11 duuor1lttion of 1111.id ii!Jid D11d tbo indabtndnaa hove montJ:ohad, .ea.id '1and no•
b aing onned b.Y ::ii a. l!ata Schnlld b• andbuaballd, Jtrnat Su~d , wha han llllda 1111plioatian to 1'llll '
Ji'8DEHAL IA.1D ll.~nc DH llDUSTQlf, tar n •lonn in thp 11um. •0~700.00 to bu 'ovidunoed by A11m:timt1011j
1into ]!a;rablu to all.id ~k in 011!111-f!nnUal. :pll,Yl'llUl~DtemUnrr onr a 11er.t1H1
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or Yl>D.1'!11 to bu uacuio,
acl by Daed
. or 'b:uat an uald 111114 to J'.Jt.Dpnuat
.. . ~untau tor all.I.II "Bank.I and . · •
.. 171!1!!llt\9, "is aid !Janie hna doelinud to Bak~on! lolllt unl.ao~ it11 lion.'nball. bo a. :fij,nt. and auplll!.14r
lion to any and all liDDa 11111llnot oaid d:· · · '.
ll01f, :tlll!it!l!'OllB, tor lltld in oanaill ation at tb.oprOlllbao and 11113 DDLIJ.1\ in bMd :paid by
/· .
1111id Dank, nacipt or whiah !Q' her.aby aolQlowla dsad, ltia honb;r D]l•nitiaal1y ngraed thafi llDY'
/. . - .
and au lien• 'llow held and ovq_71 by tile 11ndoraiBt1•d nsainat aqid lllltd, oholl lla, 111¥1 tho nllllla -:
in llerehy do11J.nr11d to 110., 11,.fund aP