Quinton Jackson v. State ( 2015 )


Menu:
  •                                                                                     ACCEPTED
    06-15-00036-CR
    SIXTH COURT OF APPEALS
    TEXARKANA, TEXAS
    7/20/2015 2:01:04 PM
    DEBBIE AUTREY
    CLERK
    FILED IN
    6th COURT OF APPEALS
    TEXARKANA, TEXAS
    7/20/2015 2:01:04 PM
    No. 06-15-00036-CR             DEBBIE AUTREY
    Clerk
    __________________________________________________________________________
    IN THE SIXTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    AT TEXARKANA, TEXAS
    __________________________________________________________________________
    QUINTON JACKSON
    Appellant,
    v.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS
    Appealed from the 124th District Court
    Gregg County, Texas
    __________________________________________________________________________
    BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT
    __________________________________________________________________________
    Clement Dunn
    State Bar No. 06249300
    140 East Tyler, Suite 240
    Longview, Texas 75601
    Telephone: 903-753-7071
    Fax: 903-753-8783
    ORAL ARGUMENT WAIVED
    IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
    Appellant certifies that the following is a complete list of all parties to the trial court’s
    judgment and the names and addresses of their trial and appellate counsel.
    1.     Appellant:      Quinton Jackson
    2.     Appellant’s Trial Counsel:      Richard Hurlburt
    Attorney at Law
    222 North Fredonia St.
    Longview, TX 75601
    TSB No. 10308600
    3.     Appellant’s Counsel on Appeal:          Clement Dunn
    Attorney at Law
    140 E. Tyler Street, Suite 240
    Longview, TX 75601
    TSB No. 06249300
    4.     Attorney for the State:         Zan Brown
    Assistant District Attorney, Gregg County
    101 East Methvin St., Suite 333
    Longview, Texas 75601
    TSB No. 03205900
    I
    TABLE OF CONTENTS
    IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I
    TABLE OF CONTENTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
    INDEX OF AUTHORITIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
    STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
    ISSUE PRESENTED .                  .......................................................... 1
    STATEMENT OF THE FACTS.                            ................................................... 2
    SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT .                                  ................................................ 3
    ARGUMENT ..              .............................................................. 3
    PRAYER. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .                     5
    CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .                            5
    ii
    INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
    Cases
    Issa v. State, 
    826 S.W.2d 159
    , 161 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
    Constitutional Provisions
    Article 1, Section 10; Texas Constitution.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
    Fourteenth Amendment to The United States Constitution.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
    Article 42.12, Sec. 3d(b), V.A.C.C.P. (1988). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
    Article 42.12, Sec. 5(b), V.A.C.C.P. (1990). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
    iii
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE
    Offense:       Injury to a Child.
    Verdict:       Guilty; Ten (10) years confinement - Texas Department of Criminal Justice -
    Institutional Division
    Date of Verdict:       November 24, 2014
    Trial Court:   124th District Court, Gregg County, Texas.
    This case involves a criminal prosecution for Injury to a Child. C.R., 58; R.R. 4, at 8.
    Based on the Appellant’s plea of guilty, the District Court had initially imposed a sentence
    of ten years’ imprisonment, probated for seven years. R.R. 3, at 10. Subsequently, however,
    the Court granted the Appellant’s Motion for New Trial, and instead placed the Appellant on
    a deferred adjudication community supervision for a period of ten years. C.R., at 68; R.R. 4,
    at 4-5. This appeal arises from the District Court’s adjudication of the Appellant’s guilt, and
    imposition of a sentence of ten years’ confinement. R.R. 5, at 102.
    STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
    Believing the instant case contains issues capable of resolution on the basis of record
    the Appellant respectfully does not request oral argument.
    ISSUE PRESENTED
    The Appellant respectfully submits that the District Court erred in failing to hold a
    separate hearing on punishment following the decision to adjudicate guilt.
    BRIEF OF APPELLANT, QUINTON
    PAGE 1
    STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
    Since this appeal arises from procedural aspects of the case, the Appellant respectfully
    submits that this renders a review of the underlying facts of the offense itself, as well as the
    initial procedural history, unnecessary. Instead, the pertinent facts of the record entail the
    hearing on the State’s Application for Adjudication of Guilt. C.R., at 80; 86 (State’s First
    Amended Application for Adjudication of Guilt). At the conclusion of this hearing, the
    Appellant’s counsel argued against the adjudication of guilt: “Judge, I would ask the Court to
    find the new violations ‘not true’ based on the fact I don’t believe the State has proved by a
    preponderance of the evidence that the new violations occurred.” R.R. 5, at 96. Though he
    conceded the Appellant had pled “true” to come of the “other” violations (id.), the Appellant’s
    counsel concluded:
    So we’d ask the Court to find the new offense “not true,” modify the probation
    to whatever the Court deems fit, We would just ask that he not be revoked and
    sent to prison.
    
    Id., at 97.
    Next the State argued that the Appellant “deserves to be revoked.” 
    Id., at 99.
    In arguing
    for revocations, the State re-emphasized: “So the State’s asking him to be revoked because he’s
    earned it.” 
    Id. The record
    reflects no argument or discussion by the State regarding what the
    punishment should be in th event of revocation.
    Finally, the District Court expressed concerns about the Appellant’s conduct, and then
    concluded:
    I adjudicate you guilty. I sentence you to 10 years’ confinement in the
    Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice.
    R.R. 5, at 102.
    BRIEF OF APPELLANT, QUINTON
    PAGE 2
    SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
    The District Court erred in failing to hold separate hearings, first on the adjudication
    of the Appellant’s guilt and, second, on the disposition in the event of adjudication.
    ARGUMENT
    The record reflects that the District Court held a hearing on the State’s Application for
    Adjudication of Guilt (see C.R., at 80; 86) on November 24, 2014. R.R. 5. The hearing
    concluded on that date. 
    Id. The District
    Court held no further hearings regarding the
    adjudication or disposition.
    As noted above (see Statement of 
    Facts, supra
    ), at the end of that hearing the Court
    simultaneously adjudicated the Appellant guilty and sentenced him to ten years’ confinement.
    R.R. 5, at 102. Immediately prior to that, both the Appellant’s counsel and the prosecution
    representing the State had presented arguments that focused entirely upon whether or not the
    Appellant’s community supervision should be revoked. The State did not recommend a
    particular sentence in the event of adjudication. Similarly, in asking that the Appellant’s
    community supervision not be adjudicated, the counsel for the Appellant made no mention of
    what an appropriate sentence, or outcome, might be if the Court did adjudicate the Appellant
    guilty.
    Because the Court sentenced the Appellant to prison immediately upon adjudicating him
    guilty, the Appellant had no opportunity to present evidence on the issue of sentencing. This
    violates the Appellant’s right to Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
    States Constitution and Due Course of Law under Article 1, Section 10, of the Texas
    BRIEF OF APPELLANT, QUINTON
    PAGE 3
    Constitution. In Issa v. State, 
    826 S.W.2d 159
    , 161 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), the Court held:
    Today we hold that when a trial court finds that an accused has committed a
    violation as alleged by the State and adjudicates a previously deferred finding
    of guilt, the court must then conduct a second phase to determine punishment.
    As Art. 42.12, Sec. 3d(b), V.A.C.C.P. (1988), provides, "(a)fter an adjudication
    of guilt, all proceedings, including assessment of punishment, pronouncement
    of sentence, granting of probation, and defendant's appeal continue as if the
    adjudication of guilt had not been deferred." See now Art. 42.12, Sec. 5(b),
    V.A.C.C.P. (1990). Thus, based upon the statute, the defendant is entitled to a
    punishment hearing after the adjudication of guilt, and the trial judge must allow
    the accused the opportunity to present evidence.
    In the instant case, the record reflects that the District Court held but one hearing; no hearing
    on punishment occurred, as is required both statutorily and constitutionally.
    The Appellant respectfully notes that in the instant case his counsel made no objections
    to this violation. Similarly in Issa, however, trial counsel also failed to object. 
    Id. In a
    manner
    almost identical to the instant case, the trial court in Issa adjudicated the appellant guilty and
    sentenced him to confinement for ten years “in one proclamation.” 
    Id. Under these
    circumstances, the Court in Issa held that the “appellant had no opportunity to object to the trial
    court’s action until after that action was taken.” 
    Id. The failure
    of the Appellant’s trial counsel
    to object in the instant case arose under the same circumstances presented in Issa and should
    be viewed, and excused, in the same light.
    PRAYER
    The Appellant respectfully requests this case be reversed and remanded to the District
    Court for a hearing on punishment.
    Respectfully submitted,
    BRIEF OF APPELLANT, QUINTON
    PAGE 4
    __/s/ Clement Dunn_______________
    140 East Tyler Street, Suite 240
    Longview, Texas 75601
    (903) 753-7071 Fax: 903-753-8783
    State Bar No. 06249300
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
    I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of this brief was delivered to the Gregg
    County District Attorney’s Office, Longview, Texas on this 20th day of July 2015.
    __/s/ Clement Dunn_______________
    CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT
    I hereby certify that a total of1362 words are included in this brief.
    __/s/ Clement Dunn_______________
    BRIEF OF APPELLANT, QUINTON
    PAGE 5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 06-15-00036-CR

Filed Date: 7/20/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/29/2016