Jack Rettig v. Ronald E. Bruno, Christopher Garcia, Sergio Lopez, Patrick G. Mendoza, and Troy J. Williams ( 2015 )


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  •                                                                                         ACCEPTED
    04-15-00350-CV
    FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS
    SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS
    7/6/2015 4:33:08 PM
    KEITH HOTTLE
    CLERK
    No. 04-15-00350-CV
    FILED IN
    4th COURT OF APPEALS
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS
    FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TEXAS7/6/2015 4:33:08 PM
    SAN ANTONIO             KEITH E. HOTTLE
    Clerk
    Jack Rettig,
    Appellant
    v.
    Patrick Mendoza and Christopher Garcia,
    Appellees
    Appeal from the 111th District Court of Webb County, Texas
    APPELLEE CHRISTOPHER GARCIA’S
    RESPONSE TO MOTION TO ABATE APPEAL
    BECKSTEAD TERRY, PLLC
    Jana K. Terry
    State Bar No. 24003041
    9442 N. Capital of Texas Hwy
    Arboretum Plaza One, Suite 500
    Austin, TX 78759
    (512) 827-3574; (855) 845-3262 fax
    jterry@becksteadterry.com
    Attorneys for Appellee
    Christopher Garcia
    1
    TO THE HONORABLE FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS:
    COMES NOW Appellee Christopher Garcia and files this Response to Motion
    to Abate Appeal, and for cause would show:
    FACTUAL BACKGROUND
    In 2014, Appellant Rettig filed suit against Appellees Garcia and Mendoza
    (and three other individuals) in the United States District Court for the Eastern
    District of Louisiana (the “Federal Court”) in Civil Action No. 14-996 (the
    “Louisiana Action”). On August 19, 2014, Rettig filed a motion for summary
    judgment but did not serve it on the five individual defendants, who were then
    proceeding pro se. The Federal Court granted the motion for summary judgment on
    September 22, 2014 even though Appellee Mendoza had not filed any response and,
    according to the certificate of service of Rettig’s counsel, Mendoza had not been
    served with the motion for summary judgment. On September 30, 2014, the Federal
    Court entered a judgment against all of the individual defendants in the amount of
    $2,692,895.23, plus 14% interest and attorneys’ fees to be determined later (the
    “Foreign Judgment”).
    Rettig then sought to domesticate the Foreign Judgment in Texas under the
    Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act by filing a certified copy of the
    Foreign Judgment in Cause No. 2014-57941 in the Harris County District Court.
    Thereafter, Appellees Mendoza and Garcia timely filed motions to transfer venue
    2
    and, subject thereto, motions to vacate the judgment. As venue was improper, the
    Harris County District Court granted the motions to transfer to Webb County, which
    had the effect of vacating the judgment that had been automatically entered in the
    Harris County District Court because improper venue is never harmless and always
    reversible error.
    Upon the docketing of the case in Webb County, which had the effect of again
    automatically entering a new domesticated judgment, Appellees again filed motions
    to vacate the judgment. The Webb County District Court’s orders granting Garcia’s
    and Mendoza’s motions to vacate the judgment are the orders at issue in Rettig’s
    appeal. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), Appellee Mendoza has
    also filed a motion in the Louisiana Action to vacate the Foreign Judgment.
    APPELLEE GARCIA OPPOSES THE REQUESTED ABATEMENT,
    TO THE EXTENT RELATED TO THE FEDERAL COURT ACTION
    Appellant Rettig is asking that this Court abate the appeal until such time as
    the Federal Court determines Mendoza’s pending Rule 60 motion. However, in
    connection with Rettig’s earlier unsuccessful attempt to have the Federal Court
    enjoin the case in Webb County, Rettig argued that the Webb County District Court’s
    ruling would have a res judicata effect upon the Federal Court, not vice versa.
    Specifically, in a Memorandum in Support of his Motion for Preliminary
    Injunction (the “Memorandum”), Rettig argued that, if the Webb County Action
    were permitted to proceed, he would be unable to have recourse in the Federal Court.
    3
    See Memorandum (Docket No. 50-3), at 27. Citing United States Supreme Court
    and local authority, Rettig explained that if the Webb County District Court granted
    Appellees’ motions to vacate, the Federal Court would “no longer be permitted to
    protect or effectuate its judgment, but must instead sit by as its authority is
    determined by another sovereign.” 
    Id. (citing Parsons
    Steel, Inc. v. First Ala. Bank,
    
    474 U.S. 518
    , 525 (1986) and Raj v. Tomasetti, No. 03-1993, 
    2008 WL 2718905
    , at
    *3 (E.D. La. July 11, 2008 (Vance, J.)).
    As stated by Rettig, “[t]he U.S. Supreme Court has explained that
    ‘[c]hallenges to the correctness of a state court’s determination as to the conclusive
    effect of a federal judgment must be pursued by way of appeal through the state-
    court system and certiorari from [the U.S. Supreme Court].’” Memorandum, at 27
    (quoting Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Ala. Bank, 
    474 U.S. 518
    , 525 (1986)) (emphasis
    added). In reply briefing that Rettig filed with the Federal Court, Rettig argued
    further that “any ruling by the Webb County District Court w[ould] be res judicata
    and entitled to full faith and credit by all other courts, including [the Federal] Court.”
    Reply to Defendants’ Oppositions to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction
    (Docket No. 63-2), at 3 (emphasis added).
    Notwithstanding these arguments, the Federal Court denied Appellant’s
    motion for preliminary injunction and permitted the Webb County action to proceed.
    See the Federal Court’s April 29, 2015 Order and Reasons (Docket No. 71).
    4
    Thereafter, the Webb County District Court did, indeed, vacate the judgment as
    domesticated in Texas. Rettig’s challenge to the Webb County District Court’s
    rulings, per his own arguments and the cases he cited, belongs in the Texas state court
    appeal process – and the Federal Court does not disagree. Accordingly, the Federal
    Court action in Louisiana is no basis for an abatement of this Court’s proceedings.
    PRAYER
    WHEREFORE, Appellee Christopher Garcia prays the Court to DENY
    Appellant Rettig’s motion to abate this appeal until the foreign court – the Louisiana
    federal court -- rules on Appellee Mendoza’s pending Rule 60 motion. Garcia prays
    for all other relief to which he is entitled.
    Respectfully submitted,
    /s/ Jana K. Terry
    Jana K. Terry
    State Bar No. 24003041
    Beckstead Terry, PLLC
    9442 N. Capital of Texas Hwy
    Arboretum Plaza One, Suite 500
    (512) 827-3574; (855) 845-3262 fax
    jterry@becksteadterry.com
    Attorneys for Christopher Garcia
    5
    [VERIFICATION – see attached]
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
    I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument was
    served in accordance with the Texas Rules of Appellate and Civil Procedure, on
    counsel named below, on this the _6th       day of July, 2015.
    Audrey Mullert Vicknair – counsel for Appellant Rettig
    LAW OFFICE OF AUDREY MULLERT VICKNAIR
    802 N. Carancahua Ste. 1350
    Corpus Christi, Texas 78401-0022
    C.M. Henkel III – counsel for Appellant Rettig
    Fritz Byrne Head & Fitzpatrick PLLC
    500 North Shoreline, Suite 901
    Corpus Christi, Texas 78401
    Lance H. Beshara – counsel for Appellee Mendoza
    PULMAN CAPPUCCIO
    PULLEN BENSON & JONES, LLP
    2161 N.W. Military Hwy., Suite 400
    San Antonio, Texas 78213
    By tex.gov electronic filing system
    /s/ Jana K. Terry
    Jana K. Terry
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 04-15-00350-CV

Filed Date: 7/6/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/29/2016