City of Carrollton, Texas v. Milan Hamrla, Petra Chudejova, Michael and Laura Brewer, Dalia Chavarria, Diane and Gene Hines, and Keith Effert ( 2015 )


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  •                                                                       ACCEPTED
    02-15-00119-CV
    SECOND COURT OF APPEALS
    FORT WORTH, TEXAS
    7/10/2015 9:27:36 AM
    DEBRA SPISAK
    CLERK
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT FORT WORTHFILED IN
    ________________________________2nd COURT OF APPEALS
    FORT WORTH, TEXAS
    7/10/2015 9:27:36 AM
    No. 02-15-000119-CV     DEBRA SPISAK
    _________________________________ Clerk
    CITY OF CARROLLTON, TEXAS
    V.
    MILAN HAMRLA, PETRA CHUDEJOVA, MICHAEL AND
    LAURA BREWER, DALIA CHAVARRIA, DIANE AND GENE
    HINES, AND KEITH EFFERT
    ___________________________________
    APPELLEES' BRIEF
    ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED
    Bruce E. Turner
    Texas Bar No. 20310500
    bturner@bennettweston.com
    J. Michael Weston
    Texas Bar No. 21232100
    jmweston@bennettweston.com
    Bennett Weston LaJone & Turner PC
    1603 LBJ Freeway, Suite 280
    Dallas, Texas 75234
    Telephone: 972-862-2332
    Facsimile: 214-373-2570
    ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
    TABLE OF CONTENTS
    Page
    Table of Contents ......................................................................... ii
    Index of Authorities ..................................................................... iv
    Statement Regarding Oral Argument........................................... vii
    Statement of Facts ........................................................................ 1
    The Slope............................................................................. 2
    May 2009 ........................................................................... 4
    Continuing Global Slope Failure ........................................ 5
    Carrollton's Warnings About Slope Failure ...................... 7
    Missing Records ................................................................. 10
    Taking Earth ...................................................................... 12
    History ................................................................................ 13
    Retaining Wall.................................................................... 16
    Problems from Slope Failure.............................................. 17
    Summary of the Argument ........................................................... 18
    Argument ..................................................................................... 19
    Standard of Review ............................................................ 19
    ii
    Reply to Issue I - Inverse Condemnation ..................................... 20
    Inverse Condemnation ....................................................... 21
    Taking of Earth .................................................................. 24
    Taking By Slope Failure ..................................................... 25
    Knowledge of Effects of Actions ......................................... 26
    Reply to Issue II - Negligence....................................................... 31
    Negligence .......................................................................... 31
    Reply to Issue III - Declaratory Judgment ................................... 33
    Prayer ........................................................................................... 36
    Certificate of Compliance ............................................................. 37
    iii
    INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
    Constitution and Statutes                                                               Page
    Article I, section 17(a) of the Texas Constitution .............................. 18, 
    21 Tex. Civ
    . Prac. & Rem. Code § 37.004(a) .......................................... 
    34 Tex. Civ
    . Prac. & Rem. Code, § 101.001 et seq. .................................. 
    31 Tex. Civ
    . Prac. & Rem. Code, § 101.021 ............................................. 31
    Cases
    City of Amarillo v. Burch, 
    369 S.W.3d 684
     (Tex. App. -
    Amarillo 2012, no pet.)...................................................................... 23
    City of Carrolton v. RIHR Inc., 
    308 S.W.3d 444
    (Tex.App.-Dallas 2010, rev. denied) ................................................. 22, 29
    City of Dallas v. Jennings, 
    142 S.W.3d 310
     (Tex.2004) ................. 24, 28, 30
    City of Dallas v. Stewart, 
    361 S.W.3d 562
     (Tex. 2012)..................... 23
    City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 
    284 S.W.3d 366
     (Tex. 2009) ................ 35
    City of El Paso v. Mazie's, L.P., 
    408 S.W.3d 13
    (Tex.-El Paso 2012, rev. denied) ....................................................... 24
    City of El Paso v. W.E.B. Investments, 
    950 S.W.2d 166
    (Tex. App. - El Paso 1977, rev. denied) .............................................. 31
    City of Houston v. Carlson, 
    451 S.W.3d 828
     (Tex. 2014) ................. 29
    City of Houston v. Wall, 
    207 S.W.2d 664
     (Tex.App.-
    Galveston 1947, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ....................................................... 23
    iv
    City of Keller v. Wilson, 
    168 S.W.3d 802
     (Tex. 2005) ................... 26-27, 30
    City of San Antonio v. Pollock, 
    284 S.W.3d 809
     (Tex. 2009)...... 26, 28-30
    Cozby v. City of Waco, 
    110 S.W.3d 32
     (Tex.App.-Waco
    2002, no pet.) .................................................................................... 23
    DuPuy v. City of Waco, 
    396 S.W.2d 103
     (Tex. 1965) ........................ 22
    Edwards Aquifer Authority v. Day,
    
    369 S.W.3d 814
     (Tex. 2012) .............................................................. 24
    Hale v. Colorado River Mun. Water Dist., 
    818 S.W.2d 537
    (Tex.App.—Austin 1991, no writ) ...................................................... 24
    Harris Cnty. Flood Control Dist. v. Kerr, --- S.W.3d ---,
    
    2015 WL 3641517
    , *2-3 (Tex. June 12, 2015) .................................... 20
    Hidalgo Cnty. Water Improvement Dist. No. 2 v.
    Holderbaum, 
    11 S.W.2d 506
     (Tex. Comm'n App. 1928,
    judgm't adopted) ............................................................................... 24
    Hubler v. City of Corpus Christi, 
    564 S.W.2d 816
    (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.)............................... 23
    Magnolia Pipe Line Co. v. City of Tyler, 
    348 S.W.2d 537
    (Tex.Civ.App.—Texarkana 1961, writ ref'd)....................................... 23
    Manning v. Embridge Pipelines (East Texas), L.P.,
    
    345 S.W.3d 718
     (Tex. App. - Beaumont 2011, rev. denied) ............... 34
    Marcus Cable Assocs., L.P. v. Krohn, 
    90 S.W.3d 697
    (Tex. 2002) ........................................................................................ 25
    Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 
    964 S.W.3d 922
    (Tex. 1998) ........................................................................................ 21-22
    v
    Roberson v. City of Austin, 
    157 S.W.3d 130
    (Tex. App.-Austin 2005, pet. denied) ................................................ 34
    Simon v. Nance, 
    45 Tex. Civ. App. 480
    , 
    100 S.W. 1038
    (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1907, no hist.) ............................................. 26
    State v. Brownlow, 
    319 S.W.3d 649
     (Tex. 2010) .............................. 22, 24
    Suarez v. City of Texas, --- S.W.3d ---, WL 3802865
    (Tex. June 19, 2015) ......................................................................... 20
    Tarrant Reg'l Water Dist. v. Gragg, 
    151 S.W.3d 546
    (Tex.2004)......................................................................................... 22, 27
    Texas Dept. of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda,
    
    133 S.W.3d 217
     (Tex. 2004) .............................................................. 21
    Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. Sefzik, 
    355 S.W.3d 618
     (Tex. 2011) ............. 35
    Texas Parks & Wildlife Depar't v. Callaway,
    
    971 S.W.2d 145
     (Tex.App.-Austin 1998, no pet.)............................... 
    23 Will. v
    . Thompson, 
    152 Tex. 270
    ,
    
    256 S.W.2d 399
     (1953) ...................................................................... 26
    vi
    STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
    The Record is extensive and, in places, quite technical. Oral
    argument could assist the Court by permitting the parties to address
    questions from the Court about the evidence and the applicable law.
    vii
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT FORT WORTH
    ________________________________
    No. 02-15-000119-CV
    _________________________________
    CITY OF CARROLLTON, TEXAS
    V.
    MILAN HAMRLA, PETRA CHUDEJOVA, MICHAEL AND
    LAURA BREWER, DALIA CHAVARRIA, DIANE AND GENE
    HINES, AND KEITH EFFERT
    ___________________________________
    APPELLEES' BRIEF
    Milan Hamrla and Petra Chudejova, Michael and Laura Brewer, Dalia
    Chavarria, Diane and Gene Hines, and Keith Effert file their Appellees'
    Brief.
    STATEMENT OF FACTS
    Carrollton relies upon its vague and erroneous assertions that it "did
    not know, could not have known, and was not substantially certain, that
    any of its actions would result in specific damage." Appellant's Issue I,
    Brief p. 5. Appellant makes scant mention of the Record. Appellees'
    -1-
    references to the record 1 demonstrate they that have satisfied their burden
    in establishing jurisdiction. 2
    The Slope
    This case involves a slope failure on Dudley Branch Creek in
    Carrollton along the rear of the Appellees' homes. 3 Earth from the
    Appellees' properties moved onto Carrollton's Dudley Branch Creek right of
    way.4 Carrollton's Director of Engineering, Cesar Molina, evidenced
    Carrollton's attitude towards the slope failure:
    Q.    How would you evaluate whether or not or how you would put
    the earth back?
    A.    I guess they're welcome to go in there and just dig it out. Put it
    back on their property.
    Q.    So you're going to put it on the Appellees to take back what the
    city now has?
    A.    The city did not take it from them. It moved there.
    Q.    Well, you do admit the city has it?
    1     References to the Record will be have the appropriate volume number with the
    type of as follows: Court Record = C.R., Supplemental Court Record = Supp.
    C.R., Reporter's Record = R.R. The reference shall be followed by a page
    reference or for plaintiff or defendant exhibit number in volume 5 of the Report's
    Record to a document. For example, 2 C.R. at 2505, 5 R.R., DX 2.
    2     Appellees refer to just a portion of the evidence before the trial court.
    3     The common word for a slope failure is landslide.
    4     2 C.R. at 2504.
    -2-
    A.     Something moved it there. I'm sure some of it was dirt that was
    on this side. Now it's on that side. 5
    The suggestion ignores the warnings of Carrollton's expert regarding the
    caution with which the earth on the landslide slope must be handled. 6
    Geotechnical engineers, particularly Carrollton's geotechnical
    engineer, Terracon Consultants, explained the slope failure.7 In its October
    2, 2009 Report, Terracon noted as probable causes of the slope failure the
    "presence of groundwater and seepage from the heavy rainstorms leading
    up to the slope's failure."8 The soil behind the retaining wall at 1325
    Barclay after the landslide was so wet and unstable that Terracon could not
    drill bore holes in which to place inclinometers to measure the movement
    of the slope. 9
    Appellees' expert, Mark Farrow, summarized the causes of the slope
    failure:
    The homes were built below the street grade, which . . . meant the
    drainage was extremely poor. The drainage from the lots had to run
    back to the retaining wall, which would create a very poor drainage
    condition in the back of those properties.
    5     2 C.R. at 2505.
    6     1 C.R. at 1201-1205.
    7     1 C.R. at 934, 1193.
    8     1 C.R. at 1200-1201.
    9     1 C.R. at 944, 1197.
    -3-
    The wall was constructed along a slope that was much too steep
    for a retaining wall. A 3-to-1 slope is much too steep . . . to be placed
    next to a retaining wall, because . . . as [Carrollton's expert] indicated,
    you see slope failures in 3-to-1 slopes routinely in levees and highway
    embankments . . . that is not in proximity to any . . . structure or
    residential improvement is one issue, but when you have a slope
    failure beneath a retaining wall that is supporting residential
    improvements and a residence, that is a much -- much larger concern,
    and so retaining walls are just not constructed on -- on slopes that
    steep. . . . [A]s Terracon concluded in their report, they indicated that
    the failure was due to deterioration of the soil, but when you do a
    global stability study -- as engineers, when we do a global stability
    study, we model -- actually model the soil in a deteriorated condition.
    We determine how -- when we do triaxial testing or direct shear
    testing, we actually model how soft the soil will get in a deteriorated
    condition. And from their study, they indicated the factor of safety
    was -- was 1.2 without any water impacts, which is well below a safe
    factor of safety of 1.5. 10
    Carrollton controlled the "presence of groundwater and seepage from the
    heavy rainstorms" through its retaining wall, its Dudley Branch right of way
    and its drainage system in the addition. Carrollton violated its own
    standards related to the "presence of groundwater and seepage from the
    heavy rainstorms leading up to the slope's failure."
    May 2009
    10   1 C.R. at 973-974, see also 1 C.R. at 977-981. Carrollton's in-house engineer only
    disagreed with Terracon's report with regard to the measurement of the slope. 1
    C.R. at 1033. See 2 Supp. C.R. at 1476-1486.
    -4-
    It rained heavily during the night of May 3-4, 2009. 11 In the morning,
    Appellee Hamrla, 1325 Barclay Drive, found that his back fence was
    destroyed, the retaining wall on his property had sunk three feet and moved
    eight to ten feet towards Dudley Branch. 12 By July 2013, the drop was
    more than seven feet. 13 The landslide was not isolated to 1325 Barclay. 14
    Appellees did not cause the landslide.15 Appellees cannot prevent the
    slope failure from continuing. 16 The retaining wall failure was caused by,
    and not a cause of, the landslide.17 On May 11, 2009, Carrollton's engineer
    stated that repair of the retaining wall would not solve the slope failure. 18
    The affected properties cannot be sold without disclosure of the
    landslide. Tex. Prop. Code, § 5.008. The homes have no value. 19
    Continuing Global Slope Failure
    Unless something impedes its movement, gravity will cause a slope to
    flatten. 20 The likelihood of slope movement is called the factor of safety. 21
    11    1 C.R. at 914-915.
    12    1 C.R. at 914, 923.
    13    1 C.R. at 915.
    14    1 C.R. at 1208.
    15    1 C.R. at 973-975.
    16    1 C.R. at 974-975, 1357.
    17    1 C.R. at 1449.
    18    1 C.R. at 944, 1197,1470.
    19    1 C.R. at 899, 928.
    20    1 C.R. at 940-941, 2 C.R. at 2144.
    21    1 C.R. at 941-2, 2 C.R. at 2145.
    -5-
    The higher the factor of safety, the more stable the slope. 22 A factor of
    safety of 1.5 or more indicates a stable slope. 23 The International Building
    Code adopted by Carrollton requires a factor of safety of 1.5 for retaining
    walls. 24 According to the Terracon report, the slope's existing factor of
    safety at the retaining wall before heavy rainfall lead to the slope failure was
    of 1.013, which signifies imminent failure.25 A factor of safety of one
    designates an occurring landslide or slope failure. 26
    Carrollton's expert described the slope failure as "continuing global
    failure" and stated that "the failure wasn't just in the yard, it went under the
    retaining wall and the retaining wall didn't actually fail. You had a global
    landslide that impacted the retaining wall." 27 The scarp of the failed slope
    continues to move towards and then under the Appellees' homes. 28
    Carrollton governs drainage in Rosemeade 14, on Barclay Drive, and
    into Dudley Branch all of which contributed to the slope failure. 29 The
    retaining wall is part of Carrollton's drainage infrastructure, as are the
    22    1 C.R. at 943, 2 C.R. at 2147.
    23    4 R.R. at 1120.
    24    1 R.R. at 1115, 2 C.R. at 1982.
    25    1 C.R. at 942, 1291, 1221.
    26    1 C.R. at 1222, 2 C.R. at 2147.
    27    2 C.R. at 2090.
    28    1 C.R. at 950, 976.
    29    Carrollton Ordinance 2581, 1 C.R. at 1228-1339.
    -6-
    Dudley Branch right of way and the sanitary sewer line easement on which
    the retaining wall was constructed.30
    Carrollton's Warnings About Slope Failure
    Carrollton has adopted ordinances and standards to deal with
    drainage and the problems of erosion. 31 Those ordinances and standards
    set standards that are to be met to avoid the problems experienced with the
    Barclay slope. Carrollton violated its own standards with regard to
    drainage on Barclay Drive and Dudley Branch Creek and retaining wall.
    Carrollton's Ordinance No. 2581, "Stormwater and Flood Protection
    Ordinance," 32 states a purpose of the Ordinance to be "Control and manage
    all stormwater runoff and drainage from points and surfaces within
    subdivisions." 33 The Stormwater Ordinance applies to all areas of land
    within Carrollton, including, with certain exceptions, property owned by
    Carrollton. 34 In this case, Dudley Branch, Barclay Drive and the retaining
    wall are part of Carrollton's drainage infrastructure. 35
    30    2 Supp. C.R. at 932.
    31    2 C.R. at 1503.
    32    1 C.R. at 1228.
    33    1 C.R. at 1229.
    34    1 C.R. at 1241.
    35    1 C.R. at 1271, 2 C.R. at 1563.
    -7-
    In its requirements for the Design of Local Drainage Systems, Section
    C Street and Alley Capacities, the Stormwater Ordinance provides in
    paragraph 3:
    The first floor elevations of all residential and other structures shall
    be set at a minimum elevation of the lower of either 1.5 feet above the
    alley invert or one foot above the top of the street curb elevation, and
    with positive drainage provided away from the structure.36
    Appellees' homes on the creekside of Barclay Drive are below the elevation
    of Barclay Drive and do not drain on to Barclay Drive. Water at the front of
    the homes flows to the homes and then towards Dudley Branch. 37
    In its report, Terracon found that the Dudley Branch Creek slope was
    three feet horizontal to one foot vertical. 38 This slope, maintained by
    Carrollton, violates the Stormwater Ordinance which requires a 4 to 1
    slope.39
    In its December 1992 Erosion Control Master Plan Carrollton makes
    a number of comments directly relevant to the allegations regarding
    Carrollton's obligations for the landslide. 40 A significant concern in the
    36    1 C.R. at 1261, 2 C.R. at 1571.
    37    1 C.R. at 973.
    38    1 C.R. at 1219.
    39    1 C.R. at 1268, 2 C.R. at 1562 (Ordinance No. 1375 enacted in December 1986).
    40    1 C.R. at 1340.
    -8-
    Erosion Control Master Plan was the stability of sideslope. 41 Regarding the
    erosion process, the Erosion Control Master Plan states:
    Many of the channel areas in the City of Carrollton are located in clay
    soils. Clay soils have high cohesive properties and under dry
    conditions will exist with steep banks. Under high rainfall and
    flooding conditions the clay soils become saturated and lose their
    cohesive strength. The loss of cohesive strength results in unstable
    slopes and sideslope failures. A frequently experienced erosion
    process includes the following conditions:
    7.      Steep channel sideslopes become saturated and unstable.
    8.   Sideslopes fail in unstable planes and continue to become
    wider and deeper.42 (Emphasis added)
    The erosion process causes a three fold problem, the second of which is
    "Channel sideslopes are unstable and are subject to sloughing or rotational
    failures. 43
    Regarding the specific area in which the slope failure occurred,
    Carrollton's December 1992 Erosion Control Master Plan states "This
    erosion is undermining the concrete channel section and resulting in slope
    failures. The slope failures are in danger of impacting retaining walls,
    fences, and residences. 44 (Emphasis added).
    41     1 C.R. at 1342, 1343.
    42     1 C.R. at 1344.
    43     1 C.R. at 1344.
    44     1 C.R. at 1335.
    -9-
    Understanding that Terracon's October 2009 report described the
    earth at the slope failure as various forms of clay, 45 the following statement
    from the Erosion Control Master Plan is particularly important:
    The worst case condition for slopes, which consisted of
    predominantly clay soils, occurs when the slopes become saturated
    from frequent rainfall and flooding. Under these conditions the clay
    soils loose their cohesive strength and develop internal water
    pressure which result in slope failures. Retention systems must be
    designed to prevent these soils from movement under these
    conditions.46
    (Emphasis added). The quoted excerpts show Carrollton knew that its
    failure to follow its own standards would result in slope failure.
    Missing Records
    Carrollton's failure to maintain legally mandated records, 47 some of
    which once existed and others of which were never maintained complicated
    the presentation of evidence.48
    As an example of the impact of the missing documents, Appellees
    direct the Court to testimony from Michael McKay, the Carrollton engineer
    in charge of "review of development plans, . . . construction inspection, and
    45    1 C.R. at 1199-1200.
    46    1 C.R. at 1358.
    47    1 C.R. at 2223-2228.
    48    2 C.R. at 2216, 2223-2234.
    -10-
    . . . drainage,"49 regarding the retaining wall that is central to this case. 50
    The exhibit being discussed states that Carrollton "approved the
    construction plans for the wall, inspected the wall during construction and
    accepted the improvements on completion." Carrollton also received a
    maintenance bond for the wall. 51 Looking at the exhibit, McKay testified:
    Q.     Okay. Then the next sentence says, the City approved the
    construction plans for the wall. Do you see that?
    A.     Yes.
    Q.     Did you find anything in the records of the City of Carrollton
    improving -- approving the construction plans for the wall?
    A.     No, I did not.
    Q.     The next section says, inspected the wall during construction.
    Did you find anything that related to inspection of the wall
    during construction?
    A.     I found no documentation of that.
    Q.     And that the City accepted the improvements on completion.
    Do you see that?
    A.     I see that, yes.
    49    2 R.R. at 31.
    50    According to McKay, Carrollton has no standards for retaining walls in private
    property other than have to be signed and sealed by a professional engineer. 2
    R.R. at 44. However, Carrollton adopted the International Building Code with
    regard to retaining walls which requires a factor of safety of 1.5. 1 C.R. at 1044.
    51    1 C.R. at 1225.
    -11-
    Q.     Did you find anything that says that they accepted the
    documents -- the retaining wall?
    A.     I saw no specific documents that said that they had accepted
    it. 52
    Documents once existed related to the first retaining wall include (a)
    a proposal and contract for a reinforced concrete retaining wall, (b) a
    "Preliminary Engineering Observation Report" on the retaining wall failure,
    (c) letters from Carrollton regarding review of retaining wall repairs, (d) a
    letter from engineers revising plans for retaining wall repair, (e) a letter
    requesting city fill in eroded areas along retaining wall, and (f) documents
    related to decision of builder not to develop lots between 1319 and 1331
    "because they were deemed to be undesirable."53 Carrollton provided no
    explanation for the failure to produce the documents in discovery other
    than the documents do not exist.
    The Motion for Sanctions details more problems with documents. 54
    Taking Earth
    Carrollton is taking earth from both the surface of and under
    Appellees’ properties. 55 The slope failure occurs underground. 56 The earth
    52    2 Supp. C.R. at 1581, 2 R.R. at 63-67.
    53    1 C.R. at 1226-1227.
    54    2 C.R. at 2216.
    55    2 C.R. at 2088-2089.
    -12-
    movement damaged and damages the surface and surface structures,
    including to the retaining wall and the subsurface.57
    History
    In 1981, Carrollton accepted a 15 feet wide sanitary sewer easement
    along what became the rear of the affected Barclay properties. 58 The
    property owners subject to the easement, including all of Appellees, cannot
    construct anything on the easement without Carrollton's permission. 59
    Carrollton approved the Rosemeade 14 final plat in September
    1986. 60 The retaining wall was built on the sewer easement. 61 On July 21,
    1987, Carrollton accepted the retaining wall and a maintenance bond
    stating that the retaining wall had been correctly installed. 62 The retaining
    wall is part of Carrollton's storm water drainage infrastructure. 63
    Stormwater in Rosemeade 14, other than for the odd side of Barclay Drive,
    drains on to the roads and alleys of the subdivision. Barclay Drive is higher
    56    1 C.R. at 951-952.
    57    1 C.R. at 952, 2 C.R. at 2089.
    58    1 C.R. at 1103.
    59    2 R.R. at 51.
    60    5 R.R. DX 2.
    61    5 R.R. DX 2, Rosemeade010.
    62    1 C.R. at 1225.
    63    Tumulty Deposition, 2 C.R. at 2340-2341, Molina Deposition, 2 C.R. at 2442,
    2446-2448, 2450.
    -13-
    than the affected Barclay properties. 64 The Dudley Branch slope is too
    steep.65
    The retaining wall had problems in 1987 behind 1317 and 1319
    Barclay Drive. Documents related to the problems once existed. 66 In
    February 2007, Carrollton declared that the retaining wall located at 1317
    and 1319 Barclay:
    has been found in a state of disrepair and appears structurally
    unsound and is in danger of collapse causing an obstruction of the
    drainage channel and possible severe damage to the homes located at
    both 1317 Barclay and 1319 Barclay. The conditions of the retaining
    wall render the structure and premises as a "Dangerous Building."67
    Other than the notices, no documents exist.
    In the 1990's an event occurred which evidences slope failure.68
    Carrollton has no geotechnical engineer report explaining the "wall
    failure."69 In 1993, Carrollton's Engineering Department issued warnings
    about construction on affected Barclay Drive properties.70 Nine of the
    64    1 C.R. at 973.
    65    1 C.R. at 973.
    66    2 Supp. C.R. at 392.
    67    1 C.R. at 1429-1431.
    68    1 C.R. at 964-965.
    69    1 C.R. at 1103, 2 C.R. at 2220, 2230-2233.
    70    1 C.R. at 1099-1102. "These addresses are empty lots that back up to Dudley
    Branch. There is a retaining wall on the back of the lots. This wall has failed in
    several areas (1341-1343 & 1347) where either the house or the pool/spa is within
    10 feet of the retaining wall. To avoid anymore possible wall failures, I would
    suggest that the builder place the house as close to the street as legally allowed."
    -14-
    houses on the affected Barclay properties were constructed after the 1990's
    event, including homes located at 1323-1329 Barclay Drive. 71
    After the 1990's problems with the slope and retaining wall,
    Carrollton conducted no investigation of the slope or the retaining wall.
    Carrollton continues to maintain and repair Dudley Branch, Barclay Drive
    and the retaining wall so as to continue the factors that caused the slope
    failure.
    In 2008, Carrollton, responding to information about a crack in the
    retaining wall, inspected the retaining wall and took photographs. The
    photographs evidence an on-going slope failure.72 Before the May 2009
    landslide, adjacent to Dudley Branch a large water filled hole developed in
    the Dudley Branch channel due to erosion. 73 The hole and water may have
    changed the factor of safety of the slope. 74 Carrollton filled the hole after
    the May 2009 slope failure. 75
    When faced with accumulating water on their lots, some Barclay
    residents attempted to alleviate the accumulation of water by installing
    71    1 C.R. at 1109-1110.
    72    1 C.R. at 965.
    73    1 C.R. at 465 (photograph after repair), 1441.
    74    1 C.R. at 964-965.
    75    1 C.R. at 736-737.
    -15-
    French drains to move the water to Dudley Branch. 76 Accepted
    engineering standards and Carrollton's standards require French drains for
    lots with retaining walls. 77 French drains were not installed as part of the
    retaining wall or of the drainage system.
    Retaining Wall
    Retaining walls are supposed to permit the drainage of water along
    and under a slope, and to impede movement of the slope and objects (earth
    and improvements) down the slope. 78
    The Rosemeade 14 developer submitted an "as-built" drainage plan
    dated June 1986. 79 The as-built drainage plan merely states "construct" a
    retaining wall and provides no drawings of the retaining wall. 80
    Carrollton’s drainage system resulted in the affected Barclay properties
    draining to the back of the lots where ponding occurred adjacent to the
    76    1 C.R. at 419, 910.
    77    1 C.R. at 2688, Carrollton General Design Standards, page 24, Section 3G-2
    "French Drain System: A french drain system, composed of a minimum six inch
    diameter perforated PVC pipe, will be installed between the back of curb and
    right-of-way line whenever adjoining lot elevations necessitate the use of
    retaining walls to maintain lot grades. French drain system must be connected to
    the storm sewer system."
    78    2 C.R. at 1982.
    79    5 R.R. DX 2, Rosemeade010.
    80    5 R.R. DX 2, Roll031-TS000170. Note that the other "plans" are detailed
    drawings.
    -16-
    retaining wall.81 The affected Barclay properties become saturated which
    lowers the slope's factor of safety, which contributed to the slope failure.
    Carrollton violated accepted engineering standards and its standards
    with regard to the retaining wall and the drainage of the affected Barclay
    properties.82
    Problems from Slope Failure
    The surface effect of the slope failure can be seen in February 2008,
    May 2009, 2011 and 2013-2014 photographs of the backyard at 1325
    Barclay Drive. 83 The Brewer Appellees abandoned their swimming pool for
    safety concerns.84 Adjacent properties have similar but less severe
    problems. Appellee Effert (1329 Barclay Drive), David Wozniak (1343
    Barclay Drive) and other owners of property behind the reconstructed
    retaining wall have seen the anchored retaining wall sinking, the earth
    moving towards Dudley Branch and the retaining wall breaking. 85 The
    Effert property sinks so much that Effert spreads 200 forty pound bags of
    dirt on his backyard each year. 86
    81    2 C.R. at 2376-2380.
    82    2 R.R. at 76-77.
    83    1 C.R. at 1086, 1088, 1453-1454, 5 R.R., PX 16, 18, 27 and 30.
    84    1 C.R. at 892, 902.
    85    3 R.R. at 87-88, 91.
    86    3 R.R. at 87.
    -17-
    All of Carrollton actions with regard to drainage, maintenance of
    Barclay Drive, and erosion control were accomplished with motor driven
    vehicles and motor driven equipment.87 Carrollton's actions constitute
    negligence and proximately caused the injuries and damages of which
    Appellees complain.
    SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
    Issue I
    Carrollton established standards to be followed for stormwater and
    drainage infrastructure in its territory. Carrollton justified its standards by
    noting the consequences of failing to adhere to the standards, including
    specific references of resulting slope failure. Carrollton did not follow its
    standards with regard to Appellees' properties. The warned of
    consequences occurred in the form of a continuing global slope failure.
    Carrollton's actions constituted a taking under Article I, Section 17(a)
    of the Texas Constitution.
    Issue II
    87    1 Supp. C.R., 30-31, 2 Supp. C.R., 880-881, 945-949.
    -18-
    Carrollton's actions with regard to Appellees' breached Carrollton's
    obligations to Appellees as established by Carrollton. The breaches
    proximately caused Appellees injuries and damages.
    Issue III
    The court has jurisdiction over Appellees' damages claims against
    Carrollton and that jurisdiction includes jurisdiction needed to assert
    claims for Declaratory Judgment relief. Appellees seek a declaration of
    Carrollton's duties and obligations regarding stormwater and drainage
    under its standards and ordinances with regard to Appellees' properties.
    ARGUMENT
    Standard of Review
    This is the standard of review of the denial of Carrollton's Plea to
    Jurisdiction:
    Whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists is a question of law that
    can be challenged, as it was here, by a plea to the jurisdiction. Bland
    Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 
    34 S.W.3d 547
    , 554 (Tex.2000). We review
    de novo the disposition of Texas City's jurisdictional plea. Miranda,
    133 S.W.3d at 226. Because we address a plea to the jurisdiction in
    which disputed evidence implicates both the court's subject-matter
    jurisdiction and the merits of the case, we consider relevant evidence
    submitted by the parties to determine if a fact issue exists. Id. at 227.
    We take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant, indulge
    every reasonable inference, and resolve any doubts in the
    nonmovant's favor. Id. at 228. If the evidence creates a fact question
    regarding jurisdiction, the plea must be denied pending resolution of
    -19-
    the fact issue by the fact finder. Id. at 227–28. If the evidence fails to
    raise a question of fact, however, the plea to the jurisdiction must be
    granted as a matter of law. Id. at 228.
    Suarez v. City of Texas, --- S.W.3d ---, 
    2015 WL 3802865
    , *6 (Tex. June 19,
    2015); also Harris Cnty. Flood Control Dist. v. Kerr, 
    2015 WL 3641517
    , *2-
    3 (Tex. June 12, 2015). Appellees met their burden to sustain jurisdiction
    over this matter.
    Reply to Issue I.
    Whether the trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction over
    Appellees’ takings claim when the evidence shows the City did not
    know, could not have known, and was not substantially certain, that
    any of its actions would result in specific damage to Appellees’
    property.
    Carrollton violated the standards it imposed to control stormwater
    and drainage and caused the injuries Carrollton used to justify the
    imposition of its requirements. This fact alone establishes the requisite
    knowledge and intent. Harris Cnty. Flood Control Dist. v. Kerr, 
    2015 WL 3641517
     at *3:
    In a takings case, “the requisite intent is present when a
    governmental entity knows that a specific act is causing identifiable
    harm or knows that the harm is substantially certain to result.”
    Tarrant Reg'l Water Dist. v. Gragg, 
    151 S.W.3d 546
    , 555 (Tex.2004).
    It is not enough that the act causing the harm be intentional–there
    must also be knowledge to a substantial certainty that the harm will
    occur. City of Dallas v. Jennings, 
    142 S.W.3d 310
    , 313–14
    (Tex.2004). Intent, in takings cases as in other contexts, may be
    -20-
    proven by circumstantial evidence. See Spoljaric v. Percival Tours,
    Inc., 
    708 S.W.2d 432
    , 435 (Tex.1986).
    Carrollton warned of the consequences of not complying with its drainage
    requirements. Carrollton did not comply with its standards. The warned of
    consequences occurred.
    The district court has jurisdiction over Appellees' claims for taking
    private property for public use without just compensation. Tex. Const. Art.
    I, § 17. Sovereign immunity has been waived under the Texas Tort Claims
    Act. Because jurisdiction exists for Appellees' taking and tort claims,
    jurisdiction exists over Appellees' Declaratory Judgment Act claims to
    determine Carrollton's obligations to remedy the slope failure and maintain
    the property in its control so as to avoid a recurrence of the slope failure.
    Appellees filed sufficient pleadings and provided extensive evidence
    that precludes the granting of Carrollton's plea to jurisdiction. Texas Dept.
    of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 
    133 S.W.3d 217
    , 228 (Tex. 2004).
    Inverse Condemnation
    Article I, section 17(a) of the Texas Constitution provides that: "No
    person's property shall be taken, damaged, or destroyed for or applied to
    public use without adequate compensation being made, unless by the
    consent of such person . . . ." See Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964
    -21-
    S.W.3d 922, 933 (Tex. 1998); City of Carrolton v. RIHR Inc., 
    308 S.W.3d 444
    , 448-449 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2010, rev. denied) (dispute over payment
    for retaining wall repairs and city's demand for payment before issuance of
    a building permit was an unconstitutional exaction).
    Whether particular facts constitute an unconstitutional taking is a
    question of law for the court. Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.3d
    at 937. The Supreme Court wrote in State v. Brownlow, 
    319 S.W.3d 649
    ,
    652 (Tex. 2010):
    The essence of an inverse condemnation proceeding is that the
    government has intentionally taken or unreasonably interfered with
    an owner’s use of property and the property owner is attempting to
    recover compensation for the lost or impaired rights. (citations
    omitted)
    A “taking, damaging, or destruction” for purposes of inverse condemnation
    is defined as the physical appropriation or invasion of property, or
    unreasonable interference with a landowner’s right to use and enjoy the
    property. See Tarrant Reg'l Water Dist. v. Gragg, 
    151 S.W.3d 546
    , 552
    (Tex. 2004); DuPuy v. City of Waco, 
    396 S.W.2d 103
    , 108 -109 (Tex. 1965).
    The evidence is that earth from the surface and below the Appellees'
    properties is on or under Carrollton's Dudley Branch right of way.
    Carrollton's apparent objection to the inverse condemnation is not to the
    -22-
    fact of the taking but how the taking of the earth occurred.
    A "taking, damaging or destruction" constituting inverse
    condemnation can occur in a variety of ways:
    a.    declaration of a nuisance and the demolition of the property. City of
    Dallas v. Stewart, 
    361 S.W.3d 562
     (Tex. 2012).
    b.    requirement to lower and encasing pipe line under streets
    established after area incorporated. Magnolia Pipe Line Co. v. City
    of Tyler, 
    348 S.W.2d 537
    , 540 (Tex.Civ.App.—Texarkana 1961, writ
    ref'd).
    c.    diversion of water through streets and other city "infrastructure"
    onto landowner's property. City of Amarillo v. Burch, 
    369 S.W.3d 684
     (Tex. App. - Amarillo 2012, no pet.).
    d.    drainage in excess of natural drainage. Hubler v. City of Corpus
    Christi, 
    564 S.W.2d 816
     (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1978, writ ref'd
    n.r.e.).
    e.    change in drainage flow. City of Houston v. Wall, 
    207 S.W.2d 664
    (Tex.App.-Galveston 1947, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
    f.    build up of dirt adjacent to alley constructed which impaired access
    to garage and parking. Cozby v. City of Waco, 
    110 S.W.3d 32
    (Tex.App.-Waco 2002, no pet.).
    g.    opening canal over landowner's property to public use in
    contravention of terms of easement. Texas Parks & Wildlife Dep't v.
    Callaway, 
    971 S.W.2d 145
     (Tex.App.-Austin 1998, no pet.).
    -23-
    h.    construction of public works or their subsequent maintenance and
    operation. Hale v. Colorado River Mun. Water Dist., 
    818 S.W.2d 537
    , 539 (Tex.App.—Austin 1991, no writ); Hidalgo Cnty. Water
    Improvement Dist. No. 2 v. Holderbaum, 
    11 S.W.2d 506
    , 507 (Tex.
    Comm'n App. 1928, judgm't adopted).
    i.    construction, operation and maintenance of drainage system. City
    of El Paso v. Mazie's, L.P., 
    408 S.W.3d 13
    , 23 (Tex.-El Paso 2012,
    rev. denied).
    Carrollton knows that its actions with regard to its Barclay Drive and
    Dudley Branch Creek and the retaining wall caused an identifiable harm -
    slope failure. Carrollton's implemented standards for the construction,
    maintenance and repair of its drainage system, slopes and retaining walls
    identify slope failure as a consequence of failing to follow its standards
    proves intent. See City of Dallas v. Jennings, 
    142 S.W.3d 310
    , 314 (Tex.
    2004)
    Taking of Earth
    Carrollton's chief engineer agrees that on or under Carrollton's
    Dudley Branch right of way, there is now earth that once was on or under
    Appellees' property. Taking earth from Appellees' properties is a taking.
    Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 
    369 S.W.3d 814
    , 832 (Tex. 2012) (taking
    groundwater beneath property), State v. Brownlow, 319 S.W.3d at 653
    -24-
    (earth taken from easement to construct mitigation pond).
    Carrollton has the right to build a sewer line on the sewer easement
    and may have had the right to place the retaining wall on the sewer
    easement. Carrollton has not claimed the right to take earth from the
    affected Barclay properties. Carrollton's rights are limited to what is
    necessary to exercise the right of placing and utilizing the sewer line on the
    easement. See Marcus Cable Assocs., L.P. v. Krohn, 
    90 S.W.3d 697
    , 701-
    702 (Tex. 2002).
    A significant amount of earth has been taken since the initial slope
    failure in May 2009. Carrollton knew that a continuing slope failure was
    manifested by the May 2009 events. Immediately after the May 2009 slope
    failure at 1325 Barclay Drive, there was a scarp of roughly three feet, which
    reflects how much the surface of the backyard of 1325 Barclay Drive had
    sunk because earth was moving onto the Dudley Branch right of way. At
    the time of the hearing, the scarp was in excess of seven feet. A lesser
    damaged property requires 200 40 pound bags of dirt each year to fill in
    sunken areas.
    Taking By Slope Failure
    If Carrollton changed the Dudley Branch slope outside the retaining
    -25-
    wall and that removal of earth caused a slope failure, there would be a
    taking by removing the lateral support of the property. Williams v.
    Thompson, 
    152 Tex. 270
    , 277-278, 
    256 S.W.2d 399
    , 403 (1953), Simon v.
    Nance, 
    45 Tex. Civ. App. 480
    , 483-484, 
    100 S.W. 1038
    , 1040 (Tex. Civ.
    App. - Austin 1907, no hist.). In this case, the removal of lateral support
    comes from a combination of circumstances, all of which are in the
    exclusive control of Carrollton.
    Appellees' properties are falling in to Dudley Branch as a result of the
    global slope failure. Carrollton's ordinances and standards warn of slope
    failure and provide standards to be followed to prevent slope failure.
    Carrollton consistently violated its rules. If Carrollton had obtained expert
    advice to violate its standards, Carrollton might not be subject to the claim
    of inversely condemned Appellees' properties. See City of Keller v. Wilson,
    
    168 S.W.3d 802
     (Tex. 2005). If Carrollton had perceived problems and
    attempted to remedy the problems, albeit unsuccessfully, Carrollton might
    not have inversely condemned Appellees' properties. See City of San
    Antonio v. Pollock, 
    284 S.W.3d 809
    , 821 (Tex. 2009); City of Keller v.
    Wilson, 168 S.W.3d at 828–830.
    Knowledge of Effects of Actions
    -26-
    Carrollton knew that its actions and policies with regard to the
    affected Barclay properties would or were substantially certain to result in
    the slope failure. Tarrant Reg'l Water Dist. v. Gragg, 151 S.W.3d at 551–
    554. The Supreme Court 's opinion in City of Keller v. Wilson illustrates an
    important point. In City of Keller v. Wilson, Keller, like Carrollton,
    established standards and violated its standards which caused flooding.
    The property owners based their claims on the violation of the Keller's
    standards. Regarding the issue of knowledge or culpability of Keller, the
    Supreme Court noted:
    Here, it was uncontroverted that three sets of engineers certified that
    the revised plans met the City’s codes and regulations—and thus
    would not increase downstream flooding.
    City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d at 829. Carrollton established
    standards, ignored its standards in creating and maintaining drainage for
    the affected Barclay properties, and ignored its engineer's
    recommendations of how to avoid future wall failures. The Supreme Court
    noted that:
    The missing piece in the evidence here is proof that the City knew the
    plans it approved were substantially certain to increase flooding on
    the Wilsons’ properties.
    Id. The piece is not missing in this case. Carrollton's standards were
    -27-
    written to prevent slope failure. Carrollton received no recommendations
    from experts that it should ignore its standards.
    In City of Dallas v. Jennings, the Appellees sued for damages after a
    sewer line backed up and flooded their home with raw sewage, the Court
    noted:
    Nor do we believe, however, that the City must necessarily intend to
    cause the damage; if the government knows that specific damage is
    substantially certain to result from its conduct, then takings liability
    may arise even when the government did not particularly desire the
    property to be damaged.
    City of Dallas v. Jennings, 142 S.W.3d. at 315. In this case, Appellees rely
    on Carrollton's' statements implementing its standards to establish "that
    [Carrollton] believes that the consequences are substantially certain to
    result from [violations of its standards]." Carrollton violated its standards.
    In City of San Antonio v. Pollock, property owners sued because of
    gases coming from a closed landfill. When the city found pockets of
    methane gas near the landfill, it drilled a system of ventilation wells to draw
    the gases back into the landfill, established monitoring facilities, surveyed
    water quality, hired a consulting firm, improved the methane collection
    system, and, ultimately, installed a new system. City of San Antonio v.
    Pollock, 284 S.W.3d at 813-814. The Court noted that the knowledge of the
    -28-
    City cannot be determined in hindsight:
    The Pollocks contend that the City knew its management of the
    West Avenue landfill was damaging their property, or knew at least
    that damage to their property was a necessary result. But the evidence
    is all to the contrary. Whenever the City was aware that gas was
    migrating from the landfill, it took steps to prevent damage. It
    monitored gas generation, monitored leachate, and installed methane
    collection systems.
    Id. at 821. Even when Carrollton replaced a portion of the retaining wall in
    the 1990's it (a) did nothing to determine the causes and scope of the
    problem and solve it, or destroyed or discarded documents reflecting its
    efforts, (b) did not follow its engineer's recommendations that might have
    reduced the problems, and (c) ignored future signs of problems.
    In February 2008, Carrollton declared a portion of the retaining wall
    a "dangerous building" which enabled it to take actions to remedy the
    situation. See City of Houston v. Carlson, 
    451 S.W.3d 828
     (Tex. 2014).
    Carrollton did nothing. Compare City of Carrolton v. RIHR Inc., 308
    S.W.3d at 447. After the May 2009 slope failure, in the face of a continuing
    slope failure, Carrollton did nothing to determine the causes and scope of
    the problem, ignored numerous warnings of a global slope failure, and
    falsely denied responsibility for drainage of Appellees' lots and Dudley
    Branch Creek, and for the retaining wall. Carrollton took steps to conceal
    -29-
    the true problem.
    In City of Dallas v. Jennings, City of San Antonio v. Pollock and City
    of Keller v. Wilson, the cities obtained professional advice and followed that
    advice. Based on the lack of documentation, we must assume that
    Carrollton either failed to get outside professional advice until the May
    2009 slope failure or obtained advice and ignored that advice. Carrollton
    ignored the in-house engineering advice after the "wall failure" in the
    1990's. In February 2008, Carrollton declared a portion of the retaining
    wall a dangerous building. Carrollton did nothing to resolve the situation
    or even investigate the cause of the retaining wall being a "dangerous
    building." In May 2009, when Carrollton received the warning of a
    continuing, global slope failure along Barclay Drive, Carrollton (a) did not
    determine the scope of the slope failure, (b) did not determine the source of
    water that lead to the slope failure, (c) denied responsibility, and (d)
    concealed its responsibility for the slope failure. Carrollton continued its
    actions with regard to Barclay Drive storm water drainage and Dudley
    Branch that caused the slope failure.
    There is no question that the slope failure resulted in earth previously
    located on and under Appellees' properties moving so that the earth is now
    -30-
    located under Carrollton's Dudley Branch channel. That is a taking.
    Appellees are entitled to the cost of either returning the earth to its proper
    location, rebuilding the properties to the condition they enjoyed before the
    taking or the value of the properties if the problem cannot be remedied.
    Reply to Issue II
    Whether the trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction over
    Appellees’ negligent-property-damage claim when they have failed to
    plead and the evidence negates a City-employee use of motor-driven-
    vehicle or equipment sufficient for a waiver of governmental
    immunity from suit under the Texas Tort Claims Act.
    Negligence
    Under the Texas Tort Claims Act, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §
    101.001 et seq., Carrollton can be held liable for property damage
    proximately caused by the wrongful act or omission or the negligence of an
    employee acting within the scope of his employment if the property damage
    arises from the operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle or motor-driven
    equipment, and the employee would be personally liable under Texas law.
    Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code, § 101.021.
    It is not contested that Carrollton used motor-driven vehicles and
    motor-driven equipment to construct, maintain and repair its drainage
    system. See City of El Paso v. W.E.B. Investments, 
    950 S.W.2d 166
    , 170
    -31-
    (Tex. App. - El Paso 1977, rev. denied). As discussed above, Carrollton
    established the duties and standards that it applied and applies to the
    construction, maintenance and report of its drainage systems. Carrollton's
    Department of Public Works maintained and repaired the drainage system,
    Barclay Drive and Dudley Branch Creek, in a manner that water did not and
    does not drain from Appellees' properties, causing the water to pond and
    accumulate on the property, thereby reducing the factor of safety of such
    properties with the result that the slope failed. Carrollton required specific
    slopes and factors of safety and French drains for retaining walls. The
    Barclay Drive retaining wall, part of Carrollton's infrastructure does not
    meet those requirements.
    Pursuant to ordinance, Barclay Drive was to provide drainage for the
    Appellees' properties, which it does not. Barclay Drive was repaired and
    maintained with motor vehicles and motor driven equipment in such a
    manner that Appellees' properties cannot drain on to Barclay Drive.
    Dudley Branch was repaired and maintained contrary to Carrollton's
    standards with improper slopes and no provision for drainage of Appellees'
    properties even though the properties contained Carrollton's retaining wall.
    All repair and maintenance was done with motor driven vehicles and motor
    -32-
    driven equipment.
    Carrollton is liable for its negligence.
    As quoted above, in its final report dated October 2, 2009 Terracon,
    Carrollton's expert, noted regarding the cause of the slope failure the
    presence of groundwater on the Barclay Drive side of 1325 Barclay Drive.
    Groundwater that did not drain from Appellees' properties which, if for no
    other reason, did not drain from Appellees' properties because of the way
    Carrollton maintained and repaired Barclay Drive and the retaining wall. 88
    Reply to Issue III - Declaratory Judgment
    Whether the trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction over
    Appellees’ requests for declaratory relief and related attorney’s fees
    when Appellees are not seeking to challenge the validity of any City
    ordinance or franchise.
    In their claims for inverse condemnation and negligence, Appellees
    seek relief for injuries and damages suffered due to the slope failure. In
    their declaratory judgment action, Appellees seek a judicial resolution of
    issues related to the future maintenance and repair of Dudley Branch
    Creek, Barclay Drive and the retaining wall. Appellees particularly seek a
    declaration of Carrollton's obligations under its standards and ordinances.
    88    C.R. at Vol 1, 1200.
    -33-
    A declaratory judgment action is the proper vehicle to determine
    issues relating to easements. Manning v. Embridge Pipelines (East Texas),
    L.P., 
    345 S.W.3d 718
    , 727 (Tex. App. - Beaumont 2011, rev. denied),
    Roberson v. City of Austin, 
    157 S.W.3d 130
    , 137 (Tex. App.-Austin 2005,
    pet. denied). Appellees' action is exactly the sort of action that the
    Declaratory Judgment Act was written to address,
    A person interested under a deed, will, written contract, or other
    writings constituting a contract or whose rights, status, or other legal
    relations are effected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract, or
    franchise may have determined any question of construction or
    validity arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract,
    or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal
    relations thereunder.
    Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 37.004(a) (Emphasis added).
    Appellees seek specific declaratory relief under the Texas Declaratory
    Judgment Act, requesting that declarations that Carrollton employees in its
    Engineering Department failed to perform ministerial acts under
    Carrollton's ordinances, rules, regulations and standards and the laws of
    the State of Texas by failing to
    a.    determine that the retaining wall is part of Carrollton's
    infrastructure.
    b.    complying with ordinances, rules, regulations and standards
    regarding retaining walls in connection with the retaining wall
    on the affected Barclay properties.
    -34-
    c.    complying with its ordinances, rules, regulations and standards
    with regard to slope stability.
    d.    complying with ordinances, rules, regulations and standards
    with regard to retaining walls.
    e.    complying with ordinances, rules, regulations and standards
    with regard to drainage.
    See City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 
    284 S.W.3d 366
    , 372-373 (Tex. 2009)
    Regarding jurisdiction, Appellees accept that sovereign immunity
    would not be waived for the Declaratory Judgment Act claims if they were
    seeking to establish jurisdiction through the Declaratory Judgment Act.
    See Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. Sefzik, 
    355 S.W.3d 618
     (Tex. 2011) (plaintiff
    only sought declaratory relief challenging the denial of a permit), City of El
    Paso v. Heinrich (plaintiff sought declaratory relief and an injunction
    against state officials). The Declaratory Judgment Act does not enlarge the
    trial court's jurisdiction, but is "merely a procedural device for deciding
    cases already in a court's jurisdiction." Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. Sefzik, 355
    S.W.3d at 621-622 (quoting Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep't v. Sawyer Trust,
    
    354 S.W.3d 384
    , 388 (Tex.2011)).
    Appellees have established jurisdiction independent of the
    Declaratory Judgment Act claims. Appellees' claims for declaratory relief
    -35-
    seek to have a determination of their "rights, status, or other legal relations
    . . . effected by a . . . municipal ordinance . . . and obtain a declaration of
    rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder." The issues raised by
    Appellees for declaratory relief all relate to claims over which this Court has
    jurisdiction independent of the Declaratory Judgment Act.
    PRAYER
    Appellees pray that the District Court's order denying Carrollton's
    Motion to Dismiss be in all things affirmed.
    Respectfully submitted,
    s/ Bruce E. Turner
    __________________________
    Bruce E. Turner
    Texas Bar No. 20310500
    bturner@bennettweston.com
    J. Michael Weston
    Texas Bar No. 21232100
    jmweston@bennettweston.com
    Bennett Weston LaJone & Turner PC
    1603 LBJ Freeway, Suite 280
    Dallas, Texas 75234
    Telephone: 972-862-2332
    Facsimile: 214-373-2570
    -36-
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
    The undersigned certifies that a true and correct copy of Appellees'
    Brief was served on all counsel of record by electronic service under Tex. R.
    App. P. 9.2 on the 10th day of July 2015, in accordance with the
    requirements of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. The persons
    served are:
    Fredrick "Fritz" Quast                      Meredith A. Ladd, City Attorney
    George A. Staples, Jr.                      City of Carrollton, Texas
    Counsel for Appellant                       1945 East Jackson Road
    Taylor, Olson, Adkins, Sralla               Carrollton, Texas 75006
    & Elam, LLP
    6000 Western Place, Suite 200
    Fort Worth, Texas 76107
    /s/ Bruce E. Turner
    ___________________
    Bruce E. Turner, Esq.
    CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
    Pursuant to Rule 9.4(3) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure,
    the undersigned authority hereby certifies that according to the word
    processing software used to prepare this filing, the word count of this
    document is 7,438.
    /s/ Bruce E. Turner
    ___________________
    Bruce E. Turner, Esq.
    -37-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 02-15-00119-CV

Filed Date: 7/10/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/29/2016

Authorities (20)

Cozby v. City of Waco , 110 S.W.3d 32 ( 2003 )

Spoljaric v. Percival Tours, Inc. , 29 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 280 ( 1986 )

City of Dallas v. Jennings , 47 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 715 ( 2004 )

Tarrant Regional Water District v. Gragg , 47 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 707 ( 2004 )

Texas Parks & Wildlife Department v. Callaway , 1998 Tex. App. LEXIS 3574 ( 1998 )

State v. Brownlow , 53 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1100 ( 2010 )

Marcus Cable Associates, L.P. v. Krohn , 46 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 167 ( 2002 )

Simon v. Nance , 45 Tex. Civ. App. 480 ( 1907 )

City of El Paso v. W.E.B. Investments , 950 S.W.2d 166 ( 1997 )

Manning v. Enbridge Pipelines (East Texas) L.P. , 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 5336 ( 2011 )

Texas Department of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda , 47 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 386 ( 2004 )

Williams v. Thompson , 152 Tex. 270 ( 1953 )

Magnolia Pipe Line Company v. City of Tyler , 1961 Tex. App. LEXIS 1861 ( 1961 )

DuPuy v. City of Waco , 9 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 42 ( 1965 )

Hubler v. City of Corpus Christi , 1978 Tex. App. LEXIS 3093 ( 1978 )

Roberson v. City of Austin , 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 460 ( 2005 )

City of Keller v. Wilson , 48 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 848 ( 2005 )

City of San Antonio v. Pollock , 52 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 665 ( 2009 )

City of Carrollton v. RIHR INC. , 308 S.W.3d 444 ( 2010 )

Bland Independent School District v. Blue , 44 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 125 ( 2000 )

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