Albert Dotie, Jr. v. State ( 2015 )


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  •                                                                        ACCEPTED
    06-15-00094-CR
    SIXTH COURT OF APPEALS
    TEXARKANA, TEXAS
    7/27/2015 2:20:06 PM
    DEBBIE AUTREY
    CLERK
    NO. 06-15-00094-CR
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS                  FILED IN
    6th COURT OF APPEALS
    TEXARKANA, TEXAS
    SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF         TEXAS
    7/27/2015 2:46:00 PM
    DEBBIE AUTREY
    AT TEXARKANA, TEXAS                    Clerk
    ALBERT DOTIE, JR.,
    Appellant
    VS.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS,
    Appellee
    Appealed from the 276th Judicial District Court
    Marion County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. F14540
    BRIEF OF APPELLANT
    Submitted by:
    James P. Finstrom
    Counsel for Appellant
    P.O. Box 276
    Jefferson, Texas 75657
    903-665-7111
    Fax: 903-665-7167
    State Bar #07038000
    APPELLANT DOES REQUEST ORAL ARGUMENT
    IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
    Pursuant to T.R.A.P. 38.1(a)
    Appellant: Albert Dotie, Jr.
    Institutional Division of Texas Department
    of Criminal Justice
    Joe F. Gurney Unit
    1835 FM 3328
    Tennessee Colony, Texas 75803
    Appellant’s Counsel for Appellant at trial and on appeal:
    Hon. James P. Finstrom
    P.O. Box 276
    Jefferson, Texas 75657
    State’s Counsel at trial and on appeal:
    Hon. Angela Smoak, County Attorney
    102 West Austin Street
    Jefferson, Texas 75657
    Trial Judge:
    Hon. Robert Rolston, Judge,
    276th Judicial District Court
    Marion County, Texas
    2
    TABLE OF CONTENTS
    Pursuant to T.R.A.P. 38.1(b)
    Page
    IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL                        2
    TABLE OF CONTENTS                                      3
    INDEX OF AUTHORITIES                                   4
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE                                  5
    ISSUE PRESENTED                                        5
    STATEMENT OF FACTS                                     5
    ISSUE NO. 1: IS THE EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN
    THE APPELLANT’S CONVICTION?
    ISSUE NO. ONE (Restated)                               9
    IS THE EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN APPELLANT’S
    CONVICTION?
    SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT                                9
    ARGUMENT (Issue No. 1)                                 11
    PRAYER                                                 14
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE                                 15
    CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE                              15
    3
    INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
    Pursuant to T.R.A.P. 38.1(c)
    Cases:                                                      Page
    Green v. State, 
    350 S.W.3d 617
                                  12
    (Tex.App. – Houston 14th Dist. 2012, p.d.r. ref.)
    Martin v. State, 
    252 S.W.3d 803
                                 12
    (Tex.App. – Texarkana 2008, no pet.)
    Mills v. Bartlett, 
    377 S.W.2d 636
    (Tex. 1964)                11
    Rios v. State, 
    141 S.W.3d 750
                                     11
    (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2004, p.d.r. ref.)
    Silber v. State, 
    371 S.W.3d 605
    , 613                         11
    (Tex.App.—Houston 1st Dist. 2012, no pet.)
    Simpkins v State, 
    300 S.W.3d 860
    ,                            12
    (Tex.App.—Texarkana 2009, no pet.)
    Whitney, 
    472 S.W.2d 524
    (Tex.Crim.App. 1971)                 11
    Statutes:
    Article 62.051(a), Code of Criminal Procedure                12
    Article 62.102, Code of Criminal Procedure                   11
    All references to Texas statutes, rules, etc. are to the latest
    edition published by West Publishing Company, unless otherwise
    noted.
    4
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE
    Pursuant to T.R.A.P. 38.1(d)
    Appellant was tried by a jury on May 4, 2015, on his plea of not
    guilty to an indictment alleging the third degree felony offense of
    failure to timely register a change of address as a sex offender
    alleged to have occurred on or about December 21, 2013. (CR 4, 7)
    The jury found him guilty and assessed a four (4) year sentence in
    the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice
    on May 5, 2015. (CR 27-28)       Appellant gave timely notice of appeal
    on June 2, 2015. (CR 32) Counsel was appointed to represent
    Appellant on January 14, 2014, which appointment has continued
    through this appeal. (RR 5-6)
    ISSUES PRESENTED
    Pursuant to T.R.A.P. 38.1(e)
    ISSUE NO 1: IS THE EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN
    APPELLANT’S CONVICTION?
    STATEMENT OF FACTS
    Pursuant to T.R.A.P. 38.1(f)
    The State called four witnesses and the Defendant testified and
    called one other witness.
    Deronda Riley, the administrative assistant court clerk and, as
    such, the sex offender registrar for the City of Jefferson, testified that
    5
    Appellant had a reportable conviction for indecency with a child and
    had been reporting to her as a resident of Jefferson, Texas, for at
    least fourteen years. (RR 12-14) At the time of this case, Appellant
    was reporting to Ms. Riley annually. (RR 15) Ms. Riley met with
    Appellant on December 10, 2013, when he reported a change of
    primary address to 408 Saint John, Jefferson, Texas, and a
    supplemental address of 305 West Watson, Jefferson, Texas. (RR
    14-15) On December 22, 2013, she received information that
    Appellant had used the address of 1406 FM 2208, Jefferson, Texas,
    but did not remember Appellant reporting that address to her seven
    days prior to using it and did not remember if he had any explanation.
    (RR 16-21) Appellant returned to her office on January 8, 2014 and
    again on January 10, 2014, when he reported a new change of
    address to her. (RR 17) She believed that Appellant had moved less
    than seven days before he reported his change of address and
    violated his registration requirements and she reported this to Deputy
    Quada at the Marion County Sheriff’s Department. (RR 17) Ms.
    Riley did not remember if Appellant offered her any explanation for
    the change of address to 1406 FM 2208. (RR 21) And she did not
    know if any officer had gone to 305 West Watson or 408 Saint John
    6
    to see whether or not Appellant had moved. (RR 21) When
    Appellant returned to Ms. Riley’s office on January 13, 2014, he was
    arrested for the offense alleged in this case. (RR 24)
    Deputy Marion County Sheriff David Quada testified that he
    received a telephone call from Appellant on January 3, 2014, to
    report a change of address outside the city limits of Jefferson and he
    told Defendant to report the change first to Deronda Riley within ten
    days. (RR 42, 45-46) He did not ever verify the change of address
    by going to the new address or the old address but believed that a
    Deputy Riehl had. (RR 48-49) However, Deputy Riehl never
    testified.
    Paula Bradshaw, who was Appellant’s girl friend’s mother,
    testified that she did not see Appellant after he moved from her house
    at 808 Canal Street until January 30, 2014, and she did not know
    where he was living. (RR 51) She did not know for certain where he
    lived and did not know that he had reported a change of address to
    305 W. Watson on December 10, 2013. (RR 55)
    Joyce Guess, rented a mobile home to Jennifer Smith, who was
    Appellant’s girlfriend, on December 18, 2013. (RR 58-59, State’s
    Exhibit 3). Appellant signed the lease later a few days after Jennifer
    7
    Smith signed it. (RR 59) She had a conversation with Appellant
    when he told her that he was a sex offender and had a duty to
    register a change of address if he moved. (RR 63-64) Guess never
    actually confirmed that Appellant was living there at her mobile home
    and she never saw him very often. (RR 65-66, 68)
    Appellant’s employer, Charles McCoy, testified that he was
    picking Appellant up from his home when Appellant was arrested in
    January, 2014, and that he may have picked him up at the address
    on FM 2208 twice prior to his arrest in this case. (RR 73-74) The
    rest of the time, McCoy picked Appellant up at the bar-b-que place
    downtown and assumed he was living near there. (RR 74-75)
    Appellant testified that the bar-b-que place was about 50 feet from his
    residence. (RR 82-83)
    Appellant testified that he and Jennifer Smith went to
    Shreveport to his brother’s funeral and he was arrested there on
    December 18, 2013, after his brother’s funeral. (RR 81) At the jail in
    Shreveport, he was putting his address on the jail records and told
    the officer he was moving to another place, but had not moved yet
    and the officer told him to use the new address where he was going
    to be living so that they could get in contact with him. (RR 81-82) He
    8
    further testified that until he moved, he would be living near the bar-b-
    que place. (RR 82) At the time he got arrested in this case, he had
    spent about three separate nights with Jennifer at the address on FM
    2208. (RR 84-85) Appellant testified that he went to report the
    change of address to the FM 2208 address before he moved and was
    told he would have to come back later. (RR 88-90) He got arrested
    when he came back to change his address and said that he did not
    move into the FM 2208 address until he got out of jail and after he
    reported the change of address. (RR 91-92, 108) He also testified
    that he had tried to report the change of address earlier but was told
    that he had to get papers from Deronda Riley, and that there was no
    reason he would not have reported the change of address before he
    moved in. (RR 108)
    ISSUE NO. ONE
    (Restated)
    IS THE EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN APPELLANT’S
    CONVICTION?
    SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
    Pursuant to T.R.A.P. 38.1(g)
    Appellant had been timely reporting changes of address for at
    least fourteen years before this case allegedly occurred and
    9
    recounted many of these changes to the jury. (RR 18-21, 79-80) He
    testified that he did not move in this case before he changed his
    registration and that any nights he stayed away from his residence
    were temporary and less than seven days. (RR 84-85) His
    employer, who picked him up to go to work, confirmed this. (RR 72-
    77) The State relied upon an address given by Appellant when he
    was placed in jail in Lousiana but wholly failed to rebut Appellant’s
    testimony that they wanted a good mailing address rather than his
    actual address if he was going to move to the new address in the
    near future. (RR 81-82) All of the State’s evidence is equivocal and
    no witness ever went to Defendant’s registered address to verify that
    he had moved from it or to his new address to verify when he in fact
    moved in there and stayed for more than seven days. Appellant was
    trying to register his new change of address when he was arrested.
    (RR 91-92, 10-8) Careful analysis of the testimony shows that the
    evidence is insufficient to sustain Appellant’s conviction because it
    does not rebut his testimony that he tried to report his change of
    address as required before he moved and was told to go to see
    Deronda Riley first and that he actually had reported his change of
    address before he moved.
    10
    ARGUMENT
    Pursuant to T.R.A.P. 38.1(h)
    Issue No. 1
    In Silber v. State, 
    371 S.W.3d 605
    , 613 (Tex.App.—Houston 1st
    Dist. 2012), the court held that “a registered sex offender is not
    required to spend every spare moment and every night at their
    registered address. See Whitney, 
    472 S.W.2d 524
    at 525
    (Tex.Crim.App. 1971), where the Court of Criminal Appeals held that
    residence is an elastic term and the meaning that must be given to it
    depends upon the circumstances surrounding the person involved
    and largely depends upon the present intention of the individual.
    And, see Mills v. Bartlett, 
    377 S.W.2d 636
    (Tex. 1964), which held
    that neither bodily presence alone nor intention alone will suffice to
    create the residence, but when the two coincide, at that moment the
    residence is fixed and determined. In Mills, as in the case at bar, the
    evidence is not clear that Appellant made the FM 2208 address his
    residence less than seven days before he was arrested.
    There must be a determination based on the particular facts
    and circumstances of the case that Appellant failed to register within
    the requirements of Art. 62.102, Code of Criminal Procedure. As in
    Rios v. State, 
    141 S.W.3d 750
    (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2004), there
    11
    was conflicting testimony as to where the defendant was living and
    his actual residence was not verified if it was different from his
    registered address, and thus the evidence was insufficient to sustain
    the conviction in that case. And, as in Green v. State, 
    350 S.W.3d 617
    at 630-635 (Tex.App. – Houston 14th Dist. 2012), the court made
    a careful analysis of the evidence as to an address change found that
    no rational fact finder could have found beyond a reasonable doubt
    that appellant ever had an intent to change his address that he failed
    to report not later than the seventh day before the date of the
    intended address change. See also Simpkins v State, 
    300 S.W.3d 860
    , 862-65 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 2009, no pet.) and Martin v.
    State, 
    252 S.W.3d 750
    , 753-54 (Tex.App. – Texarkana 2008, no pet.)
    In Simpkins, at page 862, this Court noted that Article
    62.051(a), of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure defines the
    location of registration:
    A person who has a reportable conviction or adjudication or who is
    required to register as a condition of parole, release to mandatory
    supervision, or community supervision shall register or, if the person
    is a person for whom registration is completed under this chapter,
    verify registration as provided by Subsection (f), with the local law
    enforcement authority in any municipality where the person resides or
    intends to reside for more than seven days. If the person does not
    reside in a municipality, the person shall register or verify registration
    in any county where the person resides or intends to reside for more
    than seven days.
    12
    Appellant had been living in the municipality of Jefferson, Texas, but
    intended to move to an address outside the city but in Marion County.
    He went to the deputy sheriff who handled registration in the county
    and was told that he had to first report the change to Deronda Riley at
    the city police department. He went to Deronda Riley who was out
    when he called there and he was told to return later. He did return
    later to register the new address and was arrested, although he
    testified that he had not moved into the new address yet at that time.
    This testimony was not rebutted by anyone who checked to see that
    he had moved out from his old address or had in fact moved into his
    new address. The burden of proof is on the State and never switches
    to the Appellant, as is required by the court’s charge to the jury in this
    case.   (RR 18)      No witness for the State was able to testify
    unequivocally that Appellant was not staying at the residence for
    which he was registered or that he had been staying at the new
    address for more than seven days or that it was more than a mailing
    address for him. No city police officer or sheriff’s deputy or civilian
    witness could testify of their own personal knowledge or as a result of
    their own personal investigation that Appellant violated the statutory
    registration requirements. Appellant’s testimony that he had not yet
    13
    moved as of date of his arrest in this case was simply not rebutted so
    as to sustain the jury’s verdict. His conviction must be reversed and
    judgment of acquittal entered.
    PRAYER
    Upon the issue presented, Appellant, Albert Dotie, Jr., prays
    that this Court reverse the judgment of the trial court and render a
    verdict of not guilty, and for such other and further relief to which he
    may be entitled.
    Respectfully submitted,
    _/s/James P. Finstrom____
    James P. Finstrom
    Counsel for Appellant
    202 S. Marshall,
    P.O. Box 276
    Jefferson, Texas 75657
    903-665-7111
    Fax: 903-665-7167
    Texas Bar #07038000
    14
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
    I certify that I have delivered a true copy of this brief to Hon.
    Angela Smoak, counsel for the State, and to Appellant by United
    States mail, first class postage prepaid, at the Joe F. Gurney Unit,
    1385 FM 3328, Tennessee Colony, Texas 75803, on this 27th day of
    July, 2015.
    __/s/James P. Finstrom___
    James P. Finstrom
    CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
    I certify that Appellant’s Brief filed electronically on this 27th day
    of July, 2015 complies with Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(i)(2)(B). This Brief
    contains 2,556 words.
    /s/ James P. Finstrom
    James P. Finstrom
    15
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 06-15-00094-CR

Filed Date: 7/27/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/29/2016