Roberto Cardenas v. State ( 2015 )

ACCEPTED
13-14-00530-cr
THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS
CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS
7/8/2015 10:36:01 PM
CECILE FOY GSANGER
CLERK
NO. 13-14-00530-CR
IN THE
FILED IN
13th COURT OF APPEALS
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE CORPUS CHRISTI/EDINBURG, TEXAS
7/8/2015 10:36:01 PM
THIRTEENTH SUPREME JUDICIAL DISTRICT CECILE FOY GSANGER
Clerk
CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS
______________________________________________________
ROBERTO CARDENAS GARZA
VS.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
______________________________________________________
ON APPEAL FROM THE
206th JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
EDINBURG, HIDLAGO COUNTY, TEXAS
IN CAUSE NO. CR-4064-11-D
______________________________________________________
APPELLANT’S BRIEF
______________________________________________________
ALFREDO MORALES, JR.
ATTORNEY AT LAW
P.O. BOX 52942
MCALLEN, TX 78505
(956) 536-8800 TEL
(956) 381-4269 FAX
EMAIL: amjr700@gmail.com
APPELLANT’S COUNSEL
ORAL ARGUMENT WAIVED
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
The undersigned counsel of record certifies that the
following listed persons have an interest in the outcome of
this case. This representation is made so that the judges
of this court may properly evaluate said information to
determine the existence of any reason which would require
his/her disqualification or recusal from the case at bar.
A. Parties
Appellant: Pedro Cantu Villalobos
Appellee: State of Texas
B. Counsel at Trial
For Appellant: Rogelio Garza
Attorney at Law
310 W. University
Edinburg, TX 78539
For Appellee: Joaquin Zamora, ADA
Hidalgo County Dist. Atty.
100 N. Closner
Edinburg, TX 78539
C. Counsel on Appeal
For Appellant: Alfredo Morales, Jr.
P.O. Box 52942
McAllen, TX 78505
For Appellee: Ted Hake, ADA
Hidalgo County Dist. Atty.
100 N. Closner
Edinburg, TX 78539
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
IDENTITIES OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL . . . . . . . . . . i
TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii - iv
STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
APPELLANT’S SOLE POINT OF ERROR . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
STATEMENT OF FACTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 - 3
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
ARGUMENT UNDER SOLE POINT OF ERROR . . . . . . . . 3 - 13
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 - 14
PRAYER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
ii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
STATUTES
Texas Penal Code
Section 6.03(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Section 6.03(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Section 7.02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Section 19.03(a)(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
CASES
United States Supreme Court
Jackson v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 717 (1996) . . . . 4
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 895 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Burden v. State, 55 S.W.3d 608 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Denton v. State, 911 S.W.2d 388 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Fuentes v. State, 991 S.W.2d 267 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Gross v. State, 380 S.W.3d 181 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Haggins v. State, 785 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
McDuff v. State, 939 S.W.2d 607 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
iii
Patrick v. State, 906 S.w.2d 248 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1995). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Rodriguez v. State, 146 S.W.3d 674 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Salazar v. State, 86 S.W.3d 640 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Turner v. State, 805 S.W.2d 423 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Turro v. State, 867 S.W.2d 43 (Tex. Crim. App.
1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Texas Courts of Appeals
Delgado v. State, 840 S.W.2d 594 (Tex. App. –
Corpus Christi 1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Erivin v. State, 333 S.W.3d 151 (Tex. App. – Houston
[1st Dist.] 2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Montgomery v. State, 198 S.W.3d 67 (Tex. App. – Ft.
Worth 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Murray v. State, 24 S.W.3d 881 (Tex. App. – Waco
2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Wooden v. State, 101 S.W.3d 542 (Tex. App. – Ft.
Worth 2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
iv
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant Roberto Cardenas Garza was charged by
indictment with the offense of capital murder. More
specifically, the State alleged at trial that Appellant, on
or about August 15, 2011, did then and there intentionally
and knowingly cause the death of David Alejandro Martinez
by shooting him with a firearm while in the course of
committing or attempting to commit the offense of
kidnapping. (RR. Vol. 31, p. 16). The Appellant entered a
not guilty plea to the charge before the jury at his formal
arraignment. (RR. Vol. 31, p. 16, ln. 21)
After the State presented its evidence, the jury found
the Appellant guilty of the offense of capital murder as
charged in the indictment, (RR. Vol. 33, p. 58), and the
trial court then imposed an automatic life sentence,
without parole in accordance with the law. (RR. Vol. 33,
p. 63).
Appellant then filed his notice of appeal with the
trial court.
1
APPELLANT’S SOLE POINT OF ERROR
APPELLANT’S SOLE POINT OF ERROR:
The evidence introduced at the Appellant’s trial was
legally insufficient to support the jury’s guilty verdict
for the offense capital murder.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The evidence presented at trial showed that, late in
the afternoon of August 17, 2011, police responded to a
call of a body found in an open filed at a remote location
in western Hidalgo County, Texas. The initial
investigation revealed the possibility of several “persons
of interest,” including the Appellant.
While police officers were executing a search warrant
at Appellant’s house for possible evidence relating to the
body discovered in the open field (but unbeknownst to
Appellant), Appellant was arriving at his house. Alarmed
by the number of officers and police units at his house, he
did not stop. Not knowing what to do, he immediately
contacted his lawyer (who was representing him in an
unrelated drug case) and asked for his advice. His lawyer,
believing the presence of police was related to his drug
2
case, advised him to stop and return to the residence.
Appellant promptly returned to his residence, but was
told he could not go in. He was then detained and taken to
the Hidalgo County Sheriff’s Department, where police
interrogated him for over 20 hours, resulting in three
separate statements in which he ultimately admitted to
being present when the person, later identified to be the
body found in the open field, was killed. (RR. Vols. 31 –
32).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The evidence introduced at the Appellant’s trial was
legally insufficient to prove all of the elements of the
offense of capital murder beyond a reasonable doubt.
APPELLANT’S SOLE POINT OF ERROR
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT APPELLANT’S TRIAL WAS LEGALLY
INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JURY’S GUILTY VERDICT FOR THE
OFFENSE OF CAPITAL MURDER
Appellant contends that the evidence presented for the
jury’s consideration at his trial was legally insufficient
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that, on the date
alleged by the State in the indictment, he intentionally
and knowingly caused the death of David Alejandro Martinez.
In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence,
3
the appeals court examines all of the evidence in the light
most favorable to the verdict in order to determine whether
any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson
v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 717 (1996); Denton v. State, 911
S.W.2d 388 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). The Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals has determined that the legal sufficiency
review is the only standard that an appellate court must
review to ascertain whether the evidence is sufficient to
support each element that the State is required to prove to
the jury. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 895 (Tex. Crim. App.
2010). This standard is the same for both direct and
circumstantial cases. Burden v. State, 55 S.W.2d 608 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2001). The evidence is measured by the elements
of the offense as defined by a hypothetically correct
charge for the case, Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1997), and the appeals court considers all the
evidence adduced at trial, regardless of whether or not it
was properly admitted. Murray v. State, 24 S.W.3d 881
(Tex. App. – Waco 2000). The jury, as the trier of fact,
is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and
of the strength of the evidence, and it may choose to
believe or disbelieve any portion of the witnesses’
4
testimony. Fuentes v. State, 991 S.W.2d 267 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1999). When faced with conflicting evidence, the
appeals court presumes the jury resolved conflicts in favor
of the prevailing party. Turro v. State, 867 S.W.2d 43
(Tex. Crim. App. 1993). Moreover, the appeals court may
not overturn a jury’s verdict, but must affirm the verdict
if it determines that, based on the evidence presented, any
rational trier of fact could have found all the essential
elements of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
McDuff v. State, 939 S.W.2d 607 (Tex. Crim. App.1997).
In the case at bar, in order to prevail under the
foregoing legal standard, the State had to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the Appellant, on the specified date,
intentionally and knowingly caused the death of another in
the course of committing a kidnapping. Tex. Pen. Code,
Sect. 19.03(a)(2). Under the law, a person acts
“intentionally,” or with intent, with respect to the
nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct when it
is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the
conduct or cause the result, Tex. Pen. Code, Sect. 6.03(a),
and acts “knowingly,” or with knowledge, with respect to
the nature of his conduct or to circumstances surrounding
5
his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct
or that the circumstances exist. A person acts knowing, or
with knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct
when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to
cause the result. Tex. Pen. Code, Sect. 6.03(b).
Moreover, in a capital murder case, the State must
prove that the accused committed the underlying aggravating
crime (in this instance, kidnapping), Patrick v. State, 906
S.W.2d 2481 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995); Rodriguez v. State, 146
S.W.3d 674 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004), and also prove that the
accused not only intended to engage in in the act that
caused the death, but that he had the specific intent to
cause the death of the individual. Turner v. State, 805
S.W.2d 423 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
Given the statutory definitions, it is clear that the
mental state criminalized is the state of mind that
contemplates the prohibited result. See, Haggins v. State,
785 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). In this particular
case, then, the State had to prove, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that Appellant, on or about , intentionally or
knowingly caused the death of David Alejandro Martinez.
As the record on appeal demonstrates, the State’s
witnesses, together physical and forensic evidence
6
introduced at trial, failed to establish beyond a
reasonable doubt that Appellant intentionally or knowingly
– and with the requisite specific intent – killed David
Martinez.
Before addressing the legal insufficiency of the
evidence, the Appellant readily acknowledges that he gave
three detailed statements to the police regarding the
events leading up to that fateful day. But it is well
settled law that a person may not be convicted upon his
confession alone; rather, the State must establish all the
elements of the crime for which he is charged totally
independent of the confession. In short, there must be
sufficient, independent evidence tending to corroborate the
facts contained in the confession. Salazar v. State, 86
S.W.3d 640 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Delgado v. State, 840
S.W.2d 594 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi 1992).
The evidence in the case at bar, contrary to the
Assertion of the State at trial, corroborates the
Appellant’s statements that he did not harbor the specific
intent to kill Martinez, as alleged in the indictment.
Appellant openly admits to putting the zip ties on
Martinez, but only at the insistence (and under the
direction) of “Pepe,” and then accompanying them to the
7
open filed where Villarreal was ultimately murdered.
However, none of those acts rose to the level of having
engaged in the intentional and knowing conduct contemplated
by the statute. Proof of a culpable mental state
invariably depends upon circumstantial evidence, Montgomery
v. State, 198 S.W.3d 67 (Tex. App. – Ft. Worth 2006), and
intent can be inferred from the facts and circumstances
regarding the event in question. Patrick v. State, Id,
supra.
However, a close examination of the Appellant’s
statements does not show that, by engaging in the conduct
in which he admits doing, it was “his conscious objective
or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result,” or
that “he (was) aware that his conduct (was) reasonably
certain to cause the result.” In other words, by having
placed the zip ties on Martinez and then travelling
in the pickup truck (as a passenger) to the remote area, it
was not Appellant’s “conscious objective or desire” to
cause Martinez’s death; or, that, even by having engaged
in such conduct, he had the specific intent to cause his
death.
The evidence introduced at trial in this case, when
8
coupled with the Appellant’s statements to the police,
clearly supports his contention that he did not engage in
an act or course of conduct – with the requisite intent or
knowledge as contemplated by the statute – to kidnap and
kill Martinez.
The testimonial, physical, scientific and forensic
evidence was scant and did not support the State’s theory
that Appellant intentionally and knowingly murdered
Martinez, either as a principle or party.
More specifically, none of the witnesses nor any of
the forensic evidence introduced before the jury
established, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the Appellant
killed Martinez in the course of committing, or attempting
to commit, his kidnapping.
The crime scene specialists and evidence technicians
collected a number of items, both at the crime scene and
the Appellant’s home, mechanic shop, and vehicles.
However, none of the items recovered – shotgun shell,
casing, zip ties, tire tracks, and empty gun holsters –
was connected to the Appellant. In fact, the witnesses
made clear that the evidence recovered could not be
in any way attributed to the Appellant, much less tie him
9
to the murder. (RR. Vol. 31, pp. 27 – 217). Moreover, the
State’s expert firearms expert unequivocally testified that
neither the casing nor cartridges he examined matched the
one found at the crime scene, and that the weapon he test-
fired was definitely not the murder weapon. (RR. Vol. 31,
pp. 39 – 56).
Even the State’s key witness, Jose Francisco
Rodriguez, who was the person the investigation determined
was the person who actually picked up Martinez and drove
him over to, and dropped him off with, the perpetrators
failed to identify – by name or physical description – the
Appellant. In fact, when specifically asked by the State
on direct examination if the person(s) who had requested
that he (Rodriguez) bring them Martinez were present in the
courtroom, he did not identify the Appellant. (RR. Vol.
31, pp. 242 – 262).
The State’s entire case was predicated exclusively on
the Appellant’s three statements given to the investigators
after he was arrested. (RR. Vol. 32``, pp. 56 – 276)(See
also, SX 148, SX 149, and SX 151). There was a total
absence of physical, testimonial, or forensic evidence to
tie the Appellant to the capital murder of Villarreal.
In fact, when Appellant’s counsel pointedly asked Vic
10
De Leon, the main investigator in the case, what evidence
he had that Appellant had actively participated in the
demise of Martinez, he candidly stated, that there was
nothing “other than what Robert (Appellant) was telling
me.” (RR. Vol. 32, p. 269, line 20). He also reiterated
that none of the physical or forensic evidence found at the
crime scene and at the Appellant’s home, mechanic shop, and
vehicles connected, or even implicated, him in the
kidnapping / murder of Martinez. (RR. Vol. 32, pp. 250 –
256). When asked about the basis for the issuance of the
arrest warrant, Investigator De Leon, again, stated without
hesitation or reservation – “his (Appellant’s) confession.”
(RR. Vol. 32, p. 259).
Although the Appellant was charged as a principle with
the death of Villarreal, the case was submitted to the jury
under the law of parties. Sect. 7.02, Texas Penal Code.
Nonetheless, there was legally insufficient evidence
to find the Appellant guilty of capital murder, under
either theory.
Certainly, there was legally insufficient evidence to
establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Appellant,
alone, acting as a principle, kidnapped and murdered
Martinez. Even under the theory of the law of parties,
11
the State had legally insufficient evidence to make
Appellant criminally responsible for Martinez’s death.
there was no evidence to show that, acting with the intent
to assist the commission of the crime, the Appellant
solicited, encouraged, directed or aided another person to
commit the kidnapping and murder involved here.
In order to hold him criminally responsible under the
law of parties for this capital murder, the State had to
provide some evidence of a common scheme or understanding
to commit a crime. Gross v. State, 380 S.W.3d 181 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2012).
While undoubtedly the Appellant placed himself at the
scene of the crime by virtue of his statements to the
police, mere presence, alone, will not be sufficient to
convict a person of a crime under the law of parties. In
order to hold a person responsible for the conduct of
another, the evidence must show that, at the time of the
offense, the parties were acting together in concert for
a common purpose, with each contributing some part towards
the execution of the crime – here, the kidnapping and
murder of Martinez. However, the evidence introduced at
Appellant’s trial failed to establish that Appellant
encouraged the commission of the offense by acts, words,
12
or agreement. Wooden v. State, 101 S.W.3d 542 (Tex. App. -
Ft. Worth 2003); Ervin v. State, 333 S.W.3d 151 (Tex. App.
– Houston [1st Dist.] 2010).
The testimonial facts adduced at trial, together with
the corresponding forensic and physical evidence collected
at the crime scene, and Appellant’s home, business, and
vehicles, failed to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt
that Appellant intentionally or knowingly – and certainly
with the requisite specific intent – caused the death of
David Martinez.
Accordingly, examining all of the pertinent evidence
in the light most favorable to the verdict, it is evidently
clear that no rational trier of fact could have found all
of the essential elements of the offense of capital murder
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Therefore, the Appellant requests that the court
sustain this point of error, reverse the jury verdict in
this cause with respect to the charge of the capital
murder.
CONCLUSION
Appellant has established that the evidence adduced at
his trial was legally insufficient to support the jury’s
guilty verdict for the offense of capital murder, because
13
the State failed to prove that Appellant intentionally,
knowingly, and with the specific intent, caused the death
of Martinez.
PRAYER
Therefore, in light of the foregoing facts, arguments,
and legal authorities, the Appellant respectfully requests
that the court reverse the jury’s guilty verdict of capital
murder, enter a judgment of acquittal, and discharge the
Appellant.
Respectfully Submitted,
Alfredo Morales, Jr.
Attorney at Law
P. O. Box 52942
McAllen, TX 78505
(956) 536-8800 TEL
(956) 381-4269 FAX
/S/ Alfredo Morales, Jr.
_______________________
ALFREDO MORALES, JR.
STATE BAR NO. 14417290
14
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Alfredo Morales, Jr., hereby certify that a true
and correct copy of the foregoing Appellant’s Brief was
hand-delivered to the Hon. Ted Hake, chief appellate
counsel for the State, at the Hidalgo County Courthouse,
100 N. Closner, Edinburg, TX 78539, on this the 8th day of
July, 2014.
/S/ Alfredo Morales, Jr.
_______________________
ALFREDO MORALES, JR.
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
In accordance with Rule 9.4(i)(3) of the Amended Rules
of Appellate Procedure, effective December 1, 2012, I,
Alfredo Morales, Jr., counsel of record for Appellant,
hereby certify that, relying on the word count of the
computer program used to prepare Appellant’s Brief herein,
the brief contains 3,668 words.
/S/ Alfredo Morales, Jr.
________________________
ALFREDO MORALES, JR.
15