Temika Charnette Owens v. State ( 2015 )


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  •                                                                                       ACCEPTED
    06-15-00069-CR
    SIXTH COURT OF APPEALS
    TEXARKANA, TEXAS
    8/17/2015 10:03:39 AM
    DEBBIE AUTREY
    CLERK
    FILED IN
    I$ The Sj.xth Court of A1>peal's
    6th COURT OF APPEALS
    TEXARKANA, TEXAS
    Texarkana, Texas
    8/17/2015 10:03:39 AM
    DEBBIE AUTREY
    Clerk
    Tqika Charnette          Owetts,
    Ap'pe77ant,
    v.
    THE STAW OF TE){AS,
    Ay>pellee.
    Ay:,peal-s   from the   Ath   Distri<:t Court,
    Rusk Courtty, Texas
    Trial Court No.         G.74-,305
    Anders Brief
    ATTORNEY FOR .APPELI,ANT:
    ileff T. J'ackson
    SBOT No. 2406997 6
    736-A Hwy' 259 N.
    KilEone, TX 75662
    Phonr::         -654-3362
    1903
    Fax:         8L7 -887-4333
    ORAL ARGTTMENT NOT REQUESTED
    LIST   OF" PARSTES             AI{D   COUNSIIL
    APPELLAIiIT: Ternika Charnette                     Owens
    TDCJ No. 019991628
    SrD No. 060614L0
    Texas Department of Criminal Justice
    San Saba Unit
    206 S. Wallace Creek Rd.
    San Saba, TX 1 6817
    Represented at appeal by:
    SBOT    No. 24069916
    136-A Hwy 259 N.
    Kilgore, TX 15662
    Phone   :   903-65 4-3362
    Fax:        BIl - BB7-4333
    Represented at trial_ by:
    ffi
    SBOT    No. 00785248
    P.O" Box 1108
    Henderson, TX 75653
    Phone: 903-657-0561
    APPELLEE: State of Texas
    Renrescn1-od
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    SBOT: 00189406
    115 N. Main St.
    Hencl6rrson - TX 15652
    Phone: 903-651-2265
    Fax:       903- 651 -0329
    TABLES OE' CONTENTS
    List of Parties and Counsel_
    Tabl-e of Content.s
    Index of Authorities-
    Statemen +'U           aF
    VI    1_l.r^
    (-II.g t.\--^
    UClDC
    Tq.qrraq         P   resent.ed
    Statemen t             of Facts
    St tmma    rr;       of the Arguments
    7\ rnr rmn n I
    nr   v LrllrgLr L-
    I.         WHETHER THE IND]CTMENT WAS          SUFF-TC]ENT......3
    II.        WHETHER THE TR]AL COURT ERRED IN RULING ON
    PRETRIAL MATTERS OR APPELLANT' S OBJECTIONS
    DUR]NG TRIAL, OR WHETHER THERE WAS
    FUNDAMENTAL             ERROR                  ......6
    ITT. WHETHER THE EVIDENCE WAS SI]FF-TCIENT                           TO
    SUPPORT A CONVICTION FOR THE OFFENSE                            OF
    HARASSMENT OF            A PUBLIC SERVANT       ....13
    rV. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSJEL IS NOT A
    VIABLE CLA]M BASED ON THE           RECOF|D ]SEFORE THE
    COURT                                          .....15
    Statement of Attorney to the Court                                        . . .18
    Conclusion and Prayer...                                               .....19
    Certificate                 of Compliance                               ....20
    Certificate                 of Service..                               .....2I
    rNDEX OF AUTHORTTTES
    vsVV        !UVY.
    Anders v. CaLifornia,
    385 u.s. 138, '744, (1961)                               2,LB
    Brooks v. State,
    
    951 S.W.2d 30
    (Tex.Crim.App. L99j).                     .6,L3
    Currie v. State,
    
    516 S.W.2d 684
    (Tex.Cr.App.I914).                     .18
    Duff-Snith v. State,
    
    685 S.W.2d 26
    (Tex. Crim. App. L9B5).                       B
    Frausto v. State,
    
    642 S.W.2d 505
    (Tex.Crim.App. 1982).                       11
    Fttr"rafa       \r   _ql_ate /
    
    200 S.W.3d 7BI
    (Tex. App.-Fort Worrh 200G)             .6
    Hawkins v. State,
    
    605 S.W.2d 586
    (Tex. Crim. App. I9B0).                      L2
    Hernandez v. State,
    126 S.W.2d53,51               (Tex.Crim.App.19B6).      15
    Jackson v " State,
    811 S.W.2d '768, 11I (Tex.Crim.App. 1994) .             13,15
    Jeffery v" St.ate,
    
    903 S.W. 11
    6 (Tex.App. -Dallas            1995   )     . 1B
    Lawrence v. State,
    
    240 S.W.3d 9I
    2 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).                   .3,5
    Lindley v" State,
    
    535 S.W.2d 54I
    , (Tex. Crim. App. 7982)                    .B
    111
    PoLk   v. State,
    
    337 S.W.3d 286
    (Tex. App. -Eastland     ,1010 )   .      .13
    Riney v" State,
    
    28 S.W.3d 56I
    , (Tex.Crim.App.200O)
    Smith v " State,
    
    309 S.W.3d 10
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).                         3
    State v" Moff,
    I54 S.W.3d 599 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).                  .3,5
    Strickfand v. Washington,
    
    466 U.S. 668
    (1984).                                 .]-5,16
    Stoker v. State,
    7BB S.W.2d 1 (Tex.Crim.App.l9B9).                        -B
    Thompson    v. State,
    9 S.W.3d BOB, BL2 (Tex.Crim.App.7999) .               -15,L6
    United States v" Johnson,
    521 F .2d I32B , 1329 (5th Cir " I91 6) ,'                    2
    Vil-f escas v. State ,
    
    189 S.W.3d 290
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)                       6
    SLatutes:
    Tex. Pen. Code sec.     B   .04 (a)   .                       12
    Tex. Pen. Code Sec. 12.42                                     10
    Tex. Pen. Code Sec. 22.II
    Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art 36.01(a)                            11
    Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 39.14(b)                               B
    1V
    STATEIVIENT OE' THIE CA$E
    By a single count indictment relurned by the                                                              Rusk
    County grand jury                               at        the       Sanl-aml'-rar
    VVI/UVILLJJU!            fUV!ILL,
    arm             )n1
    LVLA    A
    I
    AppelIant was charged with                                       Harassment of                         a Publ-ic
    Qarrr.anf         f-P
    vr\        n     A
    v|     r^rhi nl
    ",.--i)   rs    a    l-h
    urrf!ui rrl   rlanr^aa
    \aEYIq:\,      fo I nnrz rrnrlo-
    !vtvrrj   urt\-lcI
    m^-'"
    r g2!d.D n"^'r
    relIct_L Code Sec. 22.LI                           .      The trial- court granted
    the State's moti-on to amend and interlineate                                                                          the
    indictment.                  CR        p. 30.
    Appellant was represented at trial                                            by .Brent Wil-der.
    On April           21, 2015| a jury was empaneLed to hear the
    case.            RR2, pp. 191-L94.                                 Appellant                pleaded "not
    guilt.y" to both counts on the indictment.                                                   fd p. 195.
    A trial- was held on t.he issue of gu-11t, RR3, and                                                             on
    April           29,          2015, the               jury        returned                  a verdict                    of
    "guilLy."               RRS1, pp. I51 p. 5.                          The pun:Lshment phase of
    the trial               was held on the same dav t-he verdict                                                          was
    rafrrrnad
    rrvv/         .nj
    srrv        fhe
    erfv    irrrrz:qqaqqod
    )v-J     quuvJUvv             nUnishment
    I/urr!9rrrrlvrru         Of
    vr     2 vears
    - Jgq!o
    incarceration.                         RR4   p. 39.
    On April                 29, 2015, the Trial                             Cortrt sentenced
    Appellant                        j-n         accordance                  with               t-he            j   ury'        s
    recommendations. RR4, p. 47-42.          Jeff T" Jackson     was
    appointed to represent Appellant on appeal. CR p.98.
    Appellant timely   perfected appeal by       f   iling   wri-tten
    Notice of Appeal on May 1 , 2075.   CR   p. 94.
    vi
    ISST'ES PRESENTED
    I.   Whether the indict.ment was suffidierLt?
    rr. whether the trlal               court erred j-n ruling              on
    Appellant.' s   ob   j   ections during trial , o.c whether there
    was fundamental error?
    rrr. whether the evidence was suffiqient                  Lo support     a
    conviction f or t.he         of f ense    of   hara s.smenf   of a publ-ic
    servant   ?
    vll
    TO THE HONORABLE STXTH COURT OF APPEALS:
    Comes now       l^++          rll
    I.     ,T:   r'lz
    vsvJ\uvrrt   <   nn        attorney for       Temika
    Charnette Owens, Appellant in the ablove styled                                                  and
    numbered cause, and respectfully                                        submits thi-s Brief       on
    such cause.
    STATEI\4ENT                OF THE FAcEq
    On June 1"., 2014, dt about 3:00 a.m., .Appellant. was
    stopped by officer                          Goodson, a public                          servant   of
    Henderson Police                Department,                         f   or   drlvinq       without
    headlights.           she was arrested                                    f,or d::ivinq      whil-e
    intoxicated.          The arresting                            officer        accused her of
    intending to assaul-t him by causing her sar-iva to
    contact his person while struggllng                                          with him in the
    back of hi s   ne   I rn I     rzoh   i cle    .      RR3 pp             . 2I-28   .
    NOTE:
    The record is referred to as:
    "CR": cferk's record in Cause No. CR14-305.
    *RR 7-4": reporter's record in Cause No. CR14-305.
    "RR S1": reporter's supplemental record in Cause No. CRl4-305.
    ST,MI4ARY       OF THE ARGIJI\4NTSI
    Under Anders v. Cal-if ornia , 385                           U. S .     7   3B   ,     7   44 ,
    (7967), a court-appointed attorney may not raise                                                    an
    issue in          an appeal i f                  he makes i1 conscientious
    examj-nation of the case and finds the crppeal is wholly
    f   rivolous.     To comply with Andersl counrsel- must isol-at.e
    "possibly important issues" and "furnistr the court with
    ref erences to the record and l-eqal- author:i-ties to aid
    it     in   itS    ^nnal I af a            functiOn " "           Un.tted States v.
    Johnson, 52'7 E .2d I32B , i-329 ( 5th Cir . I91 6) .                                       Af t    er
    rne
    fll^ apperra--,
    -h^n1I16l-      iq     ryirran        an
    ^n opporru
    a\nna\rJ-rrnil-rz     J-n   raqrrn6rl               .l-ha
    court makes a full- examination of the r:ecord to detect
    whether the case is                   f   rivolous .         Andez:s,     3B   6    U.      S. at
    144. As set forth by his Brief , counsel for Appel-l-ant
    has determined that there are no non-fri-volous issues
    to appeal-.
    ARGUMENTS AI{D AUTHORTETETS
    ARGI'MENT      I.
    THE TNDICTMENT !{AS SUFFICIENT.
    The sufficiency             of the indictment is reviewed                                    de
    novo because that issue is a question of l-aw. Smith v.
    State, 
    309 S.W.3d 10
    , 13-14 (Tex. Crj-m. App. 2010);
    State v. Moff, 
    154 S.W.3d 599
    , 501 (Tex. Crim. App.
    2004)             . A criminal defendant has a constitutional                                       rlqht
    to not j-ce .                Lawrence v. State, 240                     lS .    W. 3d     9I2      ,   9L6
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).                               To satisfy                 this             notice
    radrr i ramant- , an
    !VYUT!VIILVIIU'   gII indictment
    IITVIVUILIVIIU           must be
    lIIUJ   U    Vg   .qne,r-.i f=i
    O}/E;Uf,T-IU     r: enorroh f o
    EAIUUYIl        L-\J
    inform the defendant of the nature of the accusation
    against him so he may prepare a defense. Id.; Moff,                                                    L54
    S . W.     3d at       601   .     "An indictment is gene-raIly suf f icient
    as long as it                    tracks the language of a penal statute
    that itself             satisfies       the constitut.ional requirement of
    notice."               
    Lawrence, 240 S.W.3d at 9t
    6; see Snith,                                         309
    S.W.3d at L4.
    7\nnn'l'l
    nl1-yE    r   _L   -^l- L
    o.Lr       was indicted             for             the         offense                  of
    Harassment of                          Public Servant.              Tex             Pon         f-nrlo       Qon
    uvv
    22.   11     reads:
    A     person commits an of f ense rf , with. tLre intent
    to assault, harass, or alarm, the p,3rson
    causes Snnfhor n^rson the actor knows to be                                                        a
    public servant to contact the blood,                                                seminal_
    f    luid,            vaginal         f   l_uid, sal_iva, uriner , or                     f eces
    of the actor, ofly other person I or a.n                                             anj_mal
    while                   t.he         public       servant           is          lawf uf        l_y
    discharging an of f icial- duty or in retal_iation
    or on account of an exercise of the pub]ic
    servant's official                           power or performance of                           an
    official                 dutv.        
    Id. The indictment
    in the instant case was amended bv order
    of the trial                       court to read:
    . that TEMIKA                 CHARNETTE OWENS             hereinafter
    styled Defendant, on or about the 1" day of
    June      , 2014, and before the presentment of this
    'i   ncli cf ment -             in    the
    urrv    Qgrrnf
    vvurru rz
    )/ of
    v!    Rrisk -
    r\uol\f          Slf  a1-
    r) uqug    e of
    \
    Texas, did then with the intent                                  to assault,
    harass, or al-arm, the person cause i1 person the
    defendant knew to be a publrc servant, namely;
    Chris Goodson, to contact the salLiva of the
    defendant whil-e sai-d Chris Goodson                            \/vas   lawfullv
    di scharging hi s            o   ff   icial          duty as a police
    of f j-cer   f   or    the       City           of    Hender:son Pol-ice
    Department .          RR   p. 6,       29   .
    The indictment tracks the Ianguage of the appfi-cable
    penal statute sufficient                  to give the r,=quisite notice,
    as rerriri rccl under Lawrence and Moff -                  I
    stt":,ra
    uvJvLu.
    ARGI'MENT TT   .
    THE TRTAL COURT DID NOT           ERR      ]:N RIULING           ON
    PRETR.IAI,   MATTERS,      NOR      WERE         AP]PELI,ANT / S
    OB.]]ECTIONS ERRONEOUSLY O\ZERRULED .DTJIRINIG TRIAL,
    NOR If,AS THERE FUNDAI\4ENTAL ERTi.OR OTHEIRW]ISE.
    The Brooks Notice.
    The trial    court rul-ed on several pl:e-Lrial matters
    in the instant case.             Included amonq tliem was "state's
    Notice of Intent          to Seek Hiqher          Pun   j-shm,ent Based         on
    Prj-or Conviction Pursuant to Brooks                          ."     CR   p. 18-
    L9   .      Appellant did not ob; ect to thLis Notice,                         and
    Appellant stipulated to the admisslon of the court/                                s
    judgment of the prior conviction during trial.                         RR4 pp.
    The Brooks Notice was timely qj-ven under                    Brooks
    v. State, 95'7 S.W.2d 30, 33-34 (Tex. Cr:im,, App. \991);
    See al-so Vill-escas v. State , LBg              S.W"   3it   290   , 294   (Tex   .
    Crim. App. 2006) and Fugate v. State, 20Ct S.W.3d'lBL,
    783 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2006).
    The Amendment of the fndictment.
    The state a-l-so moved to amend the :Lndictment twice
    without objection by Appellant"                              An amendment of          a
    charging instrument shalf be made with Lhe leave of the
    court and under its dlrecti-on .                          Tex. cod.e crim. proc .
    art. 28.r0.           Here, the writt.en amendment \,vas submitted
    to t.he trial-            court and included in th.e record in
    compliance with Riney v. State, 28 St.W.3d 56I,                                  566
    (Tex . Crim. App      .2000   )   .
    -Ob-iection to State/ s Ca].].ing Expert !{itness
    The other objection Appelrant made before trial                         was
    an       ob   j ection to the State' s calling                chiad Tayror as an
    expert witness, citing                j_nsuf f   icient notice.        CR   p.   33   .
    Chad Taylor was allowed to testify                           as StaLte, s witness
    wiLhout an          nh-i ar-l- i nn t^ry   Appellant at trizrl "         RR3 pp.
    65   "        Appellant neither requested pre-t-riiel notice of
    designation of             an expert witness,                  nor reguested          a
    continuance f or the st.ate' s                    f   a   j-lure to give timely
    not.ice of its intent to use an expert witnerss.
    The state must disclose the witnesses who wilf                                             be
    used at any stage of the trial                               upon request by the
    defendant in a pre-trial                     motion and oriler of the triat
    court .          Stoker           v.    State ,        l BB         S . W.,   2d        L,        15
    (Tex . crim. App . 198 9 )        .     rn      the      conte>635 S.W.2d 547
    , 544 (Tex. Crim. ApF,. I9B2) .                                             See
    Duff-Smith v. State, 
    685 S.W.2d 26
    ,                           32    (Te><.       Crim. App.
    1985)    .
    Statels Voir Dire on Enhancement olf Punishment
    n-"-t^-f
    rr1-,lPe-L-Lcrllu   al.so
    qrr\J   ohreCted
    vrJJsULeLf    tO VO_L.J. cl ire
    LO vOir                cruesf inn'i nr-r         l-rrz
    pJ
    the State regarding the law relating tr: punishment if
    it were to prove a previous felony convictj_on.                                         RR2 pp.
    B   5-168    .    Appell-ant. had a prior                f   elony' conviction                   on
    which the punj_shment range could                    be    enhanced.      CR pp.
    R.-1 q       Qrran'i f i ^r'l 'l ,, the
    1
    -pecl_rl_ca_Lty,              State       asked individual
    panelists:
    rn a case where a person is convicted of                           a
    third-de.rrAA for nnr4, if         the state can prove              a
    prior     f   elony conviction         that     resr-rlted in       a
    neni fLEIrL
    yErrr  onf i:rrz    qani_ a        can    you       consi-der
    --..-vflCeT                                   the
    upper end of 20 years? you donrt have to commit
    to the increased sentence, but just                           can you
    wait     and hear         all     the    evidence i-n the
    punishment phase bef ore you                       cons   j_der your
    sentence, and are you at least open to the
    possibility        that     it     could       be         a   2O-year
    sentence?          RR2   p. 86.
    Over Appef lant' s running obj ection, RR2 pp. j 5-l j , t.his
    l-ine of questioning was permitted by the triar                         court   on
    i-ndividual voir dire.            
    Id. Appellant's objection
    to the mention of enhanced
    punishment range during individual- voir dlre was three-
    pronged: first,           that the issue should have been taken
    up as a pretrial matter so that Appel_Iant                                                                  wor-ll_d have
    suf f icient                time to respond to the Statr:' s                                                    argument;
    sor-oncl     -      f   hat the State had alreaclrz                                            r:l o.secl       its        voir
    dire,        and that it                          could only go into                                    .issues raised
    drr   ri nn rrrri r dire
    9U.!!rrY         vvr!        s!!v           of
    v!      the
    urlv           nane I
    ygrrv!        clrr
    vq!JrrYri nr-i i nd'i rri dual
    rrrva     v J              voir
    dire; and third,            that rts hiqhly pre j udir:ial and used
    as
    q'D A nl
    q     nrz hrz
    -L1JUy  tJJ fultshe JLaL-s
    sf af e to
    U\J Secure Aa rrrrv
    DV\-LrIC  )uLJ  where;
    vvr--uruIl-I
    1--"
    ^ O- -Lo.I9tj
    portJ-on of the panel had stated that they woul-d not                                                                            be
    able to follow the l-aw as to punishment for this type
    of case. RR2 pp.                           '7
    5-11      .
    Harassment of a public servant j-s a third                                                                 degree
    felony.                 If the State follows the proper p,rocedures and
    nrn\/es
    yr\JVgD           fLIIghc      Defendant
    L-lgICIIL,IO-IIL                has
    fIC-!)        nrerri       orrsl 'iz l-reen
    IJTSVI\-,rLrJr_y       I-/EErI
    .tr-i   *^'r I "
    I-LlIO.-L-Ly
    convicted for                        an offense other than a state                                                         iail
    felonrz- fhe nrrnishmenf ranne for this oJ:fense Can                                                                             be
    enhanced from 2                             10 years conflnement to 2                                            20 years
    conf inement and                      probation is no't avai.ltrbl,e .                                          Tex.       Pen.
    Code Sec. 12.42.                                 During the trial,                          the State did not
    disclose to the jury that the defend.rnt had previously
    been convicted of a felonv.
    10
    vfhile the state may question the jury panel on the
    applicable range of punishment, it mav noL. disclose to
    the veni-re that    it    bel-ieves that the      clef   endant has
    previously been convicted of a f elony "          ljee Tex.    Code
    Crim. Proc. Art 36.01 (a) .        This restrj_ction is desiqned
    to prevent the pre j udice that woul-d inev_Ltably result
    from an announcement at the outset of the proceedings
    that the state believes the defendant was previousry
    convicted 9f .a n:rj- i nrrl41 of fense at a pa:rticular time
    and in a particular      court .     See Frau,sto \r. State,       642
    s.i,{.2d 506 (Tex.crim.App. r9B2).        This:restriction     does
    not, however, prevent the trial        court or: the prosecutor
    from informing the jury panel in hypothLetj_cal terms of
    the applicabre range of punishment if the state proves
    any prior convj-ctions for enhancement pllrposes. rd.              rn
    the instant case, the state was careful- to stav within
    the legal constraints set forth in Fraus;o, 
    id. Charglof the
    Court
    Apperlant obj ected to an j-nstructio.n in the charqe
    of the court. that       voruntary intoxicati-on         i s nor    a
    t1
    defense to a criminal_ of fense.   RR 3 p. 19 .           Rel_iance
    on invol-untary intoxication to negate an intent element
    is prohibited by Tex. pen. Code sec.    B   .04 (a) ; see aLso
    Hawkins v. State, 
    605 S.W.2d 586
    , 589       (   Tex   . Crim.   App   .
    1980)   .   Therefore, the Charge of the Court correctly
    stated that law applicabl_e in this case
    t2
    ARGUMENT     III
    IHE   EVTDENCE I{AS        SUFFTCIENT    T(3 SIJPPORT A
    CONVICTION FOR THE OFFENSE CIF HAITASSMENT OF A
    ]PT'BLIC SERVA}IT.
    The standard of       revlew for        sufficiencv         of the
    evldence is whether any rationaf jury could have found
    Appel-lant guilty      beyond a reasonable doubt. . Jackson v.
    Virginia,     
    443 U.S. 307
    (I919); Brooks v,, State,                   
    323 S.W.3d 893
    , 9I2 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010);                 pc>J_k   v. State,
    331 S.W.3d 286,2BB-89 (Tex. App.-Eas;tland 2010, tr€t.
    ref 'd) . Under t.he Jackson st.andard, an examination is
    made    of al-f of the evidence in the liqht. most favorable
    to the verdict        and determine whether:, based on that
    evi-dence and reasonable inf erences                f   rom it,        any
    rational- trier     of fact could have founrl t.he essential-
    elements of the of fense bevond a reaso:nabl-e doubt.
    Jackson, 443 U . S . at     319   . The standarcl giv'es f ull ptay
    to the responsibility        of the trier      of fact to resolve
    conf   l-icts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence,                 and
    IJ
    to draw reasonabl-e inf erences                                        f rom              basic facts                    to
    uftimate            facts.          Jackson,443              U.S. at 379; Winfrey v.
    State, 393 S.W.3d'/63, 168 (Tex. Crim. Apil . 2013).                                                                  The
    st.andard of                      review        is    the          same f or                          direct          and
    circumstanti-al evidence cases.
    In the instant case, the State's wit.nesses included
    fhe
    (-l.Ig   (lomnlninant
    \/\-'ITLIJ.LCTIIIO.IlU     and anofher
    o.Il\,T
    o.I]\-/UIIgI        resn",{-i ^'*
    Tg'JT../\J.TI\,|'III,\J            "F+:r-cr-
    L,'II-L\-gI         hnfh
    L/\JLII
    '
    who testif ied                     to         the    of   fense.                          F.R3 pp.               19-52.
    Appell-ant cal-l-ed no witnesses and rested                                                                  wit.hout
    presenting any evidence.                                  Here, it                    cannot be argued
    that a rational                      j   ury could not have f or.rnd Appellant
    guilty             beyond a reasonabl-e doubt                                         f   or       the charged
    oI Iense       "
    t4
    ARGUMENT      VI.
    INEFFECTIVE ASSISTAI{CE OF                                  TRIAI    COUNSEIL           IS     NOT
    A VIABLE CI,AIM BASED UPON THE IIEICORD BEE'ORE
    TIIIS             COURT.
    Claims of ineffective                                      assistance of counsel are
    analyzed under the two-prong test set out by the United
    .Sf    af    es .Sttnreme Court. in Strickl-and v. Wa:;hinrtf on -                       vvspttLttY         uv!t    l'    466
    = v v
    U.S. 668 (1984), and adopted by Texas in Hernandez v.
    State,                          
    126 S.W.2d 53
    ,        51       (Tex.Crim.App.1986).
    Appelf ant must show that                                            trial       coun,sel-'s performance
    was deficient,                                  that is,         counsel's representation fell
    below an obj ective standard of reasoniableness.                                                             Thompson
    v. State, 9 S.W.3d B0B, BL2 (Tex.Crim.App.L999).
    Ap'oellant must also show that                                       courLsel-f         s def icient
    performance prejudiced his defense.                                                      
    StrickJand, 466 U.S. at 681
      ; Jackson v. State, B-l'7 S.W.2d 168,                                               11L
    /\f   Tow Cri m Ann
    ez\.vrlrLL.,r-y-y.LJr          .
    .1   gg4Jt )   .     Th'i
    rrrlu s    recltr i res   Annel lant                      ShOw
    there                    j-s a reasonable probability                                    thert,             but           f   or
    couLnsel-'                     s unprof essional errors,                          the result                       of the
    15
    proceeding woul_d have been                                       di_f   ferenc.           StrickLand,466
    U.   S. at 694; Jackson, 811 S.W.2d at                                              'j   jI.     A      reasonabl_e
    probability                     is a probability                         sufficient              T-ar       unde rmi ne
    confidence in the outcome. Strickl_and,                                                  tI66     rf    d
    . at 694;
    Jackson, B'7'/ S . W. 2d at                        117   .
    In reviewing an ineffective                                         assistance of counsel
    claim, there is a strong presumpt j-on that counsel                                                                     .
    s
    conduct falls                           within      the wlde ranqe o:f reasonabl_e
    professi-onal- assistance and the appei_lant musr overcome
    the presumption that the challenged conduct might                                                                       be
    considered sound trial                               s1-rafacrrz 
    Thomps<>n, 9 S.W.3d at 813
    ; strickland,                             466 u.s.              at 689. Any allegation                               of
    ineffectiveness                              must         be              fi_rmlv               founded               and
    af f j-rmatively                    demonstrated in the record to                                             ove rcome
    fhiq.         nraqlrmnfinn
    I/!vuufrryurvrr.                  'ThrlmnId.
    Counsel has 
    detected no error on the part of
    n"^1'l      ".{-t
    iaIJI-,,El-_LClr1L       ^
    D       trial       attorney, Mr. Nel-son.                               A1-
    rru        nn
    rrv   nni nl-
    I/vIrIL
    t6
    during any of       the proceedj-ngs in       thi s cause did
    Appellant assert      Lo the triar    court     that   she   was
    unhappy with the performance and repres;entation of her
    trial   counsel .    Based on this   rcr:ord - n^ legitimate
    non-frivol-ous basis exj-sts to argue trial       counsel    was
    constitutional-l-v inef fecti_ve .
    l7
    STATED4ENT   OF ATTORNSY TO 'THE COURT
    This brief      is fil-ed brz r:orrnsel appointed by the
    court to represent Appef lant on appea-L i n accord.ance
    with Anders v. Cal-ifornia,                   
    386 U.S. 738
    (I96j),             and
    Currie v.            State,    51-6 S.W.2d 684 (Tex.Cr.App. I914)                     .
    Counsel has also fil-ed wi-th this                   Cou:rt a Motion to
    Withdraw as Court Appointed Counsel on Appeal in
    accordance with t.he procedures as standards set out in
    Jeffery v. State, 
    903 S.W.2d 116
    (Tex.App.-Dallas                            1995,
    no pet. ) .           After thorough examination of the clerk's
    record and reportert s record, counsel can find no non-
    f ri vol ott.s noj-nt     of   error   that    can l-ro   sr'n1nrtrJ-   ecl hv the
    UITV
    record.             Counsel has discussed the er,,idence and the
    documents in            the record, citing           references to the
    "-A L,lD
    I-^ U\-\-,'I  ^ .
    18
    PRAYER
    wherefore, premises considered, Lhe undersigned
    counsel- request.s the court of Appeals rerview the record
    on appeal, consi-der the Motion to withd:raw as court
    Appornted Counsel, review the             foregoing              Brief   in
    Support of Motion to withdraw, and grant t-he Motion to
    Withdraw.
    qrrhmi ttarl
    Roqnor-J- frrl I rr uttvrLL.! u uvv,
    . {Jackson
    SBOT No" 24069916
    7 3 6-A Hwy 259 l{.
    Kj-lgore, TX 15662
    Phone: 903-65 4-3362
    Fax:      B]-l-887-433.3
    Email:
    -iOf                               I . com
    J _*' fJ- i:r-kqnn'i:r.rfinrnr.i
    ___-r-Lav/Lqglnaf -1
    Af f nrrla\7   fnr     Annal    I anfu
    Lstt      /
    Temika Cha.rnette               Owens
    t9
    CERTIE TCATE OE COMPLIAN'CE
    The foregoing Appellant' s Brief              is i_n compl-iance
    with TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i) (2) (B) .          The totat_ number of
    words contained in     Appe]l-ant's Brief                that        are nor
    specifically   excl-uded from the word count under TEX.                   R.
    APP. P. 9.4 (i) (1) is 2,315 words.
    SBOT No. 2406991             6
    A1-t^
    r-aLL\JLITCY   tar
    LrJJ-    Zrrnal   l tnf
    rlJPC.L_LA.ttL/
    Temika Charn<>tte Owens
    20
    CERTTFTCATE OF SERVTCE
    r, the undersigned attorney, do hereby certify        that
    a true and correct copy of the above Motion was served
    on the state of Texas by mailing same to the District
    Attorney of Rusk County on August Il , 2015.
    I further certify   that I have mail_ed a copv of the
    above Brief   and accompanying Motj-on by First          cl-ass
    Mail-, postage paid,    to Appel_l_ant, Temi.ka Charnette
    owens at the address fisted    above on the same date.
    ar:kson
    2,406997   6
    2l