in Re Jose Gomez and Eduardo Gomez, Individually and as Former Representatives of MaCarty Truck Wash & Lube, Inc. Gomez McCarty Truck Wash and Lube Inc. F/K/A McCarty Truck Wash and Lube, Inc., and Brothers Tire Services, Inc. ( 2015 )


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  •                                                                                ACCEPTED
    14-15-00401-CV
    FOURTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS
    HOUSTON, TEXAS
    5/4/2015 12:45:30 PM
    CHRISTOPHER PRINE
    CLERK
    NO. __________-CV
    __________________________________________________________________
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS               FILED IN
    14th COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST OR FOURTEENTH DISTRICT OFHOUSTON,  TEXAS TEXAS
    __________________________________________________________________
    5/4/2015 12:45:30 PM
    CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
    Clerk
    IN RE JOSE GOMEZ AND EDUARDO GOMEZ, INDIVIDUALLY AND
    AS FORMER REPRESENTATIVES OF MCCARTY TRUCK WASH &
    LUBE, INC., GOMEZ MCCARTY TRUCK WASH & LUBE, INC. F/K/A
    MCCARTY TRUCK WASH & LUBE, INC. AND BROTHERS TIRE
    SERVICES, INC. D/B/A MCCARTY TRUCK WASH, LUBE AND TIRES
    __________________________________________________________________
    ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN THE 215TH DISTRICT COURT OF
    HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
    CAUSE NO. 2010-56104
    THE HONORABLE JUDGE ELAINE H. PALMER, PRESIDING
    __________________________________________________________________
    RELATORS’ MOTION FOR EMERGENCY STAY
    _________________________________________________________________
    Steve M. Williard
    Texas Bar No. 00788684
    The Williard Law Firm, L.P.
    1920 N. Memorial Way, Suite 207
    Houston, Texas 77007
    Phone: (713) 529-6300
    Fax: (713) 529-6315
    E-mail: steve@williardlaw.com
    ATTORNEY FOR RELATORS,
    JOSE GOMEZ AND EDUARDO GOMEZ,
    INDIVIDUALLY AND AS FORMER
    REPRESENTATIVES OF MCCARTY
    TRUCK WASH & LUBE, INC., GOMEZ
    MCCARTY TRUCK WASH & LUBE,
    INC. F/K/A MCCARTY TRUCK WASH
    & LUBE, INC. AND BROTHERS TIRE
    SERVICES, INC. D/B/A MCCARTY
    TRUCK WASH, LUBE AND TIRES
    NO. ____________-CV
    __________________________________________________________________
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST OR FOURTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    __________________________________________________________________
    IN RE JOSE GOMEZ AND EDUARDO GOMEZ, INDIVIDUALLY AND
    AS FORMER REPRESENTATIVES OF MCCARTY TRUCK WASH &
    LUBE, INC., GOMEZ MCCARTY TRUCK WASH & LUBE, INC. F/K/A
    MCCARTY TRUCK WASH & LUBE, INC. AND BROTHERS TIRE
    SERVICES, INC. D/B/A MCCARTY TRUCK WASH, LUBE AND TIRES
    __________________________________________________________________
    ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN THE 215TH DISTRICT COURT OF
    HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
    CAUSE NO. 2010-56104
    THE HONORABLE JUDGE ELAINE H. PALMER, PRESIDING
    __________________________________________________________________
    RELATORS’ MOTION FOR EMERGENCY STAY
    __________________________________________________________________
    Relators, JOSE GOMEZ AND EDUARDO GOMEZ, INDIVIDUALLY AND
    AS FORMER REPRESENTATIVES OF MCCARTY TRUCK WASH & LUBE,
    INC., GOMEZ MCCARTY TRUCK WASH & LUBE, INC. F/K/A MCCARTY
    TRUCK WASH & LUBE, INC. AND BROTHERS TIRE SERVICES, INC. D/B/A
    MCCARTY TRUCK WASH, LUBE AND TIRES, asks the Court for an emergency
    stay.
    2
    A. INTRODUCTION
    1.    Relators    are   JOSE    GOMEZ       AND      EDUARDO        GOMEZ,
    INDIVIDUALLY AND AS FORMER REPRESENTATIVES OF MCCARTY
    TRUCK WASH & LUBE, INC., GOMEZ MCCARTY TRUCK WASH & LUBE,
    INC. F/K/A MCCARTY TRUCK WASH & LUBE, INC. AND BROTHERS TIRE
    SERVICES, INC. D/B/A MCCARTY TRUCK WASH, LUBE AND TIRES
    (collectively “Relators”). Real Parties In Interest are MANUEL D. PINEDA,
    SUCCESSOR TO MCCARTY TRUCK WASH & LUBE, INC. (“Pineda”),
    MCCARTY TRUCK WASH & LUBE, L.L.C. (“McCarty”) and JUAN MUNOZ
    (“Munoz”) (Pineda, McCarty and Munoz collectively “Real Parties In Interest”).
    Respondent is HONORABLE JUDGE ELAINE H. PALMER (“Respondent”).
    2.    Relators have simultaneously filed their Petition for Writ of Mandamus,
    in which it asks the Court to direct Respondent, the Honorable Judge Elaine H.
    Palmer, 215th District Court, Harris County, Texas, to vacate an order signed by
    Respondent on September 26, 2014 (“Order”). (App. Tab No. 1).
    3.    Relators attach a certificate of compliance certifying that on May 4,
    2015, they notified Respondent and Real Parties In Interest by expedited means (fax,
    email and/or telephone) that a motion for temporary relief would be filed. Tex. R.
    App. P. 52.10(a).
    3
    4.     This original proceeding and request for emergency stay arises out of an
    order granting sanctions against Relators.
    5.     On August 1, 2014, Real Parties In Interest filed their First Supplemental
    Motion for Sanctions and to Strike Counter-Defendants’ Answer to Counter-
    Plaintiffs’ Counter-Claim and Plaintiffs’ Fifth Amended Petition and Application for
    Permanent Injunction (“Motion”). (App. Tab No. 2).
    6.     On September 23, 2014, Relators filed their Response to Defendants’
    First Supplemental Motion for Sanctions and to Strike Counter-Defendants’ Answer
    to Counter-Plaintiffs’ Counter-Claim and Plaintiffs’ Fifth Amended Petition and
    Application for Permanent Injunction (“Response to Motion”). (App. Tab No. 3).
    7.     On September 26, 2014, without a hearing being conducted at the time
    stated in Real Parties In Interest’s notice of hearing, the Court signed the Order
    granting Real Parties In Interest’s Motion. The Order ordered, inter alia, that (1) all
    tax and Secretary of State documents related to the Reinstatement and any testimony
    related thereto are excluded; (2) that any argument to the effect that Relators are the
    senior holder of the name or mark of McCarty Truck Wash & Lube is prohibited; and
    (3) striking the pleading entitled Counter-Defendants’ Answer to Counter-Plaintiff’s
    Counter-Claims and Plaintiff’s Fifth Amended Petition and Application for
    Permanent Injunction.
    4
    8.       Relators filed a Verified Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s
    Order of September 26, 2014 (“Motion for Reconsideration”) which has not been
    ruled on by the trial court. This matter is currently set for trial on May 18, 2015.
    9.       Relators contend the trial court abused its discretion when it granted
    sanctions against Relators based upon the fact that (a) the trial court failed to conduct
    a hearing at the time scheduled; (b) there is no evidence in the record to suggest that
    any of the allegations contained in the Motion are true; and (c) the trial court failed
    to consider lesser remedies.
    B. ARGUMENTS & AUTHORITIES
    10.      The Court may grant temporary relief pending its determination of an
    original proceeding. Tex. R. App. P. 52.10(b).
    11.      This emergency stay is necessary to maintain the status quo of the parties
    and to preserve the Court’s jurisdiction to consider the merits of the trial court’s
    Order. In re Reed, 
    901 S.W.2d 604
    , 609 (Tex. App. - San Antonio 1995, original
    proceeding).
    12.      For the reasons set forth in Relators’ Petition for Writ of Mandamus, the
    trial court abused its discretion when it signed the Order granting sanctions against
    Relators for amending their pleading in response to Real Parties In Interest’s
    amending their court-suit six (6) days before trial alleging for the first time a breach
    5
    of an alleged contract and/or producing fifty (50) boxes of records nine (9) months
    before trial. To enable the Court to fully consider the arguments and record, Relators
    request a stay of the Order until such time as the Court issues a final ruling on the
    Petition for Writ of Mandamus.
    C. CONCLUSION
    13.    A stay of the Order which granted Real Parties In Interest’s Motion is
    necessary to preserve Relators’ rights and to prevent Relators from being subjected
    to Respondent’s abuse of discretion.
    D. PRAYER
    14.    For the reasons stated in this motion, Relators ask the Court for an
    emergency stay to maintain the status quo of the parties and preserve the Court’s
    jurisdiction to consider the merits of Relators’ Petition for Writ of Mandamus.
    6
    Respectfully submitted,
    /s/ Steve M. Williard
    Steve M. Williard
    Texas Bar No. 00788684
    The Williard Law Firm, L.P.
    1920 N. Memorial Way, Suite 207
    Houston, Texas 77007
    Phone: (713) 529-6300
    Fax: (713) 529-6315
    E-mail: steve@williardlaw.com
    ATTORNEY FOR RELATORS,
    JOSE GOMEZ AND EDUARDO GOMEZ,
    INDIVIDUALLY AND AS FORMER
    REPRESENTATIVES OF MCCARTY
    TRUCK WASH & LUBE, INC., GOMEZ
    MCCARTY TRUCK WASH & LUBE,
    INC. F/K/A MCCARTY TRUCK WASH
    & LUBE, INC. AND BROTHERS TIRE
    SERVICES, INC. D/B/A MCCARTY
    TRUCK WASH, LUBE AND TIRES
    7
    CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE
    I certify that I have conferred with counsel for the Real Parties In Interest
    regarding the requested relief and counsel for the Real Parties In Interest has not
    agreed and is opposed to the filing of this motion.
    /s/ Steve M. Williard
    Steve M. Williard
    8
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
    I certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served on all parties and/or
    counsel as required by the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure by U.S. mail, fax,
    and/or personal delivery on May 4, 2015 as follows:
    Via Certified Mail/RRR #7014 3490 0000 1008 6157
    Ms. Elizabeth Burkhardt
    Saenz & Burkhardt, P.L.L.C.
    5503 Lawndale
    Houston, Texas 77023
    Phone: (832) 922-2919
    Fax: (713) 468-5932
    E-mail: Elizabeth@SaenzBurkhardt.com
    Attorney for Real Parties In Interest: Manuel D. Pineda, Successor to McCarty
    Truck Wash and Lube, Inc., McCarty Truck Wash & Lube, L.L.C. and Juan
    Munoz
    Via Certified Mail/RRR #7014 3490 0000 1008 6164
    The Honorable Judge Elaine H. Palmer
    215th Harris County District Court
    201 Caroline, Floor 13
    Houston, Texas 77002
    Phone: (713) 368-6330
    Respondent
    /s/ Steve M. Williard
    Steve M. Williard
    9
    CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
    Under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.10(a), I certify that I have made
    a diligent effort to notify all parties by telephone and/or facsimile that a motion for
    temporary relief would be filed.
    /s/ Steve M. Williard
    Steve M. Williard
    10
    NO. ____________-CV
    __________________________________________________________________
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST OR FOURTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    __________________________________________________________________
    IN RE JOSE GOMEZ AND EDUARDO GOMEZ, INDIVIDUALLY AND
    AS FORMER REPRESENTATIVES OF MCCARTY TRUCK WASH &
    LUBE, INC., GOMEZ MCCARTY TRUCK WASH & LUBE, INC. F/K/A
    MCCARTY TRUCK WASH & LUBE, INC. AND BROTHERS TIRE
    SERVICES, INC. D/B/A MCCARTY TRUCK WASH, LUBE AND TIRES
    __________________________________________________________________
    ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN THE 215TH DISTRICT COURT OF
    HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
    CAUSE NO. 2010-56104
    THE HONORABLE JUDGE ELAINE H. PALMER, PRESIDING
    __________________________________________________________________
    RELATORS’ MOTION FOR EMERGENCY STAY
    _________________________________________________________________
    Relators submit the following documents in support of their Motion for
    Emergency Stay:
    Document Title                                                                  Tab No.
    Order Granting Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions..................................1
    First Supplemental Motion for Sanctions and to Strike
    Counter-Defendants’ Answer to Counter-Plaintiffs’
    Counter-Claim and Plaintiffs’ Fifth Amended Petition
    and Application for Permanent Injunction..............................................2
    11
    Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants’ First Supplemental
    Motion for Sanctions and to Strike Counter-Defendants’
    Answer to Counter-Plaintiffs’ Counter-Claim and Plaintiffs’
    Fifth Amended Petition and Application for Permanent Injunction........3
    12
    STATE OF TEXAS
    $
    $
    COLINTY OF HARRIS
    $
    Before me, the uncrersigned notary,
    on this day personary appeared
    Steve M.
    williard' the affiant, a person whose
    identity is known to rne. After I
    adrninistered
    an oath, affiant testified:
    l.         My narne is steve M. wiiliard. I arn
    over 1g years of age, of sound
    tnind, and capable of making this affidavit,
    The facts in this affidavit
    are within my personal knowledge
    and           true and correcr.
    2.         I am the attorney for Relators. All of the
    facts stated in the Motion for
    Ernergency Stay are
    Furlher, affiant sayeth not.
    Steve M. Williard
    SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO befo
    day of May,2015.
    DAWN M STABLEB
    i   NoTARY PUEL|C
    State of Texas
    Corffn. Exp.0S2j
    Notary        and for the
    Print Name:
    My Commission Exp
    F:\Filcs\conrez' EdLrarrio\Mccnrty Truck
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    8/1/2014 12:43:29 PM
    Chris Daniel - District Clerk Harris County
    Envelope No. 2023257
    By: GAYLE FULLER
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    APP. TAB NO. 2
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    9/23/2014 10:43:33 AM
    Chris Daniel - District Clerk Harris County
    Envelope No. 2585581
    By: JEANETTA SPENCER
    Cause No. 2010-56104
    JOSE GOMEZ and                                   §          IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
    EDUARDO GOMEZ d/b/a                              §
    BROTHERS TIRE SERVICES, INC.                     §
    Plaintiffs,                                  §
    §
    vs.                                              §              HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
    §
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    MANUEL D. PINEDA d/b/a MC CARTY                  §
    TRUCK WASH AND LUBE, INC., ET AL.                §
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    Defendants.                                   §              215TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
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    PLAINTIFFS’ RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS’
    ist
    FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AND TO STRIKE COUNTER-
    lD
    DEFENDANTS’ ANSWER TO COUNTER-PLAINTIFFS’ COUNTER-CLAIM
    AND PLAINTIFFS’ FIFTH AMENDED PETITION AND
    nie
    APPLICATION FOR PERMANENT INJUNCTION
    TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:                Da
    is
    COMES NOW, Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs, JOSE GOMEZ and EDUARDO GOMEZ
    hr
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    INDIVIDUALLY AND AS FORMER REPRESENTATIVES OF MCCARTY TRUCK WASH
    of
    & LUBE, INC., GOMEZ MCCARTY TRUCK WASH & LUBE, INC. f/k/a MCCARTY
    e
    ffic
    TRUCK WASH & LUBE, INC. and BROTHERS TIRE SERVICES, INC. D/B/A MCCARTY
    O
    TRUCK WASH, LUBE AND TIRES (collectively “Plaintiffs”) Response to Defendants,
    y
    op
    MANUEL D. PINEDA, SUCCESSOR TO MCCARTY TRUCK WASH & LUBE, INC.
    C
    ial
    (“Pineda”), MCCARTY TRUCK WASH & LUBE, L.L.C. (“McCarty”) and JUAN MUNOZ
    fic
    (“Munoz”) (Pineda, McCarty and Munoz collectively “Defendants”) First Supplemental Motion
    of
    Un
    for Sanctions and to Strike Counter-Defendants’ Answer to Counter-Plaintiffs’ Counter-Claim
    and Plaintiffs’ Fifth Amended Petition and Application for Permanent Injunction (“Motion”).
    I.
    RESPONSE
    1.    Defendants’ Motion seems to aver two (2) complaints. First, Defendants seem to
    APP. TAB NO. 3
    complain that Defendants have amended their pleadings from time to time. Defendants do not
    cite an authority that would suggest that amending a pleading is worthy of sanctions.
    2.       More importantly, Defendants failed to inform the Court that (a) Defendants filed a
    Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement 21 days before trial alleging for the first time that there
    was a settlement in the case that allegedly occurred around February 6, 2012 (almost 2 ½ years
    k
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    before Defendants filed their motion to enforce); and (b) Defendants amended their counter-
    tC
    claim just 6 days before trial; both of which necessitated Plaintiffs to file affirmative defenses to
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    ist
    the newly raised allegations. As a result of Defendants’ Motion to Enforce Settlement
    lD
    Agreement that Plaintiffs learned for the first time that Defendants were attempting to enforce an
    nie
    unsigned settlement agreement. As a result, Plaintiffs amended their answer on July 28, 2014 to
    Da
    include ambiguity, estoppel, statute of limitations, waiver, failure to mitigate, proportionate
    is
    hr
    responsibility and fraud in the inducement associated with such Motion to Enforce Settlement
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    of
    Agreement. Further, Defendants site no authority for sanctioning a party for amending its
    e
    pleadings.
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    3.       Second, Defendants seem to aver Plaintiffs abused the discovery process.
    y
    Specifically, Defendants allege that 50 boxes of receipts were presented to Defendants “Right
    op
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    before trial”. This allegation is not true. Plaintiffs sent 2 letters dated September 12, 2013 and
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    December 17, 2013 informing Defendants that Plaintiffs had 50 boxes readily available for
    fic
    of
    Defendants to review (see Exhibits “A” and “B” attached hereto and incorporated herein by
    Un
    reference). So, Defendants had more than nine (9) months to review the documents in
    preparation for trial. It is untenable to suggest that Plaintiffs did anything wrong in making the
    50 boxes of records available to Defendants nine (9) months before trial.
    2
    4.      Next, Defendants contend that somehow Plaintiffs failed to produce tax documents
    that go to the “heart of the case”. This is a trademark infringement case - tax returns have
    nothing to do with the “heart” of this case. As briefed by Plaintiffs, the loss of the corporate
    privileges in no way dissolves a company. Specifically, a “[F]orfeiture of a corporate charter
    does not extinguish the corporation as a legal entity so long as there is a statutory right to have
    k
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    the corporate charter reinstated.” Lighthouse Church v. Tex. Bank, 
    889 S.W.2d 595
    , 601 (Tex.
    tC
    App. Houston [14th Dist.] 1994); see also Parker County's Squaw Creek Downs, L.P. v. Joseph
    ric
    ist
    Earl Watson, 2009 Tex.App. LEXIS 2206,*18 (Tex.App. - Fort Worth[2nd Dist.]
    lD
    2009)(“Neither the forfeiture of corporate privileges by the comptroller nor the forfeiture of a
    nie
    corporation's charter by the secretary of state extinguishes the corporation as an entity.”);
    Da
    Tiddies, Inc. v. Brown, 
    2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3456
    (N.D. Tex. 2005)(same). Texas Tax Code
    is
    hr
    Section 171.313 provides such a statutory right: “If a corporation's charter or certificate of
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    of
    authority is forfeited . . . a stockholder, director, or officer of the corporation at the time of the
    e
    forfeiture . . . may request in the name of the corporation that the secretary of state set aside the
    ffic
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    forfeiture of the charter or certificate.” Tex. Tax Code § 171.313. Furthermore, “Once the
    y
    corporation pays the delinquent taxes and [the charter] is reinstated, the payment relates back
    op
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    and revives the corporate rights that were forfeited.” Flameout Design & Fabrication, Inc. v.
    ial
    Pennzoil Caspian Corp., 
    994 S.W.2d 830
    , 839 (Tex. App. Houston [1st Dist.] 1999). Thus, the
    fic
    of
    Defendants arguments that (a) the Plaintiff lost its ownership of the trade name “McCarty Truck
    Un
    Wash & Lube”; and (b) that a reinstatement of its charter somehow creates a new legal entity is
    simply not true. Forfeiture of a charter does not extinguish the legal entity.
    5.      In Regal Construction Company, Appellant v. Phil Hansel, et ux, Appellee, 596
    
    3 S.W.2d 150
    (Tex. App. Houston [1st Dist.]) the Supreme Court of Texas has held that where the
    Secretary of State has entered on the record in his office forfeiture of the right of the corporation
    to do business in this state, the charter of the corporation has not thereby been cancelled nor has
    the corporation been dissolved. The legal title to the assets remains in the corporation, but the
    beneficial title to the assets of the corporation is in the stockholders. This being true, and since
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    the right to sue has been denied to the corporation by the forfeiture, the stockholders, as
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    beneficial owners of the assets of the corporation, may prosecute or defend such actions in the
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    ist
    courts as may be necessary to protect their property rights. Humble Oil & Refining Co. v.
    lD
    Blankenburg, 
    149 Tex. 498
    , 
    235 S.W.2d 891
    (1951). The case of McGown v. Kittel, 480 S.W.2d
    nie
    47 (Tex.Civ.App. Fort Worth 1972, writ ref. n. r. e.), also cited, was an action by a shareholder
    Da
    of a corporation whose charter had been forfeited for nonpayment of franchise taxes to liquidate
    is
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    the corporation. Prior to the trial of the suit the corporate charter was reinstated. The significant
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    of
    holding of the court was that the forfeiture of the corporate charter did not extinguish the
    e
    corporation as a legal entity so long as there was a statutory right to have the corporate charter
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    reinstated.
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    6.       Further, a corporation may still continue to use and keep its trademark even if its
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    charter is forfeited. See Tiddies, Inc. v. Brown, 
    2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3456
    (N.D. Tex. 2005). In
    ial
    Tiddies, the assignee of a trademark forfeited its charter after receiving the assignment of the
    fic
    of
    trademark. Tiddies, Inc. v. 
    Brown, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at 2
    . The assignor began using the
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    trademark considering that the assignee had forfeited its charter. 
    Id. at 3.
    Applying Texas law,
    the court held that forfeiture of a charter does not mean a corporation has abandoned a
    trademark. 
    Id. at 12.
    The court also held that the assignor in this case had infringed on the
    4
    assignee’s trademark. 
    Id. 7. Next,
    Defendants seek an order “compelling production of all documents provided
    by or received from the Secretary of State’s and Comptroller of Public Accounts’ offices”. First,
    Defendants had to have requested documents before being compelled to produce something.
    Second, such documents must be relevant. The burden to show that the tax returns are both
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    relevant and material to the issues in the case shifts to the party seeking to obtain the documents .
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    El Centro del Barrio, Inc. v. Barlow, 
    894 S.W.2d 775
    , 779 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1994, no
    ric
    ist
    writ). "Federal income tax returns are not material if the same information can be obtained from
    lD
    another source." In re Sullivan, 
    214 S.W.3d 622
    , 624-25 (Tex. App.--Austin 2006, orig.
    nie
    proceeding); see also 
    Garth, 214 S.W.3d at 194
    (trial court abuses discretion by requiring
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    production of tax returns when trial court's order also requires production of financial statements
    is
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    regarding net worth of party); Chamberlain v. Cherry, 
    818 S.W.2d 201
    , 207 (Tex. App.--Amarillo
    C
    of
    1991, no writ) (holding that trial court did not abuse discretion in refusing to allow discovery of
    e
    income tax returns because party seeking to obtain tax returns did not attempt to obtain other
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    evidence of net worth, such as financial statements, and made no showing that tax returns were
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    relevant to determination of party's financial        [**9] position); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
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    Alexander, 
    868 S.W.2d 322
    , 331 (Tex. 1993) (Gonzalez, J. concurring) ("[T]rial courts should
    ial
    not allow discovery of private financial records, such as tax returns, when there are other
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    of
    adequate methods to ascertain net worth . . . ."). Moreover, tax returns may not be discovered
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    when the information sought is duplicative of information already provided. 
    Ramirez, 824 S.W.2d at 559
    .
    8.      Further, Texas courts treat requests for production of tax returns differently than
    5
    requests for other types of financial records out of a concern for the privacy of the responding
    party. See, e.g., In re: Beeson, 
    378 S.W.3d 8
    , 12 (Tex.App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 2011).
    Requests for production of tax returns must be material and relevant to the issues in the case, and
    tax returns are not material if the same information can be obtained from another source. In re:
    Beeson, 378 S.W.3d at 12(holding that the party seeking production of tax returns “must carry its
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    burden to show that the tax returns it seeks are relevant and would not duplicate information
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    already provided or available through other, less-intrusive means.”). Information is relevant if it
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    ist
    tends to make the existence of a fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
    lD
    more or less probable than it would be without the information. The requested tax returns would
    nie
    not lead to determining whether a trademark infringement was more or less probable.
    Da
    9.      As such, Defendants Motion against Plaintiffs for amending their pleading in
    is
    hr
    response to Defendants amending their counter-suit 6 days before trial alleging for the first time
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    of
    a breach of an alleged contract that supposedly occurred on February 6, 2012 and/or producing
    e
    50 boxes of records nine (9) months before trial and/or Defendants’ request for an order for the
    ffic
    O
    production of tax returns should be denied.
    y
    op
    II.
    C
    REQUESTED RELIEF
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    fic
    10.     The purpose of sanctions is to secure compliance with the rules, to deter future
    of
    violations of the rules, and to punish parties that violate the rules. Chrysler Corp. v. Blackmon,
    Un
    
    841 S.W.2d 844
    , 849 (Tex. 1992). The Court should not sanction Plaintiffs because Plaintiffs
    have not violated any rule. They simply amended their pleadings in response to Defendants
    alleging a breach of a putative for the first time just six (6) days before trial. When considering
    6
    sanctions, a court must ensure that the punishment fits the crime. TransAmerican Natural Gas
    Corp. v. Powell, 
    811 S.W.2d 913
    , 917 (Tex. 1991). When a court decides to sanction, the
    sanctions must have a direct relationship to the offensive conduct, measured by a direct nexus
    among the conduct, the offender, and the sanctions imposed. Am. Flood Research, Inc. v. Jones,
    
    192 S.W.3d 581
    , 583 (Tex. 2006); Spohn Hosp. v. Mayer, 
    104 S.W.3d 878
    , 882 (Tex. 2003);
    k
    ler
    
    TransAmerican, 811 S.W.2d at 917
    . What is the “offensive” conduct here - amending their
    tC
    answer in response to Defendants amending their counter-claim six (6) days before trial? A court
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    ist
    must not impose a sanction more severe than necessary to promote full compliance with the
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    rules. Am. 
    Flood, 192 S.W.3d at 583
    ; Spohn 
    Hosp., 104 S.W.3d at 882
    ; Chrysler Corp., 841
    nie
    S.W.2d at 849. Defendants have asked for the death-penalty sanctions against Plaintiffs. Yet
    Da
    there is no showing of any misconduct by Plaintiffs. The Court should deny Defendants’ Motion
    is
    hr
    because the Motion does not cite any facts or legal authority to justify any sanctions. GTE
    C
    of
    Commc’ns Sys. Corp. v. Tanner, 
    856 S.W.2d 725
    , 729 (Tex. 1993).
    e
    ffic
    11.    The Court should deny Defendants’ Motion and order a trial on the merits of this
    O
    case. Chrysler 
    Corp., 841 S.W.2d at 849
    ; see Am. 
    Flood, 192 S.W.3d at 583
    ; Spohn Hosp., 104
    y
    op
    S.W.3d at 882; 
    TransAmerican, 811 S.W.2d at 917
    .
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    ial
    III.
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    CONCLUSION
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    12.    For the reasons stated above, the Defendants’ Motion should be denied.
    7
    IV.
    PRAYER
    13.     WHEREFORE,           Plaintiffs,   JOSE        GOMEZ       and EDUARDO GOMEZ
    INDIVIDUALLY AND AS FORMER REPRESENTATIVES OF MCCARTY TRUCK WASH
    & LUBE, INC., GOMEZ MCCARTY TRUCK WASH & LUBE, INC. f/k/a MCCARTY
    k
    ler
    TRUCK WASH & LUBE, INC. and BROTHERS TIRE SERVICES, INC. D/B/A MCCARTY
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    TRUCK WASH, LUBE AND TIRES, respectfully request that this Court deny Defendants’
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    ist
    Motion and such other and further relief, both general and special, at law or in equity, to which
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    Plaintiffs may show themselves to be justly entitled.
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    Respectfully submitted,
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    THE WILLIARD LAW FIRM, L.P.
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    C
    /s/ Steve M. Williard
    of
    Steve M. Williard
    e
    Texas State Bar No. 00788684
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    E-Mail: steve@williardlaw.com
    1920 N. Memorial Way, Suite 207
    O
    Houston, Texas 77007
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    Phone: (713) 529-6300
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    Fax: (713) 529-6315
    C
    ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFFS,
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    JOSE GOMEZ and EDUARDO GOMEZ
    fic
    INDIVIDUALLY AND AS FORMER
    REPRESENTATIVES OF MCCARTY
    of
    TRUCK WASH & LUBE, INC., GOMEZ
    Un
    MCCARTY TRUCK WASH & LUBE,
    INC. f/k/a MCCARTY TRUCK WASH &
    LUBE, INC. and BROTHERS TIRE
    SERVICES, INC. D/B/A MCCARTY
    TRUCK WASH, LUBE AND TIRES
    8
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
    I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document,
    Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants’ First Supplemental Motion for Sanctions and to Strike
    Counter-Defendants’ Answer to Counter-Plaintiffs’ Counter-Claim and Plaintiffs’ Fifth
    Amended Petition and Application for Permanent Injunction has been sent via electronic filing
    service on this 23rd day of September, 2014, to all counsel of record as follows:
    Ms. Elizabeth Burkhardt Via Electronic Filing Service
    k
    ler
    5503 Lawndale
    Houston, Texas 77023
    tC
    Phone: (832) 922-2919
    Fax: (713) 468-5932
    ric
    Attorney for Defendants: Manuel D. Pineda, Successor to McCarty Truck Wash and
    ist
    Lube, Inc., McCarty Truck Wash & Lube, L.L.C. and Juan Munoz
    lD
    nie
    Da         /s/ Steve M. Williard
    Steve M. Williard
    is
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    Un
    F:\Files\G omez, Eduardo\M cC arty Truck W ash Lit\179 R esponse to First Supp. M tn. for Sanctions and to Strike.w pd
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