Laura Leticia Zepeda Vasquez, Individually and on Behalf of the Estate of Jose Abraham Vasquez,Jr. v. Legend Natural Gas III, LP Legend Natural Gas, LLC Lewis Energy Group, LP And Lewis Petro Properties, Inc ( 2015 )


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  •                                                                                    ACCEPTED
    04-14-00899-cv
    FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS
    SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS
    3/31/2015 4:47:38 PM
    KEITH HOTTLE
    CLERK
    04-14-00899-CV                                      FILED IN
    4th COURT OF APPEALS
    In the                     SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS
    03/31/2015 4:47:38 PM
    Fourth Court of Appeals                                 KEITH E. HOTTLE
    Clerk
    SITTING AT SAN ANTONIO
    LETICIA ZEPEDA VASQUEZ, Individually and on Behalf of the Estate of
    Jose Abraham Vasquez, Jr.,
    Appellant,
    v.
    LEGEND NATURAL GAS III, LP; LEGEND NATURAL GAS, LLC;
    LEWIS ENERGY GROUP, LP; LEWIS PETRO PROPERTIES, INC.;
    ROSETTA RESOURCES OPERATING, LP; VIRTEX HOLDINGS,
    LLP; VIRTEX OPERATING CO., INC.; ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS
    HOLDINGS, LLC; ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS COMPANY; and XTO
    ENERGY, INC.,
    Appellees
    Appealed From the 81st District Court
    La Salle County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. 14-07-0019-CVL
    APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF
    JEFFREY L. DORRELL
    State Bar No. 00787386
    jdorrell@hanszenlaporte.com
    11767 Katy Freeway, Suite 850
    Houston, Texas 77079
    Telephone: 713-522-9444
    FAX: 713-524-2580
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
    APPELLANT REQUESTS ORAL ARGUMENT                        .
    IDENTITY OF PARTIES & COUNSEL
    Appellant certifies that the following is a complete list of the parties,
    the attorneys, and any other person who has any interest in the outcome of
    this matter:
    PARTIES                             COUNSEL
    Leticia Zepeda Vasquez,             Jeffrey Lee Dorrell
    Appellant                        H. Mark Burck
    Daniel Dutko
    Hanszen Laporte, LLP
    11767 Katy Freeway, Suite 850
    Houston, Texas 77079
    Telephone: 713-522-9444
    FAX: 713-524-2580
    Attorney for Appellant
    Legend Natural Gas III, LP,         Isaac J. Huron
    and Legend Natural Gas, LLC         Davis, Cedillo & Mendoza, Inc.
    Appellees                        McCombs Plaza, Suite 500
    755 E. Mulberry Avenue
    San Antonio, Texas 78213
    Telephone: 210-822-6666
    FAX: 210-822-1151
    Attorney for Legend Natural Gas III, LP, and
    Legend Natural Gas, LLC
    Lewis Energy Group, LP, and         David L. Ortega
    Lewis Petro Properties, Inc.        Naman Howell Smith & Lee, PLLC
    Appellees                        1001 Reunion Place, Suite 600
    San Antonio, Texas 78216
    Telephone: 210-731-6300
    FAX: 210-785-2953
    Attorney for Lewis Energy Group, LP, and
    Lewis Petro Properties, Inc.
    ii
    XTO Energy, Inc.                  Jose E. Garcia
    Appellee                        Garcia & Villareal
    4311 N. McColl Road
    McAllen, Texas 78504
    Telephone: 956-630-0081
    FAX: 956-630-3631
    Attorney for XTO Energy, Inc.
    Rosetta Resources Oper., LP       William A. Abernethy
    Appellee                        Donnell, Abernethy & Kieschnick, P.C.
    555 N. Carancahua, Suite 1770
    Corpus Christi, Texas 78401
    Telephone: 361-888-5551
    FAX: 361-880-5618
    Attorney for Rosetta Resources Oper., LP
    Virtex Operating Co., Inc., and   Christopher Lowrance
    Virtex Holdings, LLP              Royston, Rayzor, Vickery & Williams, LLP
    Appellees                      802 Carancahua, Suite 1300
    Corpus Christi, Texas 78401
    Telephone: 361-884-8808
    FAX: 361-884-7261
    Attorney for Virtex Operating Co., Inc., and
    Virtex Holdings, LLP
    Enterprise Products Holdings,     E. Michael Rodriguez
    LLC, and Enterprise Products      Atlas, Hall & Rodriguez, LLP
    Co.                               P.O. Box 6369 (78523-6369)
    Appellees                     50 W. Morrison Road, Suite A
    Brownsville, Texas 78520
    Telephone: 956-574-9333
    FAX: 956-574-9337
    Attorney for Enterprise Products Holdings,
    LLC, and Enterprise Products Co.
    iii
    TABLE OF CONTENTS
    Page
    IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL...….……………………….ii
    TABLE OF CONTENTS ………………………………………………….iv
    INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ………………………………………………v
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE ……………………………………………2
    STANDARD OF REVIEW ……...…………………………………………3
    ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ……………………………………4
    STATEMENT OF FACTS.……………………………..………………….5
    SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT…………………………………………….6
    ARGUMENT ..…………………….…………………………………………7
    Issue 1. Did defendants have a legal duty to act to prevent
    Vasquez’s death from the dangerous situation on
    Krueger Road that defendants themselves
    negligently created? ……………………………………………..7
    CONCLUSION …...……………………………………………………10
    PRAYER ….……………………………………………………………11
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ………………………………………12
    CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT COMPLIANCE .……………14
    APPENDIX ……………………………………………………………15
    iv
    INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
    CASES
    Page
    Abalos v. Oil Development Co. of Texas,
    
    544 S.W.2d 627
    (Tex. 1976) …………………………………………9
    Buchanan v. Rose,
    
    159 S.W.2d 109
    (Tex. 1942) …………………………………………9
    Cactus Drilling Co. v. Williams,
    
    525 S.W.2d 902
    (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1975, writ ref’d n.r.e.)…9
    Chrysler Corp. v. Dallas Power & Light Co.,
    
    522 S.W.2d 742
    (Tex. Civ. App.—Eastland 1975, writ ref’d n.r.e.).…9
    City of Austin v. Liberty Mut. Ins.,
    
    431 S.W.3d 817
    (Tex. App.—Austin 2014, no pet.) …………………3
    Courville v. Home Transportation Co.,
    
    497 S.W.2d 788
    (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1973, writ ref’d n.r.e.)..9
    Dailey v. Thorpe,
    
    445 S.W.3d 785
    (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.).……3
    Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co. v. Archer,
    
    167 S.W.2d 290
    (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1942, writ ref’d w.o.m.) ….9
    Devoll v. Demonbreun,
    2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 13865 at *4
    (Tex. App.—San Antonio December 31, 2014, n.p.h.) ………………3
    GoDaddy.com, LLC v. Toups,
    
    429 S.W.3d 752
    (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2014, pet. denied) …………3
    San Benito Bank & Trust Co. v. Travels,
    
    31 S.W.3d 312
    (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2000) …………………..9
    SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Doe,
    
    903 S.W.2d 347
    (Tex. 1995) ………………………………………8-9
    Wooley v. Schaffer,
    
    447 S.W.3d 71
    (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
    2014, pet. filed) …………………………………………………….3, 7
    v
    RULES
    TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a .………………………………………………Passim
    vi
    04-14-00899-CV
    LETICIA ZEPEDA VASQUEZ, Individually and on Behalf of the Estate of
    Jose Abraham Vasquez, Jr.,
    Appellant
    v.
    LEGEND NATURAL GAS III, LP; LEGEND NATURAL GAS, LLC;
    LEWIS ENERGY GROUP, LP; LEWIS PETRO PROPERTIES, INC.;
    ROSETTA RESOURCES OPERATING, LP; VIRTEX HOLDINGS,
    LLP; VIRTEX OPERATING CO., INC.; ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS
    HOLDINGS, LLC; ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS COMPANY; and XTO
    ENERGY, INC.,
    Appellees
    APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF
    Appellant Leticia Zepeda Vasquez files her opening brief. Appellant
    will be referred to individually by name, or as “plaintiff,” as she was
    designated below.   Appellees Legend Natural Gas III, LP; Legend
    Natural Gas, LLC; Lewis Energy Group, LP; Lewis Petro Properties,
    Inc.; Rosetta Resources Operating, LP; Virtex Holdings, LLP; Virtex
    Operating Company, Inc.; Enterprise Products Holdings, LLC;
    Enterprise Products Company; and XTO Energy, Inc., will be referred to
    individually by name, or collectively as “defendants,” as they were
    designated below.
    1
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE
    Nature of the case. On July 21, 2014, plaintiff sued the ten defendants
    for negligence and gross negligence.      (CR 5-6.)    On October 2, 2014,
    plaintiff filed her first amended original petition asserting the same claims.
    (Tab C, CR 84-86.)       The various defendants generally denied, raised
    affirmative defenses, and counterclaimed.      (CR 8-56.)    The defendants’
    affirmative defenses and counterclaims are not at issue in this appeal.
    Course of proceedings.      No trial was held.      Defendants Legend
    Natural Gas III, LP, and Legend Natural Gas, LLC, filed a motion to dismiss
    plaintiff’s claims Under TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a. (CR 62.) A similar motion
    was included in the body of the answer filed by defendants Lewis Energy
    Group, LP, and Lewis Petro Properties. (CR 52-53.) On October 16, 2014,
    the trial court held an oral hearing on defendants’ motions to dismiss.
    Trial court disposition. The trial court granted defendants’ motions to
    dismiss on November 20, 2014, but failed to dispose of certain other claims.
    (CR 147-48.) Plaintiff filed a premature notice of appeal. (CR 159.) On
    January 5, 2015, the trial court entered a final order granting all defendants’
    motions to dismiss and severing the undisposed claims. (2d SCR 7-8.) (Tab
    A.) On January 29, 2015, plaintiff filed an amended notice of appeal of the
    new order. (2d SCR 1.)
    2
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    This Court reviews the trial court’s dismissal of Vasquez’s claims
    pursuant to TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a de novo. Devoll v. Demonbreun, 2014 Tex.
    App. LEXIS 13865 at *4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio December 31, 2014,
    n.p.h.); Wooley v. Schaffer, 
    447 S.W.3d 71
    , 75 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
    Dist.] 2014, pet. filed); Dailey v. Thorpe, 
    445 S.W.3d 785
    , 787 (Tex.
    App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.); City of Austin v. Liberty Mut.
    Ins., 
    431 S.W.3d 817
    , 822 (Tex. App.—Austin 2014, no pet.);
    GoDaddy.com, LLC v. Toups, 
    429 S.W.3d 752
    , 754 (Tex. App.—Beaumont
    2014, pet. denied).
    3
    ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
    Issue 1:    Did defendants have a legal duty to act to prevent
    Vasquez’s death from the dangerous situation on Krueger Road that
    defendants themselves negligently created?
    4
    STATEMENT OF FACTS
    On August 4, 2012, Jose Vasquez was tragically killed when his
    vehicle flipped over in an accident that could have been avoided if not for
    the negligence of defendants. (CR 82.) Vasquez was operating his vehicle
    on Krueger Road in La Salle County, Texas, when he was blinded by a dust
    cloud and drove into a ditch. (Id.) Once a safe, paved road for the public
    (CR 83), Kruger Road has now become dangerously dilapidated as a result
    of defendants’ negligent use of the road to operate their oil and gas wells in
    the area. (CR 81-82.) The road now has potholes, crevices, bumps, and the
    road has no markings to determine the proper lanes of travel. (CR 83, 85.)
    Defendants’ negligent operation of their trucks and businesses
    includes sending hundreds or thousands of trucks every year—some over
    legal weight limits—driving “recklessly” or at too high a rate of speed down
    Krueger Road. (CR 83.) Defendants knew that their operations had created
    the dangerous conditions on Krueger Road that eventually killed Jose
    Vasquez. (CR 83-85.) Defendants did nothing either to repair Krueger
    Road or warn others of the dangerous conditions they have negligently
    created. (CR 83-85.)
    5
    SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
    The trial court was bound to take plaintiff’s factual allegations pled as
    true and liberally construe them in her favor. The trial court implicitly found
    that defendants owed no legal duty to Jose Vasquez when it dismissed his
    widow’s claims under TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a because her claims allegedly had
    “no basis in law.” However, Texas courts have long recognized at least two
    species of duty when a defendant creates a dangerous condition. If the
    defendant created the dangerous condition negligently, he has a duty to
    repair it. If the defendant created the dangerous condition without being
    negligent, he nevertheless still has a duty to warn those who may be injured
    as a result. The trial court erred when it failed to recognize defendants’ duty
    to repair or to warn Jose Vasquez of the unreasonably dangerous condition
    their trucks had negligently created.
    6
    ARGUMENT
    Argument and Authorities—Issue 1
    Issue 1:    Did defendants have a legal duty to act to prevent
    Vasquez’s death from the dangerous situation on Krueger Road that
    defendants themselves negligently created?
    Yes. However, the trial court implicitly found that there could be no
    such duty when it dismissed plaintiff’s claims pursuant to Rule 91a as
    having “no basis in law.”
    Rule 91a allows a party to move to dismiss a baseless cause of action
    on the grounds that it has no basis in law or fact. TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.1. In
    the case at bar, fact issues are not in dispute—the trial court’s order is
    expressly limited to dismissal because the claims allegedly had “no basis in
    law.” (Tab A.)
    A cause of action has no basis in law if the allegations, taken as
    true, together with inferences reasonably drawn from them, do
    not entitle the claimant to the relief sought.
    TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.1. The trial court must decide a Rule 91a motion to
    dismiss based solely on the pleading of the cause of action, together with
    any exhibits permitted by Rule 59. TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.6.
    In conducting our [Rule 91a] review, … we must construe the
    pleadings liberally in favor of the plaintiff, look to the pleader’s
    intent, and accept as true the factual allegations in the
    pleadings….
    Wooley v. Schaffer, 
    447 S.W.3d 71
    , 76 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
    2014, pet. filed) [emphasis added].
    7
    Thus, factual allegations the trial court was obliged to “take as true”
    and liberally construe in favor of plaintiff included:
    (i)     It takes 1200 trucks to bring one oil or gas well into production;
    (Tab C, CR 81)
    (ii)    It takes 350 trucks a year to maintain one oil or gas well; (Tab
    C, CR 81)
    (iii)   The service life of roads in areas around oil or gas wells is
    reduced more than 30% per year due to well operations; (Tab
    C, CR 81-82)
    (iv)    Defendants knew that La Salle County could not repair Krueger
    Road as fast as defendants destroyed it; (Tab C, CR 82)
    (v)     Some of defendants’ trucks travelled at an unsafe speed; (Tab
    C, CR 83)
    (vi)    Some of defendants’ trucks travelled “recklessly;” (Tab C, CR
    84)
    (vii) Some of defendants’ trucks were overweight; (Tab C, CR 83,
    85)
    (viii) Krueger Road was once a safe, paved road for the public; (Tab
    C, CR 83)
    (ix)    Krueger Road is now in a dangerously dilapidated condition,
    with potholes, crevices, and bumps; (Tab C, CR 83, 85)
    (x)     Defendants knew they had created Krueger Road’s dangerously
    dilapidated condition; (Tab C, CR 83, 85)
    (xi)    It was foreseeable that Vasquez (or others) could be injured
    while in the lawful exercise of his right to drive on Krueger
    Road; (Tab C, CR 83) and
    (xii) Defendants did nothing either to repair Krueger Road or warn
    others of the dangerous conditions defendants had created there.
    (Tab C, CR 83)
    8
    Texas courts have long held that if a party creates a dangerous
    condition, he has a duty to prevent injury to others if it is reasonably
    foreseeable that others in the exercise of their lawful rights may be injured
    by the dangerous condition he created. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Doe,
    
    903 S.W.2d 347
    , 353 (Tex. 1995); Buchanan v. Rose, 
    159 S.W.2d 109
    , 110
    (1942); San Benito Bank & Trust Co. v. Travels, 
    31 S.W.3d 312
    , 319 (Tex.
    App.—Corpus Christi 2000).
    [I]t may be said generally, on the one hand, that if a party
    negligently creates a dangerous situation it then becomes his
    duty to do something about it to prevent injury to others if it
    reasonably appears or should appear to him that others in the
    exercise of their lawful rights may be injured thereby.
    
    Buchanan, 159 S.W.2d at 110
    ; see also Abalos v. Oil Development Co. of
    Texas, 
    544 S.W.2d 627
    , 632-33 (Tex. 1976); Cactus Drilling Co. v.
    Williams, 
    525 S.W.2d 902
    , 911 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1975, writ ref’d
    n.r.e.); Chrysler Corp. v. Dallas Power & Light Co., 
    522 S.W.2d 742
    , 744
    (Tex. Civ. App.—Eastland 1975, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Courville v. Home
    Transportation Co., 
    497 S.W.2d 788
    , 790-91 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont
    1973, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co. v. Archer, 
    167 S.W.2d 290
    , 293 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1942, writ ref’d w.o.m.).
    Nor does it absolve a defendant of all duty if he creates the dangerous
    condition on a “public way”—even if he does so without being negligent:
    9
    We think it may also be said that if one by his own acts, although
    without negligence on his part, creates a dangerous situation in
    or along a public way and it reasonably appears that another in
    the lawful use of such way in the exercise of ordinary care for his
    own safety may be injured by the dangerous situation so created,
    the one creating the same must give warning of the danger or be
    responsible for the consequences. To illustrate: One who in the
    exercise of a lawful right, and without negligence on his part,
    makes an excavation across a street or sidewalk or on his
    premises in close proximity to a public way, or parks a vehicle in
    a road, or otherwise obstructs the road with a foreign substance,
    is bound to give warning of the danger created thereby.
    
    Buchanan, 159 S.W.2d at 110
    [citations omitted]. Although the duty may
    be different—to warn others of the dangerous condition as opposed to a duty
    to repair the condition—there is nevertheless still a duty.
    Defendants owed the Buchanan duties to Jose Vasquez. When they
    breached their duties, defendants caused Jose Vasquez’s death.
    CONCLUSION
    The trial court was bound to take plaintiff’s factual allegations pled as
    true and liberally construe them in her favor. The trial court implicitly found
    that defendants owed no legal duty to Jose Vasquez when it dismissed his
    widow’s claims under TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a as having “no basis in law.”
    Because Texas courts have long recognized a duty when a defendant creates
    a dangerous condition, the trial court erred when it failed to recognize
    defendants’ duty to repair or to warn Jose Vasquez of the unreasonably
    dangerous condition defendants’ trucks had created.
    10
    PRAYER
    For these reasons, appellant Leticia Zepeda Vasquez prays that the
    Court reverse the trial court’s dismissal of her claims and causes of action
    against defendants as having “no basis in law,” and remand to the trial court
    for a trial.
    Respectfully submitted,
    By:           /s/ Jeffrey L. Dorrell            .
    Jeffrey L. Dorrell
    State Bar No. 00787386
    jdorrell@hanszenlaporte.com
    11767 Katy Freeway, Suite 850
    Houston, Texas 77079
    Telephone: 713-522-9444
    FAX: 713-524-2580
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT LETICIA ZEPEDA VASQUEZ
    11
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
    I hereby certify that on    3-31     , 2015, a true and correct copy of the
    foregoing was sent by:
    Hand delivery
    Certified mail
    Telephonic document transfer
    X     E-service in accordance with TEX. R. APP. P. 9.5(b)
    in accordance with TEX. R. APP. P. 9.5(c) to the following counsel of record:
    Mr. William A. Abernethy
    Donnell, Abernethy & Kieschnick, P.C.
    555 N. Carancahua, Suite 1770
    Corpus Christi, Texas 78401
    Telephone: 361-888-5551
    FAX: 361-880-5618
    COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT ROSETTA RESOURCES
    OPERATING, LP.
    Mr. David L. Ortega
    Naman Howell Smith & Lee, PLLC
    1001 Reunion Place, Suite 600
    San Antonio, Texas 78216
    Telephone: 210-731-6300
    FAX: 210-785-2953
    COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS LEWIS ENERGY GROUP, LP, and
    LEWIS PETRO PROPERTIES, INC.
    Mr. Christopher Lowrance
    Royston, Rayzor, Vickery & Williams, L.L.P.
    802 Carancahua, Suite 1300
    Corpus Christi, Texas 78401
    Telephone: 361-884-8808
    FAX: 361-884-7261
    COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS VIRTEX OPERATING CO., INC.,
    and VIRTEX HOLDINGS, LLP
    12
    Mr. Isaac J. Huron
    Davis, Cedillo & Mendoza, Inc.
    McCombs Plaza, Suite 500
    755 E. Mulberry Avenue
    San Antonio, Texas 78213
    Telephone: 210-822-6666
    FAX: 210-822-1151
    COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS LEGEND NATURAL GAS III, LP,
    and LEGEND NATURAL GAS, LLC
    Mr. E. Michael Rodriguez
    Atlas, Hall & Rodriguez, L.L.P.
    P.O. Box 6369 (78523-6369)
    50 W. Morrison Road, Suite A
    Brownsville, Texas 78520
    Telephone: 956-574-9333
    FAX: 956-574-9337
    COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS
    HOLDINGS, LLC, and ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS CO.
    Mr. Jose E. Garcia
    Garcia & Villareal
    4311 N. McColl Road
    McAllen, Texas 78504
    Telephone: 956-630-0081
    FAX: 956-630-3631
    COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT XTO ENERGY, INC.
    /s/ Jeffrey L. Dorrell
    JEFFREY L. DORRELL
    13
    CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT COMPLIANCE
    In compliance with TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4, relying on the word count
    function in the word processing software used to produce this document, I
    certify that the number of words in this document including footnotes
    (excluding captions, identity of parties and counsel, statement regarding oral
    argument, table of contents, index of authorities, statement of the case,
    statement of issues presented, statement of jurisdiction, statement of
    procedural history, signature, proof of service, certification, certificate of
    compliance, and appendix) is 1,343.
    /s/ Jeffrey L. Dorrell
    JEFFREY L. DORRELL
    14
    04-14-00899-CV
    LETICIA ZEPEDA VASQUEZ, Individually and on Behalf of the Estate of Jose
    Abraham Vasquez, Jr.,
    Appellant
    v.
    LEGEND NATURAL GAS III, LP; LEGEND NATURAL GAS, LLC; LEWIS
    ENERGY GROUP, LP; LEWIS PETRO PROPERTIES, INC.; ROSETTA
    RESOURCES OPERATING, LP; VIRTEX HOLDINGS, LLP; VIRTEX
    OPERATING CO., INC.; ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS HOLDINGS, LLC;
    ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS COMPANY; and XTO ENERGY, INC.,
    Appellees
    APPELLANT’S APPENDIX
    LIST OF DOCUMENTS
    1. January 5, 2015, Order Appealed From ……………………………Tab A
    2. TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a. …………..……………………………………Tab B
    3. Plaintiff’s First Amended Original Petition ..………………………Tab C
    15