Adam Gene Campbell v. State ( 2015 )

COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-14-00473-CR
ADAM GENE CAMPBELL APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
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FROM THE 43RD DISTRICT COURT OF PARKER COUNTY
TRIAL COURT NO. CR14-0246
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MEMORANDUM OPINION1
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Adam Gene Campbell brings two issues challenging his conviction and
fifteen-year sentence of confinement for evading arrest: (1) the trial court
harmfully erred by refusing to include an article 38.23 instruction in the jury
charge and (2) the evidence is insufficient to prove that appellant knew the officer
1
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
named in the indictment and charge was a peace officer attempting to arrest him.
We affirm.
Background Facts
A Fort Worth police officer attempted to pull over the driver of a yellow
Pontiac in the city of Fort Worth, but the driver did not stop. The officer followed
the car through a residential neighborhood where the driver continued to
increase speed, onto Interstate 35, and then further onto westbound Interstate
30. Finally, the on-duty captain ordered the officer to stop the pursuit. Fort
Worth police determined that the car was registered to a Mineral Wells address.
The Fort Worth police then informed law enforcement agencies west of Fort
Worth and Tarrant County about the yellow Pontiac.
A Parker County Sheriff’s Office dispatcher testified that she received a
phone call about the yellow Pontiac’s being involved in a “potential evading”; she
in turn passed along the information to the Department of Public Safety in
Mineral Wells. In Parker County, Officer Marshall Clark of the Hudson Oaks
Police Department got a cell phone call from an off-duty Hudson Oaks police
officer, who told Officer Clark about the chase in Fort Worth and that the yellow
Pontiac had last been seen by Fort Worth police headed west. Officer Clark
drove his car to a location facing eastbound where he could spot a car going
west on Interstate 20.2 He eventually saw a yellow Pontiac heading west on I-20,
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I-30 merges into I-20 west of Fort Worth.
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“travelling at a high rate of speed” and “driving erratically.” The amount of traffic
was moderate, and the yellow car was with a pack of other cars, which it was
passing in the left of the three lanes. Officer Clark made a U-turn into the
westbound lanes of I-20 and attempted to catch up with the car; he “immediately
observed the car accelerate at a greater speed and start passing vehicles on the
right shoulder.” He turned on his lights and sirens, but the driver did not stop.
Officer Clark saw the car “travelling at a higher than usual speed for the
area . . . [,] weaving in and out of traffic[,] and passing cars on the . . . right
shoulder, which is illegal.” He believed the driver was being reckless and
endangering other drivers on the road. The other vehicles slowed, yielded to
Officer Clark, and moved to the right. Officer Clark caught up to the yellow car
and moved “directly behind” it.
When Officer Clark was radioing that he was engaged in pursuing the
yellow car, Hudson Oaks dispatch was advising its officers about the
communication from Fort Worth police. At that time, another Hudson Oaks police
officer joined the chase and, eventually, so did units from the Parker County
Sheriff’s Office, the Weatherford Police Department, and DPS. Officer Clark was
in the lead.
The driver of the yellow Pontiac did not pull over and continued to drive
west on I-20 with Officer Clark and other officers following him. Once they were
west of Weatherford, Officer Clark began to lose his radio signal and requested
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his dispatcher to ask an upcoming DPS officer to take the lead.3 After the
trooper, Ty McLaughlin,4 caught up to the group, he moved into the lead. Officer
Clark slowed down, moved into the right lane of I-20, turned off his lights, and
continued with the other officers in pursuit for about another twenty miles out of
Parker County and into Palo Pinto County. Officer Clark had lost radio contact,
but he never lost sight of the yellow Pontiac.
DPS troopers eventually stopped the car in Palo Pinto County by using
spike strips. They arrested appellant, whom they determined had been driving,
and a passenger whom officers had seen throwing a towel with a pipe in it out of
the car. Nevertheless, officers found methamphetamine, marijuana, and
paraphernalia for smoking both in the car. Officer Clark took appellant to jail.
A jury convicted appellant of evading arrest and assessed his punishment
at fifteen years’ confinement and a $7,500 fine. The trial court sentenced him
accordingly, and appellant filed this appeal.
Article 38.23 Instruction
In his first issue, appellant contends that the trial court erred by refusing to
include his requested article 38.23 instruction.
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Weatherford police discontinued the chase once the group was out of
Weatherford.
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Officer McLaughlin testified that he initially clocked the yellow car at
around ninety miles per hour on radar and that while he was in the lead, “speeds
maintained around 90 to 100 miles an hour the entire time.” Officer Clark
testified that during the chase, he travelled between eighty and one hundred five
miles per hour.
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Applicable Law
Under article 38.23(a), “[n]o evidence obtained by an officer . . . in violation
of any provisions of the Constitution or laws . . . shall be admitted in evidence
against the accused” at trial. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.23(a) (West
2005). When evidence presented before the jury raises a question of whether
the fruits of a police-initiated search or arrest were illegally obtained, “the jury
shall be instructed that if it believes, or has a reasonable doubt, that the evidence
was obtained in violation of the provisions of this Article, then and in such event,
the jury shall disregard any such evidence so obtained.” Id.; Robinson v. State,
377 S.W.3d 712, 719 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). To be entitled to an article
38.23(a) instruction, a defendant must show that (1) an issue of historical fact
was raised in front of the jury, (2) the fact was contested by affirmative evidence
at trial, and (3) the fact is material to the constitutional or statutory violation that
the defendant has identified as rendering the particular evidence inadmissible.
Robinson, 377 S.W.3d at 719. When a defendant successfully raises a disputed,
material issue of fact, the terms of the statute are mandatory, and the jury must
be instructed accordingly. Id. Evidence to justify an article 38.23(a) instruction
can derive “from any source,” no matter whether “strong, weak, contradicted,
unimpeached, or unbelievable.” Id. (quoting Garza v. State, 126 S.W.3d 79, 85
(Tex. Crim. App. 2004)). But it must, in any event, raise a “factual dispute about
how the evidence was obtained.” Id. When the issue raised by the evidence at
trial does not involve controverted historical facts, but only the proper application
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of the law to undisputed facts, it is properly left to the determination of the trial
court. Id.
Application
During the charge conference, appellant requested an article 38.23(a)
instruction because he contended that the undisputed evidence shows that
Officer Clark did not have probable cause or reasonable suspicion to detain him
because Officer Clark’s only reason for following the yellow Pontiac was
unreliably based on hearsay. He did not point to any disputed material issue of
fact, nor have we found any evidence controverting Officer Clark’s testimony
about how he was made aware of the fact that Fort Worth police had chased and
were looking for the yellow Pontiac. Because appellant’s objection applied only
to the proper application of the law to undisputed facts, we conclude and hold
that the trial court did not err by refusing to include an article 38.23 instruction in
the charge. See, e.g., id. We overrule appellant’s first issue.
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Sufficiency of the Evidence
In his second issue, appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient
because there is a fatal variance between the proof at trial and the allegation in
the indictment and jury charge that appellant had evaded Officer Clark.
According to appellant, the evidence shows that Officer Clark “(1) turned off his
lights and slowed down during the pursuit to let other law enforcement vehicles
pass; and (2) did not continue to ‘attempt to arrest or detain’” him. [Emphasis
added.]
Standard of Review
In our due-process review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction, we view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to
determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); Dobbs v. State, 434 S.W.3d 166, 170
(Tex. Crim. App. 2014). To determine whether the State has met its burden
under Jackson v. Virginia to prove a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,
we compare the elements of the crime as defined by the hypothetically correct
jury charge to the evidence adduced at trial. Thomas v. State, 444 S.W.3d 4, 8
(Tex. Crim. App. 2014). A hypothetically correct jury charge is one that
“accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not
unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the
State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for
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which the defendant was tried.” Id. (quoting Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240
(Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). The law as authorized by the indictment consists of the
statutory elements of the offense and those elements as modified by the
indictment. Id.
There are two types of variances in an evidentiary-sufficiency analysis:
material variances and immaterial variances. Id. at 9. Immaterial variances do
not affect the validity of a criminal conviction; thus, a hypothetically correct jury
charge need not incorporate allegations that would give rise to only immaterial
variances. Id. But a material variance renders a conviction infirm, and the only
remedy is to render an acquittal. Id.
Application
Appellant argues that the evidence does not show that he evaded Officer
Clark because “Clark testified that, at some point in the chase, he slowed down
and let other peace officers pass him, and that Clark actually even turned off his
lights at that time.” Thus, according to appellant, the evidence is legally
insufficient to show that he knew Officer Clark “was attempting to arrest or detain
him by the end of the chase from Weatherford into Palo Pinto County.”
Penal code section 38.04 provides that a person commits the offense of
evading arrest by intentionally fleeing from a person he knows is a peace
officer . . . attempting lawfully to arrest or detain him.” Tex. Penal Code Ann.
§ 38.04(a) (West Supp. 2014). Using a vehicle during the flight elevates the
offense to a third degree felony. Id. § 38.04(b)(2)(A). Appellant challenges the
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sufficiency of the evidence to prove that he knew Officer Clark was a peace
officer attempting to arrest or detain him.
The evidence shows that appellant’s yellow Pontiac had very recently been
involved in a chase with Fort Worth police after a Fort Worth police officer
spotted the driver commit a minor traffic violation near a known location for drug
use. Officer Clark testified that after he made a U-turn onto I-20 with lights and
sirens on and tried to catch up to appellant’s car, appellant sped up and began
weaving in and out of traffic and passing traffic on the right shoulder. Appellant
drove at high rates of speed for at least twenty miles on an interstate with
multiple officers following him with their lights and sirens on. Although officers
from different agencies moved in and out of the chase, and at one point Officer
Clark slowed down, turned off his lights, and pulled over to the right, Officer
McLaughlin immediately took Officer Clark’s place with lights and sirens on.
Appellant did not stop his car voluntarily, and the officers following appellant’s car
saw the passenger throw items from it after it hit the stop sticks. When DPS
searched appellant’s car, they found drugs and drug paraphernalia.
We conclude and hold that this evidence is sufficient to prove that
appellant knew Officer Clark was a peace officer who was trying to arrest him for
the purpose of proving the offense of evading arrest. See, e.g., Burgess v. State,
448 S.W.3d 589, 596 (Tex. App.––Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.); Baines v.
State, 418 S.W.3d 663, 670 (Tex. App.––Texarkana 2010, pet. ref’d). We
overrule appellant’s second issue.
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Conclusion
Having overruled both of appellant’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
/s/ Terrie Livingston
TERRIE LIVINGSTON
CHIEF JUSTICE
PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; MEIER and GABRIEL, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: August 28, 2015
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